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Deposit Insurance, Market Discipline and Bank Risk

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Abstract

Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on within-bank variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits, so as to capture the magnitude of the decrease in market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance, we demonstrate for private, domestic banks that larger declines in market discipline generate larger increases in traditional measures of risk. These results hold in a difference-in-difference setting in which state and foreign-owned banks, whose deposit insurance regime does not change, serve as a control.

Keywords: deposit insurance, market discipline, moral hazard, risk taking, banks, Russia

JEL classification: E65, G21, G28, P34

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1 Introduction

Architects of modern financial safety nets face a challenge if policies designed to stabilize the banking sector weaken stabilizing forces already in place (Calomiris, 1999). The introduction of explicit deposit insurance poses just such a dilemma. Its potential for limiting bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) explains its adoption throughout the world over the past generation (Demirgüç & Kane, 2002). But its capacity for desensitizing depositors to the consequences of institutional failure may relax an important, market-disciplining, constraint on the build-up of excessive risk. These potentially offsetting effects raise the stakes for empirical analysis, giving greater urgency to the question of how deposit insurance in fact affects bank risk.

Much of the published research on whether explicit deposit insurance actually relaxes market discipline and increases bank risk draws on comparisons across banks or countries that vary with respect to deposit insurance coverage. But correlations identified through cross-sectional variation are open to criticisms of omitted variable bias and reverse causation. A smaller number of studies infer the impact of deposit insurance on market discipline and bank risk by comparing the behavior of a well-defined group before and after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance. This approach, however, cannot dismiss the possibility that results are driven by time-specific factors other than the introduction of insurance. In an earlier paper (Karas et al., 2013), we exploited what amounted to a quasi-experiment from the introduction in 2004 of explicit deposit insurance in Russia to circumvent these identification problems. In a manner unique to the literature, we explored how deposit insurance affected the deposits of households relative to those of firms, an uninsured control group. Using a difference-in-difference estimator, we demonstrated that household sensitivity to bank capitalization diminished markedly after the introduction of deposit insurance. The quasi-experimental setting, in other words, turned up strong evidence of deposit insurance causing a decline in market discipline.

This earlier paper, however, did not address the connection between market discipline and bank risk. We did not explore whether a greater deposit-insurance-induced decrease in market discipline actually led to greater bank risk. It is to this question that we turn in this paper. To answer it, we begin from an assumption, well-grounded in the empirical and theoretical literature (Karas et al., 2013; Gropp & Vesala, 2004), that the bank-level treatment effect of deposit insurance – *i.e.*, the magnitude of the decline in market discipline – can be proxied for by the ratio of firm deposits to the sum of firm and household deposits. A greater dependence on household deposits, *ceteris paribus*, means a greater decline in market discipline.

Drawing on within-bank variation in this deposit ratio, both before and after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, we demonstrate that weaker market discipline translates into increases in a number of traditional measures of bank risk and a greater subsequent rate of failure. These

basic results are robust to the inclusion of time-varying, bank-specific controls. Moreover, they hold in a difference-in-difference setting in which state and foreign-owned banks, whose deposit insurance regime has not changed over our period of analysis, serve as a control.

Our findings make the following contributions to the literature. First, our data allow us to carry out what we believe to be the cleanest test heretofore of the direct impact of deposit insurance's introduction on bank risk. Second, we bring together in one analysis two related literatures as to the moral hazard costs of deposit insurance. Some articles explore the correlation between the introduction of deposit insurance and subsequent changes in market discipline but only by implication suggest consequences for bank risk. Other articles highlight the relationship between the introduction of deposit insurance and later changes in bank risk but only by implication identify a potential shift in market discipline as the intervening factor. Here, our analysis integrates both market discipline and bank risk in an explicit manner; a time-varying, bank-level measure of the former, that is, is shown to be robustly related, with a lag, to multiple measures of the latter.

Our article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on the relationship between deposit insurance, market discipline and bank risk. Section 3 covers the relevant histories of deposit markets and deposit insurance in Russia. Section 4 introduces our data and methodology. Section 5 explores, for private, domestic banks, the relationship between deposit insurance and changes in risk as a function of their deposit mix. Section 6 introduces a difference-in-difference estimator in which state and foreign banks serve as a control. Section 7 offers concluding thoughts.

2 Deposit Insurance, Market Discipline and Bank Risk

Compared to much of the literature, our quasi-experimental setting allows for relatively clean identification of deposit insurance's moral hazard effect. Noteworthy initial studies drew primarily on cross-sectional variation. Some, for instance, exploited individual country caps on coverage to compare fully-insured bank deposits with those above the cap and thus only partially insured ([Park & Peristiani, 1998](#); [Martinez Peria & Schmukler, 2001](#)). As a way to identify deposit insurance's effect, this approach presented problems in so far as small, fully-insured depositors may systematically differ from large, partially-insured ones in ways related to market discipline. The latter, for instance, may be more risk averse or better informed about bank fundamentals.

