Prof. dr. Stephanie Rosenkranz
s.rosenkranz@uu.nl
Gegenereerd op 2017-11-18 15:12:09


Gegenereerd op 2017-11-18 15:12:09
Curriculum vitae

Education and degrees

1987

B.A. Business Economics, Technical University of Berlin

1990

M.A. Business Economics, University of Cologne

1996

Ph.D. Economics, Humboldt University of Berlin

2003

Habilitation (Venia Legendi for Economic Theory), University of Bonn

Academic positions

Sep. 2008 –

Professor, Utrecht School of Economics, Microeconomics

Sep. 2007 - Sep. 2011

Director Undergraduate School, Utrecht School of Economics

Jan. 2005 -  Dec. 2013

Principal investigator in the UU-Hipo program “Dynamics of Cooperation Networks, and Institutions” (Dyconi), with Vincent Buskens

Aug. 2003 - Sep. 2008

Associate professor, Utrecht School of Economics, Microeconomic Theory

Dec. 2002 - July 2003

Assistant professor, Utrecht School of Economics, Microeconomic Theory

Oct. 1997 - Nov. 2002

Assistant professor, Microeconomic Theory University of Bonn, Department of Economics

July 1996 - March 1997

Post-doc, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Chicago (Fellowship of the German Marshall Fund of the United States)

Jan. 1996 - Sept. 1997

Research fellow, Science Center Berlin (WZB), Research Unit 'Market Processes and Corporate Development'

Feb. 1992 - Dec. 1995

Doctoral fellow, Science Center Berlin (WZB), Research Unit 'Market Processes and Corporate Development'

1990 - 1991

Research assistant, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Department for Industry and Technology

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Key publications

Goyal, S., Rosenkranz, S., Weitzel, G.U. & Buskens, V.W. (2017). Information Acquisition and Exchange in Social Networks. Economic Journal

Rosenkranz, S. & Weitzel, G.U. (2012). Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (2), (pp. 898-920) (23 p.).

Kool, C.J.M., Middeldorp, M.H. & Rosenkranz, S. (2011). Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43 (4), (pp. 765-774) (10 p.).

Rosenkranz, S. & Puppe, C. (2011). Why Suggested Non-Binding Retail Prices. Economica, 78 (310), (pp. 317-329) (13 p.).

Rosenkranz, S. & Schmitz, P. (2007). Reserve Prices in Auctions with Reference Points. Economic Journal, 117 (520), (pp. 637-653) (17 p.).

Rosenkranz, S. & Schmitz, P. (2003). Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic RenD Alliences. Games and Economic Behavior, 43, (pp. 153-173) (21 p.). Article is written in English.

