This is a selection. For a complete list of papers and free PDFs of them, click here.

(2023). The Philosophical Debate on Linguistic Bias: A Critical Perspective. Philosophical Psychology

(2023). Hasty Generalizations are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis. Philosophy of Science (main author; co-authored with Olivier Lemeire)

(2023). Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms. British Journal for Philosophy of Science [published online in 2020; BJPS Editors' Choice 2023]

(2023). Unjustified Sample Sizes and Generalizations in Explainable AI Research: Principles for More Inclusive User Studies. IEEE Intelligent Systems (main author; co-authored with Mary Carman)

(2023). Linguistic Discrimination in Science: Can English Disfluency Help Debias Scientific Research? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

(2022). Generalization Bias in Science. Cognitive Science (main author; co-authored with A. Krauss, and O. Braganza)

(2022). Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems. Philosophy and Technology

(2022). Explainable AI Lacks Regulative Reasons: Why AI and Human Decision-making are not Equally Opaque. AI & Ethics

(2022). Algorithmic Political Bias Can Reduce Political Polarization. Philosophy and Technology

(2022). What is the Function of Confirmation Bias? Erkenntnis

(2021). Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science. British Journal for Philosophy of Science

(2021). Hidden Figures: Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Detecting (Invisible) Diversity in Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science

(2021). Reclaiming Control: Extended Mindreading and the Tracking of Digital Footprints. Social Epistemology

(2021). Extended Implicit Bias: When the Metaphysics and Ethics of Implicit Bias Collide. Erkenntnis

(2021). Weighing the Costs: The Epistemic Dilemma of No-platforming. Synthese (main author; co-authored with N. Nottelmann)

(2020). Objectivity, Perceptual Constancy, and Teleology in Young Children. Mind & Language

(2020). How (Many) Descriptive Claims about Political Polarization Exacerbate Polarization. Journal of Social and Political Psychology

(2020). An Argument for Egalitarian Confirmation Bias and Against Political Diversity in Academia. Synthese

(2020). Ideological Diversity, Hostility, and Discrimination in Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology (main author; co-authored with N. Honeycutt, A. De Block, and L. Jussim)

(2020). Values in Science: Assessing the Case for Mixed Claims. Inquiry

(2019). Teleology and Mentalizing in the Explanation of Action. Synthese

(2019). Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy. Mind & Language

(2019). The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

(2018). Introspection, Mindreading, and the Transparency of Belief. European Journal of Philosophy, 26, 1086–1102

(2017). On the Automaticity and Ethics of Belief. (Invited) Ethics, Law, and Cognitive Science (special ed.), Teoria, 37(2), 99–114

(2016). Human Thinking, Shared Intentionality, and Egocentric Biases. Biology & Philosophy, 30, 6, 1–16

(2014). Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90, 273–288