Other studies have drawn on multi-country bank-level data and cross-country variation in deposit insurance policies ([Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004](#); [Nier & Baumann, 2006](#)). As with within-country comparisons of insured and uninsured depositors, this approach relies largely on inferring market-disciplining effects of deposit insurance from a potentially diverse group of depositors. Those in countries with, say, more generous deposit insurance, however, may be fundamentally different

from those in countries with less. As such, comparing these groups' behavior may be uninformative as to how the introduction of deposit insurance affects the propensity of a given group of depositors to engage in market discipline.

To avoid drawing conclusions from a contemporaneous comparison of fundamentally different groups, a test for the effect of deposit insurance, ideally, should involve a pre-and-post assessment. For a given group of depositors and/or banks, that is, we would like to compare behavior both prior to and after a change in the deposit insurance regime. For instance, a recent study using Bolivian data from 1999 to 2003 demonstrated that after the introduction of deposit insurance in 2001, banks, in line with a decrease in market discipline, began making riskier loans (Ioannidou & Penas, 2010). Below, our analysis initially follows this basic approach; that is, we track a well-defined group – *i.e.*, private, domestic banks – before and after the introduction of deposit insurance. This type of comparison, however, can offer, at best, only suggestive evidence as to an actual effect. It cannot distinguish changes in behavior driven by the deposit insurance regime from those due to other time-contingent factors.

The most convincing evidence for a deposit-insurance-induced moral hazard effect comes from applying a difference-in-difference estimator in a quasi-experimental setting. To our knowledge, Karas et al. (2013) first adopted this approach, demonstrating that flows of newly insured household deposits in Russia became, relative to those of uninsured firms, less sensitive to bank capitalization after the introduction of deposit insurance. Lambert et al. (2017) first applied this approach in assessing the connection between deposit insurance and bank risk. Exploiting a dramatic increase in per-deposit insurance coverage ushered in by the 2008 U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, the authors demonstrate that banks whose share of insured deposits increased the most after the new policy's introduction experienced the largest increase in risky lending. Like Lambert et al. (2017), we apply a difference-in-difference estimator in a quasi-experimental setting to assess the effect of deposit insurance on bank risk. Our empirical setting, however, allows us to extend their approach in several meaningful ways. First, we can assess the effect of deposit insurance's introduction as opposed to its expansion. Second, we can explore the robustness of our findings to a wider array of bank risk measures. Third, we can delineate our treatment and control groups more clearly by comparing risk at banks affected by deposit insurance's introduction (*i.e.*, private domestic banks) with risk at (foreign and state-owned) banks wholly unaffected by the policy change.

Much of the empirical literature as to the moral hazard costs of deposit insurance can effectively be divided into two categories. One highlights the relationship between deposit insurance and market disciplining behavior, suggesting, but not demonstrating, that any evidence for the hypothesized relationship would necessarily hold implications for bank risk. The other focuses on the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk, assuming, either implicitly or explicitly, that any rela-

tionship between the two can be understood as the consequence of a change in market discipline. Both literatures, in other words, recognize a potential two-link causal chain from deposit insurance through market discipline to bank risk, but each effectively ignores one of the links.

Our article, we feel, makes an additional contribution to the literature by explicitly bringing these two links together. We lay out here, for one, a natural extension of our earlier work on deposit insurance and market discipline (Karas et al., 2013). In that study, we used a difference-in-difference estimator to demonstrate that Russian households' market disciplining behavior, relative to firms, abated after the introduction of deposit insurance. Here, we also use a difference-in-difference estimator, but to assess the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk. In doing so, we also connect the two aforementioned links by highlighting the relationship between a time-varying measure of the deposit-insurance-induced decrease in market discipline to a change in subsequent bank risk.

3 The Russian Context

Dating back just over two decades, Russia's modern experience with liberalized deposit markets has been relatively brief. When financial markets were first permitted in the early 1990s, bank deposits, particularly those of households, were held almost exclusively by Sberbank, the state-owned savings bank. But lax entry policies in the early post-communist period contributed to the quick development of a relatively competitive market for deposits. By 1994, private banks had captured over half of the household deposit market. The mix of liberalized deposit rates, naive depositors and over-burdened regulators proved destabilizing. System-wide crises, including a particularly large one in 1998, led to the insolvency of many of the largest banks on the retail market during the first decade of post-communist reform. Obligations to tens of thousands of depositors went unmet (Perotti, 2002; Radaev, 2000; Schoors, 2001; Spicer & Pyle, 2000). These experiences quickly heightened Russians' awareness of the private costs of bank failure and thus the value of carefully monitoring their financial institutions. Karas et al. (2010) provide evidence for the existence of market discipline in the half decade after the 1998 crisis, but before the introduction of explicit deposit insurance. Flows of household and firm deposits during this period were consistent with quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks; more poorly capitalized banks, that is, were less successful in attracting the deposits of households and firms. Evidence for the standard form of price discipline (*i.e.*, depositors requiring a deposit rate premium from less stable banks) was mixed.

