

Sea Change

Dutch Fishers and the European Community, 1977-
2002

Luuc Ritmeester

5993946

██████████@gmail.com

Thesis RMA History, Utrecht University

Supervisor: Dr. Liesbeth van de Grift

Date: 12-10-2018

Abstract

Scholars have widely debated European Community/European Union legitimacy. These works have not adequately addressed the historical dimension of this question. In addition, their insights are strongly normative by measuring legitimacy against a fixed standard. This thesis seeks to provide historical and explanatory insights to fill both gaps. It does so by analysing Dutch fishers' perceptions regarding the national and European level of policy-making. The analysis, based on fisheries newspapers and archival material, utilises the conceptual tools of input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The thesis argues that differences in perceptions were partly intrinsic to the European level. Fishers were not accustomed to the world of Brussels and its institutions, and they did not feel involved in policy-making. Thus, increasing fishers' involvement in decision-making can bolster legitimacy. Although, this thesis stresses that issues of interest representation can seriously undercut these attempts. For another part, the thesis argues that differences were caused by deeper trends. 'Nature' gained in importance, which manifested itself earlier in European policy-making than it did in Dutch national policy-making. In conclusion, this thesis, by examining fishers' perceptions, sheds new light on the debate of European Community/European Union legitimacy. It calls into question whether stakeholder involvement improves legitimacy and it highlights that perceptions vis-à-vis the European level of policy-making are not only shaped by characteristics intrinsic to the policy process, but also by deeper trends that manifest themselves through European policy-making.

Table of Contents

Introduction	4
Approach and methodology	9
1. From Mare Liberum to Sea Change: Dutch Fisheries in Context	15
Historical development and organisation of fisheries	16
Intergovernmental regulation of fisheries	19
A Common Fisheries Policy	20
2. Charting a Course: Constructing the CFP (1977-1982)	22
National Level	22
European Level	31
3. Closing the Net: Consolidating the CFP (1983-1990)	42
National Level	42
European Level	51
4. Charting a New Course: Readjusting the CFP (1991-1995)	57
National Level	57
European Level	67
5. Turning Tides: Reforming the CFP (1996-2002)	73
National Level	73
European Level	79
Conclusion	90
Bibliography	93
Sources	93
Literature	102

Introduction

Fisheries have become the symbol of Brexit. Leaving the European Union (EU) was about taking back control, and, it was a ‘sea of opportunity’¹ or a ‘golden opportunity’² to take back ‘stolen seas’³. These grievances were not restricted to British fishers.⁴ The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is deeply unpopular among Dutch fishers as well, their latest critiques focus on the EU’s landing obligation and the looming EU ban of electric pulse fishing.⁵ As Ernesto Penas Lado, who works at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, has stated in regard to the CFP: ‘It has been a favourite example of bad European policy-making among Eurosceptics [...] The tradition of CFP-bashing is as old as the policy itself.’⁶

Why has the CFP become such an icon of European decision-making? The symbolical value can hardly result from the fishing industry’s economic significance. In 1998, the total value of the *whole* production chain (fishing, aquaculture, processing and marketing) was estimated at €20 billion or approximately 0.28% of the Community’s GDP.⁷ Nevertheless, there are good reasons for why the CFP has become such an important symbol of European policy-making. First, it is one of the oldest and most developed European Community (EC)/EU⁸ common policies.⁹ Second, it is a profoundly political subject and ultimately revolves around resource allocation among Member States, with some losing and others winning.¹⁰ Distributional struggles have been highly sensitive issues, because losses were often concentrated in a small number of fishing communities. These communities could count on public sympathy for a long time, hence some countries went to great lengths to defend them.¹¹

¹ Macer Hall, ‘Leaving EU will open “sea of opportunity” for Britain’s fishing industry, says Michael Gove’, *Express*, 23-07-2017, <<https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/820699/Michael-Gove-leaving-EU-Brexit-opportunity-Britain-fishing-industry>>, last accessed 07-06-2018.

² Fishing for Leave, ‘Objectives’, *Fishing for Leave*, <<http://ffl.org.uk/objectives/>>, last accessed 07-06-2018.

³ Ray Finch, *Stolen Seas; How the UK suffers under the Common Fisheries Policy*, (2015), <http://www.efddgroup.eu/images/publications/Stolen_Seas.pdf>, last accessed 07-06-2018.

⁴ I have opted for the term ‘fisher’ instead of ‘fishermen’, as the former is more gender inclusive. Although, ‘fishermen’ is used in quotes or when organisations refer to themselves as such.

⁵ Arwin van Buuren and Erik-Hans Klijn, ‘Kapitein in de storm? Een institutionele analyse van de rol van het Productschap Vis in een veranderend zeevisserijnetwerk’, *Bestuurswetenschappen* 59 (2004) 3, pp. 281-304, 296; Ellen Hoefnagel, Leontine Visser and Birgit de Vos, *Drijfveren van vissers en duurzaam visserijbeheer; Een verkenning* (Den Haag 2004) 43-44; Harmen van der Werf, ‘Vissers houden protestmars in Amsterdam’, *Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant*, 11-04-2018, <<https://www.pzc.nl/zeeuws-nieuws/vissers-houden-protestmars-in-amsterdam-a172206e/>>, last accessed 26-7-2018.

⁶ Ernesto Penas Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy; The Quest for Sustainability* (Oxford 2016) 1.

⁷ Till Markus, *European Fisheries Law; From Promotion to Management* (Groningen 2004) 12.

⁸ Note on terminology: European fisheries policy was based on the EEC treaty. Thus, it was EEC policy. To prevent confusion I will refer to it as EC policy. Except for quotes in which the term ‘EEC’ was explicitly used.

⁹ Robin Churchill and Daniel Owen, *The EC Common Fisheries Policy* (Oxford 2010) VII.

¹⁰ Michael Leigh, *European Integration and the Common Fisheries Policy* (London 1983) 4.

¹¹ Mark Wise, *The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community* (London 1984) 6; Rob van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters; Sea Change in a Dutch Fishing Community* (Amsterdam 2009) 11.

The unpopularity of the CFP becomes all the more salient when fishers' perceptions vis-à-vis 'Europe' are contrasted with perceptions vis-à-vis national governments. In a 2016 survey by the University of Aberdeen, 92% of fishers stated that they would vote 'leave' in the Brexit-vote.¹² One could argue that this response is indicative that fishers hold their national government to be a better defender of their interests than the EU. Political scientist Jesper Nielsen found something similar in Denmark in that Danish fishers were more positive regarding their national government than they were with 'Europe'.¹³ That type of attitude appears to be the case in the Netherlands as well because the EC/EU was almost by definition perceived as the 'bad guy' by fishers, whereas the Dutch national government had more leeway.¹⁴

Why was this the case? The Dutch government was involved in the policy process as the EC/EU is multi-level polity, i.e., 'a polity in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government-subnational, national, and supranational.'¹⁵ Was the Dutch government able to avoid the blame by attributing all the negative outcomes to Brussels? Did fishers perceive the older (national) policies as better than European policies? Or did Dutch fishers feel better consulted by their national government than by the European Commission?

Moreover, the unpopularity of the CFP cannot be regarded as an inevitable outcome of its quotas. These certainly were not popular, but Dutch fishers voted in favour of them in 1975 and in a 1989 survey among 40 Dutch fishers, 75% indicated agreement with quota measures in principle.¹⁶ In addition, the CFP secured the equal access principle. Which meant that Dutch fishers could not be denied access to their fishing grounds by other Member States.¹⁷ Such a provision was important as Dutch fishers largely operated outside of Dutch seas. To put it even stronger, fishers all over Europe had much to gain from a European policy. Continuous fleet expansion and technical progress had led to the overfishing of certain fish stocks, which ultimately threatened fishers' economic perspectives. After the Second World War several intergovernmental organisations attempted to prevent overfishing, but they were unsuccessful in doing so.¹⁸

¹² University of Aberdeen, 'Survey finds 92 per cent of UK fishermen will vote to leave the EU', *University of Aberdeen*, <<https://www.abdn.ac.uk/news/9282/>>, last accessed 07-06-2018.

¹³ Jesper Raakjaer Nielsen, 'Participation in fishery management policy making; National and EC regulation of Danish fishermen', *Marine Policy* 18 (1994) 1, pp. 29-40.

¹⁴ Hoefnagel, Visser and De Vos, *Drijfveren*, 43-44; LEI, *Sharing Responsibilities in Fisheries Management* (Den Haag 2005) 51-53.

¹⁵ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, *Multi-level Governance and European Integration* (Oxford 2001) 2.

¹⁶ John Vervaele, Dick Ruimschotel and Rob Widdershoven, *Rechtshandhaving bij visquotering. Een evaluatieve studie naar rechtshandhaving van nationale en Europese regelgeving* (Utrecht 1990) 130.

¹⁷ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Wat met de visserij in het jaar 1980 en daarna?', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-51/52, 45.

¹⁸ Leigh, *European Integration*, 8.

In short, there appears to be a difference in Dutch fishers' perceptions of the national and European policy process and its' outcomes. The contrast poses a puzzle, one that I seek to solve by answering the following research question: *Did Dutch fishers perceive the national and European policy-making level differently in the period 1977-2002, and if so, why?* This period has been chosen as the first extensive EC/EU common fisheries policies originated in 1977, and 2002 is a well-marked end because the second CFP-reform was introduced in that year. In addition, this was a period in which policy and the organisation of fishers' associations profoundly changed.

The answer to this question could yield relevant insights for contemporary debates regarding the EC/EU's legitimacy. A topic that has been debated since at least the 1990s, mainly in terms of political scientist Fritz Scharpf's input and output legitimacy.¹⁹ Input legitimacy relates to the participatory quality of policy, i.e., a policy is considered legitimate if it contains 'some link with authentic preferences of the members of a community.'²⁰ In contrast, output legitimacy relates to the outcomes of policy, i.e., their ability to promote the common good and their alignment with the community's norms.²¹

Scharpf himself was sceptical of the EU's ability to generate legitimacy because it lacks the preconditions of input legitimacy: a collective identity and a European *demos*.²² As a result, the EU can only rely on legitimacy through its output.²³ Andrew Moravcsik, another political scientist, has argued this is not necessarily a problem. He has agreed with Scharpf that the EU has problems on the input-side, including a low electoral turnout and a lack of directly elected institutions. Yet he has also contended that the checks and balances and the possibilities for citizen participation redress the problems on the input side and create effective and responsive output in the end.²⁴ These compensatory qualities are sufficient for Moravcsik to deem the EU legitimate when judged against the practices of existing-nation states. Issues of legitimacy would only arise if the EU is evaluated against ideal types of parliamentary democracy.²⁵ In contrast, political scientist Simon Hix has been more pessimistic about these compensatory possibilities. Rather, he has posited that citizen participation (input) and 'a genuine debate about and competition over the exercise of political authority' are absolutely necessary.²⁶

¹⁹ Fritz Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play* (Boulder 1997); Fritz Scharpf, *Governing in Europe* (Oxford 1999).

²⁰ Fritz Scharpf, *Regieren in Europa: Effektiv und demokratisch?* (Frankfurt/Main 1999) 16.

²¹ Scharpf, *Regieren in Europa*, 16.

²² *Ibidem*, 168.

²³ *Ibidem*, 167.

²⁴ Andrew Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2002) 4, pp. 603-624, 620.

²⁵ Moravcsik, 'Democratic Deficit', 621.

²⁶ Simon Hix, *What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It* (Cambridge 2008) 4.

This thesis seeks to approach the issue from a different perspective. First, I aim to historicise perceptions vis-à-vis the EC/EU as a way to cast new light on the debate. Second, most scholars have measured legitimacy against a certain fixed standard, either implicit or explicit. In essence, they have asked the normative question of what legitimacy entails and then measured the EC/EU's practices against their conception. I seek to shift attention to more explanatory insights. In particular, why are certain groups of citizens unhappy with the EC/EU and why have they perceived its policy as illegitimate?

In doing so, this thesis borrows from and moves beyond existing literature on European integration. It borrows from the literature in moving away from state-centric perspectives. The process of European integration has been studied from a number of theoretical vantage points, ranging from neo-functionalism spill-over to liberal-intergovernmentalism.²⁷ The latter has become a rather popular explanation and it explains European integration as the 'realist' outcome of 'a series of rational choices made by national leaders.'²⁸ These leaders have responded to domestic interests and political pressures which were confined to their national arenas. Thus, states were the sole channel of influence for subnational actors. As a result, these perspectives have focused heavily on states, and the history and popular image of European integration have become dominated by studies on European conferences and interstate bargaining.²⁹

State-centric perspectives have been criticised since the 1990s when these conceptions were no longer deemed adequate to understand the EC/EU. The Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) had changed the political architecture of Europe. Actors other than states, including the European Parliament and interest groups, gained power.³⁰ Political scientists Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank have proposed a multi-level governance model, which views decision-making powers as shared 'by actors at different levels, rather than monopolised by state executives.'³¹ Additionally, it conceptualises political arenas as interconnected. Subnational actors were not restricted to their own domestic arena. Instead, they also operate at the European level.³²

Historian Wolfram Kaiser has historicised the idea of interconnectedness. The European political arena has never been monopolised by states, and thus, Europe was not

²⁷ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (London 1958).

²⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (New York 1998) 18.

²⁹ Marloes Beers and Liesbeth van de Grift, 'Europa als politiek arena', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 130 (2017) 3, pp. 1-3, 2.

³⁰ Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34 (1996) 3, pp. 341-378.

³¹ Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 'European Integration'.

³² *Ibidem*, 346.

made by states alone.³³ Rather, from the beginning, actors other than European institutions and states have been involved in integration. Either they were pulled in, in an attempt to bestow legitimacy on European integration, or they pushed themselves into the process.³⁴ In 2013, Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer defined these actors as ‘societal actors’, groups that ‘claim to represent collective interests emerging from national societies and an emerging transnational European society’.³⁵

My thesis builds upon these insights, but it also seeks to move beyond them. Kaiser and Meyer have kept their focus on the impact of societal actors in relation to policy-making and polity building.³⁶ Theoretically speaking, they did not change their dependent variable: the process of European integration. However, I will focus on a different dependent variable: perceptions of interest groups vis-à-vis the EC/EU. As discussed, these perceptions could shed new light on the debate regarding the EC/EU’s legitimacy. Studying these perceptions allows us to move away from normative conceptions to explanatory insights.

This research will focus on fishers belonging to two national associations – the Dutch Fishermen’s Association (*Nederlandse Vissersbond*)³⁷ and the Federation of Fishermen’s Associations (*Federatie van Visserijverenigingen*). Both represented fishers from the coastal and small sea fisheries. These particular branches of fisheries, from now on referred to as the cutter sector, are interesting for several reasons. First, this sector, in particular the small sea fisheries, was by far the largest sector of Dutch fisheries when measured by fleet size, aggregate engine power, or in contribution to total revenue (around 70% for the entire period).³⁸ Second, the so-called big sea fisheries, predominantly fishing for herring and mackerel, started to operate outside of Europe after the inception of the CFP. The introduction of freezer trawlers allowed them to fish for four to six consecutive weeks, thus these ships could operate all over the world. Somewhat overstated is that they could ‘escape’ the CFP, but cutter fishers certainly could not do so. Their vessels and fishing techniques were specifically adapted to North Sea fishing. Third, the cutter sector became split between the Association and Federation, partly as a result of diverging opinions over European policy and quotas.

³³ Wolfram Kaiser, ‘Transnational Western Europe since 1945: Integration as Political Society Formation’, in: Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie (Eds.), *Transnational European Union; Towards a common political space* (Abingdon 2005) pp. 17-36, 32.

³⁴ Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer, ‘Beyond Governments and Supranational Institutions: Societal Actors in European Integration’, in: idem (Eds.), *Societal Actors in European Integration, Polity-Building and Policy-Making 1958-1992* (Basingstoke 2013) pp. 1-14, 1.

³⁵ Kaiser and Meyer, ‘Beyond Governments’, 5.

³⁶ Ibidem, 5.

³⁷ A literal translation is ‘Dutch Fishermen’s Union’. Several authors refer to the organisation as such. The organisation translates its own name as ‘Dutch Fishermen’s Association’, and thus, I will do the same.

³⁸ S. Aukema et al., ‘De financiering van landbouw, tuinbouw en visserij’, in: A.L.G.M. Bauwens et al., (Eds.), *Landbouw tussen vrijheid en gebondenheid* (Den Haag 1981) pp. 54-67, 62; Heleen Bartelings et al., *Visserij in Trends* (Den Haag 2007) 15.

Approach and methodology

Perceptions of a policy-making level are defined as an actor's assessment of the level's legitimacy. Legitimacy can be conceptualised further in Scharpf's terms of 'input' and 'output' legitimacy. Input relates to the participatory quality of *institutions* in decision-making. Scharpf considers policy legitimate if it contains 'some link with authentic preferences of the members of a community'.³⁹ Output legitimacy relates to the *policies* coming out of decision-making. Policy is considered legitimate if it effectively promotes the common good and is in line with a community's norms.⁴⁰

Several scholars have refined Scharpf's conceptualisation and have argued that he did not pay sufficient attention to procedural legitimacy.⁴¹ For them, it deserved its own category, whereas Scharpf mainly located procedural legitimacy on the input side. These scholars thus have introduced 'throughput', legitimacy related to the *procedures* of decision-making. This third category would open up what Vivien Schmidt has called 'the "black box" of governance'.⁴² Input only reflects *where* an actor participates, whereas throughput legitimacy provides an assessment of the *quality* of interaction. Throughput helps in understanding 'why issues of legitimacy exist where it appears a plurality of actors are involved'.⁴³

Input, throughput, and output need to be conceptualised further. Before doing so, it is necessary to remark that the framework is an analytical one and organises assessments of legitimacy in an abstract manner. Of course, the assessments are present in the real world, but the way in which the framework presents perceptions does not neatly correspond with reality. In the real world, perceptions of input, output, and throughput overlap. In addition, the concept of multi-level governance presents decision-making as shared between different levels. If those levels overlap, then perceptions vis-à-vis levels might do so as well, but for analytical reasons these perceptions will be separated. Perceptions of output are a good example. The CFP follows the principle of subsidiarity. Implementation of policy is left to Member States themselves. It could be that the national level was criticised for implementing the CFP and European level was criticised for the CFP framework in general. These critiques will be discussed separately, whereas in

³⁹ Fritz Scharpf, *Regieren in Europa*, 16.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, 16.

⁴¹ Vivien A. Schmidt, 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 'Throughput'', *Political Studies* 61 (2013), pp. 2-22; Victor Bekkers and Arthur Edwards, 'Legitimacy and Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Governance Practices', in: Bekkers et al., (Eds.), *Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices* (Aldershot 2007) pp. 35-61; Thomas Risse and Mareike Kleine, 'Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU's Treaty Revision Methods', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45 (2007) 1, pp. 69-80; Michael Zürn, 'Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and other International Institutions', *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2000) 2, pp. 183-221.

⁴² Schmidt, 'Democracy and Legitimacy', 5.

⁴³ Gregory Poelzer, *Extracting Legitimacy: Input, Throughput, and Output Legitimacy in the Mining Industry* (Lulea 2018) 30.

reality they are related. Again, these perceptions were present in the real world, but their organisation into neat categories was not.

Input

Input legitimacy is dependent on opportunities for participation and on the quality of representation. Opportunities for participation offer citizens the possibility to voice their preferences, and elections are a minimal way of doing so. A more direct way of participation is citizen involvement. However, directly involving all citizens is neither feasible nor practical. Rather, citizens will participate through interest groups and their representatives, and input legitimacy is therefore dependent on the quality of representation as well.⁴⁴ Thus, perception of input legitimacy is dependent on assessments of opportunities for participation and the quality of representation.




Figure 1: Perception of level of policy-making

Turning to the perceived opportunities for participation first, which are an evaluation of the channels for participation. Are these held as sufficient and varied? Do members and representatives have the feeling they could reach high-level actors in the policy process, or are they only able to reach low-level actors? The perceived quality of representation is the extent to which members *and* representatives perceive their organisation as effectively promoting members' interest. A discrepancy between members' and representatives' assessments could yield interesting and relevant insights. For example, representatives

⁴⁴ Scharpf, *Regieren in Europa*, 16.

might have made certain bargains, thinking that their constituency would have wanted them to do so, whereas in reality this was not the case.⁴⁵

The perceived quality of representation is an outcome of three factors: the perception of information, organisation, and grassroots representation. Information refers to the evaluation of informational supply, i.e., an assessment of the top-down dissemination of knowledge within associations on policy, policy developments, and relevant actors within policy processes. Organisation encompasses the evaluation of two dimensions: wide and narrow. Organisation in the wide sense refers to the size and representativeness of the organisation; organisation in the narrow sense refers to the association's resources and internal structure. Lastly, grassroots representation can be defined as the evaluation of the ability of representatives to speak on behalf of their constituency.

In principle, the perceived quality of representation for the national level and European level is different. Quality of representation for the national level is concerned with *national* representation and its ability to influence *domestic* affairs. At the European level, it should be concerned with *national* and *European* representation and their ability to influence *European* affairs. This allows the researcher to make a distinction between problems at the national and European level. For example, representatives might regard their own association as well-organised in contrast to a European umbrella organisation. This distinction cannot be made in my research because the associations under study were not did not extensively occupy themselves with the European organisations. As a result, I will focus on the perceived ability of the *national* representation to influence *European* affairs and not on *European* representation and its ability to influence *European* affairs.

