This is a selection. For a complete list of papers and free PDFs of them, click here.

(2025). Generalization Bias in Large Language Model Summarization of Scientific Research. Royal Society Open Science (main author; co-authored with B. Chin-Yee)

(2024). Politicizing Mindshaping. Routledge Handbook of Mindshaping. Edited by Tad Zawidzki and Remi Tison 

(2024). Hasty Generalizations and Generics in Medical Research: A Systematic Review. PLoS One (main author; co-authored with H. R. Sherling, and B. Chin-Yee) 

(2024). Living with Uncertainty: Full Transparency isn't Needed for Epistemic Trust in AI-based Science. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.

(2024). Are Generics and Negativity about Social Groups Common on Social Media? – A Comparative Analysis of Twitter (X) Data. Synthese (main author with I. Ojea Quintana)

(2024). Cultural Bias in Explainable AI Research. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (main author; co-authored with M. Carman)

(2024). Science Based on Artificial Intelligence Need Not Pose a Social Epistemological Problem. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.

(2023). The Philosophical Debate on Linguistic Bias: A Critical Perspective. Philosophical Psychology

(2023). Hasty Generalizations are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis. Philosophy of Science (main author; co-authored with Olivier Lemeire)

(2023). Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms. British Journal for Philosophy of Science [published online in 2020; BJPS Editors' Choice 2023]

(2023). Unjustified Sample Sizes and Generalizations in Explainable AI Research: Principles for More Inclusive User Studies. IEEE Intelligent Systems (main author; co-authored with Mary Carman)

(2023). Linguistic Discrimination in Science: Can English Disfluency Help Debias Scientific Research? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

(2022). Generalization Bias in Science. Cognitive Science (main author; co-authored with A. Krauss, and O. Braganza)

(2022). Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems. Philosophy and Technology

(2022). Explainable AI Lacks Regulative Reasons: Why AI and Human Decision-making are not Equally Opaque. AI & Ethics

(2022). Algorithmic Political Bias Can Reduce Political Polarization. Philosophy and Technology

(2022). What is the Function of Confirmation Bias? Erkenntnis

(2021). Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science. British Journal for Philosophy of Science

(2021). Hidden Figures: Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Detecting (Invisible) Diversity in Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science

(2021). Reclaiming Control: Extended Mindreading and the Tracking of Digital Footprints. Social Epistemology

(2021). Extended Implicit Bias: When the Metaphysics and Ethics of Implicit Bias Collide. Erkenntnis

(2021). Weighing the Costs: The Epistemic Dilemma of No-platforming. Synthese (main author; co-authored with N. Nottelmann)

(2020). Objectivity, Perceptual Constancy, and Teleology in Young Children. Mind & Language

(2020). How (Many) Descriptive Claims about Political Polarization Exacerbate Polarization. Journal of Social and Political Psychology

(2020). An Argument for Egalitarian Confirmation Bias and Against Political Diversity in Academia. Synthese

(2020). Ideological Diversity, Hostility, and Discrimination in Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology (main author; co-authored with N. Honeycutt, A. De Block, and L. Jussim)

(2020). Values in Science: Assessing the Case for Mixed Claims. Inquiry

(2019). Teleology and Mentalizing in the Explanation of Action. Synthese

(2019). Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy. Mind & Language

(2019). The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

(2018). Introspection, Mindreading, and the Transparency of Belief. European Journal of Philosophy, 26, 1086–1102

(2017). On the Automaticity and Ethics of Belief. (Invited) Ethics, Law, and Cognitive Science (special ed.), Teoria, 37(2), 99–114

(2016). Human Thinking, Shared Intentionality, and Egocentric Biases. Biology & Philosophy, 30, 6, 1–16

(2014). Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90, 273–288