The 'migrant' in data: Report on analysis of national and European datasets on employment, inactivity and unemployment rates, and benefits uptake by specific groups.

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Change log

Version	Date	amended by	changes
1.0	25.08.2015	Isabel Shutes	Final document delivered

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With the increasing value placed on data collection, and the growth of migration control as a policy topic, this report as part of WP10 of *bEUcitizen, Barriers to EU citizenship: insiders and outsiders,* seeks to explore how migrants are captured in datasets and what this can tell us about the in/exclusion of different groups as explored in our previous report, D10.1 *Report on the rights and obligations of citizens and non-citizens in selected countries*[1]. For this report, WP10 partner countries (Ireland, Netherlands, UK, Spain, Croatia and Israel) explored their national datasets, in the form of national labour force surveys (LFS), administrative and register datasets. We also looked at Eurostat harmonised data sources: the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) as well as the publicly available Eurostat database on migration statistics.

Data and the themes of WP10:

- Definitional issues are a critical data challenge. Who counts as a 'migrant' can vary between national datasets and also between states and this has implications both in terms of numbers of migrants (stocks and flows) and for the analysis of the impacts of migration.

- Data can generally be said to show the positive side of citizenship, whereas the limitations and preferential access mechanisms are in the main hidden. For example, the wealthy are granted preferential access to territory through a variety of mechanisms, but this is not possible to see in the data.

- Citizenship data do not show the symbolic meaning of citizenship, and the increasing focus on 'earned' citizenship in EU countries. Discretion in the decision making process is also not revealed[2]. Those whose applications are refused are not covered in data, except for the UK which collects data on reasons for refusal.

- Data on EEA removals is not available in Eurostat. The UK only collects data on those removed for criminal behaviour, not for those unable to maintain themselves.

- Analysis of data on benefits receipt by nationality grouping provides a very limited picture of access to social benefits with respect to understanding how conditions of citizenship/residence

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[1] D10.1 *Report on the rights and obligations of citizens and non-citizens in selected countries*: http://beucitizen.eu/publications/report-on-the-rights-and-obligations-of-citizens-and-non-citizens-in-selected-countries/

[2] Evidence from D10.1 identified that discretion plays a large part of decision making processes in such things as naturalisation decisions. For example, in the UK the main reason in 2013 for refusals of citizenship applications (34% of refusals) was failure to demonstrate good character requirement, without any specification of why this may be so.

status impact on differential access to benefits, in addition to other conditions attached to claiming particular benefits.

- The diversity of European citizens themselves is not apparent from the data. One gap in the evidence is information on how long non-EU born EU citizens have lived in other EU countries before moving to another EU member state.

- Not having 'work' can mean a person is a not-quite-good-enough citizen (Anderson, 2013) – and certainly not quite good enough to be an EU citizen in terms of freedom of movement. With the 'worker citizen' an increasingly dominant concept, work is a central theme, yet work as it appears in datasets does not necessarily map onto work as construed by states for, for example, the purposes of benefits eligibility.

Conclusion

Comparing different states' datasets it becomes clear that it is necessary to engage with their political history. For example, while there were understandable concerns about migration data and representativeness, data on asylum seekers was far easier to come by. The perceived importance of collecting data on asylum (required under EU harmonisation of asylum procedures) has resulted in it being hypervisibilised. While for the purposes of our next deliverable, D10.3 which will develop more in-depth case studies on groups that have been invisibilised in data, this does not mean that making groups visible in data is necessarily a good thing for them. Identifying a population as a population can stigmatise and risk reducing complex social processes to matters of identity. The politics of visibility are complex and also nationally particular. As this report shows, it is thus important to remember that statistical processes are not necessarily the neutral and benign form of enumeration they can be taken to be (Sussman, 2004), but can contribute to processes of 'othering' and normalised ideas of in/exclusion. Data about populations can "render rigid new conceptualizations of the human being" through their categorization (Hacking, 1982 in Sussman, 2004: 102). Processes of labelling can lead to the construct of bureaucratic identities (Zetter, 1991) and Werbner (2000) similarly argues that some ethnic minority categorisation is 'imagined' by the state for the control of populations. Population data systems in European colonies, for example, were used to control colonial subjects (Anderson, 1991 in Selzer & Anderson, 2001). Thus, one needs to look behind the numbers at the framing of concepts embedded in statistical systems and what the data may be masking.

INTRODUCTION

In this report we examine how migrants are captured in national and European level datasets and what this can tell us about the in/exclusion of different groups as explored in our previous report, D10.1 *Report on the rights and obligations of citizens and non-citizens in selected countries*. The work undertaken for this report will be further developed in the case studies explored in D10.3.

States vary in the priority they give to the production of quantitative migration data. These variations seem to be related to how important migration is perceived to be as an issue. This report derives from the work of partners involved in Work Package 10 of the FP7 programme *bEUcitizen*: Utrecht University (The Netherlands); the University of Zagreb (Croatia); University College Dublin (Ireland); the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel); the University of Oviedo (Spain) and the London School of Economics and the University of Oxford (UK). The six states under study enable us to examine differences in EU15 (Ireland, Netherlands, UK, and Spain as a Southern EU state), new member (Croatia) and non-EU (Israel) states, and between states where migration has varying degrees of salience. Comparative studies can be useful for theoretical and empirical (policy) grounds. Such studies can be useful to counteract dominant narratives around 'benefit tourism', for example, and for policy purposes[3].

The report is organised as follow. It first gives a basic overview of the national data sources that are relevant to the work of WP10 and that were consulted for the purposes of this report. It also gives information about Eurostat data. It then assesses some of the limitations of those datasets for the purposes of our (comparative) research. The first part of this assessment notes some of the obvious limitations in the data for basic research purposes, the second looks more critically at the main themes covered in D10.1[4], following our interest in entry, naturalisation, and welfare benefits, and explores what data can or cannot show in this respect. Finally, the concluding section compares and contrasts the limitations of the datasets and questions the assumption that the categorization of populations by statistical technologies is an objective process that carries no attendant risks.

It should be noted that this report does NOT attempt to give an overview and comprehensive analysis of the data but rather to consider what national and comparative data are available for the exploration of the themes of our work package.

METHODOLOGY

The report explores datasets of the partner countries from the EU, the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, and Croatia and looks at Israel as a case study of a non-EU ethno-nationalist state. The aim was to describe what data are collected in which countries, to share information about what datasets are available in theory and in practice with a view to considering what quantitative data are available to explore the Work Package themes and to assist with the presentation and analysis of case studies in deliverable WP10.3.

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[3] For example, other studies, such as a recent study commissioned by the European Commission revealed that non-active intra-European migrants are only a small part of the population in EU states in which they reside, and in fact on average EU migrants are more likely to be in employment than nationals living in the same country (ICF GHK, 2013).

[4] Full report available from: http://beucitizen.eu/publications/report-on-the-rights-and-obligations-of-citizens-and-non-citizens-in-selected-countries/

We recognise that data collection and presentation do not simply describe populations but help to identify and construct them. Data do not describe the characteristics of previously existing 'migrants', but work, alongside the law and other social processes, to produce them as populations. Partners were therefore asked to identify how migrants are defined in each states' main datasets.

As well as collecting data, partners reflected on the process of data collection. States differed widely in the extent to which access to data was practicable. The UK has very comprehensive publicly available datasets, but in some states partners had to contact for example, the Ministry of Finance and liaise directly with officials to access data, or ascertain where access was not possible. These contacts took the form of informal telephone calls or emails and are not fully documented here.

The below sections outlines the datasets consulted in each country. Data was collected between July 2014 and June 2015 for the period (where available) 2000-2014.

KEY DATASETS

It is important to remember that in general the datasets below were not developed for research purposes, nor for the purposes of exploring migrants in the population and as such using them to draw conclusions about migrants can be problematic. At the most basic level for example, surveys are usually administered in the language of the reporting country, and thus those who do not have good enough command of the language are less likely to be captured.

Ireland: the main datasets utilised for the purposes of this report were i) the Census data; ii) the Quarterly National Household Survey – the data are collected and stored by the Central Statistics Office (CSO); iii) data from the Department of Social Protection, and iv) data collected by the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS)[5].

- The Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) is a nationwide survey of 39,000 households in Ireland, conducted four times each year, to produce "quarterly labour force estimates that include the official measure of employment and unemployment in the state (ILO basis)."[6] It began in September 1997, replacing the annual April Labour Force Survey (LFS). QNHS data is available by broad nationality grouping but not by specific country of nationality.

- Within the time period under consideration in this project (2000 – 2014), three national censuses were carried out in Ireland, in 2011, 2006 and 2002. The published census provides information on demographics and labour, but is limited.

- Data from the Department of Social Protection that are made publicly available include aggregate data on overall spending per support/benefit type only, with limited or no disaggregation.[7] The department was able to supply data on welfare schemes uptake, disaggregated by sex and country of nationality, for the years 2009 onwards. According to information our Irish partners received via the department, prior to 2009, a different mechanism was used to extract data, and therefore data from pre-2009 cannot be supplied. The department does not disaggregate by family/household composition.

- Finally, migration statistics are collected by the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS), the branch within the Department of Justice that has responsibility for naturalisation and immigration services. It produces little to no publicly available data on these subjects,

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[5] In addition to the sources documented, informal meetings and/or email correspondence were held with officials/staff members of the following, with a view of identifying data sources: Economic and Social Research Institute, the Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, the Department of Social Protection, and Department of Justice and Equality, The Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation and the UCD Geary Institute.

[6] Central Statistics Office, "What is the QNHS?," available at http://www.cso.ie/en/qnhs/aboutthegnhs/whatistheqnhs/

[7] Department of Social Protection, "Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services 2013," (2014), available at www.welfare.ie

other than aggregate figures on arrivals, numbers of citizens naturalised and returns, all of which are available through Eurostat.

Croatia: data are taken from i) the population census, ii) the Labour Force Survey and iii) data from the Department of Social Protection.

- The Census is conducted every ten years most recently in 2011. The 2001 census distinguishes between Croatians and foreign nationals but data have been published only partially, listing only four categories (Croatian nationals, foreign nationals, unknown citizenship and stateless persons). In the 2011 census, the countries of nationality are not all specified and there is no gender breakdown. The response to requests for the breakdown of data by nationality was that data disaggregation by citizenship cannot be obtained and that a cross-tabulation of labour/welfare statuses with citizenship has not been conducted or published.