Throughput

Throughput is concerned with the quality of interaction or more specifically, with perceptions of interactions. Fishers had certain expectations towards policy-makers in regard to responsiveness, transparency and accountability. Responsiveness refers to the extent to which fishers felt that their voice was a valid one in the process.⁴⁶ Did they feel that their wishes were taken into account? Did fishers have the sense they could access the same venues as other stakeholders, and did they feel that they were consulted at the same stage in policy-making? Or were they only pulled in after a certain problem had already been defined?

Responsiveness is fundamentally different from having the opportunity to participate because the latter refers to access of venues for participation, while the former is

⁴⁵ Bekkers and Edwards, 'Legitimacy and Democracy', 44.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, 44.

concerned with the evaluation of the actual participation. For example, fishers might have been positive that they could meet the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (opportunity for participation), while they may have had negative viewpoints that he had more meetings with environmental groups (fishers voice was perceived as less valid). At the same time, both dimensions should not be confused with actual policy output as fishers might have been positive that they could express themselves as much as other stakeholders, even though the interests of other stakeholders had been incorporated more in policy output.

In addition, fishers had certain expectations about transparency and accountability. Both are strongly related, with the latter largely dependent on the former. Accountability refers to the extent to which actors could be held responsible for their performance in decision-making and implementation. This also implies that these actors should supply information about decisions and on their effects (transparency).⁴⁷ Central in this thesis' analysis will be how fishers judged accountability and transparency.

Output

Output is concerned with the policies coming out of decision-making processes. Two relevant criteria to assess output were identified in the literature: performance and distributive justice.⁴⁸ Hence, to reconstruct the perception of output, one would need to study the perception of these norms. Schmidt has distinguished two ways to define performance: Technical and political. Technical evaluations are the 'domain of experts whose assessments are based on their technical knowledge and philosophies, with judgements likely to invoke economic principles such as competitiveness, fiscal balance, growth, or social well-being'.⁴⁹

However, as Schmidt has argued, performance in the end is political, i.e., evaluation of outcomes ultimately depends on the extent to which outcomes resonate with citizen values and community norms. Thus, policy is judged on economic performance and social impact.⁵⁰ Hence, I will focus only on the political evaluation of performance: how did fishers perceive economic performance and the social impact of policy? Related to this is distributive justice or the allocation of goods. Did fishers find the allocation of goods, for example, Total Allowable Catches (TACs) to be fair? If not, why was that the case?

⁴⁷ Bekkers and Edwards, 'Legitimacy and Democracy', 44.

⁴⁸ Ibidem, 45-46; Schmidt, 'Democracy and Legitimacy'.

⁴⁹ Vivien A. Schmidt, 'The Eurozone's Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can the EU Rebuild Public Trust and Support for European Economic Integration?', *Discussion Paper 15* (2015) Online: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp015_en.pdf>, 11, last accessed 25-09-2018.

⁵⁰ Schmidt, 'Eurozone's Crisis', 12.

Sources

Studying interest groups is far from easy. Many are reluctant to open up their archives on often highly political subjects, such as the role of lobbyists.⁵¹ As a result, relatively few historical studies on interest groups exist. This problem applies to the two main actors under study as well because their archives are not accessible. This problem can be circumvented. To do so, I made use of five different categories of sources.

First of all, I examined two weekly fisheries magazines, *Visserijwereld* (1977-1981) and its successor, *Visserijnieuws* (1982-2002).⁵² Each contains lengthy reports on meetings from fishers and their associations, and both were official magazines for the Association and the Federation. These magazines are useful in two ways: on the one hand they give insight into grassroots perceptions as they contain interviews with fishers, letters to the editor by fishers, reports on meetings by fishers, and other similar reports. On the other hand, the magazines also provide insights into perceptions held by representatives as they include interviews with representatives, reports on their speeches, and other relevant materials.

While these magazines offer important insights into perceptions of representatives and members, they cannot be used to study what happened behind the scenes. It is necessary to reconstruct this, which was done with two additional archives, both held in the National Archives (*Nationaal Archief*): the archives of the Dutch Directorate of Fisheries (*Directie Visserijen*; DF) and the archives of the Fish Board (*Visserijschap*) and later on, the Fish Product Board (*Productschap Vis*). The DF's archives contain extensive reports of meetings with interest groups, primarily with the Fish Board.

The Fish Board and the Fish Product Board were statutory corporations responsible for the representation and regulation of the Dutch fishing industry. Their exact role and history will be discussed in chapter one. These board were responsible for the industry as a whole. Therefore, only statements that could be explicitly linked to or statements that were explicitly backed by the Federation or Association were included in the analysis. To give an example, the Fish Board's general policy reports were not used, but the process in which these proposals were drafted, is of relevance, because this allowed me to study perceptions of the associations.

Several remarks on the use of these sources need to be made. First, the greater part of the DF's archives only run up until 1999, so for the years thereafter, this archive could not be used. Second, the Fish Board's archives had a different problem, which is the

⁵¹ Clive S. Thomas, 'Introduction: The Study of Interest Groups', in: idem (Ed.), *Research Guide to U.S. and International Interest Groups* (London 2004) pp. 1-20, 11.

⁵² These newspapers have been accessed through the Royal Library (*Koninklijke Bibliotheek*). For most years, all editions were bundled in a book. In several bundles, the front covers were left out. As a result, the exact date of these editions is unknown. Only the edition's number was found. Therefore, I will refer to the newspapers by their publication number. Where possible, the exact date will be mentioned in between brackets.

inconsistent availability of reports on meetings between 1983 and 1987. Third, both archives almost exclusively contain documents revealing perceptions held by representatives.

To compensate for the lack of grassroots perspectives in these archives, I included the archives of the regional association from Zeeland, the *Vereniging tot Bevordering der Zeeuwse Visserijbelangen* (Zevibel). Zevibel was a member of the Federation, while simultaneously being an encompassing association itself as it was made up out of local associations from several cities in the province of Zeeland. These fishers were then members of their local association, of Zevibel, and of the Federation.

Zevibel's archives are situated in the Zeeland Archives (*Zeeuws Archief*) but are quite unorganised. In addition, for the 1990s, reports of meetings are often missing. These archives were thus mainly used as a supplementary source, they did not make up the backbone of the analysis. Lastly, an interview with Dick Langstraat, secretary of the Fish Board and later on chairman of the Fish Product Board, was conducted. Langstraat played a pivotal role within the Dutch fishing industry. He was the Fish Product Board's chairman for more than 15 years and he was active at the European level via his role in European umbrella associations and advisory committees. This interview was used as another supplementary source as Langstraat was not a representative of the associations under study. Nevertheless, his remarks provided valuable insights into activities at the European level.

No European archives were used because the associations under study did not operate at the European level directly. Rather, they were represented through the Dutch Fishers' Trust (*Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij*). The debates within the Trust would be of interest, but the Trust's archive only offers materials until 1970. At the same time, part of the debate on European policy-making also took place within the Fish Board. Thus, there is a sufficient number of sources to answer the research question, but these sources cannot answer the question whether national associations found the Trust adequate in representing them.

Combining the five sources made it possible to construct a coherent story, although this story is far from all-encompassing or complete. Perhaps its merits rest more in its diversity than in its coherence, and this thesis should be seen as an attempt and an invitation—an attempt, as it is one of the few studies on the history of Dutch fishers, their associations, and their perceptions of policy and an invitation as I hope it encourages researchers to delve deeper into the history of Dutch fisheries in the era of European integration.⁵³ It is certainly worth doing so, which I hope this thesis will demonstrate.

⁵³ One notable exception is Rob van Ginkel's, *Braving Troubled Waters; Sea Change in a Dutch Fishing Community* (Amsterdam 2009).

1. From Mare Liberum to Sea Change: Dutch Fisheries in Context

The Netherlands has a long history of fishing. This is hardly surprising because the North Sea is one of the most productive seas in the world, accounting for over 5% of commercial fish caught internationally. Fishing is concentrated in the southern parts of the sea, as this is the area with the highest biomass. In contrast, the northern parts have more biodiversity and less biomass.⁵⁴ For the most part, the North Sea lies on the European continental shelf and its average depth is only 95 meters. Sun rays can easily reach the bottom of the sea, which is an excellent condition for plankton to grow. These organisms are a crucial element of the food chain, making the North Sea one of the most productive seas in the world.

Traditionally, the Dutch sea fishing industry has been divided into three groups: big sea fisheries (*grote zeevisserij*), small sea fisheries (*kleine zeevisserij*), and coastal fisheries (*kustvisserij*). In the period under study, the big sea fisheries exclusively used pelagic trawlers, whereas the other two sectors made use of cutters (*kotters*) and came to be referred to as the cutter sector. Trawlers were larger, could stay on sea for a longer period of time, and fished for pelagic fish (e.g. herring, mackerel), which are fish that live in the zone between the surface and the bottom of the sea. In contrast, cutters were smaller, landed their catch every week, and fished for shrimp or demersal fish, fish living on or just above the bottom of the sea (e.g. plaice, sole, and cod).

A 'kotter' is a small (12-24m) or medium (30-46m) sized vessel. I have opted to translate 'kotter' as 'cutter', as this is quite common in the literature on Dutch fisheries. Literally, 'cutter' is somewhat of a misnomer because the fishing technique used by many cutters, i.e., pulling a fishing net through the water, would be referred to as 'trawling' in English. Hence, these ships would be called 'trawlers'. However, in Dutch, 'trawler' is used exclusively for pelagic trawlers. To keep the terminology clear, I have used the Dutch naming conventions. Something similar applies to the term roundfish (*rondvis*). In English, this term can also refer to species not considered 'rondvis', e.g. all cylindrical shaped fish or round whitefish, which is a freshwater species. In this thesis, 'roundfish' will refer exclusively to 'rondvis', e.g. Gadiformes such as cod, whiting, and haddock.

As discussed, the cutter sector consists of the small sea fisheries and coastal fisheries. The sector itself can be divided into three groups: cutters fishing for flatfish (e.g. plaice and sole), roundfish, or shrimp. Flatfish and roundfish are predominantly caught

⁵⁴ Roelke Posthumus and Adriaan Rijnsdorp, *Schol in de Noordzee; een biografie van de platvis en de Nederlandse visserij* (Amsterdam 2016) 15.

on the seas (small sea fisheries), i.e., outside of the 12-nautical mile (nm) zone, whereas shrimp are only caught inside of this zone (coastal fisheries). The flatfish fleet especially expanded significantly in the period under study, whereas the roundfish fleet decreased significantly.⁵⁵ The small sea fisheries have always been the largest subsector within the cutter sector when measured in fleet size, aggregate engine power or in contribution to total revenue (around 70% for the entire period).⁵⁶ Hence, I will focus predominantly on that specific subsector.

The abovementioned division becomes clearer from the 1980s onwards as there was a strong trend towards specialisation after then. At the same time, this division is somewhat of a theoretical one. First, many fishers had their own unique 'profile'. For example, some fished for shrimp in summer and flatfish in winter (mixed fishing), whereas others fished year-round for roundfish. As a result, there was a diverging range of interest groups within the cutter sector, most fishers fitted a certain mould, however, not all did so. This is essential to note because policy had a varying impact on a range of fishers who undertook seemingly similar activities.⁵⁷ Second, specialisation is a relative term because there was the inevitability of bycatch. For example, flatfish live at the bottom of the sea and can only be caught by dragging a net over the seabed. Roundfish live slightly above the lowermost portion of the seas and will inevitably be caught when dragging a net over the bottom of the sea.

Historical development and organisation of fisheries

Historically, Dutch fisheries were dominated by the herring fishing industry. From the 17th until the mid-18th century the Dutch herring fleet was one of the largest and best organised in Europe.⁵⁸ Given the size of the industry compared to other sectors of fisheries, herring fisheries became referred to as the big fisheries (*Grote Visserij*), whereas other fisheries were called small fisheries (*Kleine Visserij*). The small fisheries were, unsurprisingly, not of much economic significance. They predominantly consisted of ships fishing for roundfish. Outside of the herring season, they would be joined by the herring fleet. The flatfish fleet was small, as flatfish was a rather marginal product and predominantly consumed by common people or used for export.⁵⁹

In the 1920s, the first cutters were introduced.⁶⁰ As of the late 1950s, the cutter sector expanded considerably, especially the flatfish fleet. A 'race for horsepower' (*pk-race*)

⁵⁵ Bartelings et al., *Visserij*, 35.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, 15; Aukema et al., 'Financiering', 62.

⁵⁷ Stichting Nederland Maritiem Land, *Nederlandse Visserijsector; Economische Betekenis en Structuur* (Delft 1999) 11.

⁵⁸ Bo Poulsen, *Dutch Herring: An Environmental History, c. 1600-1800* (Amsterdam 2008).

⁵⁹ Posthumus and Rijnsdorp, *Schol*, 76.

⁶⁰ Willem Ment den Heijer, *Ou je roer recht; de kottervoisserij vanaf 1960* (Alkmaar 1999) 8.

ensued, with aggregate fleet engine power nearly quadrupling between 1960 and 1973 from 348 cutters with 67,500 HP in 1960 to 472 cutters with 293,100 HP in 1973.⁶¹ In 1975, aggregate engine power had grown to 327,000 HP.⁶² The growth of engine power enabled flatfish fishers to drag heavier and larger nets over the bottom of the sea, which led to higher catches. The growth was made possible by technological innovations, the reintroduction of the beam trawl, the rise of an export market for flatfish, and stimulations by the Dutch fiscal regime. The fleet's expansion was unique from a European perspective, as fleets in many European countries were shrinking.⁶³

Organisation

In contrast to the small fisheries, big fisheries were already well organised in the 17th century, predominantly through the Council of Big Fisheries (*College van de Grootte Visscherij*). This national council regulated the quality, processing and trade of herring. In addition, there were several local councils, which occupied themselves with local issues and with the escorting of fishing vessels, an important activity during this era. Fishing companies were scarcely represented in these councils. It would only be around the 19th-century that the first local associations were formed, with the *Redersvereniging Scheveningen* (1812) probably being the first one. In 1886 several local associations from Katwijk, Maassluis, Scheveningen, Vlaardingen, IJmuiden, Amsterdam and Rotterdam founded the first national association, the *Vereeniging ter Bevordering van de Nederlandsche Visserij*, which focused primarily on herring fisheries as this was the largest sector at the time. This group would eventually be renamed the *Redersvereniging voor de Nederlandse Zeevisserij*.

The small fisheries had more trouble organising itself, but there was also little necessity to doing so. During the Interwar period, this changed quickly as many cutters were motorised and the economy deteriorated. In 1934, several local associations came together to form the Dutch Fishermen's association (*Nederlandsche Vissersbond*), but it is not clear how many members this organisation had or nor how representative it was of the sector as a whole at its founding.⁶⁴

In 1948, all Dutch associations in the coastal, big sea, small sea, and inshore fisheries, united in one trust, the Dutch Fishers' Trust (*Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij*). This Trust was founded to improve cooperation among fishers and to promote the interests of all Dutch fishers at the national and international levels. The latter goal was a response

⁶¹ LEI, *De Nederlandse zeevisserij op de drempel van een nieuw tijdvak* (n.p., 1975) 22.

⁶² Van Vliet and Dubbink, *Nederlandse visserijbeheer*, 32.

⁶³ Martijn van Vliet and Wim Dubbink, 'Het Tragedy of the Commons model en het Nederlandse visserijbeheer', *Beleid and Maatschappij* 25 (1998) 1, pp. 27-39, 32.

⁶⁴ H.A.H. Boelmans Kranenburg, 'Organisatie van de visserij tot 1955', in: H.A.H. Boelmans Kranenburg et al. (Eds.), *Het Visserijschap – Speerpunt voor de visserij* (Haarlem 1980) pp. 9-16, 13.

Gerrit Hiemstra, *De Nederlandse Vissersbond 1934-1994; "60 jaar zee- en kustvisserij"* (Emmeloord 1994) 11.

to the international regulation of fisheries, specifically to international post-war attempts to preserve fishing stocks after these had recovered during World War II. The Trust was largely a consultative and advisory body and rarely took decisions by a majority vote as the interests of the majority could be very damaging to minorities. The Trust preferred mixed advice over the majority's advice.⁶⁵

In addition, the Trust paved the way for the creation of a statutory corporation, the Fish Board (*Visserijschap*). Such a board was founded in 1955 and was a horizontally integrated body in that it was only responsible for the fishing industry. In 1958, it became part of the Fish Product Board (*Produktschap Vis*), which was a vertical body made up of statutory corporations in the entire sector (fishing industry, processing, and marketing). In 1992, these corporations merged together in one Fish Product Board (*Productschap voor Vis en Visproducten*).

The Fish Board took on three tasks: regulating the fishing industry, promoting the interests of the industry, and providing services to the industry. The first would be the most prominent one as the Trust and national associations had little leverage over their members. The Fish Board could impose binding obligations on fishers, whereas the Trust and associations had to resort to voluntary agreements among fishers.⁶⁶ The second and third task would mainly be fulfilled by the Trust itself. Nevertheless the Fish Board provided professional support through its secretariat. This certainly proved convenient as national associations and the Trust were far from professional organisations before the 1990s.

The Dutch fishing industry was active at the European level as well, which was done through three organisations: COGECA, founded in 1959; Europêche, founded in 1962; and the European Association of Fish Producers Organisations (EAPO), founded in 1980. The Trust was active within COGECA and Europêche, both of which advised the EC/EU on fisheries policy. In particular, COGECA was originally a farmers' association that also occupied itself with smaller fishing companies, while Europêche was exclusively made up out of national fisheries associations. Both organisations often had to resort to advises of the lowest common denominator, and as a result, they were not very influential.⁶⁷ EAPO was the European umbrella organisation for all national Producers Organisations (POs), which are official EC/EU-recognised bodies set up by fishers. Since their inception in 1970, POs have been responsible for market regulation. As a result, the Fish Board's

⁶⁵ Boelmans Kranenburg, 'Organisatie', 15.

⁶⁶ Den Dulk 'Belangenbehartiging in de visserij', 19.

⁶⁷ Troels Jacob Hegland, 'The Common Fisheries Policy and Competing Perspectives on Integration', *Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University Publication Series 6* (2009); Stephan Engelkamp and Doris Fuchs, 'Performing 'Green Europe'? A narrative analysis of European fisheries policy', *Sustainable Governance Discussion Paper 1* (2016), 14.

tasks in regulating markets shrunk significantly. EAPO's role in the policy process was small however.

The Fish Board was not a member of any of these three organisations, as it was not a fishers' association. However, Fish Board and Trust cooperated closely, and the Fish Board consequently became involved in European affairs as well. The Board and Trust focused extensively on European affairs, whereas national associations were not occupied with these affairs. In general, the level of enthusiasm for European policy-making was low within national associations.⁶⁸

Intergovernmental regulation of fisheries

Before the EC common policies were introduced, there had already been international attempts to preserve fish stocks. This efforts were made by the intergovernmental North East Atlantic Fisheries Committee (NEAFC). This committee was founded in 1959 after increasing signals of overfishing, and initially relied on technical measures such as mesh size restrictions. In 1975 it introduced quota for several fish stocks, among them flatfish.

The NEAFC had two principal actors: its member states and the Permanent Committee. The latter proposed TACs, which were catch limits for a fish stock expressed in tonnes that were based on scientific advice by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Representatives from all 16 NEAFC member states negotiated on the level and allocation of TACs. Member States could incorporate representatives from the fishing industry in their delegations, a fact that was pleasing to the industry.⁶⁹

Another factor that led to satisfaction was that quotas were only loosely based on historical catch performance while being non-binding. Member states had to come to a satisfactory allocation through negotiations. Consequently, catch limits were set rather high to accommodate everyone's wishes.⁷⁰ How these national quotas were to be divided among fishers was up to member states themselves. The Netherlands introduced a system of Individual Quotas (IQs) for the flatfish fleet. Quotas for herring and roundfish were exempted from such a system, as the Government expected that those relatively minor landings would not distort the system too much.⁷¹ Initially, IQs were based on historical catches, in 1977 this was changed to a system in which Individual Quotas were based on engine horse power (50%) and historical catches (50%). This was done to take into account heavy investments. IQs were coupled with ships, hence they could officially not be sold or used, as this would introduce unwanted concentration and extra management problems.

⁶⁸ Interview with D.J. Langstraat on 27-6-2018; Van Buuren and Klijn, 'Kapitein in de storm?'

⁶⁹ Boelmans Kranenburg, 'Organisatie', 11.

⁷⁰ Van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters*, 187.

⁷¹ W. Smit, 'Dutch demersal North Sea fisheries: initial allocation of flatfish ITQs', in: Ross Shotton (Ed.), *Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries* (Rome 2001) pp. 15-23, 17.

This coupling could, however, be circumvented quite easily, thus, there was a sizable market on which quota could be transferred. After 1985, this practice gained a legal basis as quota became freely transferable.⁷²

A Common Fisheries Policy

The European Commission also started to develop a fisheries policy. The judicial framework for such a policy was based on the Treaty of Rome, in which a CFP is regarded as a part of agricultural policy.⁷³ The CFP eventually came to consist of four pillars: structural policy (1970), market policy (1970), external policy (1977), and conservation policy (1983). These pillars were developed in different time periods, and not unimportant, by a range of different actors operating in fundamentally different contexts. Hence, it would only be around 1986 that the four pillars came to be implemented coherently.

