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Geschiedenis van de nieuwere wijsbegeerte
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Hoofd departement (interim t/m januari 2018)

Strategische thema's / focusgebieden
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Gegenereerd op 2017-08-21 21:43:49
Alle publicaties
  2016 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2016). Theories of Order in Carnap's Aufbau. In Christian Damböck (Eds.), Influences on the Aufbau (pp. 77-99). Springer.
  2016 - Vakpublicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2016). Hoop op kennis - Kants optimistische reactie op het scepticisme. Wijsgerig perspectief, 56 (1), (pp. 35-41).
Ziche, P.G. (2016). Introduction: The Future of Spinoza Research. Spinoza Research: To Be Continued (pp. 5-8). Voorschoten: Uitgeverij Spinozahuis.
Ziche, P.G. (2016). Spinoza Research: To Be Continued. (100 p.). Voorschoten: Uitgeverij Spinozahuis.
  2016 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (01-01-2016) Lid van de wetenschappelijke Adviesraad van het Allgemeinen Zeitschrift für Philosophie.
  2015 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2015). "Gefühl der unbeschreiblichen Realität jener höheren Vorstellungen" - Realismus und Religionsphilosophie um 1800. In Friedrich Hermanni, Burkhard Nonnenmachter & Friedrike Schick (Eds.), Religion und Religionen im Deutschen Idealismus (pp. 275-291). Mohr Siebeck.
Ziche, P.G. (2015). ‚Erörtern‘ – ‚ahnden‘ – ‚hoffen‘ - Ästhetik als Leitfaden zu einer neuen Logik der Wissenschaften in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft. Journal of the Faculty of Letters, Tokyo University, Aesthetics, 40/41, (pp. 27-37) (11 p.).
Ziche, P.G. (2015). Baaders' Realism: A meta-perspective on the sub-divisions of philosophy. In Alberto Bonchino & Albert Franz (Eds.), Aufklärung und Romantik als Herausforderung für katholisches Denken (pp. 181-199). Ferdinand Schöningh.
de Visser, Arjan & Ziche, P.G. (2015). Beyond specialization: Generalization and harmony as academic ideas in the Netherlands around 1900. Studium (Rotterdam, Netherlands), 8 (3), (pp. 142-158).
Ziche, P.G. (2015). Gefühlsgewissheit und logischer Takt - Neue Erfahrungsmodalitäten und offene Wissenschaftsbegründung um 1900. In Albrecht Andrea, Lutz Danneberg, Andreas Kablitz, Gerhard Regn, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann & Friedrich Vollhardt (Eds.), Scientia Poetica - Jahrbuch für Geschichte der Literatur und Wissenschaften (pp. 322-341) (20 p.). De Gruyter.
Ziche, P.G. (2015). Respondenz auf Michael Heidelberger - Naturalisierung des Transzendentalen in der Sinnephysiologie von Hermann von Helmholtz. In Andrea Albrecht, Lutz Danneberg, Andreas Kablitz, Gerhard Regn, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann & Friedrich Vollhardt (Eds.), Scientia Poetica - Jahrbuch für Geschichte der Literatur und Wissenschaften (pp. 234-236) (3 p.). De Gruyter.
Ziche, P.G. (2015). Romantik, Realismus und Idealismus um 1800. Moralia (22), (pp. 136-168).
Beyleveld, D. & Ziche, Paul (08-02-2015). Towards a Kantian Phenomenology of Hope. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18 (5), (pp. 927-942) (16 p.).
Ziche, P.G. (2015). Wirklichkeit als 'Duft' und 'Anklang' - 'Grenzenloser Realismus' un 'neue Mythologie' - Realismus im romantischen Programm. In Helmut Hühn & Joachim Schiedermair (Eds.), Europäische Romantik (pp. 125-142). De Gruyter.
  2015 - Vakpublicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2015). Schelling lesen - Wilhelm G. Jacobs zum 80. Geburtstag. In Lore Hühn, Paul Ziche & Philipp Schwab (Eds.), Schelling-Studien - Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie (pp. 81-88). Verlag Karl Alber.
  2014 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, Paul (2014). Empiricism, Aposteriori Kantianism, and "Abfall" - Historiography of philosophy in the Propaedeutics of Schelling's Würzburger System. Schelling Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie, 2, (pp. 83-102) (20 p.).
Ziche, Paul (2014). Generalization and the Impossible: Issues in the search for generalized mathematics around 1900. In Godehard Link (Eds.), Formalism and Beyond - On the Nature of Mathematical Discourse (pp. 219-227). De Gruyter.
Ziche, Paul (2014). Indecisionism and Anti-Relativism: Wilhelm Windelband as a Philosophical Historiographer of Philosophy. In Gerald Hartung & Valentin Pluder (Eds.), From Hegel to Windelband, Historiography of Philosophy in the 19th Century (pp. 207-227). De Gruyter.
Ziche, Paul, van Miert, Dirk, Sperber, Peter, de Goeij, Timmy, Giesbers, Tom & Meijer, Daniel (2014). Mining for associated words in philosophical texts. Schelling Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie, 2 (1), (pp. 215-231) (17 p.). ISBN 978-3-495-46602-5.
Ziche, Paul (2014). Passive Wissenschaft - Schellings Wissenschaftsphilosophie in der Zeit der Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen. In Lore Hühn & Philipp Schwab (Eds.), System, Natur und Anthropologie - Zum 200. Jubiläum von Schellings Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen (pp. 121-139). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
Ziche, P.G. (2014). Schelling, die "Heiligkeit der Vierzahl" und der "Bestand" von Prozessualität. In R Brandt (Eds.), Die Macht des Vierten. Über eine Ordnung der europäischen Kultur (pp. 307-327) (21 p.). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
  2014 - Populariserende publicaties
Ziche, Paul (2014). Metaphorischer Appell - Fotografie zwischen Abstraktion und Betroffenheit. In K49814 & Paul Ziche (Eds.), Atmen ohne Pause (4 p.). Heidelberg, Berlin: Kehrer.
  2014 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (03-10-2014) "Erötern" - "ahnden" - "hoffen": Ästhetik als Leitfaden zu einer neuen Logik der Wissenschaften in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft
P.G. Ziche (08-10-2014) "Gefühl der unbeschreiblichen Realität jener höheren Vorstellungen" - Realismus und Religionsphilosophie um 1800
P.G. Ziche (24-04-2014) Colloquium of the Philosophy Departement
P.G. Ziche (11-11-2014) Eenheid in extremo: Wetenschap als levensbeschouwing
P.G. Ziche (28-03-2014) Meta-Historia literaria. Strukturmodelle zur Wissenschaftseinteilung um 1800
P.G. Ziche (29-09-2014) Romantik, Realismus und Idealismus um 1800
P.G. Ziche (27-09-2014) Schellings "Gefühl einer Tatsache" - Neue Vermögen zwischen Psychologie und Fundamentalphilosophie
P.G. Ziche (29-08-2014) Sharing concepts across disciplinary divides - case studies from the history of philosophy around 1920
P.G. Ziche (06-02-2014) Workshop "The contemporary relevance of the Erklären-Verstehen debate"
  2013 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2013). Das "Gewand aus Steinflachs": Schelling als Gutachter der Akademie. In L. Hühn, P. Schwab & P.G. Ziche (Eds.), Schelling Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie (pp. 191-199) (9 p.). Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber.
Ziche, P.G. (2013). Der "Geist allgemeiner Wissenschaftlichkeit". Akademie, Universität und Wissenschaftsinstitute unter F.W.J. Schelling (1827-1841). In FW Graf (Eds.), Wendepunkte. Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (pp. 27-59) (33 p.). Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet.
Ziche, P.G. (2013). Monist philosophy of science: Between world-view and scientific meta-reflection. In T. Weir (Eds.), Monism: Science, Philosophy, Religion, and the History of a World-View (pp. 159-177) (19 p.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ziche, P.G. & Rezvykh, P. (2013). Sygkepleriazein. Schelling und die Kepler-Rezeption im 19. Jahrhundert. (299 p.). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
  2013 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (01-03-2013) Aristoteles und Mephistopheles - Debatten um die Bildung wissenschaftlicher Begriffe im 19. Jahrhundert
P.G. Ziche (20-02-2013) Buitenbeentjes in de wetenschap
P.G. Ziche (14-06-2013) Empirismus, Realismus, Idealismus - Philosophiegeschichte in der Propädeutik von Schellings Würzburger System
P.G. Ziche (20-04-2013) Fictions and foundations
P.G. Ziche (19-04-2013) Fictions and Foundations. Tolerance and Rigorousness in the philosophico-scientific landscape around 1900: The example of Hans Vaihinger and Moritz Pasch
P.G. Ziche (05-06-2013) Is bodem een wetenschap?
P.G. Ziche (13-04-2013) Karl Schuhmann on Fichte: Transcendental Idealism as a phenomenology of life
P.G. Ziche (10-04-2013) Naturphilosophie als allgemeine Ordnungswissenschaft. Neuordnungen des Wissenschaftssystems um 1900
P.G. Ziche (13-09-2013) Philosophiegeschichte als empirische Wissenschaft. Über Wilhelm Windelband
P.G. Ziche (22-01-2013) The humanities as empirical sciences
P.G. Ziche (02-07-2013) Theories of order in Carnap's Aufbau
P.G. Ziche (16-04-2013) Tolerant science - case studies in the philosophico-scientific landscape around 1900
  2012 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, P.G. & van Driel, J. (2012). Science. Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO)
Ziche, P.G. (2012). Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenthy Century. Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 35 (2), (pp. 99-112) (14 p.).
Müller, T. & Ziche, P.G. (2012). The Berlin Group. In N. Milkov (Eds.), Oppenheim on order. The career of a logico-philosophical concept. (pp. 109-121) (12 p.). Berlin: Springer.
Ziche, P.G. & Sartori, S. (2012). Translation of: Pietro del Negro: Die Universität Padua zwischen dem ausgehenden 18. und dem 19. Jahrhundert - Der Beitrag von Melchiorre Cesarotti zum Piano degli Studi von 1797. In P.G. Ziche & G.F. Frigo (Eds.), "Die bessere Richtung der Wissenschaften" - Schellings "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiusm" als Wissenschafts- und Universitätsprogramm (pp. 29-62) (34 p.). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
  2012 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (14-04-2012) De geesteswetenschappen als voorbeeldwetenschappen
P.G. Ziche (14-09-2012) Donner, Raum und Tierreich – Aristoteles über Natur und Wissenschaft
P.G. Ziche (11-10-2012) Formen von Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Eine historische Typologie
P.G. Ziche (08-06-2012) Schellings Ideenlehren. Schritte auf dem Weg zu den Weltaltern
P.G. Ziche (16-03-2012) Tolerant Science – Louis Couturat in his context
P.G. Ziche (19-06-2012) Tolerant Science. Mathematical Generalisations and New Methods for Philosophy