- The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is conducted quarterly by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS). There is no disaggregation by nationality in the LFS as these sections in the datasets are left blank for non-nationals. Data mainly had to be sourced directly from the CBS. According to the CBS, under Article 4. Section 1. of Council Regulation 577/98 it is not obligatory for statistical services to ensure the representativeness of indicators of employment, unemployment or inactivity according to citizenship or country of birth, but only to gather data on citizenship as part of the LFS. On the basis of the current situation and reporting requirements, the CBS stated that it was unlikely that future iterations of the Croatian LFS will include disaggregation by these categories, as the current census demonstrates that the populations of non-citizens – both EU and non-EU citizens – are too small. Should any changes be made, they will be more likely to include attempts increase stratification by age group, gender or group of activity, as these categories are held to be more important for subsequent analyses of employment/unemployment rates.

- Data from the Department of Social Protection that are made publicly available include aggregate data on overall spending per benefit type only, with limited or no disaggregation. The department was able to supply data on welfare schemes uptake, disaggregated by sex and country of nationality. As there was such limited publicly available data, our Croatian partners contacted several public offices (via e-mail correspondence and telephone) to request access to data[8]. Response time varied from between two weeks and six weeks, depending on the office in question and/or type of data requested.

Spain: The main source of Spanish data is the *Encuesta de Población Activa* (EPA), i.e. Labour Force Survey, which collects employment and activity related data of the Spanish population quarterly. The webpage of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security provides quantitative information on foreign workers registered with Spain's Social Security system, as well as on the recruitment of foreign

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[8] The following were contacted: the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Labour and Pension System, Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, Croatian Employment Service and the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute

persons (with a contract registered with the public employment service), job applications among foreign workers and registered unemployment. Information on immigration, is available from the Survey on Living Conditions (*Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida*; ECV). There is limited data for different years disaggregated by nationality.

The Netherlands: Relevant data sources in the Netherlands are i) the Labour Force Survey; ii) *Migration Monitors*[9] commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and prepared by Statistics Netherlands and iii) StatLine – an electronic data bank of Statistics Netherlands.

- Macro data on labour market participation/status of the population published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS - Netherlands) is based on the Dutch Labour Force Survey conducted among persons aged 15 and older, excluding persons living in institutions. The public availability of the LFS micro data is limited[10]. The macro data comprises yearly and quarterly figures for years 1996 to 2014; the micro data sets are available for years 1987 to 2012 (only yearly data). The LFS conducted in the Netherlands contains no questions on benefit take-up or income. LFS data broken by nationality (and/or country of origin) can be requested (upon charge) from CBS, either in a form of custom made tables or access to micro-data. It has little data on household type and nationality. In general, Statistics Netherlands does not publish data on A2 and A8[11] due to their limited reliability. As explained by a CBS analyst, CBS can guarantee neither the precision of the estimates (owing to small numbers) nor the representativeness of the expected target population (the LFS sample does not seem to represent the population of A2 and A8 nationals working and/or living in the Netherlands.)

- To investigate the labour market position and benefit take-up of EU citizens, one can use *Migration Monitors*[12] commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and prepared by Statistics Netherlands. The *Monitor* provides macro-data; it compiles custom-made tables and dashboards on immigrants from the European Union or the candidate EU member states living, working or receiving benefits in the Netherlands between 2007 and 2012. Not all the information is available for all the periods: some information is available only for 2012, some also for 2011 and some for 2007-2012; there are also some differences

[9] There are two versions of the monitor: *Migratiemonitor 2011-2012*, accessible via: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/informatie/beleid/publicaties/maatwerk/archief/2014/140123-migrantenmonitor-2011-2012.htm, and *Migratiemonitor, fase 2 2007-2012*, accessible via: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/informatie/beleid/publicaties/maatwerk/archief/2013/130212-migrantenmonitor-fase-2-2007-2012-mw.htm

[10] Via DANS: https://easy.dans.knaw.nl, upon request in which the purpose of requesting the data has to be specified. There is no charge

[11] A8 refer to the 2004 accession countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia (Cyprus and Malta also joined in 2004 but had less restrictions placed on them so are considered separately); A2 refer to Bulgaria and Romania who joined the EU in 2007.

[12] There are two versions of the monitor: *Migratiemonitor 2011-2012*, accessible via: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/informatie/beleid/publicaties/maatwerk/archief/2014/140123-migrantenmonitor-2011-2012.htm, and *Migratiemonitor, fase 2 2007-2012*, accessible via: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/informatie/beleid/publicaties/maatwerk/archief/2013/130212-migrantenmonitor-fase-2-2007-2012-mw.htm

in the comprehensiveness and/or level of detail of information provided in different versions/editions of the monitor: *Migratiemonitor 2011-2012* and *Migratiemonitor, phase 2 2007-2011*. Data used for the *Monitors* come from the municipality registers, tax registers and (social) insurance administration. Data cannot be broken by household type.

- Some information on benefit take-up of the general population is also provided by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) via StatLine – an electronic data bank of Statistics Netherlands. This is register data. The data can be broken by household type and country of origin, but in most cases this is restricted to a number of specific countries of origin, namely those who traditionally "supply" the highest number of migrants (and are thus often construed in the public discourse as "problematic"). No information on the nationality/citizenship of the claimants is publicly available.

UK: in the UK there are quite comprehensive sources of data on migrants and households. These have their limitations, but in comparison to the other countries involved are far more detailed in their measurements. Relevant data sources are i) The Labour Force Survey; ii) DWP data on national insurance numbers; iii) ONS data drawing on the International Passenger Survey; iv) DWP data on benefit take up, sanctions.

- The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a major source of data on migrants' labour market access and household characteristics. It is a household survey conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and uses international definitions of employment and unemployment and economic inactivity, together with a wide range of related topics such as occupation, training, hours of work and personal characteristics of household members aged 16 years and over, including benefits uptake. It is based on a quarterly household sample of about 60,000 UK private households. The country of birth variable is grossed to population estimates that only include long-term migrants (staying 12 months or more) and it excludes those who have lived in the UK for less than six months (thereby missing some 'short term' immigration) (Coats, 2008). The survey includes all UK and foreign citizens, but the relatively small size of the sample (broadly speaking, one sample interviewee is weighted up to 300 people in total) means that disaggregation by nationality and migrant characteristics cannot be detailed. Annual fluctuations may reflect sampling errors (Coats, 2008; Salt, 2010). Also, the LFS is a sample survey, and as such is subject to sampling errors. Small sample sizes and the methods of data collection mean that the LFS tends to under-estimate proportions of migrants who in some ways differ from the established population, that is, categories which are most likely to be vulnerable in the labour market, are less likely to be included (Jayaweera & Anderson, 2008).

- The Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) provides data on the new national insurance numbers (NINO) allocated to foreign workers. Every foreign worker who is legally employed requires a NINO so the allocation of new numbers should give an indication of the annual increment to the workforce. However, it does not measure who leaves. The DWP also issues publicly available data on benefits take up (although this is not disaggregated by nationality) and sanctions data.

- Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) are the official government statistics on migration to and from the UK, produced by ONS by adjustments to the International Passenger Survey (IPS). The IPS is a voluntary sample survey that needs to be scaled up and relies on people

stating their *intentions* regarding their entry to the UK. The IPS uses an interpretation of the United Nations definition of a long-term international migrant, which specifies that a person must stay in the country for at least a year in order to be properly considered as such. It therefore misses those whose intended stay is less than this at time of arrival. IPS/LTIM categorize migrants differently from administrative sources. IPS asks respondents to name their primary 'reason for migrating', and classifies migrants accordingly. Administrative data, by contrast, classify migrants by the type of visa on which they enter. Administrative data is provided by the Home Office on immigration statistics, including grants of settlement, visa grants, and citizenship acquisitions. A significant amount of data is publicly available. Full access to the LFS is available to recognized research institutions free of charge upon request.

Israel: Data sources referred to are i) the Labour Force Survey; ii) immigration data from the Central bureau of Statistics; and iii) data collected by the Population and Immigration Authority (PIBA).

- The Labour Force Survey is a major regular survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) among households. The survey follows the development of the labour force in Israel, its size and characteristics, as well as the extent of unemployment and other trends. Data regarding benefits is collected mainly by the Israeli National Insurance Institute.

- Immigration data are collected each year as part of the statistical abstract produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS- Israel). The data is quite rich and detailed, and includes references to the type of permit, former continent/country of residence, family status, age and gender. It also addresses some information regarding immigrants' status in Israel, such as place of residence and knowledge of the Hebrew language. There is a focus on "waves of immigration" (i.e. different periods such as the 70s, 80s etc.) and the relation to other indicators.

- While the CBS regularly collects data regarding immigration, and in recent years added some basic information regarding labour migrants, part of the data regarding labour migrants and the majority of data regarding asylum seekers are collected by the Population and Immigration Authority (PIBA). PIBA produces detailed quarterly reports which include information about asylum seekers, labour migrants and tourists.

Eurostat was established in 1953 to meet the requirements of the Coal and Steel Community. It then became a Directorate-General (DG) of the European Commission when the European Community was founded in 1958, with its remit widened as a result. Eurostat's key role is to supply statistics to the Commission and other European Institutions so they can define, implement and analyse Community policies. Responsibility for sample selection, questionnaire design and fieldwork lies with member states' national statistical offices, who then forward the results to Eurostat, employing a common coding scheme. *As new member states join the EU they are called upon to contribute to* Eurostat – the European the statistical office of the European Union, which provides statistics at European level that enable comparisons between countries and regions. As its website states: '*This is a key task. Democratic societies do not function properly without a solid basis of reliable and objective statistics.*'

For the EU states in the study, there is a notable difference between the quality and availability of data on migrants in the UK and the Netherlands on the one hand, and Spain, Ireland and Croatia on the other. This divide follows the division between traditional countries of immigration, and those that have only recently started to regard themselves in this light.

The UK in particular has put in place a number of mechanisms to gather data and to monitor for quality. It is possible to access a lot of data on the web and to ask for further detail if necessary. Data is also available by household type and nationality. Much of this is freely available. In the Netherlands micro data is available, though obtaining it requires payment.

In contrast teams in Ireland, Spain and particularly Croatia found it difficult to get data. In Ireland, the key challenge is that the sample size of the QNHS is relatively small, and data disaggregated by nationality is consequently not publically available and the CSO is unwilling to release the raw micro-data. As a result, only limited findings that are disaggregated by nationality/nationality groupings can be extracted from the QNHS. However, raw micro-data files from the census can be made available to researchers, upon granting of approval by the CSO.