All publications
  2017 - Articles
Goyal, S., Rosenkranz, S., Weitzel, G.U. & Buskens, V.W. (2017). Information Acquisition and Exchange in Social Networks. Economic Journal
Goyal, Sanjeev, Rosenkranz, Stephanie, Weitzel, Utz & Buskens, Vincent (2017). Information Acquisition and Exchange in Social Networks. Economic Journal
  2016 - Articles
Fabrizi, Simona, Lippert, Steffen, Puppe, Clemens & Rosenkranz, S. (2016). Manufacturer Suggested Retail Prices, Loss Aversion and Competition. Journal of Economic Psychology, 53, (pp. 141-153).
Rezaei Khavas, T., Rosenkranz, S. & Westbrock, B. (13.10.2016). Rechtvaardig en onrechtvaardig gedrag in verschillende contexten. Economisch Statistische Berichten, 101 (4742S), (pp. 63-67) (5 p.).
Corten, Rense, Rosenkranz, Stephanie, Buskens, Vincent & Cook, Karen S. (01.07.2016). Reputation Effects in Social Networks Do Not Promote Cooperation - An Experimental Test of the Raub & Weesie Model. PLoS One, 11 (7).
  2016 - Book parts / chapters
Weitzel, Utz & Rosenkranz, Stephanie (2016). Randomness and the Madness of Crowds. In Klaas Landsman & Ellen van Wolde (Eds.), The Challenge of Chance - A Multidisciplinary Approach From Science And The Humanities Heidelberg: Springer.
  2014 - Articles
De Jaegher, Kris, Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Gustav (2014). Economic Principles in Communication: An Experimental Study. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 363C, (pp. 62-73) (10 p.).
Morbitzer, Dominik, Buskens, Vincent, Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Raub, Werner (2014). How Farsightedness Affects Network Formation. Analyse und Kritik, 36 (1), (pp. 103-133) (31 p.).
  2013 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S., Muehlfeld, K.S. & Dirkmaat, T. (2013). Een zetje geven in de richting van energiebesparing. Economisch Statistische Berichten, 98 (4672S), (pp. 48-54) (7 p.).
  2012 - Articles
Urbig, D., Weitzel, G.U., van Witteloostuijn, A. & Rosenkranz, S. (2012). Exploiting opportunities at all cost? Entrepreneurial intent and externalities. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33 (2), (pp. 379-393) (15 p.).
Rosenkranz, S. & Weitzel, G.U. (2012). Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (2), (pp. 898-920) (23 p.).
  2011 - Articles
Kool, C.J.M., Middeldorp, M.H. & Rosenkranz, S. (2011). Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43 (4), (pp. 765-774) (10 p.).
Rosenkranz, S. & Puppe, C. (2011). Why Suggested Non-Binding Retail Prices. Economica, 78 (310), (pp. 317-329) (13 p.).
  2009 - Articles
Cefis, E., Rosenkranz, S. & Weitzel, G.U. (2009). Effects of acquisitions on product and process innovation and R&D performance. Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 96 (3), (pp. 193-222) (30 p.).
  2009 - Inaugural speech
Rosenkranz, S. (16.06.2009). The effect of networks on cooperation and free-riding. niet van toepassing: niet van toepassing.
  2007 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S. & Schmitz, P. (2007). Reserve Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?. Economica, 74 (294), (pp. 574-598) (25 p.).
Rosenkranz, S. & Schmitz, P. (2007). Reserve Prices in Auctions with Reference Points. Economic Journal, 117 (520), (pp. 637-653) (17 p.).
Rosenkranz, S. & Weitzel, U. (2007). Strategic Positioning of Alliances. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 14 (1), (pp. 135-149) (15 p.).
  2006 - Book parts / chapters
Koot, W.B., Rosenkranz, S. & Wijnands, J.H.M. (2006). Alliances between Wholesalers and Retailers in the Fresh Vegetable Industry. In W.J.J. Bijman, S.W.F. Omta, J.H. Trienekens, J.H.M. Wijnands & E.F.M. Wubben (Eds.), International agri-food chains and networks Management and organization (pp. 269-286) (18 p.). Wageningen: Academic Publishers.
  2004 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S. & Schmitz, P. (2004). Joint Ownership Rights and Incomplete Contracts: The case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments. Schmalenbach Business Review, 56 (1), (pp. 72-89) (18 p.).
  2003 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S. & Schmitz, P. (2003). Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic RenD Alliences. Games and Economic Behavior, 43, (pp. 153-173) (21 p.). Article is written in English.
Rosenkranz, S. (2003). Simultaneous Choice of Process and Product Innovation when Consumers have a Preference for Product Variety. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 50 (2), (pp. 183-201) (19 p.).
  2002 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S. & Witt, Peter (2002). Netzwerkbildung und Gr√ľndungserfolg. Zeitschrift fur Betriebswirtschaft, Erg√§nzungsheft 5, (pp. 85 - 105 ).
  2001 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S. (2001). To reveal or not to reveal - Know-how disclosure and joint ventures in procurement auctions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157 (4), (pp. 555-567).
  1997 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S. (1997). Quality improvements and the incentive to leapfrog. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15 (2), (pp. 243-262).
  1995 - Articles
Rosenkranz, S. (1995). Innovation and cooperation under vertical product differentiation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13 (1), (pp. 1-22).
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The Chair Multidisciplinary Micro-economics

We take a multidisciplinary approach and a thorough quantitative and analytical basis as a point of departure. For this reason we consider methodological rigor and the integration of multidisciplinary insights the key features of our research. Our research focusses on understanding (individual, firm, market) behavior as a consequence of monetary and non-monetary incentives, taking into account the interdependence with formal and informal institutions.

Thematic focus areas:

  1. Strategic framing and endogenous preferences

This research is part of what Rabin (2002) refers to as third-wave behavioral economics. In first-wave behavioral economics, anomalies and deviations from rational behavior were pointed out. In the second wage these anomalies were formalized. In third-wave behavioral economics, these are no longer considered as deviations, but they are integrated into economic theory. An important next step, which is taken in our research and which makes the research innovative, is to consider the possibility of manipulation. Whereas in standard game theory, each individual player, based on her information, plays an optimal best response to other players’ actions, in the current research, it is possible that one player manipulates another player. Reference-dependent preferences based on prospect theory, and the possibility of framing linked to it, provide a tight theoretical framework under which manipulation can be analyzed and predictions can be made. Those predictions can subsequently be tested rigorously in the laboratory. The research thus provides a combination of theory development together with rigorous experimental testing that improves understanding of the strategic manipulation of reference points.

Application: Executive compensation, monopolistic pricing, health economics

Another important further step, which is taken in our research is to consider the possibility that individuals have instable preferences. The large empirical literature showing that individuals deviate from expected utility maximization may suggest that individual preferences are shaped by formal and informal institutions rather than the other way around. Our research investigates concrete instances in which such a reversal of causality may take place.