However, the actual development of fisheries policy was slow and only started at the end of the 1960. One of the reasons for this was that the Directorate General on Agriculture was occupied with the economically far more significant Common Agricultural Policy. Another reason was that as there was little necessity for a fisheries policy. Luxemburg had no fishing industry, and the other Member States caught 90% of their fish outside of their national seas. At the time, these seas ranged to 3-nm off the coast until the London Convention of 1964 and then 12-nm off the coast thereafter.⁷⁴

The European Commission presented its first policy proposals in 1967 with the 'Basic Principles for a Common Fisheries Policy'. Both the Commission and the Fisheries Council were the two principal actors in the policy process. The European Parliament had a rather modest role as it only had to be consulted. The fishing industry could initially voice itself solely through national ministers in the Council. In 1971 and 1974, two advisory committees were established; the first was the Advisory Committee on Fisheries (ACF), which consisted of representatives from all sectors of the fishing industry plus consumers. The second was the Joint Committee on Social Problems in Sea Fishing, which was founded in 1974 and focused itself on improving and harmonising social policy in sea fisheries.⁷⁵

The Commission's first proposal was focused on structural and market policies. The inefficient French and Italian fleets suffered under economic integration and liberalisation and the two countries saw a market and structural policy as a way to protect and modernise their fleets.⁷⁶ The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium saw little advantage in such

⁷² Van Vliet and Dubbink, *Nederlandse visserijbeheer*, 32.

⁷³ Mike Holden, *The Common Fisheries Policy* (Oxford 1994) 16.

⁷⁴ Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 18.

⁷⁵ Churchill and Owen, *The EC Common Fisheries Policy*, 266.

⁷⁶ Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 21.

a policy, as they would effectively be providing funds to their competitors. The stalemate was broken quickly when Denmark, Norway, Ireland and the UK applied to join the Community by 1973. All four had major fishing industries, and much of the fishing by the six Member States took place in their waters. If the 'six' could agree on a policy before the accession of the 'four', the 'four' had to accept this as part of the *acquis communautaire*.⁷⁷

In June 1970, a day before formal negotiations with the four applicant states began, the original Member States agreed on the adoption of three regulations dealing with structural policy, a common organisation of the market in fishery products, and trade with third-party states. The pillars of market policy and structural policy were now in place. This was not well received by the applicants, and especially Regulation 2141/70 led to fierce debates because it gave vessels registered in one Member State access to the maritime zone of another Member State (equal access principle).⁷⁸ The 'six' agreed that the inner 6-nm zone was exempted from this principle for a period of 10 years, but, that concession was insufficient for Norway, Europe's biggest fishing nation. Its national catch in 1970 exceeded that of all of the original six Community states together.

The common market principles of the European Community clashed with Norway's socio-economic structure. Norway had sizeable fishing communities in isolated regions and alternative employment for these communities was non-existent. As a result, the Norwegian government had long taken measures to protect them. The principle of equal access would undermine these measures which was held as one of the reasons why Norwegians voted against accession in a 1972 referendum.⁷⁹ However, the other applicants accepted the *acquis*, and, as of 1 January 1973, two of the four CFP's pillars, structural and market policy were firmly in place.

Overall, the historical development of Dutch fisheries, its organisation, and its regulation have now been discussed. Historically, the Dutch fishing industry was dominated by herring fisheries. From the 1950s onwards, the small sea fisheries fleet, especially its flatfish fleet, expanded enormously, but the sector was organisationally weak. In the context as described above, the lack of a strong order did not prove too much of a problem, but this would change in the period covered in the next chapter.

⁷⁷ Holden, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 16.

⁷⁸ Churchill and Owen, *The EC Common Fisheries Policy*, 5.

⁷⁹ Wise, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 6.

2. Charting a Course: Constructing the CFP (1977-1982)

This chapter will focus on differences between perceptions of Dutch fishers vis-à-vis the national and European arenas of policy-making between 1977 and 1982. As discussed in the methodology section, this will be done by using the conceptual tools of input, output, and throughput legitimacy. First, it is necessary to briefly elaborate on the CFP as this period was characterised by a considerable amount of uncertainty. The CFP's final pillar, conservation, was under construction at the time. Member States held different ideas on conservation and on the allocation of resources. As long as no consensus could be reached, enforcement of conservation measures depended on the will of individual Member States. Some states attempted to fill the legal vacuum by introducing conservation or allocation systems that favoured their interests.⁸⁰ Especially Ireland and the UK, but Denmark as well, sought to compensate for their absences when the equal access principle was decided.

National Level

The Europeanisation of fisheries policy had important repercussions for domestic policy-making. However, the exact consequences differed between the two most important actors in the domestic policy process: the Dutch government and the Dutch parliament. For the latter, little changed. Its role in fisheries policy-making had always been modest. The NEAFC's conservation policies were implemented through ministerial decrees, which meant that Parliament was largely sidestepped to ensure a quick implementation of decisions.⁸¹ When structural and market policy Europeanised in 1970, the role of the national parliament decreased even further.

This is not to say that the parliament was of no importance. The Dutch public, Parliament included, was sympathetic towards fishers, who could use this to exert pressure on the Government.⁸² The House of Representatives' Standing Committee on Fisheries (*Vaste Commissie voor de Visserij*) was important in this regard, and the Committee gained significance when conservation policy Europeanised in 1977. Policy became a very technical matter and only the experts, i.e., members of the Standing Committee on Fisheries, could still make sense of the regulations. They were often rooted in fishing communities and sympathetic towards fishers, which made them a valuable channel of influence.⁸³

⁸⁰ Wise, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 181.

⁸¹ Vervaele, Ruimschotel and Widdershoven, *Rechtshandhaving*, 15.

⁸² Van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters*, 187.

⁸³ Vervaele, Ruimschotel and Widdershoven, *Rechtshandhaving*, 67.

For the Dutch government, the Europeanisation of fisheries policy had tremendous consequences. After World War II, it started to substantially involve itself in fisheries, and the DF often consulted fishers' associations when drafting policy. Fishers and their organisations tended to hold the Government responsible for promoting the common good for all fishers. At the same time, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, the fishing industry was quite heterogeneous. The Fish Board and the Trust preferred mixed advice over the majority's advice and fishers saw it as a task of the DF to balance these different interests.⁸⁴ The DF actually was quite willing to do so and it consulted with a wide range of fishers' associations, including local and regional ones.

In the early 1990s, the DF would look back on its role as 'paternalistic'⁸⁵, a role which it could easily fulfil for a long time. First, the DF had to consult with few stakeholders besides fishers. Somewhat overstated, the sea belonged to fishers, and the DF exclusively consulted fishers in making fisheries policy. Often, these meetings were rather informal. High-ranking civil servants and the chairmen of fisheries associations had personal contact, which was also made possible by the relatively long term during which these civil servants worked in the DF. For example, Th. J. Tienstra, was Director of the DF from 1964 to 1984, and as a result, he knew Klaas Hoekstra, the Association's chairman, quite well.⁸⁶ Second, policy was hardly contentious until 1975. The DF occupied itself with regulations that increased the industry's profitability.⁸⁷

After 1977, the DF tried to maintain its post war role, but this became increasingly difficult. On the one hand, the EC started to substantially involve itself. Yet, as mentioned above, it was far from clear what the EC's future policy would be. Enforcement and implementation largely depended on the willingness of Member States. On the other hand, the introduction of catch limitations led to tensions among fishers, which made it difficult for the DF to act as a broker. Hence, the old way of working came under pressure from two directions. Let us now turn to the consequences of this for fishers' perceptions regarding their national policy arena.

Input

As elaborated upon in the introduction, input legitimacy is dependent on perceptions of opportunities for participation and perceptions of the quality of representation. Opportunities for participation refer to the channels of participation, whereas the quality of

⁸⁴ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, (NL-HaNA) Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij: Directie Visserij (LNV / Directie Visserij), 2.11.81, inventory number 5, Report on the context of the Directorate General for Fisheries (04-02-1992), 1.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, 1.

⁸⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Hoekstra en Tienstra: jaargenoten', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-13 (30-3-1984), 12.

⁸⁷ Th.J. Tienstra et al., 'Vijfentwintig jaar overheidsbeleid ten aanzien van de visserij', in: H.A.H. Boelmans Kranenburg et al. (Eds.), *Het Visserijschap – Speerpunt voor de visserij* (Haarlem 1980) pp. 24-33, 24-25.

representation is the outcome of the perception of informational supply, organisational setup, and grassroots representation. The analysis on perceptions opportunities for participation will focus on two institutions: the Dutch government and the House of Representatives.

Reconstructing perceptions vis-à-vis the House of Representatives is difficult. Fishers and board members did not extensively reflect on their opportunities for input in Parliament. Parliaments' role was modest as well, and at most, the Dutch House of Representatives provided moral support.⁸⁸ Association Chairman Klaas Hoekstra was well-aware that the House could do little for fishers, as policy was drafted on the European level.⁸⁹ On the Dutch government Hoekstra was more explicit. In March 1977, he commented that both aspects of input, i.e., representation and opportunities, would change in the future and stated, 'The consultations on fisheries policy with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries or his civil servants as they were before, belong to the past now. We cannot afford ourselves to come up with different views anymore. [...] If we want to participate, we need to cooperate.'⁹⁰

In hindsight, his remarks on the perceived opportunities of input were premature, and Hoekstra himself acknowledged so in 1979.⁹¹ Zevibel's chairman also voiced his satisfaction about the relationship with the Government in 1980.⁹² Even the Federation, always critical of output, was satisfied as it stated in 1982 that they were treated as a 'full partner'.⁹³ However, Hoekstra's remarks on the representation and the necessity of cooperation were spot on, but cooperating was far from easy.

Between 1977 and 1978, the cutter sector fell apart between the Federation and Association. Both represented around half of the fleet, but the Association only represented one-thirds of aggregate engine power (Table 1; next page). The disparity between fleet size and engine power was no coincidence, as the bigger fishers left. The rift between both was profound and was comparable to schisms between Catholics and Protestants.⁹⁴ Membership was a matter of conviction. In the words of ethnologist Rob van Ginkel, the schism 'had deep symbolical implications for the social relations in the fishing industry'.⁹⁵

⁸⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1977 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (21-05-1977), 13; Laurent Nouwen and Klaas Hoekstra, 'Bijstelling overheidsbeleid in kottersector dringend gewenst', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-18, 3; NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), 2.

⁸⁹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), 2.

⁹⁰ *Visserijwereld*, 'Het EEG-Vissersbeleid', *Visserijwereld*, 1977-12, 13.

⁹¹ *Visserijwereld*, 'Jaarrede van de Voorzitter van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-21, 37.

⁹² Rijksarchief in Zeeland (RAZ) 547, Archief Vereniging tot Bevordering der Zeeuwse Visserijbelangen (Zevibel), inventory number (inv. nr.) 2, Chairman's Address at Zevibel's 1980 General Meeting (19-04-1980).

⁹³ Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Voor alle duidelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-22, 10.

⁹⁴ Van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters*, 196.

⁹⁵ Van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters*, 196

	Fleet size (in %)	Engine power (in %)
Dutch Fishermen's Association	49,8	33,4
Federation of Fishermen's Associations	42,3	56,1
-Visserijbelangen Urk*	17,7	24,3
-Samenwerking Den Helder**	5,7	8,9
-DETV Texel**	5,3	9,1
-Groep van 11 Goedereede**	2,4	4,4
-Zevibel	11,2	9,4
Non-affiliated***	7,9	10,5
-Vereniging van Schippers-Eigenaren Katwijk	6,7	8,7
-Redersvereniging IJmuiden	1,2	1,8

Table 1: Shares of associations in fleet size and engine power (1978)⁹⁶; *Left Fishermen's Association in 1968; **Left Fishermen's Association in 1976/1977; ***Members often were affiliated to either Association or Federation, however, the local association itself was not.

The Federation was everything the Association was not, its members were young, non-conformist, and possessed big ships. Ben Daalder, chairman of *DETV Texel* around 1978, was the embodiment of this group. He would later on describe his mentality at the time in the following way:

The more we would catch, the better, as we needed to safeguard our future position within Europe [The allocation of quota was heavily based on historical catch performance]. This call brought me into conflict with conventional thinkers, the law-abiders, who thought we had to accept what was decided top-down. That escalated. That was my fault. [...] As a young generation we did not want to simply accept the policy of European ministers.⁹⁷

Both associations had different styles of representing their constituencies. The Association held to a harmony model, with Hoekstra stating that 'we are no loudmouths'.⁹⁸ In contrast, the Federation held to a conflict model, which was exemplified by Daalder, who refused to conform himself to policy.

Fishers and board members were aware that the situation was severely hampering their influence in policy-making. They assessed their associations as not wide enough, i.e., their organisation was not representative enough for the cutter sector as a whole. Hoekstra stated that participation was only possible through cooperation, and the Association's members pushed the Board in 1980 'to end the organisational separation'.⁹⁹ Hoekstra responded that he would cooperate with the Federation whenever possible and in 1982, he repeated his intention, saying: 'the only way to achieve something was by cooperating, not by hampering each other'.¹⁰⁰ The Federation declared itself 'ready to fight, but, only by working together can we achieve something'. Hence, unity was necessary more than ever.¹⁰¹ It was no coincidence that the Federation's chairman, Maarten Schakel,

⁹⁶ R. Rijneveld and W. Smit, 'De Kiel gelegd voor de grote Kotterfederatie', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-22, 3-6.

⁹⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Stop de Verdeeldheid!' *Visserijnieuws*, 12-2-2010 <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/stop-de-verdeeldheidben-daalder-neemt-afschied>>, last accessed 24-7-2018.

⁹⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Nederlandse Vissersbond Kernpunten jaarvergadering', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-18, 8.

⁹⁹ Visserijwereld, 'EEG-Vissersbeleid', *Visserijwereld*, 1977-12, 13; Visserijwereld, 'Jaarverslag 1979 van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-26, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond Urk vergaderde', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-6, 4.

¹⁰¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-19, 15.

called for a merger at the Federation's general meeting in 1982.¹⁰² In addition, Schakel was appointed with the task of healing the schism between Federation and Association.¹⁰³ Attempts at doing so will be discussed in the next chapter.

To summarise, fishers perceived their opportunities for input as plentiful. However, these could not be seized as long as there were multiple national cutter associations. At the same time, there appeared to be even more at work as many fishers did not feel represented nor informed by their association. Before going into details on perceptions of information and grassroots representation it is important to remark that extensively evaluating both perceptions is difficult because the source material is fragmented. A proper in-depth analysis is only possible by studying the archives of these associations themselves. Nevertheless, by piecing several fragments together, we can get an impression of the issues these organisations faced. I will do so by first describing issues within Zevibel, as its archives could be studied. On the basis of other sources, I will then examine whether there are indications that national associations suffered from the same problems as Zevibel.

There are indications that Zevibel's board members and the grassroots level scarcely interacted with each other. The chairman of Zevibel's Cutter Board, J.M. Walhout, wrote a letter to Zevibel's local associations in May 1978, in which he stated, 'In order to represent a constituency, it is necessary to interact with this constituency. Sadly, I have the impression that several board members are not fully aware of this. I repeatedly get the impression that they are just presenting their own opinion, without taking into account their constituency or any other groups. [emphasis in original]'.¹⁰⁴

Zevibel's cutter fishers, however, were not willing to extensively participate either. In a 1980 meeting, Walhout declared that he was no longer willing to chair the board. He had the feeling that he was no longer able to keep up with developments, and he also had the feeling no-one was interested in the work that was done.¹⁰⁵ Judging by the number of fishers present at the meeting, only seven, his conclusion did not seem to be too far off. The other board members also questioned for whom they were still doing their best, as it did not seem to them that fishers did not appreciate their work.¹⁰⁶ The board found it difficult to interact with its constituency because fishers were not providing them with input. It

¹⁰² Visserijnieuws, 'Verslechterde economie zet investeringen op de tocht', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-39, 9.

¹⁰³ Visserijnieuws, 'Grote en kleine vissers moeilijk te bundelen in één organisatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-18 (02-05-1986), 4.

¹⁰⁴ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 43, Letter from J. M. Walhout to the boards of associations affiliated to Zevibel's Cutter Board (03-05-1978), 1.

¹⁰⁵ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (01-11-1980), 1.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, 1.

was not that fishers were unconcerned with policy and other developments, but that they were only sharing their thoughts with each other through their Marine VHF radio's.¹⁰⁷

With regard to the informational supply, Zevibel's Cutter Board members were critical as well. On the one hand, they saw that they themselves were to blame, and so, at the end of 1978 the Cutter Board proposed the introduction of a magazine to inform its constituency. Zevibel's Board agreed to this, but it also stated that 'it was questionable whether the effort weighs up to the interest by members in such a magazine'.¹⁰⁸ However, members were ultimately expressed satisfaction with the journal.¹⁰⁹

These issues appear not to have been restricted to Zevibel. Rather, there are indications that representatives of both the Association and Federation found it difficult to represent and inform their constituency while fishers were critical of them. The Association still had to recover from the outburst of critiques after the introduction of quotas.¹¹⁰ Hoekstra was well-aware that quotas had removed the Associations agreements to the introduction of quotas 'had removed it so far away from fishers, that they could not comprehend it anymore, and hence, they left.'¹¹¹

The situation seemed to have improved after 1979, or at least, the Board presented it as such.¹¹² At the Associations' general meeting in 1980, Hoekstra voiced his satisfaction that that issues regarding the Association and its role in the introduction of quotas belonged to the past.¹¹³ During the same gathering, the secretary also stated that he was confident the members supported the Board again so that the organisation could operate effectively.¹¹⁴

For the Federation, it was almost as difficult to win the confidence and trust of its members. Only in 1980, two years after its founding, the organisation had a functioning secretariat and operated effectively.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the Federation also struggled with informing its members. In 1982 it tried to counter the problem by informing members through a bulletin in *Visserijnieuws*.¹¹⁶ However, even then, there appeared to be quite a gap between the grassroots level and representatives. Many fishers were not well-informed about the

¹⁰⁷ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (01-11-1980), 1.

¹⁰⁸ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 4, Minutes of Zevibel's Board's meeting (21-10-1978), 2.

¹⁰⁹ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 120, Zevibel News Magazine (1979), 3.

¹¹⁰ J. Siereveld, 'Toppunt van egoïsme', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-25, 7.

¹¹¹ Visserijwereld, 'Minister ir. G.J.M. Braks sprak op drukbezochte jaarvergadering van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-25, 3-8.

¹¹² D. Tuinsma, 'Ned. Vissersbond gaat eigen weg', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-6, 10.

¹¹³ Visserijwereld, 'Minister ir. G.J.M. Braks sprak op drukbezochte jaarvergadering van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-25, 5.

¹¹⁴ Visserijwereld, 'Jaarverslag 1979 van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-26, 5.

¹¹⁵ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (30-03-1979), 2; Visserijwereld, 'Jaarverslag 1979 van "Zevibel"', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-14, 10; RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (30-05-1980).

¹¹⁶ Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Nieuws van de Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-2, 7; Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-18, 5; Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie verzette veel werk voor vissers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-40, 11.

political arena. An indication of this is that fishers asked questions at the Federation's 1980 general meeting on who was actually making policy, 'the Hague or Brussels?'¹¹⁷ Two years later, Chairman Schakel, wanted to pay more attention to the EC, but he was 'aware that this aspect of the association's work probably appeal to you. Results will not or barely be measurable. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance'.¹¹⁸

Overall, the opportunities for participation were perceived as good, contrary to the quality of representation. Fishers and representatives were well aware that their organisation in the wide sense was hampering them. As long as there existed two national associations, their influence would be weak. In addition, there were more problems, although it is difficult to draw any substantive conclusions for a lack of source material and as the voices of fishers themselves were often missing in sources. It appears, however, that representatives were quite aware of the difficulty of representing their constituency. They had the feeling that their activities were far-removed from fishers and that fishers were not well-informed on policy. As a result, it seems that they struggled with adequately involving the grassroots level in their input.

Throughput

Throughput assesses the quality of interactions, which reveals 'why issues of legitimacy exist where it appears a plurality of actors are involved'.¹¹⁹ Historically, fishers had always been the most important stakeholders in the Dutch policy process. Around the 1980s, their position came under pressure as European institutions emerged as new actors in fisheries policy. However, in the legal vacuum of 1976-1982, the influence of these institutions was unclear. As a result, fishers could retain their key position within national policy-making. Accountability and transparency were barely discussed by fishers and board members.

Both fishers and their representatives were satisfied with the responsiveness to fishers' interest at the national level of policy-making.¹²⁰ In May 1982, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, Jan de Koning, stated that he was there 'not for fish, but for fishers'.¹²¹ In a meeting with the minister, a week after he had made that comment, Daalder, in his role as the Fish Board's chairman, voiced his satisfaction with these remarks 'on behalf of

¹¹⁷ Visserijwereld, 'Jaarvergadering Federatie in teken van olieproblemen', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-21, 7.

¹¹⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Verslechterde economie zet investeringen op de tocht', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-39, 9.

¹¹⁹ Poelzer, *Extracting Legitimacy*, 30.

¹²⁰ Visserijwereld, 'Jaarrede van de Voorzitter van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-21, 37.