Croatia considers itself a migration transit rather than destination country and collects next to no data on 'migrants'. While there are foreign nationals residing in Croatia Croatian public bodies have not yet seen the need to monitor their economic activity and benefit take-up and 'migrants' are thus mainly absent from the data. A full list of nationalities from the 2001 census was provided upon request, but at a charge. The Croatian team observed:

> 'the issue with Croatian official statistics cannot be said to be the quality, comprehensiveness or methodological presumptions of the existing data – it is the existence of data on the labour market and welfare benefits, much of which was never gathered in a form differentiating among the categories of nationality or household type'.

It will be interesting to see how this changes with Croatia's membership of the EU.

In Spain, data available from the webpage of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security are not consistent and only include information on foreign nationals from 2009.

Not all of the data commonly collected by EUROSTAT and additional European data sets are collected on a regular basis in Israel. There is more information regarding different population groups in CBS data than in the National Insurance Institute data, where information in general is limited, particularly in relation to specific groups in the population. There is no data on family type and benefit uptake or in relation to work status. The LFS does not disaggregate by population groups. Instead, data presented in the spreadsheets regarding different population groups refers to the 'percentage of participants in the civilian labour force': this includes individuals aged 15 and above who are available for work (employed and unemployed). Owing to Israel's particular immigration policy whereby

immigrants entering via the Law of Return receive Israeli nationality immediately upon arrival (except migrant workers and asylum seekers), there is no significant group of 'other nationalities'. Labour migrants are not included in the LFS. Some data is available for differences between the Arab population and the Jewish population, and between Jewish immigrants of the 1990s and the rest of the population (but again, they are Israeli citizens).

DEFINITIONS OF 'MIGRANT'

As anticipated definitional issues are a critical data challenge. Who counts as a 'migrant' can vary between national datasets and also between states. Migrants can be defined in at least three different ways: by place of birth (i.e. foreign-born), nationality (i.e. foreign citizens – dual nationality is typically not captured), and in some states by length of stay. Anticipated length of stay has particular importance in terms of international comparative data because this is the UN definition of long term international migrant 'LTIM': "A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year [….] so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence". This is the definition used for global estimates of migration such as those put out by the UNDP. The dominance of one definition in one state may make comparison difficult with another state and it can also make comparison between different datasets within the same state problematic. Different definitions have significant consequences for data, both in terms of numbers of migrants (stocks and flows) and for the analysis of the impacts of migration. Conflicting definitions pose challenges for policy, particularly since many 'migrants' are not subject to immigration control and legislation[13]. There is also often a problem with small sample size, and lack of representativeness which means that states can be reluctant to put data into the public domain. This is particularly the case when examining the intersection between citizenship and welfare.

So for example:

- **UK**: In the past, foreign-born has been most commonly used definitions in the UK debates on immigration and the economy, which have tended to use LFS and APS data. The recent policy focus on reducing 'net migration' has meant considerable public interest on IPS data which the ONS uses for estimating the figure. It should be noted that the state of citizenship in this case is irrelevant. A UK national returning to the UK after a period abroad of longer than 12 months would count as a 'migrant' for the purposes of data.

- **Spain:** Migrants are identified by nationality, not by country of birth. Data only seems to be available by country of origin for the foreign population belonging to the "European Union" or the "rest of Europe".

- **Netherlands:** Migrants are defined both by country of birth and nationality, but the Dutch Statistics office prefers to use country of birth, as nationality is subject to change.

- **Ireland:** Data are collected on both nationality and country of birth, and it is country of nationality that is typically used as a disaggregating criterion. Naturalised Irish are captured as 'Irish' in data collection and analysis. However, there are good reasons to assume that in practice

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[13] For further discussion of definitional issues see Migration Observatory briefing *Who counts as a migrant? Definitions and their consequences*. Available from: http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/who-counts-migrant-definitions-and-their-consequences

this group might have different labour market and welfare access outcomes when compared with Irish-born citizens.

- **Croatia:** Both census and LFS ask about citizenship. The Census inquires about both ethnicity and citizenship, but the LFS only differentiates according to citizenship. In the LFS data distinguish between 'Croatian' and 'persons not born in Croatia', the latter being very small sample size (in an actual example cited from the LFS, less than 0.3% of surveyed respondents were not Croatian citizens). A complicating factor in Croatians is that the majority of foreign nationals have the citizenship of one of the neighbouring ex-Yugoslav countries (46% of all foreign citizens in Croatia are citizens of either Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia or Montenegro), and as such were (themselves or their parents) effectively *nationals* prior to the dissolution of the common state in the early 1990s.

- **Israel:** In Israel, immigrants are defined as persons who enter Israel for the purpose of permanent residency under the Law of Return or the Law of Entry. Unlike EU countries, there are rarely immigrants who hold non-Israeli citizenship. Jewish immigrants receive Israeli citizenship (generally upon arrival in the country) and are entitled to the same social rights as native Israelis. Refugees and labour migrants, on the other hand, do not have access to most social rights and benefits and are not entitled to receive Israeli citizenship or even permanent residence status. Data collected on basis of religion (Jewish and 'other') and Arab populations (Israeli citizens)

In sum, the UK, Netherlands and Ireland have data on 'migrants' by citizenship and by country of birth. Spain only has data by citizenship, Croatia distinguishes between those born and not born in Croatia, and by citizenship. Figure 1 below gives the 'migrant' share of the population in the selected EU partner countries in 2013 using the definition of migrant as non-citizen. As is evident, Croatia has a very low percentage indeed. Data are taken from different sources for the UK, and as such are not strictly comparable but rather used for illustrative purposes.

Figure 1: Foreign nationals (age 15-64) as a share of total population (age 15-64), by nationality grouping, 2013 (%)

Source: Eurostat [migr_pop1ctz]

^UK data for A8/ A2 taken from ONS as total age

It should be noted that the European Commission does not generally use the term 'migrant' to refer to intra-European mobility. When Austria, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands in a joint letter to the Irish presidency and the Commission complained about "certain immigrants from other member states", the then Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström protested that "EU citizens who have the right to travel, live, work and study where ever they want in the Union are put on a par with immigrants from countries outside the EU. For instance, they are being called EU immigrants, a concept that does not exist". She was supported by the then Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. In a speech to the Trieste Citizens' Dialogue, Reding wanted " Let language not betray us: European citizens exercising their right to free movement are not 'immigrants'."[14]

(DIS)AGGREGATION

Different countries have different ways of (dis)aggregating data. In Ireland for example QHNS data is available by broad nationality grouping (Ireland, UK, Polish, and EU15-25/27) but not by specific country of nationality. States are not internally consistent in disaggregations, either between data sets or over time. So in Ireland labour activity data is sometimes disaggregated by A2 and A8 data and

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[14] http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2015-02-06-hansenp-en.html.

sometimes not and datasets vary over time according to which countries are included in which nationality groupings[15].

Dutch statistics divide aggregate data into autochthone (native Dutch, officially defined as persons whose parents were both born in the Netherlands, regardless of where he/she was born) vs. allochthone (non-native Dutch, officially defined as: persons with at least one parent born abroad). The category of allochthones is typically split into western and non-western allochthones. Western allochthones are allochthones who, or whose parents, come from Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia or Japan. Statistics Netherlands explains that allochthones coming from Indonesia and Japan are classified as "Western" due to their socio-economic and socio-cultural position. The category encompasses persons born the Dutch East Indies and employees of Japanese companies and their family members. Non-western allochthones are allochthones who, or whose parents, come from Africa, Latin America, Asia (excl. Indonesia and Japan) and Turkey.

Different disaggregations and groupings can make interstate comparability extremely limited.

Eurostat population aggregates are grouped as EU27 and EU15. There is no aggregation of newer member states such as 2004 accession countries, commonly referred to as A8. Croatia, Ireland, the Netherlands (the LFS) were reluctant to release data in relation to A8/A2 migrants because of small sample size. Data on these populations groups in the UK can be gleaned from the LFS, but again the relative size of the sample is small, and with further disaggregation by gender and/or household type, reliability is poor. It is also worth noting that people who have the citizenship of a non-EU but EEA member state (such as Switzerland or Norway for example) are typically included in the data as non-EU migrants in line with Eurostat. However, unlike other Third Country Nationals, EEA nationals generally share many of the rights of EU citizens.

'Household' is a further type of aggregation that it is important not to let pass unremarked. All national datasets deploy this concept posing definitional challenges and raising issues about who is included and omitted. As with citizenship aggregations there is not necessarily consistency across different datasets in the same country – in Croatia for example household types are differentiated according to different categories in different datasets, making comparisons across datasets difficult. In Israel, 'household' is "one person or a group of people living together in an apartment most days of the week and manage together their food budget." The definition includes people who are not family members or relatives (for example, flat mates). However, the 'households population' according to CBS (i.e. included in data collection) does not include Kibbutzim, institutions, student halls and people who live outside recognized settlements (such as the unrecognized Bedouin villages).

The focus on the household can mean that migrants are missed if they are living in communal housing situations – such as direct provision in Ireland for instance, or employer provided accommodation in

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[15] It is interesting to note that in 2011 data on Polish migrants was specifically reported, unlike other nationalities (other than UK, which has historically represented the largest cohort of migrants within Ireland).

the UK. The homeless too are excluded from such datasets. According to FEANTSA, the European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless there are currently no official European statistics on homelessness. [16] At national level, data collection on homelessness is developing rapidly in most EU countries, allowing for better homeless policies, monitoring and measurement. However, there is no universally accepted definition of homelessness, nor a common European definition. [17] In some EU member states, homelessness is still limited to the most visible and needy category of rough sleepers. As a result, it excludes those living in homeless shelters or very precarious housing conditions and substandard housing and people at imminent risk of homelessness due to very insecure tenure or ownership, which in effect amounts to homelessness. [18] As 'worker' status and/or self-sufficiency is key to eligibility for residency of EU nationals in another member state, data on the homeless population could be fruitful for exploration of the limitations of citizenship and reasons why people are homeless particularly since countries such as the UK are implementing voluntary return programmes for EEA nationals found not to be self-sufficient. [19]

To sum up: the question of who counts as a migrant in data, and whether primacy is given to country of birth or nationality depends on the state in question, and this, in turn depends on the state's history of diaspora and colonialism as discussed in D10.1. [20] At the European level, Eurostat also gives many caveats– in relation to data reliability and comparability. Indeed, the migration data reported by the individual countries in Eurostat are not completely comparable (neither between countries nor

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[16] FEANTSA was established in 1989 as a European non-governmental organisation to prevent and alleviate the poverty and social exclusion of people threatened by or living in homelessness. It is the only major European network that focuses exclusively on homelessness. For more information see http://www.feantsa.org/spip.php?rubrique13&lang=en

[17] http://www.feantsa.org/spip.php?article3381&lang=en

[18] Data from the UK in the form of small scale studies indicate the increasing prevalence of migrants within the street homeless population. Data from the Combined Homelessness and Information Network (CHAIN), a multi-agency database recording information about rough sleepers and the wider street population in London reveals that in London, just over half all rough sleepers are non-UK nationals (54%) with 31% of those from Central and Eastern Europe and 10% from other European countries. About 14% of rough sleepers are non-EU nationals. [18] Outside London, research shows rough sleepers are much more likely to be UK nationals (75%) or EU nationals (20%). [18] Some scholars have pointed to the current UK policy environment in the area of migration and welfare as a potential reason for this trend, with the gradual recalibration of European welfare states entailing increasingly restrictive regimes for migrants (Hemerijck, 2013).