P.G. Ziche (20-04-2012) Wetenschap vol energie: Natuurwetenschappelijke wereldbeelden en naturalistische ethiek
P.G. Ziche (07-05-2012) Wetenschap vol energie: Scheikunde en wetenschapsfilosofie
  2011 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, P.G. & Frigo, G.F. (2011). "Die bessere Richtung der Wissenschaften". Schellings "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums" als Wissenschafts- und Universitätsprogramm. (431 p.). Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
Ziche, P.G. (2011). "Die Welt der Wissenschaft im Innersten erschüttern" - Schellings Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums als philosophisches Programm zur Wissenschaftsorganisation. In P. G. Ziche & G. F. Frigo (Eds.), "Die bessere Richtung der Wissenschaften". Schellings "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums" als Wissenschafts- und Universitätsprogramm (pp. 3-24) (22 p.). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
Ziche, P.G. (2011). "Höherer" Empirismus: Passive Wissenschaft, letzte Tatsachen und experimentelle Philosophie bei F.W.J. Schelling. Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus , (pp. 165-184) (20 p.).
Ziche, P.G. (2011). "Menschliche Wissenschaft". Freiheit als anthropologische Bestimmung im Übergang von Natur zu Mensch. In H Paetzold & H Schneider (Eds.), Schellings Denken der Freiheit (pp. 91-108) (18 p.). Kassel: Kassel universitas press.
Ziche, P.G. (2011). Alternative claims to the discovery of modern logic: Coincidences and diversification. In K François, B Löwe, Th Müller & B van Kerkhove (Eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences VII: Bringing together Philosophy and the Sociology of Science (pp. 243-267) (25 p.). London: College Publications.
Ziche, P.G. (2011). Das System als Medium. Mediales Aufweisen und deduktives Ableiten bei Schelling. In Chr. Danz & J. Stolzenberg (Eds.), System und Systemkritik um 1800 (pp. 147-168) (22 p.). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Ziche, P.G. (2011). Der Mensch als Modell des Menschen. Informative Selbstmodelle und metaphorische Selbstverdopplung. In M. Kroß & R. Zillner (Eds.), Metapherngeschichten. Perspektiven einer Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit (pp. 209-232) (24 p.). Berlin: Parerga.
Ziche, P.G. (2011). Die "reinen Vernunftwissenschaften": Mathematik und "Philosophie im Allgemeinen". In P. G. Ziche & G. F. Frigo (Eds.), "Die bessere Richtung der Wissenschaften". Schellings "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums" als Wissenschafts- und Universitätsprogramm (pp. 89-114) (26 p.). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
Ziche, P.G. (2011). New forms of science and new sciences of form: On the non-mathematical reception of Grassmann's work. In H.-J. Petsche, A. C. Lewis, Steve Russ & J. Liesen (Eds.), Hermann Graßmann. From Past to Future: Graßmann's Work in Context (pp. 131-139) (9 p.). Basel: Birkhäuser.
Ziche, P.G. & van Driel, J. (2011). Wissenschaft. Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO)
  2011 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (26-11-2011) "Ahndung" und "Construction". Realistische Subjektivität und idealistische Objektivität
P.G. Ziche (26-05-2011) Constructing immediacy
P.G. Ziche (20-05-2011) Das System der Systeme und die Wissenschaft der Wissenschaften. Dynamiken in der Wissenschaftsreflexion im 18. Jahrhundert
P.G. Ziche (15-07-2011) Die Rekonstruktion von Unmittelbarkeit. Schelling über Cartesianismus, Spinozismus und die Grenzen der Rationalität
P.G. Ziche (08-06-2011) Disciplinering en ontdisciplinering - studies over disciplinevorming
P.G. Ziche (26-04-2011) Hybride soorten. Historische biologie en analytische metafysica
P.G. Ziche (03-05-2011) Mathematik und Musik. Einführende Bemerkungen
P.G. Ziche (15-10-2011) Wat is wetenschap?
Ziche, P.G. & van Driel, J. (2011). Wissenschaft.
P.G. Ziche (15-11-2011) Wissenschaft von Form und Ordnung - Ideale der Mathematisierung um 1900
  2010 - Vakpublicaties
Bos, J.J.F.M. & Ziche, P.G. (2010). Associatieve neurale netwerken voor de humaniora. e-data & research, 5 (1), (pp. 4-4) (1 p.).
  2010 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (15-10-2010) "Wissenschaft in der höchsten Form" - Schelling als Wissenschaftsphilosoph
P.G. Ziche (26-01-2010) Corporeal literacy and dys-embodiment: towards a phenomenology of invisibility
P.G. Ziche (08-06-2010) Das System der Wissenschaften
P.G. Ziche (10-04-2010) De romantiek - een paradoxaal tijdperk?
P.G. Ziche (26-10-2010) Descartescolloquium, Disciplinevorming III: Verkenning Utrechts profiel, Ideeën, Concepten, Projecten
P.G. Ziche (22-11-2010) Diagrammatology, "emodying the conceptual", and the abstractive power of images
P.G. Ziche (19-05-2010) Institutional history and disciplinary dynamics - the Series lectionum as a historiographical source
P.G. Ziche (11-06-2010) Kant: an enlightened anti-materialist?
P.G. Ziche (28-01-2010) Mythologische Erkenntnistheorie
P.G. Ziche (19-02-2010) New sciences of form, new forms of science: Oswald Külpe's psychology and his philosophy of science
P.G. Ziche (03-12-2010) Organismus and the notion of science. Kant, 18th-century anti-materialism, and the concept of explanation in the third Critique
P.G. Ziche (22-01-2010) Schellling als Wissenschaftsphilosoph
P.G. Ziche (10-11-2010) Tatsachen zuletzt - idealistische Philosophie und die Unvollendetheit von Tatsachen
P.G. Ziche (03-12-2010) Von Geistern und Maschinen - Philosophie des Geistes bei Ryle und Putnam
  2009 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2009). Ausbildung zum Genie. Schelling und die Bildung zur Innovationsfähigkeit. In A. Hutter & M. Kartheininger (Eds.), Bildung als Mittel und Selbstzweck. Korrektive Erinnerung wieder die Verengung des Bildungsbegriffs (pp. 63-81) (19 p.). Freiburg/München: Karl Alber.
Ziche, P.G. (2009). Die Einheit der Natur. Naturphilosophische Einheitskonzeptionen bei und nach Kant. In E.-O. Onnasch (Eds.), Kants Philosophie der Natur. Ihre Entwicklung im Opus postumum und ihre Wirkung (pp. 221-240) (470 p.). Berlin / New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Ziche, P.G. (2009). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854). Philosoph, Akademievorstand, Wissenschaftspolitiker. In D. Willoweit & E. Latzin (Eds.), Denker, Forscher und Entdecker. Eine Geschichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in historischen Portraits (pp. 52-68) (17 p.). München: Beck.
Ziche, P.G. (2009). Wilhelm Ostwald als Begründer der modernen Logik. Logik und künstliche Sprachen bei Ostwald und Louis Couturat. In P. Stekeler-Weithofer, H. Kanden & N. Psarros (Eds.), Ein Netz der Wissenschaften? Wilhelm Ostwalds „Annalen der Naturphilosophie“ und die Durchsetzung wissenschaftlicher Paradigmen (pp. 46-66) (21 p.). Leipzig: Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften 2009, Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Bd. 81. Heft 4.
  2009 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (20-07-2009) ‘Der “Geist allgemeiner Wissenschaftlichkeit”. Akademie, Universität und Wissenschaftsinstitute unter F.W.J. Schelling (1827-1841)’
P.G. Ziche (22-04-2009) Afbeeldingen in de wetenschap: Abstractie en objectiviteit
P.G. Ziche (11-04-2009) Causal chains and geometrical unification: Schelling on explanation and construction
P.G. Ziche (11-06-2009) Coördinator van de Schelling-Tag van de Internationale Schelling-Gesellschaft
P.G. Ziche (03-12-2009) Das zur Wissenschaft auseinandergezogene Denken”: Spätidealismus, Aristotelismus und positive Wissenschaften
P.G. Ziche (17-03-2009) Door een rode bril. Idealisme voor Cartesianen
Ziche, P.G. (26-02-2009). Door een rode bril. Idealisme voor Cartesianen. Utrecht: Universiteit Utecht, Oratie hoogleraar Geschiedenis van de nieuwere wijsbegeerte.
P.G. Ziche (02-11-2009) How to make a radical. Readings and misreadings of Moleschott
P.G. Ziche (28-03-2009) Idealistische bewijzen. Schelling over wiskunde en filosofie.
P.G. Ziche (24-04-2009) Kahle Könige, reine Mathematik und das Streben nach Glück. Die Philosophie des Bertrand Russell
P.G. Ziche (03-04-2009) Konstruktion vs. Deduktion. Idealistische Beweiskonzepte
P.G. Ziche (02-10-2009) Monism and the unity of science
P.G. Ziche (02-11-2009) Organisator
P.G. Ziche (08-05-2009) Verloren filosofen: Schelling
P.G. Ziche (04-12-2009) Vrijheid en wetenschap. De Freiheitsschrift als wetenschapsfilosofie
  2008 - Wetenschappelijke publicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2008). Fechner und die Folgen außerhalb der Naturwissenschaften. Scientia poetica, 12, (pp. 376-389) (14 p.).
Ziche, P.G. (2008). Philosophie als Propädeutik und Grundlage akademischer Wissenschaft. Schellings Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums im Kontext der Universität Jena um 1800. In P.L. Oesterreich & M. Fehér (Eds.), Philosophie und Gestalt der Europäischen Universität (pp. 147-168) (22 p.). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
Ziche, P.G. (2008). Wissenschaftslandschaften um 1900. Philosophie, die Wissenschaften und der nicht-reduktive Szientismus. Zürich: Chronos.
Ziche, P.G. (2008). Wissenschaftssystematik als Kulturaufgabe. Möglichkeiten eines offenen Kulturbegriffs in Paul Hinnebergs Enzyklopädieprojekt. Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 31, (pp. 44-57) (14 p.).
  2008 - Vakpublicaties
Ziche, P.G. (2008). Reine Wissenschaften: Mathematik, Philologie und Philosophie. Mathematik im Wissenschaftssystem des 19. Jahrhunderts. Akademie aktuell, 2008 (3), (pp. 26-29) (4 p.).
  2008 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche (12-03-2008) Ausbildung zum Genie. Schelling und die Bildung zur Innovationsfähigkeit
P.G. Ziche (14-10-2008) Het systeem der wetenschappen
P.G. Ziche (18-04-2008) Klarheit und Sauberkeit in der Philosophie: Ernst Mach und der Wiener Kreis
P.G. Ziche (23-06-2008) Man as man's model - Human models in our scientific self-interpretation
P.G. Ziche (26-11-2008) More general concepts – Philosophy of nature between philosophy and the sciences
P.G. Ziche (23-10-2008) The multiple discovery of modern logic
P.G. Ziche (05-11-2008) Who or what am I? Anthroplogical issues in Descartes
  0 - Overige resultaten
P.G. Ziche () Onderzoeksmasters - Excellente profilering à la Veerman
P.G. Ziche () Schelling Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie
P.G. Ziche () Schelling Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie
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Gegenereerd op 2017-08-21 21:43:51