Russia's Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) was created as an independent agency in January 2004 and given responsibility for administering the national deposit insurance fund. The DIA was charged with determining bank premiums, making any necessary payouts to depositors, and overseeing the liquidation of insolvent banks. The Russian government provided initial seed capital but

premiums – payable quarterly and assessed on the daily averages of a bank’s insured deposits – quickly became the fund’s primary source of financing. The deposits of households, but not firms, were to be covered. And all banks that accepted household deposits were required to participate. All deposits up to 100,000 rubles were fully insured from when banks were first admitted into the system in September 2004 until August 2006. From then until March 2007, up to 190,000 rubles per deposit were insured, with amounts above 100,000 insured at a 90 percent rate ([Camara & Montes-Negret, 2006](#)). After March 2007, the 190 thousand ruble ceiling was increased to 400 thousand rubles. A further increase in October 2008 took the ceiling to 700 thousand rubles.

By January 1, 2005, 829 banks and a bit more than 330 million deposit accounts, with an average deposit size of seven thousand rubles (roughly \$252), were insured by the system. Of these accounts, 98.5 percent were under 100,000 rubles and thus fully insured. Three years later, 934 banks and roughly 383 million deposit accounts, with an average deposit size of thirteen thousand rubles (roughly \$529), were covered by the program. Of these, 99.6 percent held deposits under 400,000 rubles and thus were insured at a rate of at least 92.5 percent.

Subsequent to the introduction of deposit insurance, we generally observe rapid growth in personal deposits, much of which was accounted for by term deposits with maturities between half a year and three years. Sberbank’s market share declined as did the combined market share of the thirty largest banks, suggesting that deposit insurance contributed to greater competition within the retail banking market ([Camara & Montes-Negret, 2006](#); [Chernykh & Cole, 2011](#)).

Russia was struck by a small banking crisis during the spring and summer of 2004. In response, Russia’s State Duma swiftly modified the arrangements governing deposit insurance ([Tompson, 2004](#)). Household deposits with failed institutions that were outside the deposit insurance system would be temporarily covered for sums of up to 100,000 rubles. In other words, from the middle of July 2004, all household deposits were covered by temporary insurance (Federal Law No. 96-FZ). This emergency coverage was subsequently replaced by that from the general deposit insurance program for those banks that were admitted. Banks not admitted to the general program lost the right to attract new household deposits and renew existing deposit contracts, thus leading to a progressive deterioration in their household deposit base.

Whereas 2004 ushered in a fundamental change in the protection of household deposits at private, domestic banks, the deposit insurance regime at foreign as well as state-owned banks remained fundamentally unaltered. Although an explicit guarantee on retail deposits at state-owned banks (Civil Code art. 840.1) was removed (Federal Law No. 182-FZ) and state-owned banks were required to enter the newly created deposit insurance scheme, their implicit guarantees and support continued much like before. State-owned banks continued to enjoy privileged access to state funds, *de facto* exemptions from some regulatory norms and, on occasion, financial support from the state ([Tompson, 2004](#)). This support was reflected in the relatively low rates they paid to depositors.

Foreign banks have consistently been perceived as being backed by the deep pockets of their (typically Western) mother organizations. [De Graeve & Karas \(2014\)](#), in fact, show that during bank runs Russian depositors have treated state and foreign-owned banks as equally safe.

In much of the period covered by our analysis, the Russian economy was in recovery from the extended trauma of transitioning from communism. After declining consistently throughout the 1990s, GDP grew each year by at least five percent between 1999 and 2008. In 2009, however, the global financial crisis interrupted this upward trajectory and GDP shrank by eight percent. Russian banks, frozen out of international wholesale markets and suffering from declining asset performance, experienced an extended period of hardship. Many traditional measures of bank risk took a significant turn for the worse.

4 Data and Methodology

To explore the connection between deposit insurance and bank risk, we use quarterly bank balance sheets and income statements purchased from Interfax (www.interfax.ru) and Mobile (www.mobile.ru), two private financial information agencies. [Karas & Schoors \(2005, 2010\)](#) describe these datasets and confirm their compatibility; some indicators appear exclusively in one, some exclusively in the other. The resulting panel spans 1999q2-2010q1, and because of foundings, mergers, and failures, is unbalanced. When one bank acquires another, we give the former a new identifier.

An additional dataset assembled by and described in [Karas & Vernikov \(2016\)](#) documents historical timelines for all banks in Russia, including years for their founding, entrance to the deposit insurance system, loss of license, merger, acquisition, liquidation, *etc.* These records span 1988q1-2016q2. In addition, for 1999q1-2016q2, the dataset provides a time-varying classification of ownership, characterizing a bank in a particular quarter as state-controlled, foreign-controlled, or private-domestic-controlled.¹

We estimate the following equation for bank i in quarter t :

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_{it} + \beta_2 F_{it} I + \lambda_t + \mu_i + Controls_{it} + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

F_{it} is the share of firm deposits in total deposits of firms and households of bank i at time t . $\Delta Y_{it+\delta}$ represents the change in a bank risk measure between periods t and $t + \delta$. The coefficient β_1 measures the sensitivity of the latter to the former, and β_2 captures how much this sensitivity changes when household deposits get insured – *i.e.*, when dummy I switches from 0 to 1 – in 2004q4.