[19] For further details, see: http://www.thamesreach.org.uk/what-we-do/international-reconnection/london-reconnection-project/

[20] D10.1 *Report on the rights and obligations of citizens and non-citizens in selected countries* evidenced how a country's immigration policy is informed by the state's colonial history. For example, individual states give preferential access to migrants on the basis of shared ethnicity (Croatia), religion (Israel), colonial history (Spain). The immigration policies of Croatia, Ireland and Spain were to varying degrees designed with the diaspora in mind. In these instances immigration policies must be contextualised within historical relations, and ideas about 'return', and 'the nation'. Under the law of Return, Jewish people can enter Israel and automatically claim citizenship on arrival. For full report see: http://beucitizen.eu/publications/report-on-the-rights-and-obligations-of-citizens-and-non-citizens-in-selected-countries/

over time). Furthermore, not all those who are 'migrants' in data are subject to immigration controls (including intra-EU mobility), that is, the migrant in the data does not simply map on to the migrant in law which potentially raises issues for evidence based immigration policy. This poses problems for even quite elementary comparative analysis between states. It is further complicated by states' different ways of aggregating populations.

Having outlined key datasets, the ease with which they can or cannot be accessed, and the challenges for comparability raised by definitions and disaggregation, we now turn to how data can or cannot be used to inform the findings of D10.1 and, potentially our next deliverable D10.3 following our themes of entry, naturalisation and social security. Before doing so however it is worth noting that migrants — and more particularly recently arrived migrants — are likely to be under represented in both the EU‑LFS and EU‑SILC. Some migrants will have been missed from the sampling frame (which is designed to ensure a representative coverage of the overall population, rather than specifically migrants).

The below schema outlines how the themes are covered in datasets.

Dataset	Axes of in/exclusion
EUROSTAT: First permits by reason and citizenship as a percentage of total permits issued	Access to state territory. Hierarchical inclusion
EUROSTAT: Number of first permits issued per category as a percentage of the total permits issued by gender	Access to state territory: gendered processes
EUROSTAT: Share of spouses joining EU or non-EU citizen (as a percentage of total spouses)	Access to state territory: gendered processes and greater dependency of women
UK - Home Office Immigration Statistics: Grants of settlement by category of grant	Access to state territory
Statistics Netherlands: Family migration of non-Dutch by EU/non-EU country of origin and gender	Access to state territory
Clandestino project database on irregular migration: Estimate of irregular migrant population in selected countries	Access to state territory – hidden populations
Israel CBS (office for national statistics): Migration flows by permit/reason for access approval	Access to state territory: Privileged access on basis religion/ diaspora
EUROSTAT: Acquisition of citizenship by former citizenship: top ten nationalities, 2012	Access to state territory: missing temporal aspect
UK Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey: UK residents born outside the UK by nationality grouping	Access to state territory. Diversity of European citizens. Temporal aspect missing
Ireland – raw data emailed by Department for Social Protection: Distribution of recipients of Lone Parent Allowance by nationality grouping	Access to social benefits.
Ireland- raw data emailed by Department for Social Protection: Benefit receipt rate by nationality group of job seeker benefits (as percentage of whole working population)	Access to social benefits
Netherlands-Migration Monitor: Distribution of unemployment benefit recipients by nationality grouping (% of total beneficiaries)	Access to social benefits
Netherlands-Migration Monitor: Benefit receipt rate of EU foreign nationals by nationality	Access to social benefits
UK Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey: Benefit receipt rate (unemployment benefit and income support) by nationality grouping (%(of total benefits claimants)	Access to social benefits
UK Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey: Distribution of benefits recipients by nationality grouping (% of total beneficiaries per benefit type)	Access to social benefits
Spain Ministry of Labour and Social Security datasets: Benefit receipt rate by nationality grouping, 2013	Access to social benefits
Eurostat: Employment rate of female migrants by nationality grouping (age 15-64)	Access to labour market: gendered divisions
UK Home Office Immigration Statistics: Refusal of citizenship by reason	Access to naturalisation
UK Home Office Immigration Statistics: Number of EEA nationals removed from UK for criminal behaviour	Access to state territory. Enforcement
Israel PIBA: Israel enforcement data	Access to state territory. Enforcement
UK: Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) UK Decisions to apply a sanction for Jobseekers allowance	Access to social benefits. Enforcement

Visa on entry is critical for understanding the rights of different groups of migrants, whether they are eligible to access certain benefits, whether their visa is renewable, whether they can be joined by family etc. For this reason we have amalgamated data on entry and data on status. However, visas available and rights attached to them clearly vary significantly from state to state, so for example a dependent visa issued in Croatia cannot be directly compared with the rights attached to a dependent visa issued in Spain. Broad groupings according to whether entry status relates to asylum, family or work are available in national datasets and Eurostat which categorises residence permits[21] as issued for family, education, remuneration and other reasons.[22]

Figure 2: First permits by reason and citizenship as a percentage of total permits issued

Source : Eurostat [migr_resfirst]. Own calculations. Age: total

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[21] Any authorisation valid for at least 3 months issued by the authorities of a Member State allowing a non-EU citizen to stay legally on its territory. When national laws and administrative practices of a Member State allow for specific categories of long-term visa or immigration status to be granted instead of residence permits, such visas and grants of statuses are also included in these statistics. Statistics on first residence permits presented in this report refer to non-EU citizens only and include persons subject to an authorisation to stay with a validity of at least 3 months and consequently these statistics are different than statistics on migration to the reporting countries (whereby a migrant is a person who stays or intends to stay in the country for at least 12 months).

[22] Include permits issued for residence only (e.g. pensioners with sufficient financial means), international protection status (including refugee status and subsidiary protection), humanitarian reasons, permits issued to non-asylum related unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking in human beings and other reasons not specified (e.g. beneficiaries of national regularisation programmes, diplomats).

The remunerated activity and family categories are of particular interest to WP10 on account of the ways in which they structure hierarchical access to state territory. However, the data do not enable researchers to access this level of detail: 'Remunerated activity' includes highly diverse statuses including highly-skilled migrants, self-employed, seasonal workers and au pairs. As discussed in D10.1, undertaking "remunerated activity" does not necessarily mean that a person counts as a worker for the purposes of rights to access welfare benefits or indeed rights of residence as an EU citizen. Furthermore, in D10.1 we discussed the ways in which the wealthy are granted preferential access to territory through a variety of mechanisms, but only the UK collects data on settlement grants on basis of 'As business or self-employed, or as persons of independent means'. (Interestingly, as table 2 below shows, numbers show a threefold increase in numbers entering via this route from 2012 to 2013).

Data on entry for the purposes of family are further broken down by Eurostat to show categories of spouse/partner (but there is no gender breakdown), child and other family members joining either an EU or a non-EU citizen via first residence permit[23]. Available data, as shown in Table 1 below, reveals the number of first permits issued per category as a percentage of the total permits issued by gender.

Table 1: Number of first permits issued per category as a percentage of the total permits issued by gender

	Family		Education		Remunerated		Other	
	male	female	male	female	male	female	male	female
Ireland	5.9	6.5	65.6	65.0	14.2	10.4	14.2	18.1
Spain	55.3	54.4	12.7	14.1	25.6	25.6	6.5	5.9
Croatia	53.6	75.0	5.7	5.4	28.1	9.0	12.6	10.5
Netherlands	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
UK	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

Source: Eurostat.

Data are entirely based on administrative sources with the exception of the United Kingdom[24].

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[23] In the UK, Passenger entry data do not clearly distinguish people admitted as parents, grandparents, and other relatives of UK citizens or residents. Such relatives are tracked in data on grants of settlement. Passenger entry data also do not show how many spouses or fiancé(e)s are (to be) married to British citizens, as opposed to migrants with indefinite leave to remain in the UK. Again, this information is available for grants of settlement since 2006. Data do not show how many of those British citizens were foreign-born themselves (Migration Observatory).

[24] Statistics for the United Kingdom use different data sources to those used in other Member States. For that reason, the statistics on residence permits published by Eurostat for UK may not be fully comparable with the statistics reported by other countries. Statistics for the United Kingdom are not based on records of residence permits issued (as the United Kingdom does not operate a system of residence permits), but instead relate to the numbers of arriving non-EU citizens permitted to enter the country under selected immigration categories*.*

Figure 3. Share of spouses joining EU or non-EU citizen (as a percentage of total spouses)

Source: Eurostat [migr_resfirst]. Own calculations. No data for Croatia

While Eurostat has no gender breakdown of those who are using the dependent category of entry, at national level in the UK it is evident that women constitute a far larger share of those obtaining settlement as a spouse or partner than do men.