Afgesloten projecten

Project:
Thinking classified: Structuring the world of ideas around 1800 01-10-2013 tot 01-07-2017
Algemene projectbeschrijving
 
Rol: Uitvoerder Financiering
2e geldstroom - NWO
Projectleden

Thinking classified: Structuring the world of ideas around 1800

Summary

 

Comprehensive labels such as “empiricism” or “realism” structure the world of ideas in ways that directly affect crucial issues within, and beyond, academic discourse. In particular, fundamental philosophical debates, questions as to the status of the sciences and of the relationship between the sciences and other fields continue to depend on such notions.

These notions require a thorough-going historicization in order to properly understand their function. First, is has to be noted that these labels are of surprisingly recent origin; they gained currency only at the end of the 18th century, or – as in the case of “realism” – profoundly changed their scope in this period. They were formed in the context of philosophy’s claiming the leading role in structuring the field of scientific (in the broad sense of ‘science’) disciplines. In its beginning, this process was marked by a surprising openness; the range of application of these concepts was not clearly determined: virtually every philosopher around 1800 could be called, and critically denounced as, an “empiricist”. Neither the notion of ‘experience’ nor that of ‘reality’ had, in this period, a meaning that was precise enough to unequivocally classify different approaches in philosophy and the sciences.

The novelty and openness of these labels, therefore, gives the historian of philosophy – in interaction with the history of science – a unique chance to grasp how those concepts started to function as demarcating concepts and how they introduced boundaries that continue to influence our thinking. Pertinent questions in this context are: Which arguments entered into the genesis of these labels, how are various practices integrated and subsumed under one label? Which decisions, for instance regarding the notion of experience and the paradigm of reality, were made in order to give them a polemical and demarcatory function? How do these philosophical labels interact with the specialization and internal diversification of the field of the special sciences? Which disciplines form the model for reality-directed or experience-based investigations?

These questions will be addressed by studying the representative labels “empiricism” and “realism” in the context of the formative debates in philosophy, and between philosophy and the sciences, around 1800.

