Institutional Setting

The project is to be embedded within the research group “History of modern philosophy” which forms part of the philosophical research institute ZENO (now OFR, research institute for philosophy and religious studies) at Utrecht University. This group has a strong track record in the field of 17^th- and 18^th-century philosophy, with an emphasis on source studies and editions. Close contacts are established with the research group “Theoretical philosophy” that make available the colleagues’ expertise in the philosophy of science and in current-day metaphysics. Crucial for the project is the close cooperation of both research groups with the “Descartes Centre for the history and philosophy of the sciences and humanities” at Utrecht, in particular its focus area “Discipline formation”. Via the project leader, and the members of the various research groups in Utrecht, a strong international network for 18^th-century philosophy and for the history of science is made available.

Structure of the Proposed Research

All research activities will be based at the research institute OFR/Department of philosophy, University of Utrecht. Extended research stays abroad will be required for the Ph.D.-students and the PostDoc in order to study documents in archives, consult specialized libraries, and discuss their research with relevant peer groups.

Description of the Proposed Research

General description

Research question: Conceptual decisions immanent in the big labels for structuring philosophy and the sciences – A historical approach

Around 1800, the conceptualization of virtually all academic fields and of their mutual relations underwent an enormous change. Philosophy now actively claimed a leading role within the universities, and substantiated this claim by asserting ownership of the problem as to how to structure the field of the sciences (in the broad sense of “science”, covering the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences, and including philosophy itself). One of the most important results of these changes remains visible in virtually all philosophical debates ever since, and reaches far beyond philosophy proper: Large-scale labels were introduced in order to characterize and demarcate various modes of thinking. Typical examples are the labels “empiricism” or “realism” that dominate – via the oppositions between apriorical and empirical approaches, and between idealism and realism – the post-Kantian debates. Similar processes can be found in the dynamics of scientific disciplines, leading to a restructuring via broad terms such as “natural sciences” (Ziche 1998)[1].

The genesis of these labels is a significant phenomenon in its own right. It gains systematic importance by providing access to the processes that coagulated the open field of philosophical and scientific practices into these large-scale units. Around 1800, these concepts still operated in an open context without yet having a fixed meaning. In analyzing their genesis, the processes and arguments inherent in these new forms of structuring become accessible. This offers a unique chance to understand the conceptual decisions with regard to key notions in philosophy and the sciences such as “experience” or “reality” that were made in this period, and that determine our thinking about science and philosophy until today.

Background and sources

These labels, and the entire idea of structuring the world of ideas in terms of such labels, were indeed new. Take “empiricism” as an example: Diderot’s and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, the hallmark summary of French Enlightenment around 1750, strongly relies on experience as the proper method, but does not talk or argue in terms of an “empiricism”.[2] “Realism” in this period changed its meaning from being a technical term in medieval logic and metaphysics into becoming a comprehensive label for philosophy’s attitude towards reality. These labels were also in flux: Around 1800, virtually every philosopher could be labelled as being an “empiricist”.[3] Consequently, the meaning of these labels did not correspond to later usage. Take “realism” as an illustration: Around 1800, it was the realists who focussed on the relevance of subjective experience and of faith and on the relevance of religious issues and art, and who did not insist on a cleaned-up scientific world-view.

The broad scope of these labels requires strong criteria for the selection of the relevant sources. The project maintains a clear focus on the period around 1800, and takes the debates between the idealists in Germany – in whose writings the new role for philosophy was stated most forcefully, and where these labels gained prominence for the first time – and their opponents as its starting-point. Within this focus, the sources to be studied can be further delineated:

-       “Empiricism” and “realism” emerged as instruments in highly polemical debates.[4] The broad labels were used as means to clarify the conflicting positions and the issues at stake in these debates, and they inherit much of the polemical strains of this period. These debates, on the other hand, preselect relevant source material.

-       Historiographical writings play a crucial role in the emergence of these concepts. In the 18^th century, the historiography of philosophy systematized various forms of philosophy as falling under the overarching notion of “philosophy”. This led to the introduction and further clarification of the broad structuring labels investigated here. Significantly, these labels were defined systematically, and not with reference to the work of individual persons. These ideas as to how to structure philosophy also provided a model for the historiography of the sciences in the course of which it became necessary, and possible, to reconstruct the history of individual sciences that all fall under a general label of “science”. In comparing these forms of structuring philosophy and the sciences, both a coherent body of sources and clear systematic questions can be established.