Table 2. UK: Grants of settlement by category of grant

Broad category	Broad category	Category	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
*Total	*Total	*Total	139,209	179,121	134,446	124,854	148,936	194,781	241,192	166,878	129,749	154,689
Own right or on a discretionary basis	*Total	*Total	45,614	70,107	41,668	36,745	45,242	61,484	106,214	65,082	45,686	56,488
Spouses and dependants	*Total	*Total	89,081	104,382	88,205	84,202	102,785	132,984	134,580	101,444	83,796	97,969
total spouses			37,875	45,968	53,023	47,199	57,396	77,381	75,774	59,656	52,921	66,307
Spouses and dependants	**Husbands**	***Total**	**12,643**	**15,758**	**18,551**	**18,072**	**23,221**	**27,464**	**26,351**	**19,590**	**16,577**	**20,106**
as a % total spousal**			*33*	*34*	*35*	*38*	*40*	*35*	*35*	*33*	*31*	*30*
Spouses and dependants	**Wives**	***Total**	**25,232**	**30,210**	**34,472**	**29,127**	**34,175**	**49,917**	**49,423**	**40,066**	**36,344**	**46,201**
as a % total spousal**			*67*	*66*	*65*	*62*	*60*	*65*	*65*	*67*	*69*	*70*
Spouses and dependants	Children	*Total	40,815	45,445	25,665	30,219	38,958	48,232	50,904	35,698	25,464	28,221
Spouses and dependants	Parents and grandparents joining children or	*Total	1,984	1,449	1,469	1,001	975	1,003	1,766	1,783	1,389	784

		grandchildren										
Own right or on a discretionary basis	Asylum	*Total	19,027	33,849	19,073	10,251	1,995	2,102	3,158	7,493	6,498	11,168
Own right or on a discretionary basis	Work	On completion of qualifying period with a work permit	16,206	25,468	11,272	15,166	23,272	25,425	23,053	15,056	9,431	6,985
Own right or on a discretionary basis	Work	Tier 1 High Value Migrants	:	:	:	:	4	1,568	3,783	9,071	13,936	14,490
Own right or on a discretionary basis	Work	Tier 2 Sponsored with a job	:	:	:	:	:	425	2,829	4,182	4,292	5,165
Own right or on a discretionary basis	Work	Tier 5 Temporary workers and Youth Mobility	:	:	:	:	:	0	1	1	3	5
Own right or on a discretionary basis	Work	On completion of qualifying period in permit-free employment	1,324	1,624	672	791	1,735	4,779	5,260	2,217	1,256	1,262

Own right or on a discretionary basis	Work	As business or self employed, or as persons of independent means	219	321	2,595	75	329	102	523	520	318	959

Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics Oct-Dec 2014: Table se_01[25]
** Own calculations

Gendered breakdown is not available for the difference categories of family migration route, only for family migration as compared to other methods of obtaining a first residence permit.

Data from the Netherlands, see Table 3 below, shows greater percentage of females than males entering via the family route.

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[25] Excludes EEA nationals. In April 2003 the 'probationary period' (initial grant of leave) to spouses and unmarried partners of settled sponsors was increased from one year to two. In July 2012 the 'probationary period' (initial grant of leave) to spouses and unmarried partners of settled sponsors was increased from two years to five.

Table 3. Netherlands: Family migration of non-Dutch by EU/non-EU country of origin and gender

	Total - all countries			EU-total			non-EU		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
	N.	%	%	N.	%	%	N.	%	%
2000	34216	35%	65%	6642	37%	63%	27574	35%	65%
2001	36349	36%	64%	6343	38%	62%	30006	36%	64%
2002	35879	36%	64%	5317	38%	62%	30562	36%	64%
2003	34838	37%	63%	4900	41%	59%	29938	36%	64%
2004	28313	36%	64%	4120	40%	60%	24193	35%	65%
2005	25512	37%	63%	5980	39%	61%	19532	36%	64%
2006	26077	36%	64%	7061	40%	60%	19016	35%	65%
2007	25675	38%	62%	9644	40%	60%	16031	37%	63%
2008	32914	39%	61%	11474	42%	58%	21440	37%	63%
2009	34131	40%	60%	12102	42%	58%	22029	39%	61%
2010	36179	40%	60%	13761	42%	58%	22418	38%	62%
2011	37889	39%	61%	15142	42%	58%	22747	38%	62%

Source: cbs (Statistics Netherlands)

As D10.1 revealed, in EU member states hierarchies of entry are dependent upon citizenship status, wealth or skills except for those considered part of the diaspora understood as shared ethnicity/common descent (Croatia, Spain, Ireland), or religion (Israel: Law of Return). There is an evident move towards a knowledge-based economy and attracting the 'brightest and the best' across the EU, with resultant restricted access for family migration and lower skilled workers. Thus, access revolves around the management of the mobility of 'the poor', except where co-ethnicity/ religion provides access to 'poor' but in some cases this is curtailed by EU membership. As table 2 above shows for the UK, 'high value' migrants are granted far more grants of settlement than those in lower skilled jobs (Tier 5).

In D10.1 we discussed the so-called 'Surinder Singh' route, whereby couples invoke their rights as an EU citizen under free movement law to be able to be joined by a Third country national (TCN) spouse/dependent[26]. As an EU citizen, rather than a national of the state where they are residing,

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[26] In its judgment the ECJ held that a European citizen might be deterred from leaving his/her country of origin in order to work in another EU country if, on returning to his/her home country, his/her spouse and children were not also permitted to enter and reside in the citizen's country of origin under the same conditions that apply to an EU citizen going to live in an EU country other than his home country. The ECJ therefore ruled that an EU citizen who has gone to another Member State in order to work there and returns to his home country has the right to be accompanied by his spouse and children whatever their nationality. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:61990CJ0370&qid=1396704743754&from=EN. See D10.1 report page 24 for further details: http://beucitizen.eu/publications/report-on-the-rights-and-obligations-of-citizens-and-non-citizens-in-selected-countries/

they do not have to fulfil the requirements such as income thresholds that nationals have to fulfil. Having been joined by their TCN family they can then return to their state of citizenship without having to fulfil the requirements of their state of citizenship either. While use of Surinder Singh does seem to be increasing it is not possible to ascertain this from Eurostat data.

UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS

One obvious limitation of the data available on migration is the difficulty of capturing undocumented migrants (including illegal entrants, overstayers, those breaking conditions of stay, failed asylum seekers). Undocumented migrants are an 'archetypal' hidden population, a group whose very nature makes them invisible to the state, and the majority of whom one might assume actively avoid visibility to the state. While their numbers may be estimated using a variety of methodologies, and some states have estimated ranges of numbers, these estimations are often highly politicised and uncertain – as identified by the Clandestino project[27]. Data from the Clandestino project on total stocks of irregular foreign residents are available for the UK, Spain and the Netherlands. However, as can be seen from Table 4 below, estimates vary widely.

Table 4. Estimate of irregular migrant population in selected countries

Country	year	Min estimate	Max estimate
Netherlands	2005	63,320	113,912
Spain	2009	300,000	390,000
UK	2008	417,000	863,000

Source: Clandestino project database on irregular migration[28]

There are no data for Croatia or Ireland. Unofficial data from an Irish NGO, MRCI published late last year in a report which conducted 500 surveys with undocumented migrants estimates that there are between 20,000 and 26,000 undocumented migrants – including children and families – living and working in Ireland.[29]

An important exception to the paucity of data on status is the data available on asylum seekers, even in Croatia and Ireland where migration data is very limited. In this way it could be said that EU

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[27] The Clandestino project 'Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable Data and Trends Across Europe' ran from 2007 -2009 with the aim of providing an inventory of data and estimates on undocumented migration (stocks and flows) in selected EU countries, and exploring the ethics and limitations of the data. For more information, see: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/

[28] http://irregular-migration.net//index.php?id=161

[29] http://www.mrci.ie/our-work/justice-for-undocumented/

encouragement of collecting data on asylum (required under EU harmonisation of asylum procedures) has effectively resulted in asylum seekers becoming hypervisible.

DATA ON NATURALISATION

In all EU states examined except Croatia it is possible to obtain data on number of naturalisations. In Croatia there are no easily accessible data on the acquisition of citizenship and there appears to be some reluctance to make this data public. In recent years the Ministry of Interior has released limited information upon request. However, delivery of requested data is often only partial, necessitating repeated requests for full data. Since the time delay between each request and delivery of data may be about 30 or 40 days, it is common for researchers to then be unable to include data in their research.

In Israel, information regarding the numbers of people who acquired citizenship through the law of return during 2000-2014 is not available. Numbers are very likely to be similar to those of immigrants entering according to the law of return, with some minor exceptions such as people who choose not to receive an Israeli citizenship. Table 5 below shows the numbers of immigrants entering via the Law of Return to be far higher than those entering via the Law of Entry. It can be assumed the majority of the former acquired Israeli citizenship.

Table 5. Israel: Migration flows by permit/reason for access approval

Year	Immigrants according to the law of return[30]	Immigrants according to the law of entrance[31]
2000	58,292	2,356
2001	41,166	2,652
2002	31,031	2,539
2003	22,684	589
2004	17,694	3,205
2005	17,758	3,425
2006	15,786	3,483
2007	14,687	3,444
2008	12,268	1,433

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[30] The *Law of Return* (1950) "grants every Jew, wherever he may be, the right to come to Israel as an *oleh* (a Jew immigrating to Israel) and become an Israeli citizen... ". Amendments in the law during the 1970's extended this right to include also the child and the grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of the grandchild of a Jew. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the purpose of this extended definition is "to ensure the unity of families, where intermarriage had occurred" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website).

[31] The Law of Entry into Israel provides the Minister of Interior with the authority to grant three types of long-term residency permits: visitor permit (tourist visa or temporary work visa); temporary resident permit; and permanent resident visa. The decision to issue this permits and extend them, as well as decisions regarding granting citizenship for non-Jews, are largely based on the discretion of the Minister of Interior.

2009	14,453	121
2010	15,156	1,478
2011	14,298	2,595
2012	14,219	2,339
2013	15,691	1,193

Source: CBS Data: http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/cw_usr_view_SHTML?ID=635

Even in Israel, where the majority of Jewish citizens obtain citizenship on arrival, publicly published data do not include information on those who acquired citizenship or residency according to the Law of Entrance and it is therefore not possible to ascertain how many of these new citizens/residents were partners or family members of Israeli citizens. To obtain such information, one can formally request it from PIBA according to the Freedom of Information Law. Such requests usually involve a long wait.

While naturalisation data is available by gender, possibilities for analysis for our purposes are limited. D10.1 found that in many states certain groups have preferential access to naturalisation, either because they are particularly wealthy, or because of states' claims on their diasporic populations. There is a difference between those for whom naturalisation is a prize and those for whom it is an entitlement. For those whose access to naturalisation is not shaped by ethnicity/diaspora, naturalisation is a 'privilege'. In contrast, those whose access is shaped by ethnicity/diaspora often have facilitated naturalisation processes. Thus preferential access to citizenship is evident for some groups yet the data cannot always show how these patterns of in/exclusion play out. As table 6 below shows, some patterns of preferential access can be gauged from the data, in the case of Spain for example where due to historical colonial ties there is a fast track naturalisation process for immigrants from Latin American countries, who are required to have only two years residency as opposed to the standard ten years and who accounted for 84% of naturalisations in 2010.