¹²¹ Visserijnieuws, "'Wij zijn er niet voor de vissen, maar voor de vissers'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-18, 11.

the whole fishing industry'.¹²² Even the Federation, always critical of policy output, stated in June 1982 that it was a 'full partner'.¹²³

Output

The opportunities for input and throughput might have been good, but output certainly was not perceived as positive by either the Federation or Association. Critiques were almost exclusively pointed at performance, the assessment of a policy's economic performance and social impact. These perceptions evolved in two stages. In the first stage, ranging between 1978 and late-1979, fishers were critical of the domestic implementation of European output. After 1979, they proposed a different policy—effort management instead of a catch management.¹²⁴

Turning to the first stage. National policy for 1977 was not the topic of much debate as that year's TACs were kept at the NEAFC level. Thus, Dutch fishers did not have to worry too much about quota restrictions. 1978 TACs were reallocated, and the Dutch quotas were lowered considerably, which fishers were not satisfied with. Nevertheless, the situation would be manageable and long-term perspectives would be positive if national policy was not too strict on the implementation of the quota and if fleet capacity was reduced slightly.¹²⁵

However, both the Federation and Association argued that implementation was too strict, which harmed the economical positions of fishers and which had a sizable social impact upon them. On the one hand, both associations called for a policy that ensured the survival of the cutter sector, while on the other hand, they proposed a national policy that was loose on actual implementation of quotas as long as there was no level playing field across the EC.¹²⁶ These proposals were a response to attempts by other Member States to create conservation or allocation systems that favoured their interests.¹²⁷ 30 January 1978, fishers blockaded several ports to show that they were serious and that they were not prepared to pay the price for a national policy that was solely aimed at implementing European policy.¹²⁸ Rather, as the Federation framed it, 'it was the Government's primary

¹²² Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NL-HaNA), Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 40, Summary of the meeting between the fishing industry and the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (10-05-1982), 1.

¹²³ Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Voor alle duidelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-22, 10.

¹²⁴ In the literature these systems are also known as input and output control. I will refer to them as effort and catch management, to prevent any confusion Scharpf's input and output.

¹²⁵ Dick Langstraat, 'De visserij in Europees vaarwater', *Economisch Statistische Berichten* 63 (1978) 3168, pp. 840-847, 847.

¹²⁶ *Visserijwereld*, 'Verontruste vissers richten petitie tot minister', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-4, 3.

¹²⁷ Wise, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 181.

¹²⁸ Klaas Hoekstra, 'De actie van de vissers', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-5, 15.

responsibility to ensure that cutter fishers survive, instead of being the exemplary model in the EEC'.¹²⁹

There were deeper problems looming which became clear in the second stage. By 1979, the horsepower race resumed in full force.¹³⁰ Reasons for this were multiple. First, quotas were not enforced effectively and fishers could easily circumvent controls with the help of municipalities and fish auctions. Second, national policy was inconsistent. On the one hand the Government introduced several vessel decommissioning schemes. On the other, it stimulated fleet expansion through a range of fiscal measures. Third, decommissioning schemes often did not have their intended effect as they only took away old and inefficient ships. Fourth, market conditions were favourable because the export market for flatfish began to boom and processing and trade became more efficient. Fishers could make sizable profits. Fifth, both sole and plaice had several large year classes around 1980 which made it possible for fishers to catch a considerable amount of flatfish.¹³¹

Quotas and fleet capacity began to grow apart. Larger ships needed more catch to operate profitably, thus fleet expansion had a stimulating effect on fishers to catch more. In addition, fishers landed their catches on the so-called 'grey market', instead of buying additional IQs.¹³² As long as quotas were not managed effectively, this situation was controllable. Nevertheless, representatives and a majority of fishers were aware that the net would eventually close. If this were to happen, the social consequences would be tremendous as many fishers would go bankrupt. Thus, fleet expansion was a huge threat in the long term.

Both the Federation and Association called for a policy that would halt fleet expansion. They proposed the introduction of effort management in addition to the already existing policy of catch management. Both associations called for the introduction of a horsepower limit on engines, but they had different ideas on what this limit should be. The Federation proposed a limit of around 1300 HP, whereas the Association supported 500 HP and was more assertive in proposing a limit. Its members, who were smaller fishers, had much to gain from such a limit. In the long term, they feared losing the horsepower race.¹³³

In contrast, the Federation was less assertive for several reasons. First, around 1979, the Federation was mostly occupied with its internal organisation.¹³⁴ Second, some thought,

¹²⁹ Laurent Nouwen and Klaas Hoekstra, 'Bijstelling overheidsbeleid in kottersector dringend gewenst', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-18, 3.

¹³⁰ LEI, *Visserij in cijfers 1981* (n.p., 1982) 11.

¹³¹ Van Vliet and Dubbink, *Nederlandse visserijbeheer*, 33.

¹³² *Ibidem*, 32.

¹³³ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40, Letter from the Dutch Fishermen's Association to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (24-12-1979).

¹³⁴ *Visserijwereld*, 'Jaarvergadering Federatie in teken van olieproblemen', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-21, 7.

or hoped, that the horsepower race was only temporary as rising oil prices would reduce the profitability of bigger ships.¹³⁵ Third, not all of the Federation's members, who were predominantly bigger fishers, were in favour of a horsepower limit. As they perceived larger ships as equalling more profits, a limit would have reduced their incomes.¹³⁶

The Dutch government was unwilling to introduce horse power limitations because it saw no legal basis for these.¹³⁷ The Government's position would later be described as: it did not care whether one was fishing with a 'Mercedes or a Deux Chevaux [Citroën 2CV]'.¹³⁸ Hoekstra was deeply disappointed by this attitude, and he kept insisting on the introduction of such a limit.¹³⁹ Daalder, on behalf of the Federation, did so as well, although he was more assertive behind the scenes than he was in public.¹⁴⁰ Most likely the results of mixed opinions among his constituency on the topic.

Now that perceptions of output have been discussed, we can answer the sub question of this section: How was the national level of policy-making perceived by fishers between 1977 and 1982? Overall, perceptions were positive. On the input side, there were plenty of opportunities for input. Nevertheless, the quality of representation was perceived more problematic, although this was a problem within fishers' own ranks. Throughput was also perceived positively. Even the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries had explicitly acknowledged in 1982 that he was there 'not for fish, but for fishers'.¹⁴¹ These remarks were much to the satisfaction of the fishing industry.¹⁴² On the output side, perceptions were more negative as fishers feared that national policy would adversely impact their social and economic position (performance).

European Level

Until 1977, the European Community's common fisheries policy was marginal and only encompassed market and structural aspects. With the declaration of 200-nm Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), a large common 'pond' was created, which raised two questions. First, who may access our pond, and whose pond may we access? (external policy). Second, how to manage our pond's resources? (conservation policy). The former question

¹³⁵ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (14-09-1979), 2.

¹³⁶ Ibidem, 2.

¹³⁷ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NL-HaNA), Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselveiligheid, Directie Visserijen en de Stichting Ontwikkeling en Saneringsfonds voor de Visserij (LNV / Directie Visserijen), 2.11.58, inventory number 591, Report on capacity management of the cutter fleet (November 1979), 26.

¹³⁸ Van Vliet and Dubbink, *Nederlandse visserijbeheer*, 33.

¹³⁹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 40, Letter from the Dutch Fishermen's Association to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (24-12-1979); Klaas Hoekstra, 'Sombere wolven pakken zich samen boven kleine visserman', *Visserijwereld*, 1981-5 (30-01-1981), 11.

¹⁴⁰ *Visserijwereld*, "'Niet bang om beslissingen te moeten nemen, die tegen zijn groepsbelang ingaan'", *Visserijwereld*, 1981-11, 19; NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 24, Minutes of a meeting between the Minister and the fishing industry (29-01-1982), 3.

¹⁴¹ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Wij zijn er niet voor de vissen, maar voor de vissers'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-18, 11.

¹⁴² NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 24, Summary on the meeting between the Minister and the fishing industry (10-05-1982), 3; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Voor alle duidelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-22, 10.

was solved through the introduction of an external policy, which came into being in 1977 and did not cause major political debate. The policy was largely concerned with regulation of access to the EEZ of non-Member States and by fishers from non-Member States. The question of resource management proved more difficult to resolve and the emergence of negative perceptions regarding European policy-making and outcomes can only be understood against the background of the conservation policy.

As discussed, conservation policy was not entirely new. The intergovernmental NEAFC had already introduced several conservation measures. The NEAFC had two principal actors: the Permanent Committee, which proposed TACs, and member states, who negotiated over these proposals. Three elements were characteristic of the NEAFC. First, the fishing industry could provide input through its inclusion in member states' delegations. Second, the NEAFC was not too strict in adopting the scientific advice, and three, TACs were loosely based on historic catches.

The EC took over the NEAFC's basic framework: the European Commission made proposals and the Fisheries Council negotiated on these. This arrangement excluded the European Parliament. As discussed in the first chapter, the Parliament's role in fisheries policy was rather modest because it only had to be consulted. Regarding conservation policy, its role would be virtually non-existent; until 1992, the European Parliament did not have to be consulted on TACs, quotas, technical conservation measures, and enforcement rules.¹⁴³

Nevertheless, three important alterations in comparison to the NEAFC were made: the industry was consulted differently, the European Commission was more receptive to scientific advice, and TACs were allocated differently. The importance of these differences cannot be overstated as these changes would shape perceptions towards 'Europe'. In essence, these were changes in input, throughput, and output, and they therefore need to be discussed more in-depth before turning to perceptions vis-à-vis the European level.

Moving now to the first alteration. In the NEAFC, member states included representatives from the fishing industry in their delegations. The Fisheries Council, however, was exclusively reserved for national ministers. The industry could lobby its ministry but it could not be present at the meetings. Instead, the industry was officially consulted through the Advisory Committee on Fisheries (ACF). There were several other advisory bodies as well, first among them the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). However, the EESC played a marginal role, as the CFP is not extensively concerned with

¹⁴³ Churchill and Owen, *The EC Common Fisheries Policy*, 5.

social policy. In addition, the fishing sector has never been strongly unionised, and social dialogue has never really developed.¹⁴⁴

The ACF consisted of representatives from all sectors of the fishing industry and consumers and it was made up of three subcommittees: resources, markets, and structures. The full-committee met infrequently, but the subcommittees usually met once a year, with meetings lasting a full day. The subcommittees were not able to present any sectoral viewpoints; rather, they became little more than a forum for expressing national viewpoints.¹⁴⁵

However, relations between these committees and the European Commission were strained, especially those between the Commission and the subcommittee on resources, as the latter was frequently not consulted.¹⁴⁶ The lack of consultation also applied to the annual establishment of TACS. For a large part, this was a result of the timing of scientific advice, which necessitated leaving assessments to the last minutes to have the most up-to-date information. Scientific advice was only available by mid-November, and TACs needed to be fixed by the middle of December. Within those four weeks, the European Commission needed to negotiate with the Faroe Island, Norway, and Sweden before it could finally propose TACs. This left no room for extensive consultation with the fishing industry. A solution would have been to fix TACs a year in advance, but this was difficult as the heavy overexploitation of resources made it unclear how stocks would develop.¹⁴⁷

Even if the subcommittee on resources was consulted, there were additional problems. As has been discussed, the Dutch cutter fleet was heavily fragmented. At the European level, the industry's fragmentation was far more substantial and the industry was unable to formulate a coherent opinion. Politicians and administrators were faced with a well-argued report by scientists on the one hand and several conflicting demands of the industry on the other hand. The European Commission was not very receptive to those conflicting demands, and as a result, the industry became increasingly alienated from the decision-making process.¹⁴⁸ In addition, the European Parliament's powers were weak to non-existent. The only viable way to influence the process was lobbying the Fisheries Council.

The second alteration was that the European Commission proposed TACs closer to those based on scientific advice. The advice was given by the EC's own Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries (STCF), which was made up of scientists and which

¹⁴⁴ Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 260.

¹⁴⁵ Holden, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 16.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, 16.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, 16.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, 209.

was little more than a liaison between the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) and the Commission.¹⁴⁹

The third alteration was made mainly as a consequence of the 200-nm EEZ extension by third countries. Several Member States lost access to distant fishing waters, and thus historical catches within the Community's seas, would not do right by their fleet's size. As a result, two additional criteria were introduced for quota allocation: preferential allocations for regions dependent on fishing (Hague Preferences) and a measure of compensation for lost fishing opportunities in third-country waters. The former had been pushed for by Greenland, Ireland and, the UK as they had argued that they possessed communities particularly dependent on fishing. As such, these communities had to be given certain preferences in allocating quotas, when those quotas would fall below a pre-determined level.¹⁵⁰ The latter was a compensation made to Germany and the UK because as both countries had lost access to their distant fishing grounds as a result of the declaration of EEZs by third-party countries.¹⁵¹ These two criteria were topics of much debate. All Member States accepted their inclusion quickly, but their relative weight was debated fiercely. A satisfactory distribution was only reached in 1983, and so only in that year was the CFP introduced.

Input

European affairs were handled by the Fish Board and Trust's joint-secretariat, who reported on them to the national associations. The associations themselves did not always voice their opinions on European affairs. As a result, it was difficult to extensively analyse their perceptions for this period. What can be said is that associations had to make sense of European policy-making. Their perceptions of opportunities of input can therefore be distinguished into three phases. In the initial two phases, the Fish Board and national associations still had to effectively assess the European environment, and as a result, they consequently perceived opportunities for input as lacking. This would change in 1981 as the Fish Board had found out by then that there was only one effective opportunity to influence policy: the Fisheries Council.

The first phase lasted from 1977 to mid-1979, during which the Fish Board's secretariat still had to find its way on the European level. As a result, the quality of information on EC affairs was low. Representatives from national associations did not appear very knowledgeable on European affairs. They made few remarks and the secretariat had to

¹⁴⁹ Holden, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 216.

¹⁵⁰ Wise, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 158.

¹⁵¹ Holden, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 16.

explain the basics of how the EC functioned.¹⁵² To counter the problem, the Fish Board subscribed itself in 1978 to *Eurofish Report*, a magazine that provided information on European fisheries policy.¹⁵³

The Fish Board attempted to reach the Fisheries Council, European Parliament, and European Commission, but the threefold strategy was quickly deemed ineffective. Reaching the Council was difficult. Fishers did convene with the Government prior to Council meetings, however, Hoekstra questioned the results of these meetings in 1979.¹⁵⁴ The European Parliament was reached more easily and the Fish Board stood into contact with several Dutch Members of the European Parliament on fisheries policy.¹⁵⁵ However, the European Parliament was a marginal player in fisheries policy. Hence, this route was ineffective as well. Hoekstra acknowledged so in 1979, as he hoped that the introduction of direct elections for the Parliament would strengthen its position vis-à-vis the European Commission.¹⁵⁶

The Fish Board did not have the feeling it could reach the Commission either. It should have been able to do so through the ACF, but those involved complained that the Committee did not function well as it was barely consulted and it did not even convene if the European Commission did not hand in proposals.¹⁵⁷ Although, it should be noted that these remarks were not made by representatives from either the Federation of Association. To summarize, in the first phase, the Fish Board and the associations under study, saw that they were not able provide input at the European level and they perceived their opportunities for input as lacklustre.

In the second phase, ranging from late-1979 to 1981, the situation started to change slightly as the quality of information improved greatly. European affairs were discussed more in-depth during this period. The Board's secretary, H. Boelmans-Kranenburg, had become official reporter for the Dutch representative within the EESC. Hence, it seems that he had become quite well informed by then.¹⁵⁸ In addition, advisory committees started to function better and this enabled the Dutch fishers to reach the European Commission,

¹⁵² NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 39, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (11-10-1978), 3.

¹⁵³ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 39, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (11-10-1978), 3.

¹⁵⁴ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), 2.

¹⁵⁵ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 39, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (11-11-1979), 2.

¹⁵⁶ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), 2.

¹⁵⁷ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 39, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (11-10-1978), 2.

¹⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 23, Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (11-11-1980), 3.

although no indications could be found that this changed their perceptions.¹⁵⁹ What can be said is that the fishing industry became a little more assertive. In a 1980 meeting with the Dutch DF, the industry proposed the creation of a committee that would advise the Commission on socioeconomic issues in European fisheries policy. Such a committee could provide a counterweight to biological advices by the STCF, but the DF was reluctant to propose the idea in the upcoming Fisheries Council meeting.¹⁶⁰ That disinclination reflected Hoekstra's remarks that comments made through national institutions did not reach Brussels.¹⁶¹

The third phase started March 1981. By then, the Fish Board had clearly improved its understanding of the EC, just as the national associations had. During that month, Hoekstra decided it was time to move onto Brussels, i.e., it was time to organise a protest. Later that week, the Fisheries Council convened, which provided an excellent opportunity for a protest. Daalder however, raised questions about whether such an undertaking would be effective as the time to set up a protest was short and the European Commission had not proven to be very sensitive to protests. In addition, representatives from other associations were not willing to go either.¹⁶²

Still, such a protest would come during the Fisheries Council of 29 September 1981. The Fish Board offered a petition to DG Fish.¹⁶³ It was not coincidental that the Fish Board did so during the Fisheries Council. Mid-1981, the Director General of DG Fish, Mr. Visser, offered to lobby the European institutions on behalf of the Dutch fishing industry.¹⁶⁴ Langstraat stated in the interview that:

It was on the advice of someone Dutch working at the European Commission that we decided to stay in Brussels during the Fisheries Council. We did not know that this was so important, representatives from other European fishers' associations had already found out this was important. When we were in Brussels, we found this out as well. On the one hand it provided opportunities to come into contact with the press, on the other hand, it gave the opportunity to be close to policy-makers.¹⁶⁵

Afterwards, in the Board's meeting of 14 October 1981, it was decided that the Board needed to be in Brussels during future meetings of the Fisheries Council.¹⁶⁶ Just before

¹⁵⁹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 21, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (13-11-1979), 2.

¹⁶⁰ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 23, Summary of the meeting between representatives of the fishing industry and the Directorate General for Fisheries (03-09-1980), 7-8.

¹⁶¹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), 2.

¹⁶² NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (25-03-1981), 2-3.

¹⁶³ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 23, Petition by the Dutch fishing industry presented to the European Commission (29-09-1981), 2.

¹⁶⁴ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40, N Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (23-06-1981), 3.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with D.J. Langstraat on 27-6-2018.

¹⁶⁶ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 24, Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (14-10-1981), 3.

the Fisheries Council of September 1981, it had already been decided that Visser would be appointed. He would work for the Trust, but his salary was paid by the Fish Board. Interestingly, the opinion's on his appointment were mixed. The Fish Board's executive board was not in favour of lobbying, but the meeting's minutes do not specify why. Nevertheless, the Executive Board accepted Visser's offer as 'other Member States also resorted to the informal way'.¹⁶⁷ In the Fish Board's public board meeting of October 1981 Visser's name was not mentioned, rather, it was mentioned that 'the Trust had found a person with great expertise on EEC-issues willing to become advisor of the Dutch fishing industry.'¹⁶⁸

The Fish Board's secretariat was satisfied with Visser as it stated in April 1982. According to Langstraat, by then secretary of the Fish Board, his information enabled the secretariat to respond earlier and more adequately to European developments.¹⁶⁹ Interesting as well was that the level of information about European policy-making significantly increased after Visser had been appointed.¹⁷⁰ Given this context it is hardly surprising that the Federation's chairman stated in 1982 that 'it was of the highest importance for the Dutch fishing industry to be present at meetings in Brussels'.¹⁷¹

To summarize, the Dutch fishing industry had to make sense of the new political environment. Initially, The Fish Board, but also the Federation and Association, complained that there were few opportunities to provide input. After 1981, however, the Board discovered that there was a good opportunity with the Fisheries Council. As a result of this, critiques about the opportunities for input diminished.

In addition to opportunities for input is the quality of representation. For a large part, this quality has already been discussed in the previous paragraph. There is no indication nor good reason to assume that these problems were restricted to national affairs. To the contrary, with regard to the organisational setup, this was even made explicit, for example, Zevibel deemed national unity important, as it was 'the only way to prevent us from being slaughtered in the abattoir of Europe, today and tomorrow!! [emphasis in original]'.¹⁷² Hoekstra had also stated so in 1982, as he stressed that Dutch fishers could

¹⁶⁷ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (15-09-1981), 5.

¹⁶⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 24, Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (14-10-1981), 3.

¹⁶⁹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 41, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (21-04-1982), 4.

¹⁷⁰ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 41, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (06-10-1982), 1.

¹⁷¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Verslechterde economie zet investeringen op de tocht', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-39, 9.

¹⁷² RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 43, Letter from Zevibel's Executive Board to Zevibel's cutter fishers (November 1977).

only achieve something at the European level if they cooperated.¹⁷³ The Federation would agree with this assessment only weeks later.¹⁷⁴

There are some minor indications that the quality of representation was even more problematic with regard to European affairs, although this was not explicitly recognised as such. First, there were language barriers.¹⁷⁵ Second, it appears that member disinterest for European affairs was quite high, which Federation Chairman Schakel acknowledged in 1982 by saying he was 'aware that this aspect of the association's work probably does not appeal to you. Results will not or barely be measurable. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance'.¹⁷⁶ However, no substantive conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these minor indications, but it is safe to say that the problems regarding the quality of representation at the European level were at least as big as those on the national level.

Throughput

The second alteration, the European Commissions' increased receptiveness to scientific advice, led to a critique of responsiveness. This was compounded by a perceived lack of transparency and there were also some critiques of accountability regarding European policy-making. Overall, these assessments were not very substantial because for a long time the associations were more concerned with the alleged lack of opportunities to participate, than with the quality of these interactions.

Yet there was some criticism. With regards to responsiveness, fishers concluded that they were only allowed to participate after a certain problem had already been defined. This issue was most prevalent in the conservation policy, and it led to a twofold critique. First, fishers criticised the starting point of policy, i.e., the Commission mainly based its proposal on biological considerations. Hoekstra lamented the Commission's 'exclusively biological considerations'¹⁷⁷, and the incorporation of 'one-sided biological advices'¹⁷⁸ in its policy. Instead, he proposed that biologists, policy-makers, and the fishing industry should convene together to define the problem so that all interests could be taken into account.¹⁷⁹ The Federation deemed it necessary as well to include 'economic, social, and biological advices'¹⁸⁰ into policy. Second, fishers criticised the consultation process itself because they could only comment at a late stage. These critiques had had already been

¹⁷³ Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond Urk vergaderde', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-6, 15.