 

Institutional Setting

 

The project is to be embedded within the research group “History of modern philosophy” which forms part of the philosophical research institute ZENO (now OFR, research institute for philosophy and religious studies) at Utrecht University. This group has a strong track record in the field of 17th- and 18th-century philosophy, with an emphasis on source studies and editions. Close contacts are established with the research group “Theoretical philosophy” that make available the colleagues’ expertise in the philosophy of science and in current-day metaphysics. Crucial for the project is the close cooperation of both research groups with the “Descartes Centre for the history and philosophy of the sciences and humanities” at Utrecht, in particular its focus area “Discipline formation”. Via the project leader, and the members of the various research groups in Utrecht, a strong international network for 18th-century philosophy and for the history of science is made available.

 

Structure of the Proposed Research

 

Sub-Project

 

 

Comparative studies in the genesis and function of broad labels

1 (PostDoc)

Structuring the realm of science: The role of historiography and the model of philosophical historiography

 

Realism vs. idealism around 1800

2 (Ph.D. 1)

“Realism” – New models for accessing reality

 

 

Roles of “empiricism” around 1800

3 (Ph.D. 2)

 

 

 From “Experience” to “Empiricism”: Who is an empiricist?

4 (Ph.D. 3)

 

Kantian empiricism: Divergent options for interpreting Kant

Synthesis

Project leader

Open labels and radicalized philosophy: Structures for philosophy and the sciences around 1800

 

All research activities will be based at the research institute OFR/Department of philosophy, University of Utrecht. Extended research stays abroad will be required for the Ph.D.-students and the PostDoc in order to study documents in archives, consult specialized libraries, and discuss their research with relevant peer groups.


Description of the Proposed Research

 

General description

 

Research question: Conceptual decisions immanent in the big labels for structuring philosophy and the sciences – A historical approach

 

Around 1800, the conceptualization of virtually all academic fields and of their mutual relations underwent an enormous change. Philosophy now actively claimed a leading role within the universities, and substantiated this claim by asserting ownership of the problem as to how to structure the field of the sciences (in the broad sense of “science”, covering the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences, and including philosophy itself). One of the most important results of these changes remains visible in virtually all philosophical debates ever since, and reaches far beyond philosophy proper: Large-scale labels were introduced in order to characterize and demarcate various modes of thinking. Typical examples are the labels “empiricism” or “realism” that dominate – via the oppositions between apriorical and empirical approaches, and between idealism and realism – the post-Kantian debates. Similar processes can be found in the dynamics of scientific disciplines, leading to a restructuring via broad terms such as “natural sciences” (Ziche 1998)[1].

The genesis of these labels is a significant phenomenon in its own right. It gains systematic importance by providing access to the processes that coagulated the open field of philosophical and scientific practices into these large-scale units. Around 1800, these concepts still operated in an open context without yet having a fixed meaning. In analyzing their genesis, the processes and arguments inherent in these new forms of structuring become accessible. This offers a unique chance to understand the conceptual decisions with regard to key notions in philosophy and the sciences such as “experience” or “reality” that were made in this period, and that determine our thinking about science and philosophy until today.

 

Background and sources

 

These labels, and the entire idea of structuring the world of ideas in terms of such labels, were indeed new. Take “empiricism” as an example: Diderot’s and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, the hallmark summary of French Enlightenment around 1750, strongly relies on experience as the proper method, but does not talk or argue in terms of an “empiricism”.[2] “Realism” in this period changed its meaning from being a technical term in medieval logic and metaphysics into becoming a comprehensive label for philosophy’s attitude towards reality. These labels were also in flux: Around 1800, virtually every philosopher could be labelled as being an “empiricist”.[3] Consequently, the meaning of these labels did not correspond to later usage. Take “realism” as an illustration: Around 1800, it was the realists who focussed on the relevance of subjective experience and of faith and on the relevance of religious issues and art, and who did not insist on a cleaned-up scientific world-view.

The broad scope of these labels requires strong criteria for the selection of the relevant sources. The project maintains a clear focus on the period around 1800, and takes the debates between the idealists in Germany – in whose writings the new role for philosophy was stated most forcefully, and where these labels gained prominence for the first time – and their opponents as its starting-point. Within this focus, the sources to be studied can be further delineated:

-       “Empiricism” and “realism” emerged as instruments in highly polemical debates.[4] The broad labels were used as means to clarify the conflicting positions and the issues at stake in these debates, and they inherit much of the polemical strains of this period. These debates, on the other hand, preselect relevant source material.

-       Historiographical writings play a crucial role in the emergence of these concepts. In the 18th century, the historiography of philosophy systematized various forms of philosophy as falling under the overarching notion of “philosophy”. This led to the introduction and further clarification of the broad structuring labels investigated here. Significantly, these labels were defined systematically, and not with reference to the work of individual persons. These ideas as to how to structure philosophy also provided a model for the historiography of the sciences in the course of which it became necessary, and possible, to reconstruct the history of individual sciences that all fall under a general label of “science”. In comparing these forms of structuring philosophy and the sciences, both a coherent body of sources and clear systematic questions can be established.

 

Structure of the project

 

Within the focus on the period around 1800, two broader projects and three specific case studies interact.

The case studies concern the labels “empiricism” and “realism”, taking as their starting-point the debates between the idealists and their opponents.[5] The fact that Kant’s philosophy itself could be read empiristically provides a particularly instructive case study for the openness of these labels, and shows how these large-scale labels directly affected the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences.

Reconstructing these movements requires an embedding of the relevant philosophical arguments into a broader context: the dynamics of the relevant debates, their polemical character and literary style, contexts of publication and issues of academic status, the interaction with other fields – such as literature or the natural sciences – have to be investigated. Precisely because of their openness and their broad range, these labels also play a significant role in reception processes, i.e. those processes where philosophical theories have to be confronted with the typical characteristics of philosopico-scientific debates in other national or regional contexts.The initial focus on Germany-based debates around 1800 will be broadened to cover these processes as well.

Two broader projects will study the emergence and function of these labels on a more general level. While the historiography of philosophy in this period has been rather well investigated,[6] the role that models from the history of philosophy played for the historiography of science – which itself made enormous progress during the 18th century – remains virtually unexplored. In comparing the problem of sub-dividing philosophy into philosophies with that of arranging the various sciences under a general concept of “science”, the function of such labels can be studied in particular detail.

The results of the sub-projects will be synthesized by the project leader. This synthesis will embed the processes involved in introducing, and sharpening, these labels into the broader philosophical context of this time. It will pay particular attention to the relevance of these processes for idealistic philosophy at large, and will investigate how the pertinent debates around 1800 gave rise to later developments in the thinking about empiricism and realism, and thus influenced our understanding of these concepts.

 

Methods

 

The typical methodological stances in the history of philosophy are of limited value for this project. A.O. Lovejoy has famously denied the status of “ideas” to labels such as “empiricism” (Lovejoy 1953, introduction). Historicizing these notions, however, and carefully assembling a body of relevant sources can render these complex notions accessible. Within the field of more recent science studies, important models for the value of a historical approach to apparently ‘perennial’ categories have been developed (Daston/Galison 2007).

Methodologically, all sub-projects are situated at the intersection between the history of philosophy and the history of science, and the sub-projects will interact closely, on the level both of the accumulation of relevant data and texts, and of the conceptualization of the relevant historical processes. Methods from the history of philosophy, from general history (in particular in analyzing the role of historiography itself, and in the study of complex networks) and from the history of science (in particular in studying institutional aspects, the role of publication cultures, and the interaction with the special sciences) will have to cooperate. For the study of the discussion culture of this time, an expertise in literary studies will be useful. In all cases, considerable care is required in assembling the body of sources; these come from heterogeneous contexts, and have not previously been assembled. Archives and libraries abroad (Germany; for studying processes of reception: England and France) will have to be consulted.

 

Previous results

 

The project can build upon relevant research results by the project leader (listed in section 14): research on the concept of “science” in the period under consideration (Ziche1998, 2001); specialized research on the idea of a “higher empiricism” in the aftermath of classical idealism (Ziche 2012); investigations discussing the international network that brought together idealists and empiricists (Ziche/Rezvykh 2012); editions of directly relevant texts (Pfleiderer 1994; Ziche 2005 b; Ziche, in preparation); anthropology and psychology as aspects of “Kantian empiricism” (Eckardt/John/Ziche 2001; Zantwijk/Ziche 2000). None of the problems addressed in the sub-projects, however, have been directly treated in previous studies.