Table 6. Acquisition of citizenship by former citizenship: top ten nationalities, 2012 (age: 15-64)

Ireland		Spain		Croatia		The Netherlands		UK	
Nigeria	4,674	Ecuador	19,553	Bosnia and Herzegovina	372	Morocco	5,007	India	20,384
Philippines	3,277	Colombia	12,590	Serbia	139	Turkey	3,558	Pakistan	14,834
India	2,092	Morocco	7,245	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the	63	Iraq	1,088	Nigeria	6,489
Pakistan	1,088	Peru	6,983	Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG)	51	Somalia	890	China (including Hong Kong)	6,333
China (including Hong Kong)	755	Dominican Republic	4,829	Slovenia	47	Afghanistan	825	Philippines	6,226
Ukraine	738	Bolivia	4,035	Austria	42	Suriname	744	South Africa	5,699
South Africa	625	Argentina	3,023	Russia	26	Thailand	539	Sri Lanka	4,974
Moldova	553	Cuba	1,849	Italy	17	Iran	499	Bangladesh	4,866
Bangladesh	453	Venezuela	1,682	China (including Hong Kong)	12	Ghana	427	Zimbabwe	4,286
Romania	431	Brazil	1,238	Poland/ Romania/ Czech Republic	11	China (including Hong Kong)	388	Turkey	4,144

Source: Eurostat

This data can also be uncovered when EU citizens become visible through moving to another EU member state. Research by the Migration Observatory (2015) analysed the UK Labour Force Survey and found that many people using EU free movement rights are naturalised citizens of member states i.e. are not EU citizens by birth. Figure 4 shows the various changes in the UK's foreign born population since the first quarter of 2004 in relation to nationality.

Figure 4 . UK residents born outside the UK by nationality grouping, 2004-2015

Source: Migration Observatory (2015) derived from Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey

Results from other EU countries suggest that this phenomenon is by no means unique to the UK. Table 7 below presents the top ten EU countries in number of EU national population who are non-EU born. In 2011, Germany had the largest number of migrants from EU countries who were born outside the EU, followed by the UK and then Spain. Of the bEUcitizen WP10 partner countries, as a share of all EU citizens living in the country, the size of the non-EU born EU citizen population is similar in the UK, the Netherlands, and Spain.

Table 7. Top 10 EU countries in number of EU national population who are non-EU born, 2011 EU Census

	Non-EU born & EU nationals Number	Non-EU born & EU nationals As % of all EU nationals
Germany	245,000	10%
United Kingdom	**210,000**	**7%**
Spain	**126,000**	**6%**
France	51,000	4%
Belgium	42,000	6%
Switzerland	37,000	4%
Italy	22,000	2%
Netherlands	**22,000**	**7%**
Sweden	13,000	5%
Cyprus	13,000	12%

Source: Migration Observatory (2015) derived from EU Census 2011, sourced from the European Statistical System; EU nationals exclude the reporting country of residence. Note: numbers rounded to nearest 1,000.

What these data do not tell us however is how long non-EU born EU citizens have lived in other EU countries before acquiring a nationality that gives them EU citizenship and then moving to another EU member state. Some will have lived within the EU for years, perhaps having moved for work or family before becoming eligible for naturalisation. Others are likely to have been born abroad to EU-born parents who had emigrated temporarily or permanently to a country outside the EU; they would be considered eligible for citizenship through their parents but counted in the data as non-EU born (Migration Observatory, 2015). In certain countries, such as Ireland and Croatia, some people can qualify for citizenship even if they or their parents never lived there, based on the ancestry of their grandparents or great-grandparents. From the datasets of these migrants' state of EU citizenship it is extremely difficult to know the numbers of people naturalising through these routes. Similarly it is not possible to detect the impact of Ireland, the UK, and the Netherlands' introduction of fast-track admission processes for highly skilled professionals, which facilitate access to residence and provide a route to permanent residence. This is because, although length of stay is a key connection between immigration and naturalisation this is typically not captured in datasets, i.e. we do not know for how long naturalisation applicants have been resident, nor their status on entry (UK is an exception here as it has data on settlement granted by tier of employment). In Croatia for example we know the reasons for short term residency, but not the reasons for granting long term residence.

The lack of panel data and the typically 'snapshot' nature of data is a challenge for research, compounded by the relation between immigration controls on the one hand, and naturalisation on the other. Indeed, this is a problem for linking data on migration with associated rights. The rights of migrants are shaped by visa status on entry but also by length of stay. Temporal limitations also interface with questions of age, contributing to the invisibility of children in some datasets. For example in Ireland non-EEA U-16s are not captured in any regular data collection nor tracked through any official administration process.

EU members states are required to submit data on the acquisition of the nationality of the relevant Member State by immigrants (Vink & Luk, 2014) However, there is no similar obligation for statistics on the loss of nationality, which is supplied on a voluntary basis. Thus, statistics may cover voluntary loss or an aggregate of both voluntary and involuntary loss of citizenship (Ibid.).

DATA ON SOCIAL SECURITY

Data Sources

There are very little publicly available data on social benefits receipt by migrants. Eurostat publishes data on expenditure on social security by country, and the EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) provide data on receipt of social benefits as a proportion of individual and household income if the micro-data is requested and authorisation granted. The publicly available EU-SILC database contains information only on social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP per country. Social benefits are grouped in the EU-SILC following the eight functions of social protection

defined by the European system of integrated social protection statistics (ESSPROS)[32]. Therefore, it is not possible to find disaggregated data on the social benefits which compose each of these social protection functions using the EU-SILC. For individual income, data is available on receipt of unemployment-related benefits as a proportion of total income. Data on individual income can be disaggregated by nationality grouping and by gender. For household income, data is available on receipt of family allowances, social exclusion-related benefits, and housing allowances as a proportion of total income. Social exclusion-related benefits include, for example, income support. Data on household income can be disaggregated by household type and by nationality grouping (citizens of the reporting country; citizens of other EU countries; citizens of any other country).

With respect to national datasets, data on the access to social benefits of national, EU and non-EU citizens is generally limited (see country reports for details).

Croatia: There is also no single database with comparable figures on benefits receipt, since welfare benefits are disbursed according to differing criteria and have different population sizes whose overlap is impossible to establish from the published data. The *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Croatia* publishes aggregate annual figures on the take-up of some social benefits, compiled from the monthly reports from the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, but they only report on the total numbers of benefits recipients/payments and fail to take into account the differences between household types eligible for each type of support. There is no national dataset that provides statistics on benefits recipients by nationality/nationality grouping. Nationalities of beneficiaries are not reported for any benefit. Data on immigration is not linked to data on receipt of social benefits.

Ireland: data on receipt of social benefits is not publicly available. Upon request, data was provided by the Department of Social Protection on benefits receipt by type of benefit (the data include recipients and claimants), disaggregated by country of nationality and by gender, for 2009 onwards. However, the data cannot be disaggregated by household type. The tables below are therefore based on data received from the Department of Social Protection and are our own calculations.

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[32] The ESSPROS functions of social protection are: Sickness/Health care, Disability, Old age, Survivors, Family/children, Unemployment, Housing and Social exclusion. For further information see Eurostat (2008b).

Table 8. Ireland: Distribution of recipients of Lone Parent Allowance by nationality grouping

Nationality	Lone parents allowance Parent Allowance Q42013
EU26 TOTAL	10.12%
EU14 TOTALS	5.19%
A8 TOTALS	4.10%
A2 Totals	0.75%
Non EU totals	4.99%
Irish	82.09%

Source: Department of Social Protection (raw data emailed 01 December 2014).

Table 9. Ireland: Benefit receipt rate by nationality group of job seeker benefits (as percentage of whole working population)

Nationality	Job seekers allowance[33]	Job seekers Benefits[34]	Credits Only[35]	Total Welfare Claimants
Total	13.9%	2.8%	1.6%	18.3%
Ireland	0.0%	13.4%	2.6%	15.9%
Non-EU	13.0%	2.4%	1.5%	16.8%
EU14	12.4%	2.5%	1.2%	16.1%

Source: Department for Social Protection (raw data emailed 01/12/14). Data on total population groups taken from CSO "QNQ43: Persons Aged 15 Years and Over by Nationality, ILO Economic Status and Quarter". No data for A8/A2

Netherlands: In the publicly available sub-set of Netherlands' LFS micro data there is no information on the benefits uptake other than sickness leave. In standard register data available publicly from the Statistics Netherlands via Statline no information can be extracted on the nationality of the benefit

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[33] Jobseeker's Benefit is a weekly payment from the Department of Social Protection (DSP) to people who are out of work and are covered by social insurance (PRSI). It is a means tested benefit.

[34] Jobseeker's Allowance may be payable to those who do not qualify for Jobseeker's Benefit or who have used up their entitlement to Jobseeker's Benefit.

[35] Credits are paid automatically to people who are fully unemployed and getting Jobseeker's Benefit. They can continue to be paid to people who have used up their entitlement to Jobseeker's Benefit and who qualify for Jobseeker's Allowance. Credits are *not* automatically paid to people getting Jobseeker's Allowance. PRSI contributions must have been paid or credited in either of the last two tax years.

Credits can be paid to those not entitled to a social welfare payment as long as the claimant is: unemployed; available and capable of work; genuinely seeking work and have paid or credited PRSI contributions in either of the last two tax years.

claimants. [36] With respect to country of origin general country groupings are usually used: autochthon, Western- and non-Western-allochthone. The information on beneficiaries can be also broken down by their gender and age. No information on the nationality/citizenship of the claimants is publicly available. Statistics Netherlands advised that even though they possess data on nationality, they prefer using the country of origin as, unlike nationality, this is constant.

Migration Monitor 2011-2012 includes information on the benefit take-up in December 2011 by persons coming from individual EU-member states, candidate states, autochthone population and "other" allochthones (for details on country groupings see section 2). The information is provided on the specific type of benefit claimed (incl. disability benefits, old-age benefits, unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits, yet no housing benefit), number of 'export benefit' within each benefit category, residence status of the claimants (registered/non-registered) per benefit, and – in case of the registered claimants – the length of registration (per benefit type). *Migration Monitor, phase 2 2007-2011* aggregates information on benefit take-up to three major types of benefits (disability, unemployment and social assistance) and does not provide information on the benefit take-up by autochthones or "other". Table 10 below shows the share of nationality grouping claiming unemployment benefit, with Dutch nationals comprising the large majority.

Register data provides also information on the income composition of individuals and households that includes information on benefits and their claimants. [37] Here, the country (groupings) used encompass: The Netherlands; Western countries (= Western Allochthones), Indonesia, Germany, Belgium, Western countries-other; Non-western, Surinam, Dutch Antilles and Aruba, Turkey, Morocco, Non-western countries –other.