¹⁷⁴ Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-19, 15.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with D.J. Langstraat on 27-6-2018; RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board meeting (19-12-1981), 2.

¹⁷⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Verslechterde economie zet investeringen op de tocht', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-39, 9.

¹⁷⁷ Klaas Hoekstra, 'De Noordzee is niet leeggevist', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-14, 7.

¹⁷⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), 2.

¹⁷⁹ Visserijwereld, 'Heeft de visserij nog perspectief?', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-21, 51.

¹⁸⁰ Visserijwereld, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen hield tweede openbare vergadering', *Visserijwereld*, 1981-40, 8.

expressed through the Fish Board in November 1977 when the Board had sent a letter to the DG Fish, in which it called for the DG Fish to give the fishing industry more time to provide input on policy, especially conservation policy.¹⁸¹ Hoekstra would repeat these statements in 1980, and Zevibel's Cutter Board uttered the same in 1981.¹⁸²

These two problems were compounded by a perceived lack of transparency in the European policy process. The critique popped up in 1979, but it can be exemplified best by the Federation's and Association's 'battle of metaphors' early 1982. During March 1982, Hoekstra named Brussels 'a world upside down, Everything was different than usual'.¹⁸³ Not much later, he added that he would 'love to have a look behind-the-scenes [literal translation: a look into the kitchen] in Brussels to see how they prepared their meals. As they sometimes served strange menus'.¹⁸⁴ The Federation then sought to come up with a better metaphor. Three weeks after Hoekstra's remarks, it stated in own news bulletin that 'things could take a funny [*raar*] turn in Brussels'.¹⁸⁵ However, it would need something better to win this battle, and two months later, it spoke of 'EEC magicians who had pulled another magic trick out of their bag of tricks'.¹⁸⁶ These complaints were not just voiced through *Visserijnieuws* but also at Fish Board meetings, although in a more formal fashion.¹⁸⁷

To some extent, the lack of transparency was accompanied by a critique of accountability. Fishers' representatives concluded it was hard to hold anyone accountable at the European level, but the criticism was relatively limited because the actual impact of European policy on economic performance was modest at the time. Hoekstra, on behalf of the Fish Board, stated in 1979 that a lack of parliamentary control on European decision-making was hampering accountability. The European level, especially the European Commission, was perceived as unreachable to fishers' associations.¹⁸⁸ Three years later, Daalder, the Federation's vice-chairman, asked how long it would take 'before they asked themselves in Brussels whether this was the way to proceed'.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸¹ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 250, Letter from the Fish Product Board to the European Commission (01-11-1977).

¹⁸² NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 23, Minutes of a meeting between the DG Fish and the fishing industry (22-12-1980), 1; RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (19-12-1981), 2.

¹⁸³ Klaas Hoekstra, 'De omgekeerde wereld', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-8, 7.

¹⁸⁴ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Ik zou wel eens willen weten', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-13, 9.

¹⁸⁵ Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-16, 7.

¹⁸⁶ Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-27, 13.

¹⁸⁷ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (22-07-1980), 5.

¹⁸⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), 2.

¹⁸⁹ Ben Daalder, 'Daalder's nieuwjaarswensen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-1, 5.

Output

A third alteration was the new allocation of TACs, which was perceived as unfair (distributive justice) and unjust (performance).¹⁹⁰ Dutch fishers viewed themselves as the great losers of the two new criteria and their redistributive effects.¹⁹¹ They were not entirely incorrect as the Dutch were confronted in 1978 with a 30% cutback of their allowed catches in comparison to their 1973-1976 average. In contrast, Ireland was granted a 26% increase. Many fishers became critical of the Hague Preferences and the compensatory measures for lost fishing opportunities in third-country waters were not much popular either.¹⁹² In addition, quota were not just distributed unfairly, they were also enforced unevenly or 'unjust' (performance). Fishers were deeply upset at the lack of a level playing field across the EC which was summarised quite well by Zevibel's and the Federation's chairman Jan van den Bos: 'No solution will be reached if one country loyally implements EC regulations, whereas another country ignores them. It is quite obvious that this kind of EC policy is not credible for fishers.'¹⁹³ Daalder, by then still vice-chairman of the Federation, was quite clear on this as well: 'I would prefer no policy over this policy.'¹⁹⁴

Conclusion

The European conservation policy was different from the NEAFC's in three aspects. With regard to input, the consultation procedures were different. Initially, this led to criticism of the opportunities of input. After 1981, this would disappear as the Fish Board and national associations found out that there was an opportunity to influence the policy process through the Fisheries Council. A second difference was that the European Commission proved more receptive to scientific advice. As a result, representatives argued that the validity of their voice in the policy process (responsiveness) had decreased. They were only pulled in at a late stage, after the problem had already been defined. A third difference was the allocation of TACs. The European level introduced two new criteria which resulted in smaller quota for Dutch fishers. They perceived this as unfair (distributive justice), as their quota had been reduced the most of all.

The sub question for this chapter now has to be answered: Did Dutch fishers perceive the national and European policy-making level differently in the period 1977-1982, and if so, why? I would argue that both were indeed perceived differently. This diversion was mostly the result of differing perceptions of input and throughput, as the national output

¹⁹⁰ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Wat met de visserij in het jaar 1980 en daarna?', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-51/52, 69.

¹⁹¹ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Hoe staat het met de Noordzee-tong?', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-11, 11.

¹⁹² NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96, 1978 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (18-04-1978), 2; NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 23, Petition by the Dutch fishing industry presented to the European Commission (29-09-1981), 3.

¹⁹³ D. Tuinisma, 'Aan de leden van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-32, 15.

¹⁹⁴ Visserijwereld, 'Federatie luidt noodklok', *Visserijwereld*, 1981-39, 5.

was not perceived that positive either. National policy-making was geared towards fishers instead of fish. Fishers were the main stakeholders, which they were happy about. In contrast, European policy-making was perceived as aimed towards fish instead of fishers. According to fishers, biologists and their advices carried more weight for the European Commission than the fishers' voice.

3. Closing the Net: Consolidating the CFP (1983-1990)

The previous period was one of constructing the CFP and the years currently under study can be described as ones of consolidating the policy. The issue of a conservation policy was resolved in 1983 when Member States reached a compromise on the allocation of quotas. The position of Member States' fishing industries was now fixed by the principle of 'relative stability'. Quota management was left to individual Member States and the role of the European Commission was to control the controllers.¹⁹⁵ Initially, the implementation and consolidation of the CFP occurred slowly. The accession of Portugal and Spain brought new challenges and uncertainties. The issue of equal access was especially contentious as the Spanish and Portuguese EEZs were not very productive and the existing Member States only had to lose from equal access. In the end a compromise emerged. Spanish and Portuguese vessels were given very limited access to the waters of existing Member States until 2002.¹⁹⁶ After the Iberian accession in 1986 the CFP could be consolidated and coherently implemented.¹⁹⁷

National Level

As such, the CFP, which was to be evaluated after 10 years, had set a basic framework in which national policy had to operate. This had important consequences for national policy-making and its outcomes. It required a shift from short-term to long-term thinking, which was far from easy. In this period two critiques emerged: a critique on the European framework and a critique of the national decision-making process and its outcomes.

Input

The implementation of the CFP scarcely affected perceptions of opportunities for input. Just as in the previous period, fishers and their representatives were satisfied with the opportunities. Satisfaction might have even increased initially. In 1984, the new head of the DF, Broer van der Meer, stated that he was a supporter of 'open consultation'¹⁹⁸. Daalder and Hoekstra celebrated his attitude.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, in mid-1984, Ad Ploeg, State Secretary for Agriculture and Fisheries, was assigned tasks regarding the coastal and sea fisheries. Hoekstra, the Association's chairman, was positive about this as a state secretary was easier to reach than a minister.²⁰⁰ However, much to the dismay of Daalder and Hoekstra, the

¹⁹⁵ Holden, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 280.

¹⁹⁶ Churchill and Owen, *The EC Common Fisheries Policy*, 12.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, 12; Holden, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 56.

¹⁹⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Direkteur Visserijen: voorstander van open overleg', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-16 (20-04-1984), 13.

¹⁹⁹ Visserijnieuws, "'Welk systeem we ook kiezen – ik wil op voorhand een grotere verantwoordelijkheid leggen bij bedrijfsleven'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-20 (18-05-1984), 4.

²⁰⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Rolt de kop van de staatssekretaris voor de visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-25 (20-06-1986), 1.

position of State Secretary for Agriculture and Fisheries, was dissolved mid-1986.²⁰¹ Yet, their dissatisfaction with this was not high as Daalder stated in 1988 that their channels for input were sufficient.²⁰² What should be noted is that Dutch fishers gradually lost the moral support of Parliament and public. Over the course of the 1980s, fishers were framed as marauders of the seas, responsible for depleting nature of its resources. Additionally, Dutch fishers gained a reputation as lawless quota busters.²⁰³ Nevertheless, it is unclear how this affected their perceptions of opportunities for input.

In short, there were enough opportunities for input at the national level. This is not to say that perceptions regarding input were all positive. Daalder would summarise it quite well in 1988, stating, 'Our entrances in The Hague are quite well, however, they are not listening to us'.²⁰⁴ The reason for this was twofold. On the one hand, fishers were organised poorly (quality of representation). On the other hand the responsiveness (throughput) to fishers' interests was low. The latter reason will be discussed in-depth in the next paragraph.

The quality of representation was deemed problematic in all three of its aspects. The organisation of associations, both in their narrow and wide dimensions was perceived as inadequate. In addition, fishers and their representatives were critical of grassroots representation. In addition, the supply of information was deemed problematic, although this was certainly not a main issue in this period.

Difficulties in the wide dimension of organisation were not new. Both cutter associations were not representative of the cutter sector as a whole. In 1983 the organisations attempted to resolve the issue by merging together. Their first attempts failed.²⁰⁵ In late-1983, talks resumed and by the end of 1984, a merger between the Federation and Association was very close.²⁰⁶ The new association even had a name, and both organisations agreed to pool their budgets as of 1 January 1985.²⁰⁷ But, the solution was thwarted by problems in the narrow organisational setup. A group of 150 to 200 fishers, mainly round-fish fishers, had the feeling that the Federation and Association were not organisationally adapted to the best of their interests. They feared that the new association would be even more strongly dominated by flatfish fishers.²⁰⁸ They would only join in on the merger if

²⁰¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Rolt de kop van de staatssekretaris voor de visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-25 (20-06-1986), 1.

²⁰² Visserijnieuws, 'Ben Daalder en "het overweekse denken"', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-11 (18-03-1988), 4.

²⁰³ Van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters*, 11.

²⁰⁴ Visserijnieuws, "'Het overweekse denken'", 4.

²⁰⁵ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (28-05-1983), 1.

²⁰⁶ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (10-12-1983), 2.

²⁰⁷ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (15-12-1984), 1.

²⁰⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Licenties en visplannen houden Nederlandse vissers in hun greep', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-1 (11-01-1985), 1.

flatfish fishers came up with plans that were acceptable to them.²⁰⁹ Relations among fishers had become strained enormously, with Fish Board secretary Langstraat stating, 'that all solidarity among fishers was gone'.²¹⁰

The dissatisfied fishers, by then known as the Group Tuyp (*Groep Tuyp*) were invited by Federation and Association to talk about their issues, and in late-1985, the matter was resolved when Jaap Tuyp, their representative, was given a seat in the Association's Board. This reopened possibilities of a merger, but the attempts failed again. The schism between the Association and Federation proved unbridgeable and firmly entrenched as 20 to 30 smaller fishers from the Federation joined the Association because they had the feeling that the Federation was doing little for them.²¹¹ Daalder, the Federation's chairman, explicitly acknowledged this was the case as he stated that he was no longer 'mentally prepared to defend the interests of big and small cutters [...] as it was impossible to support both at the same time.'²¹² Virtually all smaller fishers were now organised in the Association and all bigger fishers in the Federation.

The Federation and Association were deeply divided of which fishers were critical.²¹³ The Government claimed it was forced to regulate the fishing industry by itself as long as fishers did not effectively organise themselves.²¹⁴ Daalder was aware of the issue, but he claimed it was impossible for both associations to come up with shared proposals, 'even if we would convene for a whole week.'²¹⁵ In 1988, he reaffirmed the need for unity to effectively influence policy-making, but unity was difficult to achieve as big and small fishers all kept a close eye on each other.²¹⁶ At the same time, one could also question the willingness of the Federation to do so. In October 1989 it sent several policy proposals to the Dutch government, but the proposals were not discussed beforehand with either the Association or the Fish Product Board. In an internal note, the DF stated its surprise with this, and the Association was not pleased either.²¹⁷

There were more issues than just organisational ones. Grassroots representation had always been an issue as discussed in the previous chapter. In this period, associations continued to struggle with representing their constituencies, although it should be noted

²⁰⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Kustvissers geven grote boomkorvissers nog zes weken bedenktijd', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-10 (08-03-1985), 1.

²¹⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'De Visserijwereld staat op instorten', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-16 (19-04-1985), 7.

²¹¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Rondvisgroep wil eerst vergaderen over visplan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-40 (04-10-1985), 1; RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 4, Minutes of Zevibel's Board's meeting (11-10-1985), 2.

²¹² RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (22-03-1986), 2-3.

²¹³ A. Klijn, 'Ingezonden brieven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-24 (16-08-1985), 7; Visserijnieuws, 'Kabeljauwvloot haalt buikriem stevig aan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-27/28 (12-07-1985), 1.

²¹⁴ Visserijnieuws, 'Visserijbeleid 1987 met hulp vissers eind dit jaar rond', *Visserijnieuws* 1986-19 (09-05-1986), 1.

²¹⁵ Visserijnieuws, 'Ploeg maakt zich hard voor 2000 PK-plafond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-39 (13-09-1985), 1.

²¹⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Ben Daalder en "het overweekse denken"', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-11 (18-03-1988), 8.

²¹⁷ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 230, Note on the Federation of Fisher's Associations' policy proposals (12-10-1989), 2; Visserijnieuws, 'Nederlandse scholvissers afhankelijk van ruil met Britten en Noren', *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-43 (27 oktober 1989), 1.

that both associations had different conceptions of their own mandate. The Association often was openly critical of fishers and its chairman, Hoekstra, presented himself as a mediator attempting to reconcile fishers' and the Government's interests.²¹⁸ In contrast, the Federation prided itself as the proper representative of fisher voices. Ben Daalder, its vice-chairman until 1985, claimed that he 'was still standing in the ports with both feet [...] in opposition to those who came in The Hague too often.'²¹⁹

Nevertheless, both associations faced the same issue—policy had driven members and their associations apart.²²⁰ Associations had become rudderless ships in the words of Hoekstra 'as the different interests of fishers had increasingly come to the fore. All seem to be focused on one thing, their own survival.'²²¹ Daalder claimed to stand in the ports, yet he was well aware that cutter fishers were far from homogenous. It was impossible to satisfy all as he acknowledged in 1986 when Daalder declared he was no longer willing to defend the interests of both smaller and bigger fishers.²²²

Illustrative of the rifts between associations and their members is that both cutter associations were willing to agree with a vessel decommissioning scheme in 1987. However according to Langstraat, chairman of the Fish Product Board at the time, 'fishers did not see the necessity of all this. Even not fishers who had ran into trouble as a result of a shortage of quota.'²²³ As a result, proposals by representatives were often thwarted by 'some group of fishers who had sent another letter of protest to the Ministry.'²²⁴ Fishers had the feeling that these proposals were not in their best interests and the associations were perceived as doing nothing for fishers.²²⁵

There were problems with the supply of information as well. Representatives were critical of fishers as they did not read the supplied information.²²⁶ Hoekstra was quite critical of fishers' attitude, stating, 'They should take information from their own associations into account. Nothing is achieved with cheap tabloid journalism.'²²⁷ Fishers countered

²¹⁸ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Het jaar 1985 – wat zal dat ons brengen??', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-51/52 (21-12-1984), 17; A.J. de Visser, 'De vangstsoorteerder in ontwikkeling', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-20, 7; Klaas Hoekstra, 'Overcapaciteit gevaar voor visplannen 1986', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-1/2 (10-01-1986), 5; Klaas Hoekstra, 'Kerst 1978, het feest van de verwachting', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-51/52, 8; Klaas Hoekstra, 'Waar gaan wij in 1984 naar toe?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-51/52 (23-12-1983), 6.

²¹⁹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 44, Minutes of a meeting with State Secretary Ploeg (04-02-1985), 1.

²²⁰ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Waar gaan wij in 1984 naar toe?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-51/52 (23-12-1983), 6; RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2, Chairman's Address at Zevibel's 1988 General Meeting (23-03-1988), 1.

²²¹ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Overcapaciteit gevaar voor visplannen 1986', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-1 (10-01-1986), 5.

²²² RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (22-03-1986), 2.

²²³ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 479, Minutes of the 58th Board meeting by the Trust for Development and Decommissioning in Fisheries (01-07-1987), 3.

²²⁴ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Visserijoverleg gefrustreerd'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-19 (06-05-1987), 1.

²²⁵ Dirk Hoek, 'Dagboek van een gullenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-25 (21-06-1985), 4; Derk Jonk, 'Kabeljauwvloot haalt buikriem stevig aan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-27/28 (12-07-1985), 5; Derk Jonk, 'Gedachten van een garnalenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-19 (09-05-1986), 5; G. Smid, 'Lezers schrijven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-45 (11-11-1988), 6; H. Oortwijn, "'Onderlaag'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1990-39 (28-09-1990), 6.

²²⁶ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 345, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (07-12-1983), 2.

²²⁷ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Het jaar 1985 – wat zal dat ons brengen??', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-51/52, 17.

these accusations by claiming that the information supplied to them was not of much use.²²⁸ In response to this, *Visserijnieuws* offered board members a chance to write about what they had done in the past week, which allowed them 'to inform fishers what they had spent their time on', according to Ben Daalder.²²⁹

At the beginning of 1987, the Association started to publish information in *Visserijnieuws* again. These 'Announcements by the Association' (*Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vissersbond*) were deemed necessary to 'inform members about issues they needed to be informed on quickly.'²³⁰ However, it is questionable whether this really helped as members complained in 1988 that they were informed rather slowly.²³¹ The Association's board attributed the blame to the boards of local associations, who allegedly were slow in passing information on to their members.²³² Judging by the example of Zevibel, it does not seem unlikely that local associations were sluggish in disseminating information, although it should be noted that Zevibel was not a member of the Association.²³³ In 1989, Johan Nooitgedagt, the Association's chairman as of 1987, reaffirmed that the supply of information had to improve, 'As those not up to date, will follow their own trails.'²³⁴ Which was acknowledged by fishers as well, with one member stressing that fishers were contacting the Government directly as the information from organisations was insufficient.²³⁵

Concluding, the existence of two national associations was perceived as highly undesirable (organisation in the wide sense). In addition, after 1985, several problems with regards to narrow organisation started as well. A sizeable group of roundfish fishers had the feeling that both the Association and Federation were structured sub optimally for the promotion of their interests. The Association made several changes to its internal setup, which seemed to have improved the situation. As a result of these changes a group of Federation members joined the Association. Yet there were other problems as fishers and their representatives had grown apart. For representatives, it became increasingly difficult to represent their members. Associations became increasingly divided as the tension between different groups of fishers had grown immensely. All of this caused a significant problem as fishers and board members were well aware that unity was the only way for fishers to influence policy-making.

²²⁸ M. Hazenoot, 'Mededelingen van de kustvissers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-19 (10 mei 1985), 9; Derk Jonk, 'Gedachten van een garnalenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-51/52 (20-12-1985), 11.

²²⁹ Ben Daalder, 'Wekelijkste beslommingen van een visserij-bestuurder', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 3.

²³⁰ Vissersbond, 'Mededelingen Ned. Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-5 (30-01-1987), 3.

²³¹ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Geen kabeljauw afstaan aan Vlissingse vissers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-42 (12-10-1988), 3.

²³² *Visserijnieuws*, 'Geen kabeljauw', 3.

²³³ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Jammer, maar verstandig'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-45 (11-11-1988), 5.

²³⁴ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Contact achterban moet beter'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-19 (12-05-1989), 4.

²³⁵ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Contact achterban'", 4.

Throughput

The implementation of the CFP profoundly influenced perceptions of throughput. Fishers had always been the main stakeholders in national policy-making and the Dutch public and Parliament morally supported Dutch fishers. The Government was perceived as existing for fishers and not for fish, but in this period, a fundamental shift took place. Parliamentary and public support for fishers gradually faded away.²³⁶ Moreover, the Government became responsive to fishers in so far their input contributed to implementation of the CFP, which input seldom did.²³⁷

National policy output had to ensure effective quota management and capacity reduction. Capacity reduction had to take place through Multi-annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs), which aimed at aligning fleet capacity and quota sizes. In February 1984, the Government consulted both associations on fleet restructuring.²³⁸ The Federation had informed the Government beforehand that it was not prepared to fix the fleet's capacity for the coming years.²³⁹ The Dutch government was unwilling to discuss the premises underpinning policy, stating, 'restructuring is compulsory, hence this is not to be discussed about.'²⁴⁰ Reluctantly, the Federation took on the challenge to draft plans which were acceptable to both fishers and the Government. This was no easy task as became clear in June 1984, when Zevibel's cutter fishers refused to accept the Federation's plans on fleet capacity reduction.²⁴¹ They wanted the Dutch government to come up with plans itself as Zevibel's cutter fishers feared that the Government would use their proposals as a way of avoiding blame.²⁴²

Broer van der Meer, head of the DF, discovered how difficult it was to cooperate with the fishers. He had already worked at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (V&W), on which he stated the following

At V&W I only had to do with one consultative body, which came with a unanimous point of view most of the time. Within fisheries this is different. There are many viewpoints, each departing from different and often opposed perspectives. [...] We need to make decisions. We would prefer to do so in cooperation with the associations, but when they have no opinion, or multiple opinions, they force us to come up with something that does not accommodate to their wishes.²⁴³

²³⁶ Van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters*, 196.