¹Specifically, we use records *os50* and *of50* from the dataset described by [Karas & Vernikov \(2016\)](#). We backfill missing 1999 records of *os50* with the first available records from 2000q1.

We expect F_{it} to determine how strongly the introduction of deposit insurance affects market discipline and, hence, bank risk taking. Specifically, we expect $\beta_2 < 0$. To understand why, define β_F and β_H as measures of market discipline exercised by, respectively, firms and households. Specifically, say β_F (β_H) is the sensitivity of firm (household) deposit growth to bank capitalization. Total market discipline experienced by a bank would thus be a weighted average of the two: $\beta_F F_{it} + \beta_H(1 - F_{it})$, or after rearranging, $\beta_H + (\beta_F - \beta_H)F_{it}$. As shown by Karas et al. (2013), the differential $\beta_F - \beta_H$ rises after the introduction of deposit insurance, because deposit insurance reduces households' incentives to monitor their banks. It then follows that the effect of deposit insurance on *bank-level* market discipline, and, ultimately, risk taking, depends on the deposit mix F_{it} . Higher F_{it} results in more market discipline, and, therefore, less risk taking. That is, we expect $\beta_2 < 0$.

We use six measures of bank risk based on balance sheet and income statement data. The first four include loan loss reserves over total assets, $\frac{LLR}{TA}$, non-performing loans over total assets, $\frac{NPL}{TA}$, log of loan loss reserves over capital, $\ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$, and log of non-performing loans over capital, $\ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$. We take the log transformation in the case of the latter two measures in order to reduce the effect of extreme values produced by dividing through by capital.

Our fifth risk measure is the bank's Z-score, commonly referred to as its distance to default and defined as the number of standard deviations a bank's return on assets has to fall to wipe out its capital:

$$Z = \frac{\overline{CAR} + \overline{ROA}}{\sigma(ROA)}$$

CAR stands for capital-to-assets ratio, and ROA is net income over assets; upper bars indicate averages; σ stands for standard deviation. Averages and standard deviations are based on a rolling window of 16 quarterly lags plus the current observation. We take the log of Z to reduce the effect of extreme values.

Our sixth risk measure is the bank's probability of failure, $PFail$, estimated from a logit regression of a license loss dummy on a set of bank balance sheet variables. (For details, see appendix A).

Capturing the change in, and not the level of, risk, our dependent variable is a difference in a particular measure between periods t and $t + \delta$: $\Delta \frac{LLR}{TA}$, $\Delta \frac{NPL}{TA}$, $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$, $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$, $-\Delta \ln Z$, and $\Delta PFail$. We take the negative of the Z-score so that higher values correspond, as they do for the other measures, to more risk.

We add a seventh measure of risk that is not based on accounting data, namely the dummy, $Fail$, which takes the value of 1 if between periods t and $t + \delta$ the bank loses its license or gets liquidated. This dummy captures the most extreme form of risk realization, bank failure.

Several factors affect our choice of the time horizon, δ . On the one hand, it likely takes a not

inconsiderable amount of time for changes in market disciplining behavior first to affect bank risk taking and then for that risk taking to reveal itself in a deterioration of loan performance and other measures of bank health. To this end, it is worth noting that during our period of analysis, the majority of outstanding bank loans to households and firms have maturities exceeding one year. Indeed, in 2010, over 70 percent of loans to households and 40 percent of loans to firms exceeded three years. A sufficiently large δ is thus needed to capture the time needed for, first, any adjustments in market discipline, and, second, any potential declines in the quality of loan portfolios. On the other hand, by choosing too large a value for δ , we reduce the number of observations available for estimation. In view of these two considerations, we set the baseline δ_{base} equal to 16 quarters for *LLR*, *NPL*, *Z-score* and *PFail*. Since actual bank failure requires not only an accumulation of loans and investments turning sour, but also a failure to replenish the capital to counter the asset quality deterioration and the conclusion of a decision process at the Bank of Russia to withdraw the banking license, we set the baseline δ_{base} equal to a longer period of 20 quarters for *Fail*. We then test whether the results are robust to $\delta_{base} \pm 4$.²

Time dummies, λ_t , control for changes in the macroeconomic environment. Bank-level fixed effects, μ_i , control for unobserved, time-invariant bank heterogeneity. We present specifications with and without controls, $Controls_{it}$, for balance sheet structure: deposits over assets, loans over assets, and liquid assets over demand liabilities.

Table 1 provides summary statistics, starting with our battery of risk measures. Loan loss reserves and non-performing loans, on average, amount to only 3% and 1% of total assets, respectively, but standard deviations are considerable; some banks, that is, exhibit very high levels of risk, reflecting, in part, the sample's retention of banks up to, and including, the quarter of their failure. The logarithmic transformations of both variables have somewhat smaller standard deviations relative to their average. The predicted probability of failure is left skewed and, on average, 1%. The distance to default measure $\ln Z$ has negative values at the left side of the distribution, indicating that some banks are less than one standard deviation of return on assets away from default and effectively implying zombie status. The smaller number of observations associated with the *Z-score* derives from the need to draw on data prior to t for its computation. As explained above, we employ the negative of $\ln Z$ in our regressions to ensure that higher values correspond to greater risk for all dependent variables.