Structure of the project

Within the focus on the period around 1800, two broader projects and three specific case studies interact.

The case studies concern the labels “empiricism” and “realism”, taking as their starting-point the debates between the idealists and their opponents.[5] The fact that Kant’s philosophy itself could be read empiristically provides a particularly instructive case study for the openness of these labels, and shows how these large-scale labels directly affected the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences.

Reconstructing these movements requires an embedding of the relevant philosophical arguments into a broader context: the dynamics of the relevant debates, their polemical character and literary style, contexts of publication and issues of academic status, the interaction with other fields – such as literature or the natural sciences – have to be investigated. Precisely because of their openness and their broad range, these labels also play a significant role in reception processes, i.e. those processes where philosophical theories have to be confronted with the typical characteristics of philosopico-scientific debates in other national or regional contexts.The initial focus on Germany-based debates around 1800 will be broadened to cover these processes as well.

Two broader projects will study the emergence and function of these labels on a more general level. While the historiography of philosophy in this period has been rather well investigated,[6] the role that models from the history of philosophy played for the historiography of science – which itself made enormous progress during the 18^th century – remains virtually unexplored. In comparing the problem of sub-dividing philosophy into philosophies with that of arranging the various sciences under a general concept of “science”, the function of such labels can be studied in particular detail.

The results of the sub-projects will be synthesized by the project leader. This synthesis will embed the processes involved in introducing, and sharpening, these labels into the broader philosophical context of this time. It will pay particular attention to the relevance of these processes for idealistic philosophy at large, and will investigate how the pertinent debates around 1800 gave rise to later developments in the thinking about empiricism and realism, and thus influenced our understanding of these concepts.

Methods

The typical methodological stances in the history of philosophy are of limited value for this project. A.O. Lovejoy has famously denied the status of “ideas” to labels such as “empiricism” (Lovejoy 1953, introduction). Historicizing these notions, however, and carefully assembling a body of relevant sources can render these complex notions accessible. Within the field of more recent science studies, important models for the value of a historical approach to apparently ‘perennial’ categories have been developed (Daston/Galison 2007).

Methodologically, all sub-projects are situated at the intersection between the history of philosophy and the history of science, and the sub-projects will interact closely, on the level both of the accumulation of relevant data and texts, and of the conceptualization of the relevant historical processes. Methods from the history of philosophy, from general history (in particular in analyzing the role of historiography itself, and in the study of complex networks) and from the history of science (in particular in studying institutional aspects, the role of publication cultures, and the interaction with the special sciences) will have to cooperate. For the study of the discussion culture of this time, an expertise in literary studies will be useful. In all cases, considerable care is required in assembling the body of sources; these come from heterogeneous contexts, and have not previously been assembled. Archives and libraries abroad (Germany; for studying processes of reception: England and France) will have to be consulted.

Previous results

The project can build upon relevant research results by the project leader (listed in section 14): research on the concept of “science” in the period under consideration (Ziche1998, 2001); specialized research on the idea of a “higher empiricism” in the aftermath of classical idealism (Ziche 2012); investigations discussing the international network that brought together idealists and empiricists (Ziche/Rezvykh 2012); editions of directly relevant texts (Pfleiderer 1994; Ziche 2005 b; Ziche, in preparation); anthropology and psychology as aspects of “Kantian empiricism” (Eckardt/John/Ziche 2001; Zantwijk/Ziche 2000). None of the problems addressed in the sub-projects, however, have been directly treated in previous studies.

Innovations and results

In all its sub-projects, the proposed project offers significant innovations:

-       Historicizing the structuring concepts itself provides a novel stance. For all sub-topics that are singled out here, the absence of a historical consciousness, even in recent literature, is striking. P. Lipton (2001) has described empiricism as “a hardy perennial in the history of philosophy”, N. Swerdlow (1993) assumes that the historiography of science sprang into existence in fully perfected form, as a Minerva in full armour. The history of realism is, up to now, a major lacuna in philosophical historiography.