Table 10. Netherlands Distribution of unemployment benefit recipients by nationality grouping (% of total beneficiaries)

Nationality	% share
NL	73,1%**
EU14	2,1%**
A8	1,9%**
A2	0,1%**
EU26	4%**
non-EU	22,1%**

Source: own calculations on the basis of data published in Migration Monitor 2011-2012, incl. all persons registered in municipalities of residence on 31/12/2012

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[36] http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/dome/?LA=en

[37]   http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=70991NED&D1=0-1&D2=46-73,76&D3=44-55&D4=a&VW=T; http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=71061NED&D1=1&D2=5-6,33-41,51-53,56-57&D3=a&D4=59-70&D5=a&VW=T

Table 11. Netherlands: Benefit receipt rate of EU foreign nationals by nationality

Type of benefit	Time period	EU14	A8	A2	EU26
Unemployment Benefit	Dec-07	1.33%	0.50%	0.93%	1.09%
	Dec-08	1.22%	0.59%	0.76%	1.02%
	Dec-09	1.84%	1.28%	1.07%	1.63%
	Dec-10	1.67%	1.23%	1.00%	1.49%
	Dec-11	1.69%	1.64%	0.96%	1.63%
	Dec-12				
Social Assistance	Dec-07	2.05%	1.26%	2.97%	1.87%
	Dec-08	2.00%	1.15%	2.36%	1.77%
	Dec-09	2.21%	1.33%	2.58%	1.96%
	Dec-10	2.25%	1.31%	2.74%	1.96%
	Dec-11	2.29%	1.25%	2.75%	1.94%
	Dec-12				

Source: own calculations on the basis of Monitor 2007-2011

UK: the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) collects data on benefits. Statistics are broken down by age, gender, duration of benefit, and ethnicity but not nationality or country of birth. Data on benefits receipt with disaggregation by nationality is available from the Labour Force Survey. The data can be disaggregated by nationality/nationality grouping, by gender, by household type and by benefits type, although the effects of disaggregation on sample size have implications for the reliability of the data.

Table 12. UK: Benefit receipt rate (unemployment benefit and income support) by nationality grouping (%(of total benefits claimants)

Benefit Type			UK	EU14	A8	A2	EU26	nonEU
Unemployment Benefit, NI credits[38]		2013	9.5%	10.0%	6.8%	4.8%	7.8%	9.5%
		2009	7.6%	4.9%	2.7%	0.0%	3.9%	8.2%
		2005	5.0%	4.3%	0.0%		5.0%	9.2%
		2001	5.0%	5.1%	3.4%	0.0%	4.9%	7.4%
Income Support (not as unemployed pers)		2013	8.5%	5.2%	1.1%	0.0%	2.4%	8.7%
		2009	11.2%	11.4%	2.3%	5.3%	7.8%	14.9%
		2005	15.4%	17.5%	4.7%		13.6%	20.9%
		2001	15.2%	17.2%	17.2%	0.0%	17.4%	24.4%

Source: UK LFS-Q4. Own calculations

Table 13. UK: Distribution of benefits recipients by nationality grouping (% of total beneficiaries per benefit type)

		Unemployment Benefit, NI credits	Income Support (not as unemployed person)
UK	2013	92.3%	94.6%
	2009	95.1%	93.9%
	2005	89.9%	91.3%
	2001	94.1%	93.6%
EU14	2013	1.7%	1.0%
	2009	1.0%	1.6%
	2005	1.8%	2.5%
	2001	1.6%	1.7%
A8	2013	1.9%	.3%
	2009	.4%	.2%
	2005	0.0%	.1%
	2001	.1%	.1%

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[38] National insurance credits are contributions towards national insurance which you do not pay for, except for credits for parents and carers. Credits are added to a person contribution record when they are unemployed or have limited capability for work, and in some other situations where a person is not working for particular reasons. They are normally automatically awarded for claimants of unemployment benefit or sickness benefit.

A2	2013	.2%	0.0%
	2009	0	0.0%
	2005	.2%	0.0%
	2001	*	*
EU26	2013	3.8%	1.3%
	2009	1.4%	1.8%
	2005	2.0%	2.6%
	2001	1.7%	1.9%
NON EU	2013	3.9%	4.1%
	2009	3.5%	4.3%
	2005	8.1%	6.1%
	2001	4.2%	4.5%

Source: UK-LFS. Q4
*sample size too small

Table 14. Spain: Benefit receipt rate by nationality grouping, 2013

	Total	Contributory benefits	Assistance level benefits[39]	Renta Activa de Inserción
nonEEA	7.7	3.3	3.6	0.8
EEA	6.9	3.5	2.9	0.5
Spanish	:	4.8	4.3	0.9

Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security datasets. Own calculations. Share calculated on basis of population statistics from Eurostat for EU27, not EEA, therefore figures are included as a proxy for illustrative purposes.

MIGRANTS, MOBILITY AND BENEFITS

The above data, and existing analyses of EU migrants' access to social benefits – for example, the ICF GHK (2013) report on the access of non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits, which draws on EU-SILC and EU-LFS micro data and migration statistics – indicate that EU migrants account for a very small share of benefit recipients (see ICF GHK, 2013, for details on which benefits in each member state are included under SNCBs). However, analysis of data on benefits receipt by nationality grouping provides a very limited picture of how conditions of citizenship/residence status impact on differential access to benefits, and data are not available on claims for social benefits, rates of refusal, or reasons for refusal. For example in the UK, EU nationals

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[39] Assistance level benefits are meant for unemployed people who, for whatever reason, have not been able to work again or are no longer entitled to unemployment benefits; these benefits are financed by state contributions.

are assessed as to whether they have a 'right to reside' in order to qualify for claiming particular social benefits (including means-tested unemployment benefit and income support). But data is not available on the proportion of EU migrants whose claims are refused on grounds of the right to reside criteria. With respect to non-EU migrants' access to social benefits, as noted in Deliverable 10.1, in some countries, such as Spain, non-EU migrants who are registered as legally resident in particular regions, in principle, may be entitled to claim means-tested income support. However, national data on benefits receipt is unable to provide a more in-depth understanding of processes of inclusion and exclusion at the local level.

Analysis of data by nationality grouping alone is limited in terms of understanding the social divisions that shape the relationship between work and welfare among those groups. For example, receipt of benefits (including benefits paid to those not in work as well as benefits paid to whose in work, e.g. tax credits or child benefit) is gendered: women are more likely than men to be in receipt of social benefits in work and out of work, and particular types of benefits, as are households with dependent children, and lone parent households in particular. Thus, measures to limit EU migrants' access to social benefits on the basis of their status as a worker or the family member of a worker (as discussed in Deliverable 10.1), are gendered in terms of their effects. Likewise, restricting access to social benefits for non-EU migrants will have gendered effects in terms of, for example, the dependence of particular groups of non-EU migrants on waged work/employers, such as domestic workers, and the risk of poverty among those groups. At the same time, the eligibility criteria for claiming benefits e.g. what is required for the status of jobseeker, worker, family member, have implications for the impact on relationships between paid/unpaid work, family and welfare.

Data on households shows the impact that being a lone parent can have on income, as migrants are not disaggregated by household type in Eurostat data the intersection between these particulars is not apparent in the data.

In the case of Israel, immigrants entering via the Law of Return are granted citizenship and access to social security immediately. Though the Israeli social security system was intended to be based primarily upon social insurance principles and includes both social insurance based universal benefits (old-age benefits, unemployment insurance, maternity insurance and long-term care) and a means tested social assistance safety net (income support), categorical benefit programmes became a major part of the system (Gal, 2007*b*). These are cash benefits paid to individuals who belong to socially defined categories, regardless of their specific income status or prior contribution to a social insurance system. The extent of categorical programmes has implications for the notion of 'universalism' in the Israeli context, and Gal (2007*a)* defines the Israel welfare state as "categorical universalism".

The categorical emphasis of Israel's social welfare system "is closely connected to the way in which the Israeli society relates, value-wise, to its two unique characteristics: immigration and the Arab-Israeli conflict" (Gal, 2007*a*: p. 14). Through these special programmes, the state is able to benefit those deemed "deserving". Amongst existing categorical benefits in Israel, benefits related to immigration ('Aliya'), and benefits related to military service are most apparent.

As highlighted in D10.1, immigrants arriving to Israel under the Law of Return are immediately entitled to access almost the same welfare benefits as those intended for native Israeli citizens. Categorical benefits do not require a qualification period, thus newcomers are entitled to child benefit, maternity benefit and work injury insurance. There are more complications with regards to programmes based on social insurance principles, as these require a history of contribution. However, statutory changes were made to ensure the inclusion of immigrants in these programmes as well. For example, in the case of old-age benefits a special programme was formulated to ensure that immigrants arriving at old age indeed receive it (Gal & Ben Tzuri, 2007). Thus the Israeli system is diametrically opposed to other welfare systems in granting 'immigrants' immediate access to welfare. Indeed, the concept of 'immigrant' itself is very different in Israel.

Table 15. Israel Share of population grouping receiving state benefits by type of benefit (% of total beneficiaries per benefit type), 2004

	Native	Immigrants[40]
unemployment	2.4%	4.6%
income support	5.3%	10.0%
disability	8.4%	6.6%
Child benefit	47.1%	40.7%

Source: Gal, J. & Bar Zuri, R. (2007) Absorbing immigrants in the social security system, Taub Center

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[40] Resident from 1990 onwards

THE WORKER CITIZEN

As discussed in Deliverable 10.1, work underpins access to rights of citizenship. Data on access to the labour force in Eurostat provides a gendered breakdown of different types of employment contract, whether it be part-time or permanent or flexible, as well as economic status and income levels. The EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) also provides data on economic activity disaggregated by nationality/nationality grouping (citizens of the reporting country; citizens of other EU countries; citizens of any other country). With respect to employment rates, the data, overall, show differences across those groupings, with relatively high employment rates for EU citizens compared to national citizens (which is partly the effect of EU migrants being more likely to be of working age), and lower employment rates for non-EU citizens. Disaggregation by gender also indicates relatively high employment rates for EU citizen women, and relatively low employment rates for non-EU citizen women. As figure 5 below shows, this is most striking in the case of The Netherlands.

Figure 5. Employment rate of female migrants by nationality grouping (age 15-64)

Source: Eurostat

Cross-sectional LFS data, while providing some indication of inequalities in relation to work, is limited with respect to understanding the effects of conditions of status and access to permanent residence/naturalisation on the experiences and decision-making of particular groups in relation to work, particular types of work, and with respect to the relationship between work, family and care.

Not having 'work' can mean a person is a not-quite-good-enough citizen (Anderson, 2013) – and certainly not quite good enough to be an EU citizen in terms of freedom of movement. In D10.1 we noted that the question of what constitutes work is becoming increasingly pressing. There are two areas where this is evident, firstly matters of care and family work that are intrinsically related to the gendered character of the 'worker' (see below) and secondly (sometimes relatedly) what constitutes 'work' in the first place. The latter was discussed above with reference to the discrepancy between the notion of 'remunerated activity' in Eurostat data and what constitutes work for the purposes of non-citizens acquiring rights. However, it also has implications for nationals. So the Irish team noted

that volunteering is not captured in employment data, including official and unofficial internships and the job bridge scheme administered by the Department of Social Protections.