Since our analysis explores changes in risk brought about by deposit insurance, the dependent variables are the forward time differences of the above measures, taken over 16 quarters (20 quarters for the binary failure variable). These change-in-risk variables have means close to zero, and minimum and maximum values almost equally distributed around the average.

With respect to the time varying independent variables, the liquidity measure averages 0.76, and the

²The results are largely robust: β_2 is always negative; in some cases it becomes more significant, in some less.

loans to assets and deposits to assets ratios average 0.52 and 0.55, respectively. At 0.1, the minimum for the deposits to assets ratio reflects a decision to exclude observations with lower values; to be able to exercise effective market discipline, after all, depositors must control a non-trivial share of the bank’s funding.

Our independent variable of interest, the deposit mix F_{it} , has a mean of 67%, indicating that the average Russian bank sources about two-thirds of its deposits from firms, and the remaining third from households. As suggested by the minimum and maximum values, some banks, at least for a time, draw wholly from either one or the other.

5 Empirical results for private domestic banks

Tables 2 and 3 report our estimations of equation 1 with and without $Controls_{it}$. The evidence connecting F , our proxy for the post-deposit-insurance decrease in market discipline, to increased risk is strong. Across twelve of the fourteen specifications, β_2 is negative and statistically significant at either the 1 or 5 percent levels; in the two instances in which statistical significance is absent, β_2 retains the expected negative sign. In other words, a higher F – *i.e.*, less representation of insured households in the bank’s deposit base – translates into less growth in bank risk after 2004q4. The relationship holds for changes in risk measures calculated on the basis of balance sheet and profit and loss data from 1999 to 2010. It also holds for changes in the probability of bank failure and actual bank failure. For the latter, recall that our data allow us to extend the analysis through 2015.³ The effect we find is sizable: if a bank were to rely more on household deposits and decrease its deposit mix F with 0.5 (about 2 standard deviations) in the post deposit insurance period, its ultimate probability of failure would rise with a considerable 4.5%, which compares to an average probability of failure of 13%. The consistency of our main finding is precisely what we would expect if deposit insurance both (1) reduces household-imposed market discipline relative to that of firms, and (2) relaxes a constraint on a bank’s risk-taking in direct proportion to its relative reliance on the deposits of insured households.

To visualize the temporal pattern of β_2 , we estimate a version of equation 1 in which we interact F_{it} with time dummies λ_t :

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_t F_{it} \lambda_t + \lambda_t + \mu_i + Controls_{it} + e_{it} \quad (2)$$

This specification allows β_t , the sensitivity of risk to the deposit mix F_{it} , to take a different value in *every* quarter. Figure 1 depicts changes in the estimated β_t , $\hat{\beta}_t$, for bank failure, the one dependent

³If we repeat our analysis for *Fail* only using the shorter data period available for the other risk-taking measures, the coefficient retains its negative sign, but shrinks in magnitude and becomes insignificant.

variable for which data extends through 2015; Figure 2 plots $\hat{\beta}_t$ for the variables for which our data end in 2010.

Since our dependent variables measure a change in risk, observations in quarter t incorporate data from two dates, t and $t+\delta$, that fall within distinct time windows in which different circumstances apply: (1) t is at least δ quarters before 2004q4 and so change in risk is measured between two dates, t and $t+\delta$, that precede the introduction of deposit insurance; (2) t is 2004q4 or after and so change in risk is measured between two dates that both come after the introduction of deposit insurance; or (3) t is less than δ quarters before 2004q4 so change in risk is measured between two dates, t and $t+\delta$, the first of which precedes deposit insurance and the second of which comes after. This third window of time, designated by gray shading in Figures 1 and 2, presents interpretation challenges. Consider the case of, say, $t=2003q2$. With $\delta=16$, the dependent variable, the change in risk between t and $t+16$, will include over a year's worth of movement in the risk measure from both before and after the introduction of deposit insurance. Just by observing $\hat{\beta}_{2003q2}$, however, we cannot know the extent to which its value is attributable to the period before 2004q4 or the period after. If more a function of the period after, $\hat{\beta}_{2003q2}$ would plausibly reflect the deposit-insurance-induced sensitivity of risk to $F_{i2003q2}$. We cannot know this to be the case, however, because we do not know precisely how many quarters pass before the introduction of deposit insurance translates into (reduced market discipline and then) increased bank risk. Even abstracting from the idiosyncrasies of a particular bank, risk measure, macroeconomic setting, *etc.*, we cannot know, that is, whether this chain of events – commencing with deposit insurance's introduction and culminating with a change in observable bank risk – is completed in four, twelve, or twenty quarters. Considering this limitation, β_2 from equation 1 is best understood as a conservative, lower-bound estimate of the sensitivity of bank risk to a given deposit-insurance-induced decline in market discipline. For instance, if $\hat{\beta}_{2003q2}$ is negative because risk measures change after but not before 2004q4, the estimate of β_2 in equation 1 will understate the true effect of deposit insurance because it only incorporates $\hat{\beta}_t$'s from 2004q4 and later.⁴

The dotted lines in Figures 1 and 2 show the average $\hat{\beta}_t$ for each of the three sub-periods. For all but one of the risk measures, they resemble a descending step function. The average $\hat{\beta}_t$ in the post-deposit-insurance window, that is, is the lowest, whereas the average in the gray-shaded window lies between the other two. Recognizing that $\hat{\beta}_t$'s in the gray-shaded period may incorporate deposit-insurance-induced changes in risk, the descending step function pattern conforms to our expectations.