-       The project is aimed at studying the relevant conceptual decisions that entered into these labels, and into the very idea of structuring the field of philosophy and the sciences via such labels: What is the basis for drawing lines of demarcation between these forms of philosophy/science? How did these concepts function in debates between philosophy and the sciences? This allows a critical analysis of notions that continue to exert an unceasing influence in our thinking about science.
The type of results that can be expected is further motivated in the descriptions of the sub-projects. In particular, it will be asked: What is the role of “experience” in determining forms of philosophy, or of science? What is the paradigm form of reality that is employed by the protagonists of the idealism-realism-debate? Thirdly: “Empiricism” and “realism” both make strong claims regarding the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences. This relationship provides a clear case for such conceptual decisions, with far-reaching implications: Around 1800, neither “realism” nor an experience-based philosophy were clearly associated with the natural sciences. The emergence of the natural sciences as the apparently natural paradigm for a “realist” or “empiricist” approach is revealed as a step that is itself far from self-evident, and that can be critically discussed on the basis of these sources.

-       This revises the picture of the 18^th century’s position in the history of philosophy and science. While still largely seen as a period of “consolidation” (Porter 2003), it turns out that this period does by no means consolidate existing concepts, but for the first time introduces the conceptual means required for such a consolidation.
This is of particular importance for the notion of “science”. Because “science” has become a concept with strong normative connotations, and functions as such in academic, but also in political and in popular debates, it is of particular relevance to understand the decisions lying at the basis of the early attempts at a concise analysis and systematic positioning of “science”.

Sub-project 1 (PostDoc): Structuring the realm of science: The role of historiography and the model of philosophical historiography

Research question

The emergence of the large-scale labels used for sub-dividing philosophy is necessitated by a conceptual problem that philosophy shares with the reflection on the various sciences, and with identifying the sciences as the objects of theoretical or institutional debates. In both cases, various “sciences” or “philosophies” – usually addressed as various “systems” of philosophy, or philosophical “sects” – have to be subsumed under the general labels “science” or “philosophy”. This systematization of the various “systems of philosophy” is a typical achievement of the historiography of philosophy in the 18^th century.[7] For the sciences, a similar function is assumed by the historiography of science. Both discourses are related on many levels; the philosophical historiography in the 18^th century clearly had a model function for the historiography of science.

This sub-project will study the latter corpus in order to analyze, by comparing the structuring principles in the historiography of science with those applied in philosophical historiography, the criteria used in establishing the large-scale sub-units of science and of philosophy.

Background, sources

The classification of the sciences and the history of the historiography of philosophy have been studied in some detail.[8] The historiography of science as a genre, and its relationship with the historiography of philosophy, however, remain virtually unexplored.[9] Earlier classifications of the sciences largely miss the typically historiographical problem of having to deal with a radically changing field that cannot be reconstructed via deductive structures, and do therefore not contribute directly to the question posed here.[10]

The source material is rich and multi-faceted; so far, only some elementary steps towards a typology of sources have been made (Welter 1979; Engelhardt 1979, 1990; Christie 1996; Rousseau/Porter 1980; Kelley 1997; Agassi 2008; Jardine 1997). In the 18^th century, the historiography of science has led to some towering achievements. Examples are specialized publications such as the history of mathematics by J.-E. Montucla (1758/1799-1802) or the gigantic project run by the Goettingen Academy of science, to wit a Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften since the Renaissance that intends to cover all academic fields. Rich source material is also available in encyclopedias and in works in the historiography of philosophy, in editorial projects, and in academic teaching.[11]

Research Plan

The challenge of this project, which justifies its being a PostDoc-project, lies in its broad scope and the need to cover various special sciences and their historiography as well as philosophical issues:

The role of philosophical categories: In many cases, the historiography of science cannot be separated from that of philosophy, and it has, therefore, to be asked in how far philosophical categories do play a role in these historiographical projects. In particular, the role of “experience”, and of empiricism, will have to be studied in detail, in close interaction with sub-projects 3 and 4.