²³⁷ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 477, Letter from the Federation to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (09-02-1984).

²³⁸ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 479, Minutes of the 48th Board meeting of the Trust for Development and Decommissioning in Fisheries (13-02-1984), 4.

²³⁹ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 477, Letter from the Federation to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (09-02-1984).

²⁴⁰ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 479, Minutes of the 48th Board meeting of the Trust for Development and Decommissioning in Fisheries (13-02-1984), 4.

²⁴¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Zevibel-voorzitter J. van den Bos op Visserijdagen Breskens; Vissers worden veel op de vingers gekeken', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-32/33 (17-08-1984), 13.

²⁴² RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the 1984 General Meeting of Zevibel's Cutter sector (23-06-1984), 1.

²⁴³ Visserijnieuws, 'Van der Meer: verhoging sommige quota zit er in', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-51/52 (21-12-1984), 17.

Daalder feared that forceful regulation would be disastrous for fishers and he deemed a plan absolutely necessary. In December 1984, he returned to Zevibel's Cutter Board with a modified plan.²⁴⁴ The plan was accepted, but putting it into action was far from easy. In a meeting with State Secretary Ploeg in February 1985 Daalder, said that 'it takes an enormous amount of time and effort to convince every fisher of the necessity of this.'²⁴⁵ It was hardly surprising that the plans were unsuccessful.

Board members saw that the Dutch government and fishers were diametrically opposed. The Federation's secretary, Jan de Bruine, stated in April 1986 that consultation between fishers and the Government brought about little. Rather, he expected that future interactions between the Government and fishers would only take place in the courts.²⁴⁶

By 1987, it became clear that the situation was spinning out of control. Fleet capacity had increased tremendously, and in the same year, MAGP objectives were widely exceeded (Table 2). Fishers' representatives acknowledged these problems and they were willing to agree with a vessel decommissioning scheme. However, fishers did not see the necessity of this, which made it difficult for fishers' representatives to provide input.²⁴⁷

	Actual capacity (1st of January, in thousands HP)	Target capacity MAGP (in thousands HP)
1982	470	-
1987	599	461
1992	505	499

Table 2: Fleet capacity measured in aggregate engine power (HP)²⁴⁸

Daalder was deeply disappointed by the Government's attitude and he argued that this was not the way to go on.²⁴⁹ The Government should also take fishers' frameworks into account in policy-making, otherwise, output would never be accepted.²⁵⁰ This sentiment was not just restricted to the Federation. Hoekstra also stated that the cooperation between the Government and fishers' associations strained when 'Brussels' became involved.²⁵¹ Both Daalder and Hoekstra agreed that consultation with the Dutch government had not stopped (opportunities for input), but the responsiveness to fishers' interests had

²⁴⁴ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (15-12-1984), 2.

²⁴⁵ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 44, Minutes of a meeting between representatives from the fishing industry and State Secretary Ploeg (04-02-1985), 1.

²⁴⁶ Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, 'Visseren zullen vaker naar rechter moeten stappen.', *Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant* (28 april 1986), 7.

²⁴⁷ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 479, Minutes of the 58th Board meeting of the Trust for Development and Decommissioning in Fisheries (01-07-1987), 3; *Visserijnieuws*, "'Visserijoverleg gefrustreerd'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-19 (08-05-1987), 1.

²⁴⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 850, Explanatory note on the MAGP chapter of the report 'Ondernemend vissen, toekomstperspectief van de kottersector' (1999), 52.

²⁴⁹ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 25, Minutes of a meeting between representatives from the fishing industry and State Secretary Ploeg (04-02-1985), 1.

²⁵⁰ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 27, Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (14-10-1986), 3.

²⁵¹ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Verantwoordelijkheid van overheid reikt verder'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-2 (15-01-1988), 4.

diminished tremendously.²⁵² In 1988 the Federation questioned whether consultation had become 'one-way traffic, as we can barely speak of a good relationship and a constructive dialogue.'²⁵³ A year later, Langstraat, by then chairman of the Fish Product Board, agreed with the Federation remarks. In his words, fishers were no longer 'consulted', but they were 'heard'.²⁵⁴

It was not just the responsiveness that was criticised. Fishers and board members were highly critical of accountability as well. They all agreed that the Dutch government was partly responsible for the fleet capacity spiralling out of control as it had not introduced policies focused on capacity reduction in the past. Even the Association, which had always adopted a cooperative stance in policy-making, resorted to a conflict-oriented approach.²⁵⁵ Both the Association and Federation argued that the Government should address its culpability first before blaming the fishers, but, much to their anger, the Government was not willing to do so.²⁵⁶ In 1987, Nooitgedagt, who was Hoekstra's successor, said he knew why the it was not willing to do so, asserting that the Government fears claims for compensation.²⁵⁷

Output

In the previous period, national policy was geared towards catch management. After 1983, it became clear that catch management alone was not effective. Quotas were exceeded massively through the grey market. In 1985, effort management via a license system was introduced, while in 1987, a 2000 HP limit, beam trawl limit, and days-in-port-regulation were all implemented. Moreover, a 1987 parliamentary inquiry concluded that civil servants were both actively and passively involved in quota busting. As a result, controls were tightened significantly and catch management became more stringent.²⁵⁸

The Association and Federation held different perceptions of national output. The Association, representing smaller fishers, argued that effort management had come too late and that smaller fishers were also carrying the burden of regulations, whereas they were not responsible for overfishing in the first place (distributive justice). In contrast, the Federation, the bigger fishers, complained that controls were hitting fishers too hard

²⁵² Visserijnieuws, 'Ben Daalder en "het overweekse denken"', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-11 (18-03-1988), 4.

²⁵³ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 46, Letter from the Federation to the Fish Board (17-03-1988).

²⁵⁴ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 707, 1990 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Product Board (18-01-1990), 3.

²⁵⁵ G.J. Dommerholt, 'Brief aan minister', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 6.

²⁵⁶ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Vissersbond overpeinzingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-43 (25-10-1985), 4; Klaas Hoekstra, 'Wie het weet mag het zeggen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-1 (09-01-1987), 4; Ben Daalder, 'Vissers mogen zich ook in '88 niet tegen elkaar laten uitspelen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-51/52 (18-12-1987), 12; Blaas Marijs, 'Lezers schrijven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-12 (25-03-1988), 4.

²⁵⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Visserbond wil eigen minister', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-40 (09-10-1987), 3.

²⁵⁸ Van Vliet and Dubbink, *Nederlandse visserijbeheer*, 33-34.

(performance) and that the Dutch government was trying to quickly set straight what had gone wrong for years.

The Association's small flatfish fishers and roundfish fishers both had the same problem. Big flatfish fishers were up taking the national quota so fast, that the smaller fishers could not fish year-round. On behalf of them Hoekstra called for a policy 'that is just to those who have not participated in the expansion of fleet capacity.'²⁵⁹ For small flatfish fishers, the problem was that their Individual Quota (IQ) was not legally guaranteed. Fishing activities had to be halted under EC obligations once national quotas had been reached, regardless of whether individual fishers had exercised their individual entitlements. In short, if one fisher exceeded his IQ, the others were to pay the price for this (and the one fisher had to pay a small fine). Disadvantaged fishers were compensated for this inequality the following year, but the compensation was not adequate. As a result, a race for fish ensued, and smaller fishers were losing the race. They held their IQs as worthless so long as quota uptake was not guaranteed.²⁶⁰ They concluded that 'one is better off as a 'Turk' [a migrant worker from Turkey], than as a fisher from Texel or Urk.'²⁶¹

The problem for roundfish fishers was that big flatfish fishers' bycatch led to a quick uptake of roundfish quotas. To counter the problem, fishers fully dependent on cod had already received a guaranteed minimum quota in 1981 through cod entitlements (*k-documenten*). In 1985, this system was revised. Flatfish fishers were allowed to land only 200 kg of cod in order to better protect the cod entitlement holders. However, this system could not prevent the early closure of cod fishing in 1985, 1986, and 1987, much to the anger of cod entitlement holders.

Roundfish fishers 'were not prepared to pay the price for the big cutters.'²⁶² They defended their positions fiercely and in 1984 they blockaded the ports of IJmuiden and Lauwersoog.²⁶³ They perceived themselves as discriminated 'to an extent only seen in South-Africa'²⁶⁴ and in October 1987 they blockaded the sea locks of IJmuiden by which they prevented ships from entering or leaving the Port of Amsterdam.²⁶⁵ Roundfish fishers called for a policy that protected them against their bigger colleagues, as the current policy was 'blowing smaller fishers to smithereens'.²⁶⁶

²⁵⁹ Visserijnieuws, "'Visstop voor gebied meer effect dan vangstverbod'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-21/22 (22-05-1987), 5.

²⁶⁰ G.J. Dommerholt, 'Brief aan minister', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 4.

²⁶¹ Kees Boersen, 'Wordt ons mooie land geregeerd door blinden?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 4.

²⁶² Visserijnieuws, 'Kabeljauwvissers: wij gaan door', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-46 (16-11-1984), 5.

²⁶³ Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, 'Blokade boze vissers', *Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant*, 04-12-1984, 5.

²⁶⁴ J.G. de Vries, 'De botte bijl', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-16 (18-04-1986), 5.

²⁶⁵ Reformatorisch Dagblad, 'Politie breekt blokkade sluisencomplex IJmuiden', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 29-10-1987, 1.

²⁶⁶ Rederij C. Drijver, 'Ingezonden brieven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-17 (25-04-1986), 5.

In late-1987, policy was changed so that roundfish fishers enjoyed more protection. Several new entitlements were granted, but some fishers were not entitled to participate as they missed the requirements by minor margins, which did not correspond to their sense of justice. One fisher complained about the Dutch ministers who were quick to point out human rights infringements in the Soviet Union. 'Were these human rights only applicable to the oppressed, or do they also apply to an ordinary Dutch fisher? [...] Or does one have no rights if he is the fifth of sixth generation fisher, and he has fished for 43 years?'²⁶⁷

The bigger fishers, represented by the Association, were also critical of policy. For them, stringent controls were a 'declaration of war'²⁶⁸ that would only antagonise relations between the Government and fishers, with one fisher comparing the controls to the persecution of Jews in the Second World War.²⁶⁹ Strain reached new levels in 1987, when controls were further tightened following a parliamentary inquiry into quota busting. Politicians and civil servants considered non-compliance a serious offence, whereas fishers regarded it as a survival strategy.²⁷⁰ Fishers in the port of Vlissingen clashed multiple times with inspection officials and riot police. In October 1988, an inspection van was set on fire. Tensions had reached an all-time high and the police deployed 300 police officers in the subsequent weeks.²⁷¹

Concluding, perceptions of national policy-making and outcomes had changed significantly. Perceptions of input still were positive, although the quality of representation remained a problem. Far more fundamental were changes in throughput. Dutch fishers still were the main stakeholders in the policy process, but their input was not automatically taken into account. Rather, their concerns were only considered when they fitted into the CFP framework. Regarding national output, fishers were even more critical than they were in the previous period. Most of them feared the social and economic impacts (performance) of aligning national output with the CFP framework.

European Level

Perceptions regarding the European level of policy-making barely changed in comparison to the previous period. The period of the CFP's consolidation can be summarised well by the words of Zevibel's chairman, Jan van den Bos when he said, 'fishers have to operate between Brussels' anvil, and the heavy hammer blows of the control system in

²⁶⁷ J. Poelkamp, 'Vragen van één vogelvrijverklaarde!', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-49 (09-12-1988), 4.

²⁶⁸ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Razziabeleid overheid wekt woede vissers op', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 1.

²⁶⁹ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Razziabeleid', 1.

²⁷⁰ Van Ginkel, *Braving Troubled Waters*, 212.

²⁷¹ *Ibidem*, 212.

The Hague.²⁷² Wherein the focus lay on the hammer instead of the anvil, the European level was not the main focus for fishers' associations.

Input

Neither perceptions of opportunities for input nor perceptions of the quality of representation fundamentally changed in this period. Board members remained critical of their opportunities for input at the European level. The problem was not that they had none. Rather, they could voice themselves through the Fisheries Council.²⁷³ The problem was that the Council only influenced policy at a late stage, which enabled fishers to redirect output at most. They, however, wanted fundamentally different output, which could only be done when decision-making was 'more democratic'.²⁷⁴ In 1985, Hoekstra also criticised the opportunities for input at the European level. These were perceived as inadequate, especially in comparison to those the NEAFC had offered in the past.²⁷⁵

In 1987, the Fish Board published a report, 'Between power and powerlessness'²⁷⁶ (*Knel tussen macht en onmacht*) in which it criticised European policy-making. Regarding the opportunities of input, two aspects are of interest and they were quite consistent with earlier critiques as the Fish Board perceived the European Commission as unreachable. First, the ACF was not functioning well and it had not grown after the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986. Moreover, its subcommittees still rarely came together.²⁷⁷ Second, the European Parliament's powers vis-à-vis the European Commission were perceived as too limited. As a result, fishers could not resort to the European Parliament calling the Commission to order.²⁷⁸

The quality of representation was problematic as well. The Fish Board asked questions about whether it was effectively seizing the opportunities for input. In 1985, it wanted to expand its European activities and the Fish Board checked with a consultancy firm about its internal setup. One of the reasons for doing so was that the Board wanted its secretary to become more involved in European policy and the accompanying lobby activities.²⁷⁹ In late-1988, the new Association Chairman, Nooitgedagt also called for fishers and associations to reflect on their own roles. There were too many divisions and rifts to operate effectively and he stated, 'The credibility we have lost, might work against us if we want to achieve something. However, a unitary action to reach this, might be

²⁷² RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2, Minutes of the 1986 General Meeting of Zevibel (19-04-1986) 1.

²⁷³ Visserijnieuws, 'Braks er door, nu visserij nog', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-51/52 (18-12-1987), 1.

²⁷⁴ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2, Chairman's Address at Zevibel's 1984 General Meeting (14-04-1984) 2.

²⁷⁵ Visserijnieuws, "'Kater in plaats van kadootje uit Brussel'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-24 (14-06-1985), 1.

²⁷⁶ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 213, Fish Board report: Between Power and Powerlessness (1987).

²⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, 6.

²⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, 5.

²⁷⁹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 25, Letter from D.J. Langstraat to the Executive Board of the Fish Board (15-02-1985) 2.

successful, this action should take place without “Haarlemmer dikes” [*Haarlemmerdijkjes*: troublemakers in their own ranks].²⁸⁰

In addition, it also appears questionable whether board members were better informed on EC affairs. For example, in November 1989, the Federation sent a letter to the Fish Product Board in which it asked for information on the role of *Europêche*, *COGECA*, and the *ACF*, as the organisation was not aware what the differences between the three was.²⁸¹ One could argue that this is rather basic knowledge and it is questionable whether the Federation involved itself in European affairs if it had to ask these questions.

Throughput

European policy-making was criticised heavily for its responsiveness to biological advices. This critique was not new, but its intensity was. In addition, fishers’ associations also started to occupy themselves with accountability. Their perceptions did not change, however, as they still perceived the European Commission as unreachable. At the same time, transparency was criticised less, which could have been the result of increasing openness, although I am not sure of this. On the one hand, perceptions on transparency in the previous period were heavily shaped by the CFP’s uncertain future. Once a completed CFP became a reality, there might have been less need for transparency. After all, it was roughly clear what future policy looked like. On the other hand, the diminishing focus on transparency coincided with a diminishing focus at the European level in general. It could have been that associations were just less occupied with European affairs, which made them less focused on transparency. In addition, the critique that was voiced towards transparency was quite consistent with earlier assessments: the allocation of TACs was perceived as a rather opaque affair.²⁸²

Responsiveness, was, as stated, criticised more. At its heart, the critique did not change in comparison to the previous period. Fishers still argued that they could only participate when the problem had already been defined and fishers criticized the weight biological advices had in policy-making. However, in comparison to the previous period, the timing of consultation became less of an issue, which is not to say that it was not.²⁸³ What probably caused the critique to vanish was that TACs were quite favourable between 1983 and 1990. In addition, the Government managed to trade certain quotas with other countries and the principle of relative stability gave more steadiness, which helped

²⁸⁰ Johan Nooitgedagt, ‘Eerste stap naar verstandig zelfbestuur’, *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-51/52 (23-12-1988), 15.

²⁸¹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 707, Letter from the Federation to the Fish Product Board (06-11-1989).

²⁸² L. van de Berg, ‘Historisch Recht; Waar is dat gebleven?’, *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-51/52 (18-12-1987), 7.

²⁸³ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 26, Minutes of a meeting of the Fish Board’s Board (18-12-1985), 1; NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 27, Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board’s Public Board (29-01-1987), 2.

as fishers more or less knew what to expect for the following years, making the timing of consultation less of an issue.

The role of biologists was the topic of much debate. Fishers wanted that their own experiences regarding the size of fish stocks were taken into account, just as they wanted more eye for fishers' economic interests. The former was made clear by Zevibel's cutter fishers in December 1983, who stated that the proposed TACs for 1984 'were not based on reality'.²⁸⁴ Jan de Bruine, Secretary of the Federation, replied to this comment that the proposals were not 'as they had been drafted by the biologists'.²⁸⁵ Derk Jonk, another fisher, complained that biologists had too much influence on the establishment of TACs.²⁸⁶ In 1985, Daalder argued that biologists' advices should be compared to everyday observations by fishers.²⁸⁷ Two years later, he would add to this that it was necessary to balance economic and biological considerations.²⁸⁸ Klaas Kramer, who succeeded Daalder as the Federation's chairman in 1989, was more outspoken on what he framed as a one sided fixation on biological advices.²⁸⁹

Fishers were quite negative on policy's performance as well, but they had the feeling that it was virtually impossible to hold the European Commission responsible for its performance (accountability). As described in chapter two, the associations perceived the Commission as unreachable, which remained the same between 1983 and 1990. Through the Fish Product Board, the associations summed up their complaints in a 1987 report in which they complained that no one appeared to be able to rebuke the European Commission.²⁹⁰ The Product Board concluded that 'the shift of decision-making from Member States to Brussels has led to a gap in parliamentary oversight.'²⁹¹

Output

Most criticism regarding the European level was output-oriented, with two critiques dominating: the allocation of quotas (distributive justice), and the absence of a level playing field (performance). Neither of the two were new and they were strongly related to earlier critiques. Fishers concluded that their historical rights had not been taken into account adequately. As Schakel, the Federation's chairman, stated in 1983 that the shares for the Netherlands were too small and country had been the biggest loser.²⁹² Very telling for

²⁸⁴ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (10-12-1983), 1.

²⁸⁵ Ibidem, 1.

²⁸⁶ Derk Jonk, 'Dagboek van een gullenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-35 (30-08-1985), 4.

²⁸⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Warrig EG-beleid betekent miljoenenstrop tongvissers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-40 (03-10-1986), 1.

²⁸⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Forumdiscussie onderstreept noodzaak tot eenheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-27/28 (10-07-1987), 6.

²⁸⁹ Klaas Kramer, "'Streven naar opereren binnen de regelgeving'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1990-1 (05-01-1990), 7.

²⁹⁰ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 213, Fish Board report: Between Power and Powerlessness (1987). (1987), 6.

²⁹¹ Ibidem, 5.

²⁹² Visserijnieuws, 'Reorganisatie PBO moet vlotter', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-39 (30-09-1983), 7.

perceptions regarding 'Europe' were Hoekstra's remarks on European and national output. The European output had nothing to do with a policy and he thus named it a 'non-policy'²⁹³. In contrast, national output was 'wrong policy'²⁹⁴, indicating that the national policy process was not bad in and of itself, whereas it appears that European one was.

In mid-1985, all Dutch fishers associations started to investigate the possibilities of a legal battle against the allocation of quotas. They hoped to bring about a redistribution of national shares as they perceived the distribution at the time as unfair. They felt forced to resort to legal means, as more conventional ways had not yet achieved any change.²⁹⁵ One could argue that this was hardly surprising. Few Member States were prepared to renegotiate the allocation keys, as it had taken six years to come up with them in the first place.

The associations indeed went to court in 1987. Fundamentally changing the entire policy would be impossible, but a significant change could be achieved. Several countries landed far less catches than their quotas allowed and Dutch fishers argued that they could exceed their national quota as long as the TAC for a fish stock would not be surpassed. The European Court of Justice was not convinced by this line of reasoning and Dutch fishers were more and more confronted with the idea that they would have to operate in a new reality.²⁹⁶ In 1989, Federation Chairman Kramer appeared well aware of the new environment as he stated, 'that we have to realise ourselves that freely hunting belongs to the past.'²⁹⁷

Fishers also criticised the European level for the absence of a level playing field. Dutch fishers were critical of other Member States who were perceived as lax on quota management and lenient on controlling their own fishers, whereas the Dutch government was neither. Dutch fishers claimed these Member States were using 'Europe' to destroy the Dutch fishing industry.²⁹⁸ Hoekstra already voiced his concerns on the absence of harmonised controls in 1983.²⁹⁹ Daalder was critical of the controls as well as he claimed that these regulations were drafted by laypeople who had no idea how their implementation would lead to tremendous differences in practice.³⁰⁰

It was hardly surprising that both the Association and Federation were not impressed when the European Commission criticised the Netherlands in 1984 for being the largest quota buster. According to both associations this only showed that the Netherlands had

²⁹³ Visserijnieuws, "'Kater in plaats van kadootje uit Brussel', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-24 (14-06-1985), 1.