⁴If we exclude this gray-shaded period from our empirical analysis, our results are qualitatively similar even though we lose at least 16 quarters of observations.

6 A Difference-in-Differences approach

Our discussion so far has implied that the dummy I captures the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance. There may, however, be other time-varying factors, correlated with I , whose impact on banks varies with the deposit mix F_{it} . To address this concern, we expand our analysis to compare two groups of banks in a quasi-experiment. The private domestic banks covered by the deposit insurance program – *i.e.*, the banks analyzed in section 5 – are our treatment. The control includes the state- and foreign-owned banks, which were unaffected by the 2004 deposit insurance policy. Showing that the relationship between F_{it} and risk measures becomes more sensitive to this distinction between treatment and control groups should mitigate concerns about an unobserved time-varying factor driving our section 5 results.

To compare changes in risk at the two groups of banks, we estimate the following difference-in-differences equation for bank i in quarter t :

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_{it} + \beta_2 F_{it}T + \beta_3 F_{it}I + \beta_4 F_{it}TI + \lambda_t + \lambda_t T + \mu_i + Controls_{it} + e_{it} \quad (3)$$

Dummy T equals 1 for all banks in the treatment group and 0 for all those in the control. The deposit insurance dummy, I , equals 1 for all observations from 2004q4 onward. The main coefficient of interest, β_4 , measures whether the post-deposit-insurance change in the sensitivity of risk-taking $\Delta Y_{it+\delta}$ to the deposit mix F_{it} of the treatment group differs from that of the control group.

Tables 5 and 6 report the results from estimating equation 3 with and without $Controls_{it}$.⁵ Across all 12 specifications, β_4 is negative and statistically significant ($\beta_4 < 0$), while β_3 is largely insignificant or even significantly positive ($\beta_3 \not< 0$). At private domestic banks, that is, the relationship between the deposit mix and later risk intensifies, relative to both the control group and the pre-deposit insurance period; foreign and state banks, on the other hand, do not experience any intensified negative relation between the deposit mix and risk in the post-deposit insurance period. For this control group of state and foreign banks, the generally insignificant results on β_3 suggest that, as we would expect, the relationship between the deposit mix, F , and risk did not change between the periods before and after the last quarter of 2004. In other words, the deposit insurance reform neither altered market discipline nor risk at banks that were not its target. Only the banks whose household depositors became insured experienced a post-deposit-insurance change in the relationship between F and subsequent risk measures.

The consistency of this finding on β_4 is what we would expect if the introduction of deposit insurance at private, domestic banks reduces the household-imposed market discipline they experience, and thereby relaxes a constraint on risk-taking in direct proportion to their reliance on households for

⁵We do not report results for $Fail$ because no banks in the control group fail (*i.e.*, $Fail=0$) prior to deposit insurance's introduction.

deposits. These results, thus, strongly support the presence of a causal chain that passes from deposit insurance to bank risk by way of reduced depositor discipline.

Similar to Figure 2, Figure 3 replicates the quarter-by-quarter sensitivity of changes in risk to F for both control and treatment banks. Specifically, it plots the difference of the estimated β_t^T 's and β_t^C 's (*i.e.*, $\widehat{\beta}_t^T - \widehat{\beta}_t^C$) from the following equation:

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_t^C F_{it} \lambda_t^C + \beta_t^T F_{it} \lambda_t^T + \lambda_t^C + \lambda_t^T + \mu_i + Controls_{it} + e_{it} \quad (4)$$

Across the three sub-periods, we again observe a pattern resembling a descending step function, with the average in the gray-shaded period close to, but still above, the average for the last period. As with Figure 2, this pattern is what we would expect if some, but not all, of the $\widehat{\beta}_t^T - \widehat{\beta}_t^C$'s from the gray-shaded period incorporate changes in risk from after 2004q4.

One concern might be that our estimates of β_4 reflect a violation of the parallel trends assumption. Visual inspection of Figure 3, however, suggests that this is likely not the case. In the periods immediately preceding 2004q4, the quarter in which the treatment is formally introduced, the difference between the two groups across all risk measures, with the possible exception of the Z-score, is neither trending upwards nor downwards.