Open methodologies: The history of science had to adopt a notion of progress that could appreciate the achievements of earlier periods, and that could make historical awareness useful for future innovation. This was achieved by focussing on methodological issues – itself a category influenced by philosophical theorizing – while at the same time allowing for a large degree of flexibility and openness. In particular, the historiography of science was interested in the “mistakes” committed by earlier scientists, and concentrated on the concrete procedures leading to the scientific results, not merely on the results themselves. Reconstructing these ideas will reveal a rather flexible picture of science with a particular emphasis on the non-deductive aspects of scientific method.[12]

“Subdivide philosophy”: The historiography of science deals explicitly with the issue of how to “subdivide philosophy” (Priestley 1775, XVII), and declares this to be a new topic. Clearly, the issue of demarcating the various sciences is as much a philosophical issue as it is an issue in establishing the field of the sciences. A reconstruction of the arguments used in these processes of demarcation will, therefore, contribute to an understanding of the role of demarcating labels at large.

Sub-project 2: “Realism” – New models for accessing reality

Research question

In the wake of Kant’s philosophy, the question how, and to which extent, philosophy and the sciences could grasp reality was debated heatedly. The opposing parties quickly adopted the labels of idealism vs. realism.[13] In contrast with the idealist tenet that – in Kant’s deliberatively provocative formula – the objects of our knowledge have to conform to our knowledge, not vice versa, the realists stated their intention to “unveil existence” (F.H. Jacobi in his David Hume, 1787). Realists typically claimed that we can indeed gain access to a reality that exists independently of our cognizing it, and they charged idealism with leading into atheism, solipsism, and an absurd loss of contact with the world.

An analysis of the realists’ movement shows that, in consolidating these movements, far-reaching decisions were made as to the paradigm of reality and the methods involved in grasping this reality.

Background, sources

“Realism” as a concept has a venerable history, dating back at least to the medieval debates between realists and nominalists regarding the status of universals. However, this concept was thoroughly re-shaped around 1800 (cf. Ritter 1992), transforming it into a comprehensive concept covering philosophy’s and the sciences’ approach to reality. This re-shaping was strongly influenced by the reaction against the idealist trends in the philosophy of this period.

The realist opponents of idealism formed a closely-knit network with a high degree of professional diversification: philosophers, poets, theologians, and historians contributed to this movement. Some of the most prominent German authors of this period, most of them with a strong international network, proclaimed themselves realists: J.G. Herder, F.H. Jacobi, C.L. Reinhold, Jean Paul; lesser-known figures were Chr.F. Bardili, F. Berg, F. Köppen or W.T. Krug.[14]

While idealism has been investigated extensively, this realists’ movement has not yet been studied in its complexity.[15] In the literature, the role of ‘realistic’ elements within the idealists’ philosophy (such as Fichte’s idea of a “Real-Idealismus”) have been discussed (most recently: Pluder 2010); but this leads to a harmonization that does not mirror the polemical and polarizing character of the debates. In this sub-project, a comprehensive analysis of this movement is – for the first time – aimed at.

Research plan

The Realist movement: In a first step, the realist network itself has to be reconstructed. Techniques of network analysis (studying networks of quotations, correspondences, professional cooperations, and personal ties) are important for grasping this movement in its complexity. The natural starting-point is given by the writings of the idealists themselves and those of their direct realist antagonists. The realism-idealism debate is also of direct relevance for the international context and reception; British common-sense philosophy and 19^th-century empiricism, French positivism, and pragmatism all engage with the realism-idealism-debate.

Models of reality and notions of rationality: The systematic importance of the realism-idealism-debate lies in the fact that a completely novel treatment has been offered of what the models for reality should be. The discussion about paradigm cases of reality shifted away from an interest in the reality of the objects of perception and the world that is studied by the natural sciences, and turned towards topics such as religion, art and intersubjectivity; at issue was the reality of transcendent phenomena. Consequently, it was not the natural sciences that served as model disciplines within realism.