²⁹⁴ Visserijnieuws, "'Kater'", 1.

²⁹⁵ Visserijnieuws, 'Visserijbedrijfsleen komt voor 1 november met beleidsplan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-25 (21-06-1985), 5.

²⁹⁶ Visserijnieuws, "'Consequenties onder ogen durven zien'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-12 (20-03-1987), 1.

²⁹⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Klaas Kramer kraakt harde noten in maidenspeech', *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-8 (24-02-1989), 6.

²⁹⁸ Klaas Kramer, 'Met de beste wensen van...', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-1 (09-01-1987), 5; J.O. Boer, 'Brief van een teleurgestelde visserman', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-14 (10-04-1987), 5.

²⁹⁹ Klaas Hoekstra, 'Waar gaan wij in 1984 naar toe', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-51/52 (23-12-1983), 6.

³⁰⁰ Ben Daalder, '1983, een onstuimig jaar', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-51/52 (23-12-1983), 8.

the best functioning controls of the Community.³⁰¹ In 1986 the associations followed up on this by claiming that the European Commission should harmonise instead of criticise.³⁰² Fishers did not have the feeling that the Commission was taking their calls serious, to the contrary, Piet van Dam, a fisher from Stellendam, argued that 'Europe was messing about'³⁰³ and in the words of Zevibel's chairman, Van den Bos, 'everyone was protecting his own interest',³⁰⁴ which had led to a situation in where control was completely uneven across the Community.³⁰⁵

Conclusion

The question now is whether fishers perceived the national and European policy-making level differently in the period 1983-1990, and if they did, why? On the one hand, this appears to have been the case. Perceptions regarding the national level were at slightly more positive, which can best be described in the words of Association Chairman Hoekstra. According to him, European policy-making had led to a 'nonpolicy'³⁰⁶, whereas the national level was 'conducting a wrong policy'³⁰⁷, a subtle difference that hints at the fact that national policy-making was not necessarily bad, while European decision-making was.

On the other hand, differences between two levels started to fade. In chapter two, it was concluded that the national level was geared towards fishers, whereas the European level more focused on fish. After 1983, this started to change, and fishers gradually began to criticise national policy-making and its outcomes. Whether national policy-making was still geared towards fishers was up to debate, but it appeared to them that concerns about fish took on a more prominent role. In this sense, differences between the national and European level were fading.

Ultimately, I would argue that there were differences between the two, which mainly lay on the input side. The output and the throughput were not perceived fundamentally different, but perceptions of input at both levels were quite different. At the national level, the opportunities for participation were virtually always perceived as adequate, which certainly was not always the case at the European level. These differences should not be overstated, because fishers felt threatened by both levels.

³⁰¹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 27, Minutes of a meeting of the Fish Board's Board (24-06-1986), 1.

³⁰² NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 27, Minutes of a meeting of the Fish Board's Board (24-06-1986), 1; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Gele kaart EG voor Nederlandse controle', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-27/28 (11-07-1986), 3.

³⁰³ Piet van Dam, 'Ingezonden brieven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-50 (12-12-1986), 5.

³⁰⁴ Paul de Schipper, "'Geprobeerd vissers bij elkaar te houden'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-17 (28-04-1989), 5.

³⁰⁵ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 27, Policy Note by the Fish Product Board (1990), 2.

³⁰⁶ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Kater in plaats van kadootje uit Brussel'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-24 (14-06-1985), 1.

³⁰⁷ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Kater'", 1.

4. Charting a New Course: Readjusting the CFP (1991-1995)

After 1990, a process of reconsideration took place at the national and European levels. At the European level, the CFP was evaluated after its first decade, and the European Commission was critical of the CFP in 1991. It had been ineffective in achieving its goals.³⁰⁸ A reform was necessary, but the Commission was only worried over the output side as the CFP had not protected fish or fishers.³⁰⁹ The Commission neglected Dutch fishers' perceptions that the policy lacked legitimacy in input and throughput as well.

The proposed remedy was to incorporate socio-economic aspects into policy and to improve resource management. Both could have increased legitimacy as they would have addressed some of the grievances that fishers had. Nevertheless, the will to reform the CFP was lacking. Many Member States still had their experiences between 1976 and 1983 in mind. As a result, the CFP was readjusted at most. Systemic issues were left untouched, and legitimacy in the eyes of Dutch fishers only increased marginally.³¹⁰

National Level

Domestically, policy-making and its outcomes were reconsidered as well. First, the Government started to distance itself from the fishing industry. Second, the balance between economy and ecology within policy-making was adjusted. Third, the Government questioned its own involvement in the industry. Compliance had increased in the late 1980s as the result of strict enforcement, which came at a cost. Controls were expensive, and regulations were rigid. Additional top-down measures yielded few benefits and the Government argued that proper compliance would only come if legitimacy increased.³¹¹ The House of Representatives agreed with this, and it was prepared to give cutter fishers one last chance to participate in policy-making. They could cooperate with the Government to draft policy with which they would comply, or the House would accept the introduction of a harsh mandatory vessel decommissioning scheme.³¹²

Fishers knew the Government and House of Representatives meant business. The troubles of the 1980s had left a deep imprint on fishers. Late in 1990, this culminated with the resignation of Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Gerrit Braks, a popular government official. His policy might have been perceived as bad by fishers, but his attitude

³⁰⁸ European Commission, *Report 1991 From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Common Fisheries Policy*, SEC-2288 (1991).

³⁰⁹ Commission, *Report 1991*, IV.

³¹⁰ David Symes, 'The European Community's Common Fisheries Policy', *Ocean and Coastal Management* 35 (1997) 2-3, pp. 137-155, 144; Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 292.

³¹¹ NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 228, Note on fisheries white paper (23-10-1989), 3.

³¹² Trouw, 'Kamer stemt in met "laatste kans" voor de kottersvissers', *Trouw*, 25-06-1992, 1.

towards them certainly was not. 'He spoke the language of farmers and fishers'³¹³ as one newspaper described it. Langstraat would later on refer to Braks' resignation as 'a dark page in the history of fisheries'³¹⁴ In the words of the Federation Chairman, Kramer, it was time for 'clean fishing'.³¹⁵ Kramer was not just some board member uttering these words. To the contrary, he knew everything about operating outside of the law. Late in 1989, he had even spent two short periods in jail for burning documents on illegal catches and it was in prison that he realised the situation could no longer continue.³¹⁶

Distancing, rebalancing and deregulating led to changes in perceptions regarding input, throughput, and output. Overall, perceptions changed for the positive, and as result, it is tempting to see this period as a success. Yet there are two strong reasons to be cautious in doing so. First, distancing and rebalancing led to a critique of input and throughput. Second, deregulation was only accepted cautiously and under strong pressure.

Input

The opportunities for input changed tremendously in this period. The Federation and Association were far from satisfied with them. It is difficult to grasp the exact reasons for this, but processes interacted. The Government distanced itself and the industry's organisation changed. Turning to the Government first. For a long time, relations between fishers and the Dutch government were personal and informal. As described in chapters two and three, fishers and board member had always been positive about the opportunities for input. If there were any problems with input, these were the result of their own quality of representation. The Government was always willing to hear, although whether it was responsive was another question.

Relations were personal in the sense that the same actors were active within the DF and fishers' associations for a long time. For example, Tienstra headed the DF from 1964 to 1984 and Klaas Hoekstra was the Association's chairman from 1964 to 1987. Relations were informal in the sense that the DF was not unwilling to speak to associations or fishers outside the formalised consultations through the Fish Board and it was not uncommon to contact individual fishers on policy matters.

Relations between fishers and the Government already started to change in the late-1980s. For example, in 1987, the DF decided that 'future contact with the fishing industry

³¹³ G.A. Vroegindeweyj, 'Minister Braks spreekt nog altijd de klare taal van boeren en vissers', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 19-07-1988, 7.

³¹⁴ H. van den Berge, 'Majesteit, het is maatjestijd', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 11-01-2002, 19.

³¹⁵ H. van den Berge and J. Visscher, "'De visser moet wel een beetje zeerover blijven'", *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 19-04-1997, 11.

³¹⁶ Van den Berge and Visscher, "'Zeerover'", 11.

on policy matters from now on should only take place through formal consultation'.³¹⁷ In addition, the personal aspects also began to disappear. Tienstra's successor, Van der Meer, was only active from 1984 to 1988 and his successor, Wim Tacken, was in the position from 1988 until 1990.

In the early 1990s, these changes were intensified. In the era of smaller governments, the DF had to focus on setting frameworks for the fishing industry. Instead of regulating, it should be facilitating and it had to create 'a certain distance from those directly involved in the fishing industry.'³¹⁸ The Association and Federation were not too happy with this and their chairmen were not in favour of quick changes of personnel within the DF, as they threatened the continuity of consultation.³¹⁹

At the same time, the industry was organised differently. Until 1991, the fishing industry had its own statutory corporation in the Fish Board. The sector as a whole (fishing industry, processing, and marketing) was organised through the Fish Product Board. In short, there were four boards. One for the sector as a whole, and three for the subsectors. This was expensive and complicated. In 1991, these boards were all merged into one Fish Product Board. From then on, the subsectors were organised through committees.

Both the Federation and Association were afraid that this setup would diminish their influence.³²⁰ The Fish Board was an official consultation partner for the Government and so the fishing industry could consult the Government at its discretion. In contrast, committees within the Fish Product Board were not allowed to do so. All consultation had to go through the Board of the Fish Product Board. To compensate for this, the industry's Supply Committee (*Commissie Aanvoer*) was given a special status and more autonomy.³²¹ However, consultation still had to take place through the Board of the Fish Product Board.

In June 1995, the Federation and Association voiced their dissatisfaction with input and consultation. In an internal note, the secretariat stated that the consultation between the ministry and industry 'did not run smoothly'.³²² There were no periodic meetings between the industry and the DF and the cutter sector only had bimonthly meetings with the DF's deputy director.³²³ They had the feeling that the DF's director was unreachable to

³¹⁷ NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 50, Internal note to all employees of the Directorate of Fisheries (10-06-1987).

³¹⁸ NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 5, Note on the organisation of the Directorate of Fisheries (13-12-1991).

³¹⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Kleemans volgt Draaisma op als de nieuwe directeur Visserijen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-7 (18-02-1994), 3.

³²⁰ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 46, Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (27-01-1989), 2.

³²¹ *Ibidem*, 2.

³²² NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 897, Note on consultation between the cutter sector and the government (22-08-1995), 1.

³²³ *Ibidem*, 1.

them.³²⁴ Nooitgedagt, the Association's chairman, refuted the secretariat's interpretation. The problem was not the DF; instead, the issue was that the cutter sector should come up with well formulated plans.³²⁵ Nooitgedagt's remarks cast doubt whether changing perceptions regarding input were only caused by the Government altering its ties with the fishing industry, but there is sufficient evidence to conclude that both Associations certainly were not satisfied with the Government's changes.

In contrast, perceptions about the quality of representation changed to the positive in this period. From the onset of the CFP in 1976, fishers' associations had always been plagued by problems with their organisation, representation, and information. In the early 1990s, they sought to mitigate these problems by professionalising themselves and by improving coordination. Both terms are relative and we cannot speak of a full-scale professionalisation. However, their significance lays in the trend, not in their impact.

Around 1991, unity in the cutter sector was more necessary than ever. Fishers had been the only stakeholders in national policy-making, but this started to change as environmental organisations gained traction. Fishers stressed the need to form a 'blue front' to fight the 'green front'.³²⁶ Or as Zevibel's chairman, Cees J. van Liere, put it, 'He who is divided in himself, cannot exist.'³²⁷ Forming such a front in the sense of a merger between the Association and Federation was out of the question and their chairmen refrained from voicing an opinion on the matter. At most, they could improve coordination between the two organisations, but for many fishers this was not enough.³²⁸ They demanded a merger.

Visserijnieuws gave a strong voice to 'outsiders' within this debate. Strictly speaking though, these individuals were not outsiders as they were active within fishers' associations. Nevertheless, they were outsiders in the sense that they had never been fishers themselves but had become involved in fisheries for their managerial qualities. By far the most prominent 'outsider' was Bas van der Beek, who was the chairman of *DETV Texel*, a local association from Texel. His claim to legitimacy was quite strong as he was a farmer and he had considerable experience as a board member in farmers' associations. Fishers identified themselves with farmers as they perceived themselves as farmers of the sea. At the same time, fishers saw that farmers had organised themselves more effectively and that there was probably something to learn from them. Van der Beek was critical of the cutter sector's organisation. He repeatedly stressed the need for a merger of the Association and

³²⁴ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 897, Note on consultation between the cutter sector and the government (22-08-1995), 1.

³²⁵ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 897, Minutes of a Cutter Committee meeting (22-08-1995), 5.

³²⁶ B.W. Schot, 'Groenen lachen zich blauw', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-42 (18-10-1991), 5.

³²⁷ Klaas Kramer, 'Tijd voor het oppakken van eigen verantwoordelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-1 (11-01-1991), 10.

³²⁸ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Vissersbond en Federatie over ontheffing zeedagen verdeeld', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-44 (01-11-1991), 3.

Federation. *Visserijnieuws* would eventually refer to it as his 'hobby-horse'³²⁹. He deemed it 'childish'³³⁰ that 600 companies did not have one national association.

In addition to coordination, a process of professionalisation took place. Historically, fishers' associations, just as many interest groups and associations, depended on time-intensive participation.³³¹ The pre-professionalisation state of affairs within Zevibel illustrates the problems of time-intensive participation. Few fishers were prepared to extensively participate in Zevibel's Cutter Board.³³² Those that were prepared to do so had severe time constraints because they were at sea from Monday to Friday morning. Thus, the Board could only convene on Friday evenings or Saturday, and as a result, meeting frequency was low. The Board itself was aware that the frequency was too low, but increasing regularity was 'not possible'.³³³

In the 1990s, fishers' associations shifted from time-intensive participation to capital-intensive participation.³³⁴ The driver behind this process was the expansion of POs in 1993. The new Biesheuvel quota management system made POs de facto important in quota management and the EU increased their market regulatory powers.³³⁵ The Federation and Association also had their own POs and both expanded their staff to fulfil the related administrative duties. Their chairman and secretariat could now shift their attention to policy and influencing policy.

Nevertheless, professionalisation is a relative term. It did not take much to professionalise. For example, up until 1993, the Association had a staff of three: a chairman, a secretary, and a supporting staff member.³³⁶ In fact, the Association is the best example to get an impression of what professionalisation entailed. It hired two staff members for administrative duties between 1993 and 1995, and, the position of vice-chairman had become more time-intensive as well.³³⁷ Besides expanding its staff, the Association also sought to smoothen its internal setup. Chairman Nooitgedagt argued that meetings often were fragmented and redundant, which hampered the Association's effectiveness.³³⁸ To counter the problem, the Association organised a two-day convention late 1994, so that

³²⁹ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Laatste pleidooi Van der Beek voor één landelijke vereniging', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-16 (19-04-1996), 5.

³³⁰ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Texel pleit voor één landelijke organisatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-13 (27-03-1992), 3.

³³¹ Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille, *Diploma Democracy; The Rise of Political Meritocracy* (Oxford 2017) 103.

³³² RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the 1991 General Meeting of Zevibel's Cutter sector (08-06-1991), 2; RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter sector's meeting (10-10-1992), 1.

³³³ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the 1991 General Meeting of Zevibel's Cutter sector (08-06-1991), 1.

³³⁴ De Hart, *Landelijk Verenigd*, 8.

³³⁵ Churchill and Owen, *The EC Common Fisheries Policy*, 266.

³³⁶ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Uitbreiding personeel bij Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-36 (10-11-1993), 6;

³³⁷ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Uitbreiding personeel', 3; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Nederlandse Vissersbond gaat kantoor uitbreiden', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-39 (30-09-1994), 4; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Uitbreiding personeel bij Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-9 (03-03-1995), 3.

³³⁸ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Problemen van zestig jaar geleden spelen nog steeds', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-17 (29-04-1994), 9.

several issues could be discussed in-depth.³³⁹ Another solution to reduce meetings was merging local associations.³⁴⁰

Increased coordination and professionalisation had mitigated several problems in the organisational setup of fishers' associations. In addition to organisation, the perceived quality of representation also depends on perceptions of grassroots representation and information. After 1991, board members attempted to heal the rifts that had emerged between them and their constituency. These attempts at improving grassroots involvement seem to have been quite effective. Although it is difficult to find explicit satisfaction, critiques of representatives at least diminished. Most attempts at improving grassroots representation can be found for the Association, so I will therefore predominantly focus on the Association. This is not to say that the Federation did not undertake these attempts. In contrast, there is some evidence it did, but more sources are needed to draw any substantive conclusions on the difference between the two associations.

Nooitgedagt had already made clear in 1989 that he was different from his predecessor. Hoekstra tended to be openly critical of some members, while Nooitgedagt cherished these critics, once stating, 'Without outspoken fishers, there would be no organisation'.³⁴¹ From 1991 onwards, he would bring this philosophy into practice by involving grassroots members through surveys.³⁴² A year later, Nooitgedagt highlighted the importance of involving his constituency, but, he was not willing to follow their advices blindly.³⁴³ To the contrary, Nooitgedagt stated that, there will always be opponents, but you don't always have to listen to them.³⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Nooitgedagt was aware that many members still kept a close eye on the organisation as they feared it might neglect their interests.³⁴⁵ Thus, it appears that grassroots members often did not feel adequately represented. Whether this was the case for the Federation too is unclear as it was difficult to find explicit statements on the Federation. At most, it was found that the Federation also started to use surveys and that these certainly were no cure-all as response was low at times.³⁴⁶

Reconstructing the perception of information, is even more difficult. The source material is too fragmented to say anything substantive. In addition, the available source material only covers 1990, 1991, and 1992, of which 1990 falls outside the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, I have included source material from this year as the point is to sketch

³³⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Marathonvergadering bestuur Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-41 (14-10-1994), 5.

³⁴⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Goeree zet schouders onder flinke Vissersbondafdeling', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-1 (06-01-1995), 4.

³⁴¹ Visserijnieuws, "'Kop erbij en niet inslapen'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-16 (21-04-1989), 1.

³⁴² Visserijnieuws, 'Vragenuurtje op jaarvergadering Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-16 (19-04-1991), 1;

Visserijnieuws, 'Directie Visserijen betreurt schrijven van de Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-4 (24-01-1992), 1.

³⁴³ Visserijnieuws, 'Boomkorfloot krijgt volgend jaar gemiddeld 100 zeedagen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-18 (01-05-1992), 1.

³⁴⁴ Visserijnieuws, "'Ons Belang" belangrijke pijler van Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-41 (09-10-1992), 7.

³⁴⁵ Visserijnieuws, 'Problemen van zestig jaar geleden spelen nog steeds', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-17 (29-04-1994), 9.

³⁴⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond bekritiseert "groot nieuws" op havens', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-10 (08-03-1991), 3.

an impression. The material is too fragmented to say anything substantive, but it appears that the informational supply was not deemed adequate.

The Association had planned to set up a fax network in 1991 so that local associations were reached faster. These networks could spread information among their members, which could counter the spread of false rumours in the harbours.³⁴⁷ Zevibel also concluded in 1990 that its informational supply needed improvement.³⁴⁸ These problems were not restricted to just Zevibel; the whole of the Federation had trouble in adequately informing its members. As a result, it was decided that the Federation would spread newsletters after Federation meetings.³⁴⁹ In 1992, Zevibel decided to spread its own newsletter every six weeks, also indicating that the informational supply was deemed inadequate by board members.³⁵⁰

Overall, this period was quite different in comparison to the previous two. For the first time since 1977, satisfaction with opportunities for input began to diminish. The exact causes for this are unclear. On the one hand, the Government started to distance itself from the cutter sector and the Association and Federation were not satisfied with this development. On the other hand, the cutter sector was organised differently as well. From 1991, consultation went through the Fish Product Board instead of the Fish Board. Both associations were unhappy with this change, as they concluded their influence had diminished. Therefore, it is not fully clear what the exact causes for changing perceptions on opportunities for input were. At the same time, satisfaction with the quality of representation seemed to increase. The Association and Federation sought to improve coordination between the two associations and both professionalised their organisation.

Throughput

Around 1991, the environment took a strong place on the political agenda. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries had already been renamed to 'Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Fisheries' in 1989. A change which was reflected four years later in the white paper 'Balanced Fisheries' (*Vissen naar evenwicht*).³⁵¹

This development had repercussions for perceptions of throughput at the national level. The Government explicitly acknowledged that it would be more responsive to ecological interests at the costs of responsiveness to economic interests. Both the Federation and Association had issues with this attitude and their main issue was with the

³⁴⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond bekritiseert', 3.

³⁴⁸ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (23-03-1991), 1.

³⁴⁹ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (29-09-1990), 1.

³⁵⁰ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 4, Minutes of Zevibel's Board's meeting (04-12-1992), 2.