Finally, it is certainly worth noting from Figure 3 that for all risk measures, the estimate $\widehat{\beta}_t^T - \widehat{\beta}_t^C$ is at its lowest in the final three quarters for which we have data. Since observations from these final quarters draw on changes in risk measures that occur as late as 2009 and 2010, this pattern suggests that the effect of deposit insurance on bank risk may reveal itself most clearly during periods of macroeconomic difficulty.⁶

7 Conclusion

Using data from what amounts to a natural experiment, we employ a difference-in-difference estimator to explore whether the introduction of deposit insurance increases bank risk. Our evidence confirms the presence of a causal chain from deposit insurance to greater risk by way of increased moral hazard and decreased market discipline. In exploring this mechanism, we introduce the deposit mix – *i.e.*, the ratio of firm deposits to the sum of firm and household deposits – as a time-varying proxy for the magnitude of the insurance-induced decline in market discipline. The greater a bank's dependence on the deposits of households, the more policies to expand the insur-

⁶One could argue that the two first quarters in our data sample are different because they date from the pre-Putin period, when trust in the government, and possibly therefore trust in state banks, were fundamentally lower than in the Putin era that started in July 1999. Cutting the first two quarters to accommodate this concern, however, though costing us a lot of observations in the already limited pre-deposit insurance period, makes no qualitative difference for the results.

ance of their deposits will undermine their willingness to limit bank risk. Banks, in turn, alter their behavior, assuming more risk, as this market disciplining constraint weakens. These results confirm what regulators hopefully already understand – that they should exercise particular vigilance over banks that have come to rely excessively on the savings of insured depositors.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
$\ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	36909	.15	.18	0	5.03
$\frac{LLR}{TA}$	37126	.03	.04	0	.85
$\ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	36909	.06	.13	0	4.16
$\frac{NPL}{TA}$	37126	.01	.03	0	.98
$\ln Z$	25955	3.72	.82	-.42	7.76
<i>PFail</i>	37121	.01	.02	0	.98
$\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	21280	.05	.19	-3.17	5.05
$\Delta \frac{LLR}{TA}$	21404	0	.05	-.68	.9
$\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	21280	.01	.14	-3.12	5.06
$\Delta \frac{NPL}{TA}$	21404	0	.04	-.8	.89
$-\Delta \ln Z$	12270	-.01	.95	-3.94	4.89
$\Delta PFail$	21526	0	.02	-.58	.87
<i>Fail</i>	37126	.13	.33	0	1
Capital / Assets	36909	.24	.15	0	.96
ROA = Net Income / Assets	36840	.01	.02	-.9	.72
F = Firm Deposits / Deposits	37126	.67	.24	0	1
Liquid Assets / Demand Liabilities	37126	.76	.56	0	9.93
Loans / Assets	37126	.52	.2	0	1
Deposits / Assets	37126	.55	.2	.1	.99

Table 2. Estimation Results: Equation 1

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_{it} + \beta_2 F_{it} I + \lambda_t + \mu_i + e_{it}$$

$\Delta Y_{it+\delta}$ is a measure of bank risk taking over period $[t, t + \delta]$. Specific measures are reported in column headings. F_{it} is the share of firm deposits in total deposits of firms and households. Dummy I switches from 0 to 1 in 2004q4. Only coefficients of interest are reported. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1) $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	(2) $\Delta \frac{LLR}{TA}$	(3) $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	(4) $\Delta \frac{NPL}{TA}$	(5) $-\Delta \ln Z$	(6) $\Delta PFail$	(7) $Fail$
F	0.02 (0.02)	0.008 (0.006)	0.01 (0.02)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.06 (0.1)	0.0009 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.03)
FI	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.03*** (0.007)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01** (0.007)	-0.4*** (0.2)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.09** (0.04)
Observations	21,321	21,451	21,321	21,451	12,280	21,547	37,390
R^2	0.060	0.050	0.092	0.084	0.074	0.111	0.126

Table 3. Estimation Results: Equation 1

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_{it} + \beta_2 F_{it} I + \lambda_t + \mu_i + Controls_{it} + e_{it}$$

$\Delta Y_{it+\delta}$ is a measure of bank risk taking over period $[t, t + \delta]$. Specific measures are reported in column headings. F_{it} is the share of firm deposits in total deposits of firms and households. Dummy I switches from 0 to 1 in 2004q4. Only coefficients of interest are reported. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1) $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	(2) $\Delta \frac{LLR}{TA}$	(3) $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	(4) $\Delta \frac{NPL}{TA}$	(5) $-\Delta \ln Z$	(6) $\Delta PFail$	(7) $Fail$
F	0.009 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.01 (0.02)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.007 (0.03)
FI	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.02*** (0.007)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.4*** (0.2)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.09** (0.04)
Observations	21,280	21,404	21,280	21,404	12,270	21,526	37,126
R^2	0.062	0.073	0.096	0.094	0.079	0.126	0.127




Figure 1. $\hat{\beta}_t$ from Equation 2 over Time.




Figure 2. $\hat{\beta}_t$ from Equation 2 over Time.