Application: Online auction versioning, (local) public goods provision

2.  The  microeconomic origin and impact of institutions

People make (consumption, production, investment) decisions in an institutional environment of values and norms, of laws and regulations, and of different types of organizations and contracts. These institutions exert a powerful influence on economic actors, who in turn create and influence institutions. In order to fully understand this interrelation, we need to understand why and how institutions change, and how institutions persist in a changing environment. These questions are difficult to address when institutions are purely viewed from a game-theoretic perspective in which they are considered self-enforcing (institutions-as-equilibria), and in which all behavior is generated endogenously. To integrate the game-theoretic perspective on institutions with complementary perspectives requires a more dynamic approach than presently offered by the notion of self-enforcing institutions. For this purpose our research follows two lines: investigating empirically the success of specific institutions in a comparative approach, and extending the theoretical framework by introducing shared beliefs and institutional reinforcement.

Application: Worker participation and corporate governance, communication, cultural variation of cooperative behavior

3. Sustainable decision making

Policymakers have encountered substantial difficulties over the past three decades trying to induce people to change consumption behaviors and to adopt new, more sustainable behavioral patterns, even when these behaviors appear to be in the consumers’ own (financial) interests. Individuals decide as “Humans” rather than as “Econs” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008): While “Econs” may not make perfect forecasts, they at least make unbiased forecasts. And they respond primarily to incentives—their decisions are not affected by seemingly “irrelevant” factors such as the display of a set of alternatives, or the order in which options are offered. In contrast, “Humans” make systematic and predictable errors—their forecasts are flawed and biased in systematic ways. For example, people tend to suffer from the so-called “status-quo” bias—a strong tendency to stick to the status quo and go along with a default option, even if an alternative option exists that would offer superior benefits for them. Therefore, a growing body of (mainly experimental) research in psychology and behavioral economics suggests that non-price interventions that take into account these systematic biases can potentially be just as powerful as prices in changing choices and behavior—and potentially much less costly. Recent studies have yielded increasingly compelling results. Understandably, this insight has triggered the interest of policymakers, as the prospect of enhancing sustainable decision making both more effectively and efficiently is compelling. Behavioral economists thus agree that individuals can be nudged, i.e. subtly pushed, to alter their choices and behavior towards, for example, (more) socially-desirable behavior. However, what “nudges” to use most effectively is far from clear. An important next step, which is taken in our research, is to distinguish between individuals in different roles (consumer, manager) and rigorously develop theory and test predictions in large scale experiments, and to design adequate field experiments to test whether findings are transposable to the real world.

Application: Energy efficiency, food consumption behavior, charity donation

 

4.  Social and Economic Networks

This research studies network formation and behavior on networks under different institutional arrangements. The aim is to develop innovative theory on the interdependence between the interaction structure and behavior of strategic decision makers (individuals, firms, governments). We test this theory with complementary data from experiments, from alliance formation among firms, and from international trade relations.

A wide range of theoretical and empirical research from various disciplines suggests that social networks are highly relevant in determining the outcomes of cooperation and coordination problems. These findings add to the more general notion that social networks have important effects on many types of social phenomena, including (but not limited to) social inequality, labor market outcomes, the diffusion of innovations, and the spread of information or diseases. A natural next question, then, is where these network structures come from. An often implicit assumption in theories of network effects is that social networks are fixed structures, or exogenously exposed on the actors. While in some cases it may be reasonable to assume that people have little or no control over their social environment (e.g., in kin relations), many social relations actually result from people’s choices. Moreover, the notion that networks have important consequences for behavior suggests that people do not only often have the opportunity to change their social relations, but also have incentives to do so. Given that networks potentially produce benefits for the actors in the network, it seems reasonable that actors will consciously form relationships to optimize their benefits from the network.

Application: Trade networks and development, information provision, money laundering, microfinance institutions

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Additional functions and activities

Chairperson Stichting GXP (since 2015)

Research Fellow, Economics Network for Competition and Regulation, (ENCORE) (since 2005)
Member, American Economic Association
Member, European Economic Association
Member, Econometric Society
Member, Game Theory Society
Member, German Association of Business Administration and Economics
Associate Editor Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (since 2013)

Gegenereerd op 2017-11-18 15:12:09
Full name
Prof. dr. S. Rosenkranz Contact details
Adam Smith Hall

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Room T.1.18
3584 EC  UTRECHT
The Netherlands


Phone number (direct) +31 30 253 9806
Postal address
P.O. Box 80125
3508 TC    UTRECHT
The Netherlands
Availability
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Gegenereerd op 2017-11-18 15:12:09
Last updated 14.09.2017