This shift in focus required new types of cognitive faculties commensurate with these object realms, and relating directly to new ideas about rationality. Realists set in on directly grasping a reality that is beyond our rational capacities; epistemologically, this led to a highly subjectivist ideal of cognition, and implied a surprising neglect of the natural sciences. Realists consequently tended to focus on immediate feelings, or redefined faculties such as “sense” (“Sinn”) or “reflection”. The corpus of texts allows to reconstruct these conceptual options, and thereby to get a clearer focus in those decisions that amounted, in the long run, to the notions of realism that we adopt today.

Philosophy and other fields: The realism-idealism debate has direct implications for the conceptualization of the interaction of philosophy with other fields, in particular with theology and with topics at the borderline between philosophy, literature and psychology (here, there are close interactions with sub-project 4).
Sub-project 3: From “Experience” to “Empiricism”: Who is an empiricist?

Research question

The empirical method and, consequently, a form of philosophy based upon experience have been a crucially important, and strongly demarcating, concept in philosophy at least since authors such as Bacon, Locke, Hume, or the philosophers of the French Enlightenment. However, the meaning and function of the label “empiricism” itself only became established at the very end of the 18^th century.[16] This becomes strikingly clear in the fact that, around 1800, virtually every philosopher could be labelled an “empiricist”; this was intended not as a neutral classificatory label, but as a strongly polemical verdict.

The role and function of the label “empiricism”, therefore, establishes a strong case study that reveals the processes relevant for the genesis of such a label; what happens when existing practices, be they institutional or related to particular persons, are subsumed under a broader label? It also becomes clear that this label does not grow forth directly from an already existing and clearly delineated methodological practice, as is illustrated by its openness: it requires, and the very process of consolidating “empiricism” also initiates, a discussion as to the very role of experience, again – as was the case with “realism” – with far-reaching decisions. Since “empiricism”, finally, is related closely to the special sciences, a study of the genesis of this label contributes to understanding the conceptual space in which the notion of “science” operates.

Background

There is consensus that “empiricism” as a label acquires its meaning in the writings of Kant who contrasts, and tends to unite in his work, an “empiricist” and a “rationalist” form of philosophy.[17] In the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy, “empiricism” both entered the handbooks of the history of philosophy and was at the same time used widely (and somewhat wildly) to characterize and criticize other philosophers. This strategy was employed in particular by the idealist followers of Kant. To name some of the more surprising ascriptions of this label: In Schelling’s and Hegel’s writings from 1801-3, Kant could be seen as an empiricist because of his insistence on the possibilities of experience, Descartes because of his interest in the physical sciences, Fichte because he attempted to derive a foundation of experience.

The idealists at the same time made the new label part of their own reconstructions of the history of philosophy that were presented in close connection with a trenchant critique of their contemporaries (i.e. in the historiographic schemas in Schelling’s Propädeutik from 1805/6; Ziche (in prep.)).

Research Plan

Establishing the relevant corpus of texts has to look at both the writings of Kant and the ensuing polemical debates (in close interaction with sub-project 4), and at the historiography of philosophy in the immediate post-Kantian period. The broad scope of empiricism-ascriptions and -verdicts immediately leads to conceptual problems: The openness of these ascriptions at the same time indicates a debate concerning the various roles of “experience” that contributes to a clarification of the notion of “science” and of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences. In these debates, “experience” is transformed from a method that can be applied in various contexts into an object of investigation.

Earlier discussions of an experience-based method, as available f.i. in the – frequently historically directed, thereby establishing a link to sub-project 1 – self-reflection of important institutions such as the “Royal Society” (Glanvill; Sprat) typically characterize the notion of “science”, and that of an “empirical philosophy”, in terms of open lists of features and methods. The texts from the period around 1800 show how these open characterizations are transformed into a clearer definition of “science”.

A rather remarkable implication of this historical reconstruction of the notion of “empiricism” is that the standard reading of Kant as integrating “empiricism” and “rationalism” needs to be reconsidered: both labels do only emerge in this context. How does this picture emerge, how is this picture – sketched by Kant himself – received, how does it enter the debate?

Finally, the international reception is of particular importance with regard to the notion of “empiricism”, given the role of a “philosophy of experience” in French and British contexts.

The role of these notions for the further development of idealistic philosophy – with particular respect to the idealists’ philosophy of nature, and to Schelling’s notion of a “higher” empiricism (Ziche 2012) – will be further explored in the project leader’s synthesis.