Table 4. Summary Statistics for the Control Group

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
$\ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	2780	.15	.21	0	4.28
$\frac{LLR}{TA}$	2797	.02	.03	0	.43
$\ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	2780	.09	.22	0	5.66
$\frac{NPL}{TA}$	2797	.01	.03	0	.45
$\ln Z$	2038	3.24	.83	-.06	5.53
<i>PFail</i>	2797	0	.01	0	.19
$\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	1444	.03	.18	-2.01	.6
$\Delta \frac{LLR}{TA}$	1459	0	.03	-.17	.17
$\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	1444	.01	.18	-1.9	.7
$\Delta \frac{NPL}{TA}$	1459	0	.02	-.18	.18
$-\Delta \ln Z$	809	-.18	.87	-3.73	3.04
$\Delta PFail$	1439	0	.02	-.19	.52
<i>Fail</i>	2797	.08	.27	0	1
Capital / Assets	2780	.19	.14	0	.88
ROA = Net Income / Assets	2765	.01	.02	-.48	.35
F = Firm Deposits / Deposits	2797	.71	.23	.07	1
Liquid Assets / Demand Liabilities	2797	.82	.72	0	9.54
Loans / Assets	2797	.48	.22	0	.97
Deposits / Assets	2797	.51	.22	.1	.96

Table 5. Estimation Results: Equation 3

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_{it} + \beta_2 F_{it}T + \beta_3 F_{it}I + \beta_4 F_{it}TI + \lambda_t + \lambda_t T + \mu_i + e_{it}$$

$\Delta Y_{it+\delta}$ is a measure of bank risk taking over period $[t, t + \delta]$. Specific measures are reported in column headings. F_{it} is the share of firm deposits in total deposits of firms and households. Dummy I switches from 0 to 1 in 2004q4. Dummy T equals 1 for private domestic banks; 0 for state- and foreign-controlled. Only coefficients of interest are reported. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1) $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	(2) $\Delta \frac{LLR}{TA}$	(3) $\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	(4) $\Delta \frac{NPL}{TA}$	(5) $-\Delta \ln Z$	(6) $\Delta PFail$
F	0.03 (0.07)	0.02** (0.010)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.6 (0.5)	0.002 (0.006)
FT	-0.007 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.004 (0.01)	0.6 (0.5)	-0.002 (0.006)
FI	0.07 (0.07)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.1* (0.07)	0.008 (0.010)	0.7* (0.4)	0.02 (0.01)
FTI	-0.2** (0.08)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.2** (0.08)	-0.02** (0.01)	-1.1*** (0.4)	-0.02** (0.01)
Observations	23,114	23,262	23,114	23,262	13,397	23,341
R^2	0.064	0.053	0.094	0.088	0.076	0.110

Table 6. Estimation Results: Equation 3

$$\Delta Y_{it+\delta} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_{it} + \beta_2 F_{it}T + \beta_3 F_{it}I + \beta_4 F_{it}TI + \lambda_t + \lambda_t T + \mu_i + Controls_{it} + e_{it}$$

$\Delta Y_{it+\delta}$ is a measure of bank risk taking over period $[t, t + \delta]$. Specific measures are reported in column headings. F_{it} is the share of firm deposits in total deposits of firms and households. Dummy I switches from 0 to 1 in 2004q4. Dummy T equals 1 for private domestic banks; 0 for state- and foreign-controlled. Only coefficients of interest are reported. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	$\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{LLR}{Cap})$	$\Delta \frac{LLR}{TA}$	$\Delta \ln(1 + \frac{NPL}{Cap})$	$\Delta \frac{NPL}{TA}$	$-\Delta \ln Z$	$\Delta PFail$
F	0.03 (0.07)	0.02* (0.009)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.010)	-0.6 (0.5)	0.002 (0.006)
FT	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.007 (0.01)	0.5 (0.5)	-0.003 (0.007)
FI	0.07 (0.07)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.1* (0.07)	0.01 (0.010)	0.7** (0.4)	0.02 (0.01)
FTI	-0.2** (0.08)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.2** (0.08)	-0.02* (0.01)	-1.2*** (0.4)	-0.02** (0.01)
Observations	23,070	23,212	23,070	23,212	13,386	23,317
R^2	0.066	0.074	0.098	0.097	0.083	0.126




Figure 3. $\widehat{\beta}_t^T - \widehat{\beta}_t^C$ from Equation 4 over Time.

Appendices

A Default Prediction Model

Following [De Graeve & Karas \(2014\)](#), we estimate a logit regression of a dummy equal to 1 if a bank loses its license in quarter t , on a set of bank balance sheet variables measured at the end of quarter $t - 1$. All coefficients have intuitive signs and are significant at 1%. The area under the ROC curve (AUR) exceeds 0.8 and thus signifies a very good fit ([Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000](#)).

VARIABLES	(1) revdum
Log (Assets)	-0.17*** (0.036)
Capital/Assets	-2.13*** (0.38)
ROA	-9.44*** (1.15)
Liquid Assets/Assets	-3.50*** (0.83)
Non-performing Loans/Assets	4.19*** (0.94)
Non-Government Securities/Assets	2.71*** (0.34)
Term Deposits of Firms/Assets	-5.89*** (1.51)
Term Deposits of Households/Assets	-6.49*** (1.07)
Observations	51,275
# Failures	358
Pseudo R2	0.19
AUR	0.82