 

Innovations and results

 

In all its sub-projects, the proposed project offers significant innovations:

-       Historicizing the structuring concepts itself provides a novel stance. For all sub-topics that are singled out here, the absence of a historical consciousness, even in recent literature, is striking. P. Lipton (2001) has described empiricism as “a hardy perennial in the history of philosophy”, N. Swerdlow (1993) assumes that the historiography of science sprang into existence in fully perfected form, as a Minerva in full armour. The history of realism is, up to now, a major lacuna in philosophical historiography.

-       The project is aimed at studying the relevant conceptual decisions that entered into these labels, and into the very idea of structuring the field of philosophy and the sciences via such labels: What is the basis for drawing lines of demarcation between these forms of philosophy/science? How did these concepts function in debates between philosophy and the sciences? This allows a critical analysis of notions that continue to exert an unceasing influence in our thinking about science.
The type of results that can be expected is further motivated in the descriptions of the sub-projects. In particular, it will be asked: What is the role of “experience” in determining forms of philosophy, or of science? What is the paradigm form of reality that is employed by the protagonists of the idealism-realism-debate? Thirdly: “Empiricism” and “realism” both make strong claims regarding the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences. This relationship provides a clear case for such conceptual decisions, with far-reaching implications: Around 1800, neither “realism” nor an experience-based philosophy were clearly associated with the natural sciences. The emergence of the natural sciences as the apparently natural paradigm for a “realist” or “empiricist” approach is revealed as a step that is itself far from self-evident, and that can be critically discussed on the basis of these sources.

-       This revises the picture of the 18th century’s position in the history of philosophy and science. While still largely seen as a period of “consolidation” (Porter 2003), it turns out that this period does by no means consolidate existing concepts, but for the first time introduces the conceptual means required for such a consolidation.
This is of particular importance for the notion of “science”. Because “science” has become a concept with strong normative connotations, and functions as such in academic, but also in political and in popular debates, it is of particular relevance to understand the decisions lying at the basis of the early attempts at a concise analysis and systematic positioning of “science”.


Sub-project 1 (PostDoc): Structuring the realm of science: The role of historiography and the model of philosophical historiography

 

Research question

 

The emergence of the large-scale labels used for sub-dividing philosophy is necessitated by a conceptual problem that philosophy shares with the reflection on the various sciences, and with identifying the sciences as the objects of theoretical or institutional debates. In both cases, various “sciences” or “philosophies” – usually addressed as various “systems” of philosophy, or philosophical “sects” – have to be subsumed under the general labels “science” or “philosophy”. This systematization of the various “systems of philosophy” is a typical achievement of the historiography of philosophy in the 18th century.[7] For the sciences, a similar function is assumed by the historiography of science. Both discourses are related on many levels; the philosophical historiography in the 18th century clearly had a model function for the historiography of science.

This sub-project will study the latter corpus in order to analyze, by comparing the structuring principles in the historiography of science with those applied in philosophical historiography, the criteria used in establishing the large-scale sub-units of science and of philosophy.

 

Background, sources

 

The classification of the sciences and the history of the historiography of philosophy have been studied in some detail.[8] The historiography of science as a genre, and its relationship with the historiography of philosophy, however, remain virtually unexplored.[9] Earlier classifications of the sciences largely miss the typically historiographical problem of having to deal with a radically changing field that cannot be reconstructed via deductive structures, and do therefore not contribute directly to the question posed here.[10]

The source material is rich and multi-faceted; so far, only some elementary steps towards a typology of sources have been made (Welter 1979; Engelhardt 1979, 1990; Christie 1996; Rousseau/Porter 1980; Kelley 1997; Agassi 2008; Jardine 1997). In the 18th century, the historiography of science has led to some towering achievements. Examples are specialized publications such as the history of mathematics by J.-E. Montucla (1758/1799-1802) or the gigantic project run by the Goettingen Academy of science, to wit a Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften since the Renaissance that intends to cover all academic fields. Rich source material is also available in encyclopedias and in works in the historiography of philosophy, in editorial projects, and in academic teaching.[11]

 

Research Plan

 

1. Sources: Assembling the relevant texts

 

2. Interpretation:

The role of philosophical categories

 

Open methodologies

 

“Subdivide philosophy”: Historiography and issues of demarcation

 

The challenge of this project, which justifies its being a PostDoc-project, lies in its broad scope and the need to cover various special sciences and their historiography as well as philosophical issues:

The role of philosophical categories: In many cases, the historiography of science cannot be separated from that of philosophy, and it has, therefore, to be asked in how far philosophical categories do play a role in these historiographical projects. In particular, the role of “experience”, and of empiricism, will have to be studied in detail, in close interaction with sub-projects 3 and 4.

Open methodologies: The history of science had to adopt a notion of progress that could appreciate the achievements of earlier periods, and that could make historical awareness useful for future innovation. This was achieved by focussing on methodological issues – itself a category influenced by philosophical theorizing – while at the same time allowing for a large degree of flexibility and openness. In particular, the historiography of science was interested in the “mistakes” committed by earlier scientists, and concentrated on the concrete procedures leading to the scientific results, not merely on the results themselves. Reconstructing these ideas will reveal a rather flexible picture of science with a particular emphasis on the non-deductive aspects of scientific method.[12]

“Subdivide philosophy”: The historiography of science deals explicitly with the issue of how to “subdivide philosophy” (Priestley 1775, XVII), and declares this to be a new topic. Clearly, the issue of demarcating the various sciences is as much a philosophical issue as it is an issue in establishing the field of the sciences. A reconstruction of the arguments used in these processes of demarcation will, therefore, contribute to an understanding of the role of demarcating labels at large.


Sub-project 2: “Realism” – New models for accessing reality

 

Research question

 

In the wake of Kant’s philosophy, the question how, and to which extent, philosophy and the sciences could grasp reality was debated heatedly. The opposing parties quickly adopted the labels of idealism vs. realism.[13] In contrast with the idealist tenet that – in Kant’s deliberatively provocative formula – the objects of our knowledge have to conform to our knowledge, not vice versa, the realists stated their intention to “unveil existence” (F.H. Jacobi in his David Hume, 1787). Realists typically claimed that we can indeed gain access to a reality that exists independently of our cognizing it, and they charged idealism with leading into atheism, solipsism, and an absurd loss of contact with the world.

An analysis of the realists’ movement shows that, in consolidating these movements, far-reaching decisions were made as to the paradigm of reality and the methods involved in grasping this reality.

 

Background, sources

“Realism” as a concept has a venerable history, dating back at least to the medieval debates between realists and nominalists regarding the status of universals. However, this concept was thoroughly re-shaped around 1800 (cf. Ritter 1992), transforming it into a comprehensive concept covering philosophy’s and the sciences’ approach to reality. This re-shaping was strongly influenced by the reaction against the idealist trends in the philosophy of this period.

The realist opponents of idealism formed a closely-knit network with a high degree of professional diversification: philosophers, poets, theologians, and historians contributed to this movement. Some of the most prominent German authors of this period, most of them with a strong international network, proclaimed themselves realists: J.G. Herder, F.H. Jacobi, C.L. Reinhold, Jean Paul; lesser-known figures were Chr.F. Bardili, F. Berg, F. Köppen or W.T. Krug.[14]

While idealism has been investigated extensively, this realists’ movement has not yet been studied in its complexity.[15] In the literature, the role of ‘realistic’ elements within the idealists’ philosophy (such as Fichte’s idea of a “Real-Idealismus”) have been discussed (most recently: Pluder 2010); but this leads to a harmonization that does not mirror the polemical and polarizing character of the debates. In this sub-project, a comprehensive analysis of this movement is – for the first time – aimed at.

 

Research plan

 

Corpus: The Realist movement

 

Analysis of the movement:

Analysis of the idealism-realism debate

 

Models of reality and notions of rationality

 

Philosophy and other fields

Issues in the reception of realism:

Kantianism; international reception

 

The Realist movement: In a first step, the realist network itself has to be reconstructed. Techniques of network analysis (studying networks of quotations, correspondences, professional cooperations, and personal ties) are important for grasping this movement in its complexity. The natural starting-point is given by the writings of the idealists themselves and those of their direct realist antagonists. The realism-idealism debate is also of direct relevance for the international context and reception; British common-sense philosophy and 19th-century empiricism, French positivism, and pragmatism all engage with the realism-idealism-debate.