Whilst the Croatian statistical regime (foremost, the LFS) recognizes any form of remunerated work as 'labour', regardless of formality or contractual basis, the Law on Labour only explicitly acknowledges standard, employment-contract-based employment as the basis for its regulation. This form of employment has, as elsewhere, become less common in recent years. There are furthermore limited incentives for employers to sign standard contracts with their employees, because of the high costs they incur for the employer. However, under the Law on Employment Services and Rights During Unemployment, 'remunerated work' is considered to be work as long as income received is higher than the basis for social assistance, which is rather low. Care work is not recognized as a separate category of economic activity and remains informal for the most part. Notably, the Aliens Act does not specify that the source of funds for ensuring financial self-sufficiency (a prerequisite for acquiring and keeping residence) needs to be regular work, which may lead migrants to contend themselves with the niche of semi-formal or entirely informal employment.

As table 16 below shows, in Israel employment rates of Jewish citizens are higher than other population groups. There is also a wide disparity between males and females, particularly in the Arab population.

Table 16. Israel: Employment rate by population group

	Employment Rates Males (approx.)			Employment Rates Females (approx..)		
	Arab	*Jewish*	*Orthodox*[41]	*Arab*	*Jewish*	*Orthodox*
2000	69	83	38	28	72	45
2004	70	80	40	28	72	45
2008	77	85	35	32	80	49

Source: Kimhi, E. (2012) Labour Market Trends: Employment rate and wage disparities, Policy Paper N. 2012.07, Taub Center.

ENFORCEMENT

States enforcement capacity is not just directed at migrants, but also at those claiming welfare benefits. There can be multiple interactions between enforcement on crime, immigration and welfare restrictions. However it is difficult to find enforcement data on migration. Eurostat provides data on refusal of entry, persons found illegally in country and persons returned. All EU countries except the UK show a decrease in persons returned from 2008 to 2013. Data on EEA removals are not available in Eurostat However, the UK collects data on EEA nationals removed for criminal offences, though not

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[41] A large number of Jewish Orthodox men do not take part in the labour market. Instead, men of working age study the 'Torah' as their main occupation and are supported by the state and additional organizations

on those removed due to inability to maintain themselves. As table 18 below shows, numbers of removals of EEA nationals for criminal behaviour has significantly increased over the past three years. The UK is also alone in collecting data on reasons for refusal of naturalisation applications. As table 17 below shows, the main reason in 2013 for refusals of citizenship applications (34% of refusals) was failure to demonstrate good character requirement, without any specification of why this may be so.

Table 17. UK: Refusal of citizenship by reason

Reason for refusal	2003 n. refusals	2003 % of total refusals	2013 n. refusals	2013 % of total refusals
Incomplete applications	608	7	687	10
Parent not a British citizen	775	9	553	8
Not of good character	945	11	2,295	34
Delay in replying to enquiries from UKBA	1,756	20	423	6
Residence	4,277	48	2,264	33
Oath not taken in time	115	1	0	0
Insufficient Knowledge of English and KOL	:		62	1
Other	500	6	536	8
Total refusals	**8,976**		**6,820**	
British already	1,395		375	
Withdrawn	184		74	
Total refused or withdrawn	**10,555**		**7,269**	
Rejected applications	:		97	

Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics Oct-Dec 2014: Table cz_09

The other EU countries do not provide additional enforcement data to that provided in Eurostat.

Table 18. Number of EEA nationals removed from UK for criminal behaviour

Year	Removals
2009	748
2010	933
2011	1,147
2012	1,653
2013	2,130

Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics - July to September 2014

Israel also collects some enforcement data.

Table 19. Israel enforcement data[42]

	2011	2013
Asylum seekers	54,497	52,961
Legal Labour migrants	74,778	71,352
Illegal labour migrants	14,118	15,366
Tourists with expired permits	95,000	93,000
Persons returned	3,827	4,699
Left of free will[43]	30,073 (labour migrants + asylum seekers)	2,612

Source: PIBA (2014). Foreigners in Israel – data for 2013, Policy Planning Department. Retrieved from: http://www.piba.gov.il/PublicationAndTender/ForeignWorkersStat/Documents/563343n80.pdf

PIBA (2012). Foreigners in Israel – data for 2011, Policy Planning Department. Retrieved from: http://www.piba.gov.il/PublicationAndTender/ForeignWorkersStat/Documents/%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9D%20%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%99%202011.pdf

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[42] Asylum seekers, legal and illegal labour migrants and tourists numbers indicate people found in the country. 'returned' means people that left following a warrant.

[43] Israel collects data on persons "Leaving of free will", which according to the Population Immigration and Border Authority (PIBA) is a "direct and indirect action used by PIBA to encourage illegal people found in the country to leave without a warrant. These actions include giving out information, paying travelling expenses and arranging travelling documents. Alongside these actions, PIBA utilizes deterrence enforcement activities and encourages their departure" (PIBA, 2012, p. 7).

The UK is the only country out of the partners which collects data on sanctions applied to benefits claimants for failure to comply with requirements. Since the new sanctions regime was introduced in 2012, 84% of sanctions applied to Employment and Support Allowance (ESA)[44] claimants were due to failure participate in a work related activity and the remaining due to failure to attend a mandatory interview (DWP, 2015). A total of 6.38 million decisions to apply a sanction[45] for Jobseekers' Allowance (JSA) were made between April 2000 and September 2014 (Ibid.). As figure 6 below shows, sanctions decision increased significantly from 2008 onwards. The number of JSA claimants halved between February 2013 and December 2014, and total JSA sanctions have fallen to reflect this (Webster, 2015). Over the five years from April 2007 to March 2012 one fifth (19%) of all JSA claimants were subject to sanctions or disallowances (Webster, 2014). The commonest reason for JSA sanctions remains 'not actively seeking work', followed by non-participation in the Work Programme and then failure to attend an interview. The alleged 'failures' are often trivial or non-existent (Webster, 2015).

Figure 6. UK Decisions to apply a sanction for Jobseekers allowance

Source: Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) sanctions summary May 2015

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[44] ESA is a benefit for people who are unable to work due to illness or disability. It can be contributory or non-contributory.

[45] Includes a decision to end a claim because of a failure to comply with benefit entitlement condition

CONCLUSION

This report has detailed some of the challenges facing researchers who are interested in comparative work, whether cross country or within the same country between 'migrants' and welfare claimants. Some of these challenges relate to gaps in the data. However, we should emphasise that, while for the purposes of D10.3 we are particularly interested in groups that have been invisibilised in data, this does not mean that making groups visible in data is necessarily a good thing for them (though it is highly useful for researchers!). Indeed, it is important to remember that statistical processes are not the neutral form of enumeration they can be taken to be (Sussman, 2004), but can contribute to processes of 'othering' and normalised ideas of in/exclusion. As scholars have identified (Hacking, 1982) data about populations, accurate or inaccurate, is "seldom effective in controlling or altering the populations of study in the way intended" but rather "render rigid new conceptualizations of the human being" (in Sussman, 2004: 102) through their categorization. Such as occurred with population data systems in European colonies, used for the control of those populations (Anderson, 1991 in Selzer & Anderson, 2001). Processes of labelling can lead to the construct of bureaucratic identities (Zetter, 1991), based on identities of vulnerable subpopulations, or even the definition of entire populations as "others" (Werbner, 2000; Selzer & Anderson, 2001). Thus it is important to look behind the numbers at the framing of concepts embedded in statistical systems and what the data may be masking. Noting that a population is hidden in data does not necessarily mean a call to make that population visible. Identifying a population as a population can stigmatise and risk reducing complex social processes to matters of identity. The politics of visibility are complex and also nationally particular, depending upon the particular historical trajectory of the state and nation building constructs as well as the conflicting wants and desires of the population concerned.[46] Further analysis of hidden populations will be undertaken in the next stage of our research process in D10.3 where we will be developing case studies of hidden populations and exploring why they may be excluded from datasets and the consequences, both negative and positive, of such exclusion.

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[46] For example, some working in the field of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights advocate that visibility in datasets is essential for normalising such relationships and establishing their presence in society. LGBT people and families have for generations been invisible in studies of families, and inclusion in datasets, it is held, visibilises these families and provides greater understanding of different family set ups (Russell & Muraco, 2013: 350).

This report has the potential to generate the most impact with European policymakers and statisticians and researchers.

For policymakers the deliverable can improve understanding of the limitations of data and perhaps the limitations of a purely quantitative evidence based approach. With the caveat that visibility is not always a positive thing! It helps draw attention to the complexities of migrants as they appear in datasets and the need to be mindful of this when discussing migration data. Additionally, Members states can benefit from an understanding of what other national statistics office choose to present or not in their datasets. As well as perhaps a greater focus on migrants in data and the need to harmonise some concepts if data is really to be comparable across countries. It will assist researchers, particularly qualitative researchers who are interested in informing themselves about the possibilities of drawing on national and European datasets.

When new member states join the EU they are called upon to contribute to Eurostat: As Eurostat states that: '*Democratic societies do not function properly without a solid basis of reliable and objective statistics.*' This reports points to the need to further explore the concepts embedded in datasets, particularly in relation to more vulnerable populations and for the foregrounding of conceptualising migrants in data. The datasets were not developed for research purposes, or for the purposes of exploring migrants in the population thus using them to draw conclusions about migrants can be problematic. Yet they are regularly used by policy makes for the purposes of constructing debates about migrants and access to the labour market, welfare regime and state territory. Thus there is a clear need for clarity when discussing data, particularly in relation to issues such as migration that have risen up the political agenda and become heavily politicised.

RECOMMENDATIONS for dissemination

- Policy circles – think tank conferences, etc
- Academic researchers
- Academic conferences to expand upon debate of the migrant in datasets
- Briefing/ report on bEUcitizen website for general public to access

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Partners were asked to collect basic data on entry, naturalisation and access to welfare from relevant national datasets i.e. national labour force surveys (LFS), and administrative and register datasets. We also examined Eurostat harmonised data sources: the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) as well as the publicly available Eurostat database on migration statistics.

Partners were also requested to report on the process of collecting the data in order to assess data availability in practice. Data which are publicly available can often be limited, and detailed analysis can require access to datasets following clearance by the relevant institutions, and may also require payment.