Sub-Project 4: Kantian empiricism: Divergent options for interpreting Kant

Research question

The final sub-project investigates a phenomenon that is related to, and differs in important strategic aspects from, those that are discussed in the other Ph.D.-projects: The phenomenon that in the very first generation of post-Kantian philosophers, the option of reading Kant himself as an empiricist, i.e. of developing a form of a Kantian empiricism, has been defended with great vigour.

The project of developing a “Kantian empiricism” around 1800 led to an immediate clash with the idealistic interpretations of Kant, and is therefore particularly illustrative for the attempts to structure philosophical debates along the new, broad labels. By creating a “Kantian empiricism”, the interpretation of the oeuvre of a particular author is subsumed under a broader concept; the interaction between this concept and the concrete details of Kantian philosophy, in the direct vicinity of strongly opposing trends, gives access to the decisions that had to give the label “empiricism” its function.

A reconstruction of this Kantian empiricism, and its position in the philosophical debates around 1800, will discuss and elucidate the following questions:

-       the relationship with the special sciences that is inherent in characterizing Kant as an empiricist

-       the decisions that had to be taken in subsuming Kant under the movement of empiricism: which aspects of his philosophy are highlighted, or just pushed to the background, in the debate between empiricist and idealist interpretations of Kant? How does this interpretation of Kant relate to the usage of the broad label “empiricism” in other philosophical contexts?

-       again, phenomena of reception prove important: how do these prototypical readings of Kant fare in different contexts of reception?

Background, Sources

In the first positive reactions to Kant’s philosophy, two prototypical reactions can be distinguished. Both found a basis in Kant’s writings, but both started off in diametrically opposite directions, centering on divergent readings of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences: On the one hand, one could stress the ideal of an absolute foundation for all sciences that could provide absolutely incontrovertible knowledge. This option lay at the basis of the idealists’ reaction as developed, f.i., in the early writings of J.G. Fichte and F.W.J. Schelling. On the other hand, Kant’s emphasis on the possibility of experience as a standard for all scientific endeavours could be emphasized, and this emphasis then led to an empiricist understanding of Kant’s philosophy. Important protagonists of this empiricist Kant-interpretation were, among others, C.C.E. Schmid (who was also one of the first to lecture about Kant, and helped popularize Kant’s work through his influential Wörterbuch on Kant (Schmid 1788)) and J.F. Fries, one of the forefathers of a mathematicized empirical psychology, whose work exerted considerable influence in 19^th century debates on the philosophy of science.[18]

Research on “Kantian empiricism” has frequently been dominated by continuations of the polemical debates from the years around 1800 (e.g. Bonsiepen 1997). The broader question of the specifically empiricist characteristics of this Kant-interpretation, its character as a movement and its reception, have hardly been dealt with. As regards the relationship with the special sciences, a strong focus within Kantian empiricism lay on the topics of psychology and anthropology, but again, the further implications for the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences have not yet been sufficiently addressed.

Research Plan

As in the other Ph.D.-projects, a reconstruction of the relevant movement will have to be the first step. In this case, there are well-established starting-points in the literature, but as already stated, these have to be extended to cover the movement in its entirety.

While “empiricism” entered the stage as a (polemical or critical) label for large movements, the empiricist interpretation of Kant started, in good faith, as an interpretation of Kant’s work. Still, it immediately became the subject of fierce debates (Frank 1997; Wallwitz 1998; Zantwijk/Ziche 2000). If one assumes that Kant can indeed be read empiristically, this has implications for the relationship between Kantianism and the special sciences. These features of the debate lead to two concrete research issues; the relationship of a “Kantian empiricism” to empiricism in general, and the identification of open questions in Kant’s philosophy that allowed for enormously divergent interpretations. Both steps will be pursued in close cooperation with sub-projetcs 2 and 3, as will be the issue of the reception of the empiricist interpretation of Kant. Finally, the relationship with the empirical sciences has to be discussed. A particularly important case study is provided by the discipline of psychology: while Kant explicitly refuted all claims as to psychologizing his theoretical philosophy, this is precisely what the Kantian empiricists – Schmid and Fries can again serve as paradigms – attempted.