Models of reality and notions of rationality: The systematic importance of the realism-idealism-debate lies in the fact that a completely novel treatment has been offered of what the models for reality should be. The discussion about paradigm cases of reality shifted away from an interest in the reality of the objects of perception and the world that is studied by the natural sciences, and turned towards topics such as religion, art and intersubjectivity; at issue was the reality of transcendent phenomena. Consequently, it was not the natural sciences that served as model disciplines within realism.

This shift in focus required new types of cognitive faculties commensurate with these object realms, and relating directly to new ideas about rationality. Realists set in on directly grasping a reality that is beyond our rational capacities; epistemologically, this led to a highly subjectivist ideal of cognition, and implied a surprising neglect of the natural sciences. Realists consequently tended to focus on immediate feelings, or redefined faculties such as “sense” (“Sinn”) or “reflection”. The corpus of texts allows to reconstruct these conceptual options, and thereby to get a clearer focus in those decisions that amounted, in the long run, to the notions of realism that we adopt today.

Philosophy and other fields: The realism-idealism debate has direct implications for the conceptualization of the interaction of philosophy with other fields, in particular with theology and with topics at the borderline between philosophy, literature and psychology (here, there are close interactions with sub-project 4).
Sub-project 3: From “Experience” to “Empiricism”: Who is an empiricist?

 

Research question

 

The empirical method and, consequently, a form of philosophy based upon experience have been a crucially important, and strongly demarcating, concept in philosophy at least since authors such as Bacon, Locke, Hume, or the philosophers of the French Enlightenment. However, the meaning and function of the label “empiricism” itself only became established at the very end of the 18th century.[16] This becomes strikingly clear in the fact that, around 1800, virtually every philosopher could be labelled an “empiricist”; this was intended not as a neutral classificatory label, but as a strongly polemical verdict.

The role and function of the label “empiricism”, therefore, establishes a strong case study that reveals the processes relevant for the genesis of such a label; what happens when existing practices, be they institutional or related to particular persons, are subsumed under a broader label? It also becomes clear that this label does not grow forth directly from an already existing and clearly delineated methodological practice, as is illustrated by its openness: it requires, and the very process of consolidating “empiricism” also initiates, a discussion as to the very role of experience, again – as was the case with “realism” – with far-reaching decisions. Since “empiricism”, finally, is related closely to the special sciences, a study of the genesis of this label contributes to understanding the conceptual space in which the notion of “science” operates.

 

Background

 

There is consensus that “empiricism” as a label acquires its meaning in the writings of Kant who contrasts, and tends to unite in his work, an “empiricist” and a “rationalist” form of philosophy.[17] In the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy, “empiricism” both entered the handbooks of the history of philosophy and was at the same time used widely (and somewhat wildly) to characterize and criticize other philosophers. This strategy was employed in particular by the idealist followers of Kant. To name some of the more surprising ascriptions of this label: In Schelling’s and Hegel’s writings from 1801-3, Kant could be seen as an empiricist because of his insistence on the possibilities of experience, Descartes because of his interest in the physical sciences, Fichte because he attempted to derive a foundation of experience.

The idealists at the same time made the new label part of their own reconstructions of the history of philosophy that were presented in close connection with a trenchant critique of their contemporaries (i.e. in the historiographic schemas in Schelling’s Propädeutik from 1805/6; Ziche (in prep.)).

 

Research Plan

 

Establishing the corpus:

Kant and the polemical debates around 1800

 

Historiography

Interpretation:

Systematizing the role of “experience”

 

Philosophy and the sciences

 

Kant as integrating empiricism and rationalism

International reception

 

 

Establishing the relevant corpus of texts has to look at both the writings of Kant and the ensuing polemical debates (in close interaction with sub-project 4), and at the historiography of philosophy in the immediate post-Kantian period. The broad scope of empiricism-ascriptions and -verdicts immediately leads to conceptual problems: The openness of these ascriptions at the same time indicates a debate concerning the various roles of “experience” that contributes to a clarification of the notion of “science” and of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences. In these debates, “experience” is transformed from a method that can be applied in various contexts into an object of investigation.

Earlier discussions of an experience-based method, as available f.i. in the – frequently historically directed, thereby establishing a link to sub-project 1 – self-reflection of important institutions such as the “Royal Society” (Glanvill; Sprat) typically characterize the notion of “science”, and that of an “empirical philosophy”, in terms of open lists of features and methods. The texts from the period around 1800 show how these open characterizations are transformed into a clearer definition of “science”.

A rather remarkable implication of this historical reconstruction of the notion of “empiricism” is that the standard reading of Kant as integrating “empiricism” and “rationalism” needs to be reconsidered: both labels do only emerge in this context. How does this picture emerge, how is this picture – sketched by Kant himself – received, how does it enter the debate?

Finally, the international reception is of particular importance with regard to the notion of “empiricism”, given the role of a “philosophy of experience” in French and British contexts.

The role of these notions for the further development of idealistic philosophy – with particular respect to the idealists’ philosophy of nature, and to Schelling’s notion of a “higher” empiricism (Ziche 2012) – will be further explored in the project leader’s synthesis.


Sub-Project 4: Kantian empiricism: Divergent options for interpreting Kant

 

Research question

 

The final sub-project investigates a phenomenon that is related to, and differs in important strategic aspects from, those that are discussed in the other Ph.D.-projects: The phenomenon that in the very first generation of post-Kantian philosophers, the option of reading Kant himself as an empiricist, i.e. of developing a form of a Kantian empiricism, has been defended with great vigour.

The project of developing a “Kantian empiricism” around 1800 led to an immediate clash with the idealistic interpretations of Kant, and is therefore particularly illustrative for the attempts to structure philosophical debates along the new, broad labels. By creating a “Kantian empiricism”, the interpretation of the oeuvre of a particular author is subsumed under a broader concept; the interaction between this concept and the concrete details of Kantian philosophy, in the direct vicinity of strongly opposing trends, gives access to the decisions that had to give the label “empiricism” its function.

A reconstruction of this Kantian empiricism, and its position in the philosophical debates around 1800, will discuss and elucidate the following questions:

-       the relationship with the special sciences that is inherent in characterizing Kant as an empiricist

-       the decisions that had to be taken in subsuming Kant under the movement of empiricism: which aspects of his philosophy are highlighted, or just pushed to the background, in the debate between empiricist and idealist interpretations of Kant? How does this interpretation of Kant relate to the usage of the broad label “empiricism” in other philosophical contexts?

-       again, phenomena of reception prove important: how do these prototypical readings of Kant fare in different contexts of reception?

 

Background, Sources

 

In the first positive reactions to Kant’s philosophy, two prototypical reactions can be distinguished. Both found a basis in Kant’s writings, but both started off in diametrically opposite directions, centering on divergent readings of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences: On the one hand, one could stress the ideal of an absolute foundation for all sciences that could provide absolutely incontrovertible knowledge. This option lay at the basis of the idealists’ reaction as developed, f.i., in the early writings of J.G. Fichte and F.W.J. Schelling. On the other hand, Kant’s emphasis on the possibility of experience as a standard for all scientific endeavours could be emphasized, and this emphasis then led to an empiricist understanding of Kant’s philosophy. Important protagonists of this empiricist Kant-interpretation were, among others, C.C.E. Schmid (who was also one of the first to lecture about Kant, and helped popularize Kant’s work through his influential Wörterbuch on Kant (Schmid 1788)) and J.F. Fries, one of the forefathers of a mathematicized empirical psychology, whose work exerted considerable influence in 19th century debates on the philosophy of science.[18]

Research on “Kantian empiricism” has frequently been dominated by continuations of the polemical debates from the years around 1800 (e.g. Bonsiepen 1997). The broader question of the specifically empiricist characteristics of this Kant-interpretation, its character as a movement and its reception, have hardly been dealt with. As regards the relationship with the special sciences, a strong focus within Kantian empiricism lay on the topics of psychology and anthropology, but again, the further implications for the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences have not yet been sufficiently addressed.

 

Research Plan

 

The corpus: Kantian empiricism

 

Interpretation:

Relationship with “empiricism” in a broader sense

 

Kantian empiricism and the special sciences

 

Identifying open questions in Kant’s philosophy

Phenomena of reception

 

 

As in the other Ph.D.-projects, a reconstruction of the relevant movement will have to be the first step. In this case, there are well-established starting-points in the literature, but as already stated, these have to be extended to cover the movement in its entirety.

While “empiricism” entered the stage as a (polemical or critical) label for large movements, the empiricist interpretation of Kant started, in good faith, as an interpretation of Kant’s work. Still, it immediately became the subject of fierce debates (Frank 1997; Wallwitz 1998; Zantwijk/Ziche 2000). If one assumes that Kant can indeed be read empiristically, this has implications for the relationship between Kantianism and the special sciences. These features of the debate lead to two concrete research issues; the relationship of a “Kantian empiricism” to empiricism in general, and the identification of open questions in Kant’s philosophy that allowed for enormously divergent interpretations. Both steps will be pursued in close cooperation with sub-projetcs 2 and 3, as will be the issue of the reception of the empiricist interpretation of Kant. Finally, the relationship with the empirical sciences has to be discussed. A particularly important case study is provided by the discipline of psychology: while Kant explicitly refuted all claims as to psychologizing his theoretical philosophy, this is precisely what the Kantian empiricists – Schmid and Fries can again serve as paradigms – attempted.

 

 

Literature

Due to the limited space, the bibliography remains restricted to (selected) references to sources for sub-projects 1 and 2, and to titles that are directly referred to in the proposal.

 

Sources: History of science around 1800 (highly selective)

Brucker, J. (1742sqq.; 2nd ed. 1766sqq.) Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta. Leipzig: Breitkopf.

Cuvier, F.L.C.F.D. (1810) Rapport historique sur les progrès des sciences naturelles depuis 1789, et sur leur état actuel. Paris: Imprimerie impériale.

Davy, H. (1812/1840) Elements of chemical philosophy. In: id.: Collected Works. Vol. 4. London: Smith, Elder and Co. Cornhill.

Glanvill, J. (1668) Plus ultra: or, the Progress and Advancement of knowledge Since the Days of Aristotle. [...], London: James Collins.

Eichhorn, J.G. (ed.) Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Göttingen.

Montucla, J.-É. (1799-1802) Histoire des mathématiques, dans laquelle on rend compte de leurs progrès depuis leur origine jusqu'à nos jours. Nouv. éd. 4 vols. Paris: Agasse.

Pfleiderer, Chr.F. von (1994) Physik. Naturlehre nach Klügel. Nachschrift einer Tübinger Vorlesung von 1804. Ed. by P. Ziche. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog 1994.

Priestley, J. (1772) The history and presentstate of discoveriesrelating to vision,light, and colours. London.

Priestley, J. (1775) The History and present state of Electricity, with original experiments. 3rd ed. P. 1. London: C. Bathurst.

Savérien, A. (1777) Historie des progrès de l’esprit humain dans les sciences et dans les arts qui en dépendent. Sciences intellectuelles. Paris: Lacombe.

Sprat, Th. (1667) The History of the Royal-Society of London, For the Improving of Natural Knowledge. London: J. Martyn/J. Allestry.

 

Sources: Minor “realists” around 1800 (selective)

Bardili, Chr. G. (1788) Epochen der vorzüglichsten philosophischen Begriffe. Nebst den nöthigsten Beylagen. Halle.

Bardili, Chr. G. (1800) Grundriß der ersten Logik. gereinigt von den Irrthümern bisheriger Logiken überhaupt, der Kantischen insbesondere; keine Kritik, sondern eine Medicina mentis, brauchbar hauptsächlich für Deutschlands Kritische Philosophie. Stuttgart.

Bardili, Chr. G. (1803) Beytrag zur Beurtheilung des gegenwärtigen Zustandes der Vernunftlehre. Landshut.

Berg, F. (1804) Sextus oder über die absolute Erkenntniß von Schelling. Ein Gespräch. Würzburg.

Berg, F. (1805) Epikritik der Philosophie. Arnstadt et al.

Fries, J.F. (1803) Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling. Leipzig.

Koeppen, Fr. (1803) Schellings Lehre oder das Ganze der Philosophie des absoltuen Nichts. Nebst drey Briefen verwandten Inhalts von Friedr. Heinr. Jacobi. Hamburg.

Koeppen, Fr. (1806) Vermischte Schriften. Hamburg.

Koeppen, Fr. (1807) Ueber den Zweck der Philosophie. München.

Koeppen, Fr. (1813sqq.) Philosophie des Christenthums. Leipzig.

Krug, W.T. (1800) Briefe über die Wissenschaftslehre. Nebst einer Abhandlung über die von derselben versuchte Bestimmung des religiösen Glaubens. Leipzig.

Krug, W.T. (1801) Entwurf eines neuen Organon’s der Philosophie oder Versuch über die Prinzipien der philosophischen Erkenntniß. Meissen.

Krug, W.T. (1802) Wie der ungemeine Menschenverstand die Philosophie nehme. Buxtehude.

Krug, W.T. (1803) Fundamentalphilosophie. Züllichau.

Krug, W.T. (1810sqq.) System der theoretischen Philosophie. Königsberg.

Molitor, F.J. (1805) Der Wendepunkt des Antiken und Modernen. Oder Versuch den Realismus mit dem Idealismus zu versöhnen. Frankfurt a.M.

Rückert, J. (1801) Der Realismus, oder Grundsätze zu einer durchaus praktischen Philosophie. Leipzig.

Weiß, Chr. (1801) Winke über eine durchaus praktische Philosophie. Leipzig.

Wrede, E.G.F. (1791) Antilogie des Realismus und Idealismus. Zur nähern Prüfung der ersten Grundsätze des Leibnizischen und Kantischen Denksystems. Halle.

 

General literature (only texts referred to in the proposal)

Agassi, J. (2008) Science and its history. A Reassessment of the Historiography of Science. Dordrecht et al.: Springer.

Baur, M. (ed.) (1999) The emergence of German Idealism. Washington, D.C.

Bondeli, M. (1998) “Hegels Identitätsphilosophie in Auseinandersetzung mit Reinholds Rationalem Realismus”, In Hegels Jenaer Naturphilosophie, ed. K. Vieweg. Paderborn/München, 163-174.

Bondeli, M. / Schrader, W. (2003) Die Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds. Amsterdam/New York (Fichte-Studien Supplementa 16).

Bonsiepen, Wolfgang (1997) Die Begründung einer Naturphilosophie bei Kant, Schelling, Fries und Hegel. Mathematische versus spekulative Naturphilosophe. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann.

Braun, L. (1973) Histoire de l’histoire de la philosophie. Paris: Ophrys.

Catana, L. (2008) The historiographical concept ‘system of philosophy’. Its origin, nature, influence and legitimacy. Leiden: Brill (Brill’s studies in intellectual history 165).

Christie, J.R.R. (1996) “The Development of the Historiography of Science”. In: R.C. Olby et al. (eds.) Companion to the History of Modern Science. London/New York: Routledge, 5-22.

Daston, L./Galison, P. (2007) Objectivity. New York: Zone.

Dauben, J.W./Scriba, Chr.J. (2002) Writing the History of Mathematics: Its Historical Development. Basel/Boston/Berlin: Birkhäuser.

Diemer, A. (ed.) (1970) Der Wissenschaftsbegriff. Historische und systematische Untersuchungen. Meisenheim a. Glan: Hain.

Daston, L. (1995) Classical Probability on the Enlightenment. Princeton UP.

Engelhardt, D. von (1979) Historisches Bewußtsein in der Naturwissenschaft von der Aufklärung bis zum Positivismus. Freiburg/München: Alber.

Engelhardt, Dietrich von (1990) “Historical consciousness in the German Romantik Naturforschung”, in: Andrew Cunningham/Nicholas Jardine (eds.) Romanticism and the Sciences, Cambridge: CUP, 55-68.

Frank, M. (1997) “Unendliche Annäherung”. Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik. Frankfurt a.M.: suhrkamp.

Geldsetzer, L. (1968) Die Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Zur Wissenschaftstheorie der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung und -betrachtung. Meisenheim a. Glan: Hain.

Giovanni, G. di (2005) “Reinhold’s Criticism of Fichte and Schelling: The Commonality at a Distance, between Reinhold’s Late Thought and Hegel’s Logic”, Archivio di filosofia 83/1-3, 271-284.

Goulding, R. (2006) “Histories of Science in Early Modern Europe: Introduction”, Journal of the History of Ideas 67, 33-40

Gueroult, M. (1988) Histoire de l’historie de la philosophie. Breteuil: Auber.

Guillermit, L. (1982) Le réalisme de F.J. Jacobi. Dialogue sur l’idéalisme et le réalisme. Traduction et notes. Aix-en-Provence.

Hogrebe, W. (ed.) (1999) Jakob Friedrich Fries – Philosoph, Naturwissenschaftler und Mathematiker. Frankfurt a.M.

Jaeschke, W. (ed.) (1993) Transzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation. Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten Philosophie (1799-1807). Hamburg.

Jaeschke, W./Sandkaulen, B. (eds.) (2004)Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: ein Wendepunkt der geistigen Bildung der Zeit. Studien zum achtzehnten Jahrundert. Vol. 29. Hamburg.

Jardine, N. (1997) “The Mantle of Müller and the Ghost of Goethe. Interaction between the Sciences and Their Histories”. In: Kelley (ed.) (1997), 297-317.

Kelley, D.R. (1997) “The Problem of Knowldege and the Concept of Discipline”. In: id. (ed.) History and the Disciplines. The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe. Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press 1997, 13-28.

Lipton, P. (2001) “Empiricism, History of.” International encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier, 4481-4485.

Longo, M. (1986) Historia philosophiae philosophica. Theorie e metodi della storia della filosofie tra Seicento e Settecento. Milano: Istituto propaganda libraria.

Lovejoy, A.O. (1953) The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard  UP. 5th printing.

Paimann, R. (2009) Das Denken als Denken. Die Philosophie des Christoph Gottfried Bardili. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.

Pinkard, T. (2002) “1801-1807: the other post-Kantian: Jacob Friedrich Fries and non-Romantic Sentimentalism”, in: id., German Philosophy 1760-1860. The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge: 199-211

Pinkard, T.P. (2002) German Philosophy 1760-1860. The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge.

Pluder, V.G. (2010) Die Vermittlung von Idealismus und Realismus in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie. D.phil.-thesis Bochum.

Pomata, G. / Siraisi, N.G. (Eds.) (2005) Historia. Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, Mass. / London: MIT Press.

Porter, R. (2003) “Introduction”. In: id. (ed.) Cambridge history of science, IV: 18th century. Cambridge: CUP.

Pulte, H. (1999) “ ‘...sondern Empirismus und Speculation sich verbinden sollen’. Historiographische Überlegungen zur bisherigen Rezeption des wissenschaftstheoretischen und naturphilosophischen Werkes von J.F. Fries und einige Gründe für dessen Neubewertung”, in: W. Hogrebe/K. Herrmann (Eds.), Jakob Friedrich Fries. Philosoph, Naturwissenschaftler und Mathematiker. Frankfurt a.M. et al: Peter Lang,  57-94.

Ritter, J. (ed.) (1972, 1992) Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 2/Vol. 8. Basel: Schwabe & Co.

Rousseau, G.S./Porter, R. (eds.) (1980) The ferment of knowledge. Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science. Cambridge e.al.: CUP.

Santinello, G. (ed.) Storia delle storie generali della filosofia. 1: F. Bottin e.al.: Dalle origini rinascimentali alla “historia philosophica”. Brescia: La Scuola 1981; 2: F. Bottin e.al.: Dall’età cartesiana a Brucker. Brescia: La Scuola 1979;  3: I.F. Baldo e.al: Il secondo illuminismo e l’età Kantiana. Padova: Antenore 1988; 4: B. Bianco e.al.: L’età Hegeliana. Padova: Antenore 1995.

Swerdlow, N.M. (1993) “Montucla’s Legacy: The History of the Exact Sciences”. Journal of the History of Ideas 54, No. 2, 299-328.

Wade, I. (1977) “The seventeenth-century philosophers as seen by the eighteenth century”, in: id.: The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment. vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton UP, 35-86.

Wallwitz, G.v. (1998) Die Interpretation und Ausformung von Kants Philosophie durch Carl Christian Erhard Schmid (1762-1812). Aachen.

Welter, R. (1979) “Bibliographie zur Selbstthematisierung der Wissenschaft”, in: C. Burrichter (ed.) Grundlegung der historischen Wissenschaftsforschung. Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe,213-266.

Yeo, R. (2003) “Classifying the sciences”. In: Porter (ed.) (2003) 241-266.

Zantwijk, T. van (2009) Heuristik und Wahrscheinlichkeit in der logischen Methodenlehre. Paderborn: Mentis.

Zantwijk, T.van / Ziche, P. (2000) “Fundamentalphilosophie oder empirische Psychologie? Das Selbst und die Wissenschaften bei Fichte und C.C.E. Schmid”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 54, 557-580.

Zelle, C. (ed.) (1998) Enzyklopädien, Lexika und Wörterbücher im 18. Jahrhundert. Göttingen: Wallstein.

Zöller, G. (2000) “German Realism: The Self-Limitation of Idealist Thinking in Fichte, Schelling and Schopenhauer”, In: K. Ameriks (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism. Cambridge: CUP, 200-218.



[1] For the relevant publications of the project leader, please refer to section 14, “Short CV”.

[2] In the Encyclopédie, this term is only used as the name for a school in ancient medicine. Also in other encyclopedias (e.g. Zedler in 1734, Ersch/Gruber still in 1840), “empiricism” is viewed as a particular attitude in medicine. Neither Hume nor Locke give this term prominence in their major works.

[3] A particular striking example is to be found in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel and F.W.J. Schelling from 1801-3: They denounce, in a highly critical vein, not only Kant and their fellow-idealist Fichte, but also Descartes – virtually everywhere else considered to be the archetypical exponent of rationalism – as empiricists.

[4] On these debates, see Jaeschke (ed.) 1993.

[5] Parallel investigations are possible for rationalist movements. “Empiricism” and “realism”, however, were more actively debated around 1800, and for this reason are singled out here.

[6] For references to the literature, see the descriptions of the sub-projects.

[7] A locus classicus for this idea is J.J. Brucker’s monumental Historia critica philosophiae (1742sqq.); on the innovative terminology of philosophical “systems” in Brucker, see Catana 2008.

[8] On classifications and encyclopedias, see Yeo (2003), Zelle (1998); Diemer (1970); on the historiography of philosophy, cf. Catana (2008); Braun (1973); Santinello (1988); Gueroult (1988); Geldsetzer (1968); Longo (1986).

[9] On specific issues see Swerdlow (1993); Dauben/Scriba (2002).

[10] The classifications of the science in the 17th century (e.g. Alsted) assume that the strucutre of the system of the sciences can be deduced apriorically; the same idea is inherent in Chr. Wolff’s systematization of the sciences.

[11] Ziche (2005b); Pfleiderer (1994).

[12] See also Daston (1995); Zantwijk (2009) on the increasing role of probable judgements during the 18th century.

[13] There was, however, some debate as to terminology; “dogmatism” (used, f.i., by Fichte) was a prominent alternative for “realism”. – Kant himself, by combining an “empirical realism” with a “transcendental idealism”, provides an example for the intricacies involved here.

[14] See, e.g., Bondeli (1998), Bondeli/Schrader (2003), Giovanni (2005), Guillermit (1982), Jaeschke/Sandkaulen (2004), Paimann (2009).

[15] A first sketch in Ziche (2005 a). See also Baur (1998), Pinkard (2002), Zöller (2000).

[16] For the relationship between a theory of “empiricism” and historiographic issues, see Wade (1977); Pomata/Siraisi (2005).

[17] Ritter 1972, 477-8.

[18] See Pulte (1999), Hogrebe (1999).

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