³⁵¹ Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, *Vissen naar Evenwicht* (Den Haag 1993).

indisputability of ecology's importance.³⁵² The Association was deeply critical as it was the smaller fishers that had most to do with national policy. They were operating on Dutch territorial seas, and hence, Dutch law applied to them. Whereas the Federation's fishers were active on the North Sea, which was governed by EC/EU regulations and not by Dutch national law. Nevertheless, the Federation was far from satisfied either.

Nooitgedagt feared that ecological interests would triumph over fishers' concerns and in the words of Zevibel's chairman it appeared as if 'environmental activists would only rest when the last fishers had ceased fishing.'³⁵³ In 1995, the Association published a report, 'Help, the fishing industry is still drowning' (*Help de visserij verzuipt nog steeds*)³⁵⁴, in which it expressed its dissatisfaction with the many pro-environment civil servants in the Ministry.³⁵⁵

Besides responsiveness, throughput has two more elements, transparency and accountability. Regarding the former, no statements could be found, and thus, reconstructing perceptions is not possible. For accountability, there were more than enough statements, and interestingly, many were made by fishers and not by their representatives. Relations between the Government and fishers had become strained in the late 1980s. At the time, fishers and associations sought to hold the Government accountable for the situation. In the 1990s, however, associations stopped doing so and decided it was time to move on. Instead, they emphasised fishers to reflect on their own role and responsibility. As said, associations and fishers sought to start anew around 1991. As Kramer, who was chairman of the Federation said, 'It is easy to blame the opposing party. [...] But we have to take our own responsibility as well.'³⁵⁶ Nooitgedagt of the Association voiced similar sentiments in 1991 and three years later he would repeat these.³⁵⁷

Concluding, in comparison to the previous period, perceptions of throughput changed slightly. On the one hand, fishers adopted a more reflective attitude. They started to acknowledge their own past mistakes and they stopped to hold the Government accountable. On the other hand, perceptions of responsiveness changed. The Dutch government had become more responsive to ecological interests, much to the anger of fishers.

³⁵² RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2, Minutes of the Zevibel 1992 General Meeting (25-04-1992), 2; NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 25, Comments by the Federation on the White Paper 'Balanced Fisheries' (17-07-1992), 4; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Nooitgedagt: Harde werker dreigt "underdog" te worden', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-6 (12-02-1993), 7.

³⁵³ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 1, Zevibel's 1993 annual report (1993), 1.

³⁵⁴ *Visserijnieuws*, "'Help de visserij verzuipt nog steeds'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-22 (02-06-1995), 3.

³⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, 3.

³⁵⁶ Klaas Kramer, 'Tijd voor het oppakken van eigen verantwoordelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-1 (11-01-1991), 10.

³⁵⁷ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Individuele zeedagenregeling is niet het ei van Columbus', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-17 (26-04-1991), 3; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Problemen van zestig jaar geleden spelen nog steeds', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-17 (29-04-1994), 9.

Output

The third change, deregulation, would lead to tremendous differences in perceptions of output. Deregulation was typical of the time and it gained ground in the era of smaller governments. The Dutch government also gave two arguments for deregulation. First, top-down measures were expensive and had reached their maximum effectiveness. Stricter monitoring would only yield marginal improvements. Second, the Government argued it had become too involved in the industry. For example, the Government decided on which days fishers were allowed to fish, whereas, it now argued that these decisions should be left to fishers themselves.³⁵⁸ In short, a system of self-regulation had to be devised and management tasks had to be devolved to the industry.

In hindsight, this system became popular and effective, which was mainly because of its output and not because of its distributive justice. Turning to performance first, the Government opted for a carrot and stick approach, although it mainly was the stick that drove fishers to accept a new quota management system. Two advisory committees were formed in 1991. One was presided over by a lawyer named Robert Mok. Another was overseen by former Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel. The Mok Committee (*Commissie Mok*) proposed a hard, compulsory decommissioning scheme and the Biesheuvel Committee (*Commissie Biesheuvel*) proposed a co-management system. This latter system sought to involve fishers through management groups. Fishers participating in these groups would pool their individual quota and remain owners of their own allocations. Within these groups, the quotas can easily be sold or leased, which allowed for considerable flexibility. These groups would be administered by a board consisting of fishers but chaired by an independent chairman. The Government would manage quotas at the level of groups, which would decrease monitoring costs substantially.³⁵⁹

Fishers were, however, far from enthusiastic about Biesheuvel's recommendations. They saw that the system would give them more flexibility, but were still sceptical. First, they asked questions about whether it would be possible to find independent chairman for these groups. Second, they wanted a guarantee that everyone could fulfil his own quota, even if others had exceeded theirs.³⁶⁰ However, the Government did not give such a guarantee and it also did not alter its demands that groups were to be chaired by independent chairmen. As was stated in Zevibel, deciding between Biesheuvel and Mok was

³⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 25, Note by the Directorate of Fisheries on self-regulation (15-02-1991), 1.

³⁵⁹ Luc van Hoof, 'Co-management: an alternative to enforcement', *ICES Journal of Marine Science* 67 (2010) 1, pp. 395-401, 398.

³⁶⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Bedrijfsleven en Biesheuvel niet op één lijn', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-21 (22-05-1992), 1.

'picking your poison'.³⁶¹ The Federation also lamented the aura of 'take it or leave it'.³⁶² Nevertheless, fishers still accepted Biesheuvel's findings. In 1993, the new system was put into practice. Ninety-three percent of all fishers participated in the system in 1993 and in 1996, this rose to 97%.³⁶³ Initially, Kramer was critical of the new management regime, but Nooitgedagt, who had always been more positive about the system, voiced his satisfaction.³⁶⁴ Kramer, however, revised his opinion, and he stated that co-management worked quite well in 1995.³⁶⁵ The Government was satisfied with co-management as well, but it also questioned whether this was the result of changing mentalities or of favourable TACs.³⁶⁶

Two groups of fishers were critical of policy's distributive justice. The first were the roundfish fishers, whose perceptions were not new as they again feared that policy was geared towards their destruction.³⁶⁷ Their rhetorical strategies were not new either. Again, they compared their circumstances to those in dictatorships.³⁶⁸ Besides roundfish fishers, there was a second group as well. Fishers in the so-called 'mixed fisheries' (*Gemengde visserij*) also felt threatened. Many of these fishers were from Wieringen in the province of North-Holland and fished for different species with different fishing techniques year-round. Their fishing activities often depended strongly on the weather. In short, they needed quite some flexibility, but policy could not cope with this situation. The Biesheuvel co-management system was not adapted to the flexibility these fishers needed.³⁶⁹ As a result, these fishers had the feeling they were paying for the consequences of fleet overcapacity, while they were not the ones responsible for it.³⁷⁰

In short, perceptions on output changed dramatically between 1991 and 1995. The Biesheuvel system brought massive changes about and the system eventually attained strong support. Having discussed output, we can answer the sub-question for this section: How did fishers perceive the national level of policy-making between 1991 and 1995? Overall, I would argue that fishers were quite positive, even when fishers and associations were negative on input and throughput. Opportunities for input were increasingly

³⁶¹ RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71, Minutes of the 1992 General Meeting of Zevibel's Cutter sector (06-06-1992), 1

³⁶² Visserijnieuws, 'Bedrijfsleven en Biesheuvel', 1.

³⁶³ Visserijnieuws, "'Misschien nog een kruimeltje op ons stoepje, maar we zijn op de goede weg'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-31 (02-04-1993), 5; NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 323, Report on the final evaluation of the Biesheuvel system (1996), 5.

³⁶⁴ Klaas Kramer, 'Doel en middel', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-27 (09-07-1993), 2; Visserijnieuws, 'Problemen van zestig jaar geleden spelen nog steeds', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-17 (29-04-1994), 9.

³⁶⁵ Visserijnieuws, 'TAC- en quotasysteem doffe ellende', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-48 (01-12-1995), 3.

³⁶⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Doorgaan op de weg die we samen zijn ingeslagen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-9 (04-03-1994), 4; Visserijnieuws, 'Groepsexperiment verlengd', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-26 (01-07-1995), 3.

³⁶⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Rondvisvissers ontevreden over belangenbehartiging', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-19 (08-05-1992), 1.

³⁶⁸ B. Pasterkamp, 'Het spel van de kat en muis', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-25 (25-06-1993), 6.

³⁶⁹ NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 230, Policy note by the Federation of Fishermen's Associations on mixed fisheries (04-02-1992), 10-11.

³⁷⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Van Aartsen oriënteert zich in Den Oever op visserijsector', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-37 (16-09-1994), 6.

criticised as the Government started to distance itself from fisheries. Moreover, the environment had taken a strong place on the political agenda, which decreased responsiveness to fishers' interests. Nevertheless, positive perceptions of output compensated sufficiently for perceptions of input and throughput.

European Level

As stated in the previous chapters, fishers perceived the European level as illegitimate in input, output, or throughput. In the 1991 CFP evaluation, the European Commission was only worried over the output side. First, the CFP had not protected fish and the race for fish had not been halted. Even worse, a tremendous problem of discards emerged, which was not a new issue. A portion of the catch had always been returned, often dead, to the sea. This was mainly done for economic reasons as some fish are unmarketable. The introduction of quotas had given a political reason for discarding as well. Some fish was marketable, but it was not allowed to land these fish due to quota restrictions. Second, the European Commission concluded that policy had not protected fishers either. There had been too little attention to the socioeconomic aspects of policy, which had been a complaint by fishers from the CFP's onset. Third, there were problems with the CFP as the coherence between the different pillars was too low, a problem most prevalent in the market and structural pillars. Fourth, implementation and compliance diverged tremendously across Member States. A major cause for this was the lack of political will among them to comply.³⁷¹

The European Commission's attempt in addressing the abovementioned issues were largely unsuccessful as the political will for reform was lacking. First, the issue of discards was tackled only marginally and the problem remains considerable at the time of writing this thesis. Second, coherence improved slightly. Third, socioeconomic aspects gained more weight. For example, the EC's Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries (STCF) was renamed to Scientific, Technical, and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF), and from 1992 onwards, this advisory body incorporated socioeconomic aspects in its advices to the Commission. Nevertheless, it would take 15 years before economic considerations gained proper ground. Only in 2000 was a system set up to systematically collect data and the information necessary to give solid advice was finally available around the mid-2000s.³⁷² Fourth, implementation and compliance across Member States improved, but there still were vast differences.

³⁷¹ Commission, *Report 1991*, IV.

³⁷² Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 294.

As already mentioned, legitimacy issues were not discussed in the European Commission's 1991 report. In addition, the reforms were undertaken with little stakeholder engagement, but it does not appear that stakeholders pushed for their involvement. Very few remarks on the CFP's reform can be found in the source material. Nevertheless, the 1992 reforms brought minor changes in perceptions of European decision-making and these have to be understood against the background of other changes. First, associations professionalised themselves. Thus, they started to involve themselves in European affairs. Whereas, they let the Fish Board do so in the past. Second, fishers and association perceived the Dutch fishing as the most compliant industry of the EC/EU, thus it was time to closely scrutinise other Member States.³⁷³

Input

Reconstructing the perceived opportunities of input for this period was difficult. Criticism of the opportunities for input had diminished across the years, but the critiques had never been replaced by explicit satisfaction. On the basis of circumstantial evidence, this appears to be the case now, but substantive conclusions cannot be drawn.

One indication is that Langstraat was quite satisfied with the opportunities for input.³⁷⁴ Langstraat became chairman of the ACF in 1989 and as he described it himself, he had attained a 'key position'³⁷⁵ in Brussels. Another indication is that Langstraat managed to make use of his position. He arranged several meetings between Dutch fishers' association and the European Commission. It has to be noted that some of these indications come from 1990, even though this year falls outside of the period under study in this chapter. Yet, to give some indication, I will briefly elaborate upon them.

Fishers and the Federation had issues with the EC regulations regarding mesh measurements. Under the conservation policy, regulations were set up to control maximum mesh sizes for fishing nets. Failure to comply with these regulations resulted in hefty fines. The European Commission had also prescribed regulations on the construction and application of the wedge gauges used for measuring. The Federation, however, argued that these gauges were inadequate and first presented its issues in 1988, claiming the wedge gauge's measurements depended on the force applied to the tool.³⁷⁶ In 1990, Langstraat went to Brussels together with Geert Meun, the Federation's secretary. The

³⁷³ Visserijnieuws, "Misschien nog een kruimeltje op ons stoepje, maar we zijn op de goede weg", *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-13 (02-04-1993), 5.

³⁷⁴ Visserijnieuws, 'Maaswijdteproblemen voorlopig niet opgelost', *Visserijnieuws*, 1990-23 (08-06-1990), 1; Visserijnieuws, 'Dick Langstraat al meer dan 25 jaar in de ban van visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-12 (25-03-1994), 4.

³⁷⁵ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 707, Letter from D.J. Langstraat to the Federation of Fishers' Associations (09-01-1990).

³⁷⁶ NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 369, Policy note 'A margin of freedom' by the Federation of Fishers' Associations (05-10-1989), 7.

Commission was not very receptive of the Federation's complaints, but Langstraat voiced his satisfaction on the meeting.³⁷⁷ Additionally, in early 1995 Langstraat arranged an informal meeting between the European Commission and several representatives from the fishing industry on the 1995 TAC for plaice. Among these representatives was Nooitgedagt. Again, no statements on the meeting could be found, making it difficult to reconstruct Nooitgedagt's perceptions.

Overall, there are several indications that the opportunities for input improved. There were a few meetings with the European Commission and Dick Langstraat voiced his satisfaction with the opportunities for input. However, it is difficult to draw substantive conclusions and it remains unclear whether fishers and their representatives had the same opinion as Langstraat.

As was discussed for the national level, perceptions about the quality of representation changed to the positive. For this period, no explicit statements could be found on the quality of representation on the European level. As elaborated upon in the previous chapters, fishers' associations had always been plagued by several problems at the European level: the existence of two cutter associations, language barriers, member disinterest on European affairs, and a lack of knowledge on the EC/EU by board members.

There are, however, indications these issues disappeared. The attention to European policy-making increased significantly in this period. First, associations professionalised, which enabled chairmen to be more occupied with policy and policy proposals. As a result, they could also involve themselves to a greater extent with European affairs. Second, Dick Langstraat had obtained a key position in the European policy process and he could inform the associations on European affairs. Third, began to look across the borders how fishers from other Member States were doing, as they perceived themselves as well-compliant with the CFP. However, all of this should not be overstated. As was discussed in the previous paragraph, there were more than enough problems regarding the quality of representation.

An indication that associations started to occupy themselves with 'Europe' is that they went to Brussels for meetings with the European Commission to talk about issues regarding mesh measurements and TACs. A second indication was that the associations themselves became more assertive on European affairs. In 1993, Nooitgedagt stated that he always wanted to know how other Member States were doing and now the Dutch

³⁷⁷ Visserijnieuws, Maaswijdteproblemen voorlopig niet opgelost', *Visserijnieuws*, 1990-23 (08-06-1990), 1.

fishing industry was compliant with the CFP, it was time to focus on these EC members.³⁷⁸ Which the Federation and Association both did in 1995.³⁷⁹

Throughput

The European policy process had always been perceived as barely responsive to fishers, i.e., it was perceived as oriented towards fish instead of fishers. The European Commission even acknowledged that the CFP had paid too little attention to socioeconomic aspects. In the 1992 reforms, socioeconomic aspects were officially incorporated in the CFP. For example, the STCF was renamed to Scientific, Technical, and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). In 1994, the Federation and Association voiced their satisfaction with the Commission's adjustments. Against their expectations, 1994 TACs were rather high and according to the Federation this development was the result of the EU's new policy in which biological considerations were no longer the only interests at stake.³⁸⁰

This is not to say that fishers were suddenly very positive about the European level of policy-making. To the contrary, in 1995, Nooitgedagt made perfectly clear what his opinion on the European Commission was. The Dutch government wanted to close of certain areas in the North Sea, but these areas could only be closed off by EU decisions. The Commission and Member States were sceptical of the Dutch proposals, and, Nooitgedagt assessed that fishers were stabbed in the back by their own government, saying, 'it is sad that even the European Commission has meant more for the fishing industry than our own national government.'³⁸¹

In the past, fishers had always been critical of 'Europe's' accountability. They perceived European-level policy as bad, but there was no way to hold anyone accountable for it. In particular, the European Commission was perceived as especially unreachable. In this period, no statements on accountability were voiced. On the one hand, this could be the result of more positive perceptions towards 'Europe'. On the other hand, it should be noted that TACs were relatively favourable for the years between 1991 and 1994. Thus, there was little to complain about for fishers.

Transparency became a topic again in this period, in contrast to the period before. Fishers' perceptions were not new. In years where TACs were unfavourable, they started to question the allocation process of TACs. From 1991 to 1994, TACs were relatively favourable, and thus their allocations were not an issue. In 1995, the TAC for plaice was

³⁷⁸ Visserijnieuws, "Misschien nog een kruimeltje op ons stoepje, maar we zijn op de goede weg", *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-13 (02-04-1993), 5.

³⁷⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'NVB wil rechercherapport over illegale visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-51 (22-12-1995), 1; Visserijnieuws, 'Stappen voor komst objectief meetinstrument maaswijdte', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-20 (19-05-1995), 4

³⁸⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Positieve reacties op vangstquota', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-1 (07-01-1994), 1.

³⁸¹ Visserijnieuws, "Help de visserij verzuipt nog steeds", *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-22 (02-06-1995), 3.

lowered substantially and the Federation and Association again asked questions about how these exactly were allocated. Both criticised the opacity of the horse-trading around the establishment of TACs.³⁸²

Output

Just as in the previous periods, most criticism of the European level was output-oriented. Perceptions of distributive justice changed to the positive between 1991 and 1995. For example, in 1992 Kramer voiced his satisfaction on the allocation of TACs for sole. He hoped that the Netherlands could maintain its position for the next 10 years.³⁸³ Performance became the issue after 1991. In the previous period, fishers started to criticise the lack of harmonisation of controls and in the years after 1991 they would do so even more. Fishers' associations found that compliance and implementation of the CFP depended on the political will of Member States, just as the European Commission concluded in 1991.³⁸⁴ Fishers' associations lamented the lack of harmonisation across Member States and two issues emerged. First, differences in quota management and second, there were differences in control systems among Member States.

Turning to differences in quota management first. Nooitgedagt, who was chairman of the Association, already stated in 1993 that he wanted to keep an eye on other Member States. According to Nooitgedagt, the same rules and standards should apply to all fishers in the EC/EU. Just as fishers in the Biesheuvel system watched over each other, Member States should do the same in the EC/EU.³⁸⁵ Kramer would state the same in 1995, saying 'In England, they use different methods to operate within the TAC and quota system. They are very willing to apply article five: turning a blind eye to catch landings.'³⁸⁶ With 'Article five' Kramer was referring to the EC Treaty. Article five sets out the principles that limit the power of the Community, and one of these principles is subsidiarity. Kramer was hinting at the use of 'subsidiarity' as a way to not comply with EC regulations.

Moving on to differences in controls across Member States. As discussed in the previous chapter, fishers were critical of the lack of harmonisation for controls within the EC/EU. In 1992, Urk's section of the Association deemed more uniformity necessary.³⁸⁷ Nooitgedagt reiterated the same sentiment in 1995. He argued that these differences in

³⁸² Visserijnieuws, 'Hoop gevestigd op ministers bij vaststelling schol-TAC', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-9 (03-03-1995), 1.

³⁸³ Visserijnieuws, "'Grote plus groepsvorming is maken van eigen beleid'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-40 (02-10-1992), 4.

³⁸⁴ Commission, *Report 1991*, IV.

³⁸⁵ Visserijnieuws, "'Misschien nog een kruimeltje op ons stoepje, maar we zijn op de goede weg'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-13 (02-04-1993), 5.

³⁸⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'TAC- en quotasysteem doffe ellende', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-48 (01-12-1995), 3.

³⁸⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Bos bepleit uniform boetesysteem in EG', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-8 (21-02-1992), 3.

implementation undermined the credibility of the CFP. Which could only lead to tremendous problems in the future.³⁸⁸

For the Federation, the lack of harmonisation had a very concrete example in the wedge gauge which had been an issue for longer. The Federation claimed that the gauge's measurements depended on the procedure of measurement and on the force applied to the tool. The EC had published regulations on both, but they left some room for interpretation and the Federation had the feeling the rules were interpreted to their disadvantage by other Member States. The significance of these differences should not be underestimated. In German seas, a one-millimetre difference could result in fine of 10.000 Deutsche Mark [around 9.000 Dutch guilder].³⁸⁹ The wedge gauge was incomprehensible to Federation Chairman Kramer, who claimed that the tool was horribly dated.³⁹⁰

Conclusion

In comparison to the previous periods, perceptions regarding the European level of policy-making became slightly more positive. The critique of opportunities for input disappeared and there is some circumstantial evidence these were even perceived positively. In addition, the Federation and Association started to involve themselves more in European affairs. Perceptions on throughput changed slightly as well. The European Commission had acknowledged that the CFP had paid too little attention to socioeconomic aspects and sought to take socioeconomic considerations into account. This led to explicit satisfaction regarding 'Europe's' responsiveness. Nevertheless, in general, perceptions on throughput remained negative. Most critiques of the European level were pointed at output, just as in previous periods. Fishers' associations lamented the lack of harmonisation across the Community, which had always been an issue. Yet, once that Dutch fisher became relatively well compliant with the CFP, they felt it was time to voice their complaints.

Did fishers perceive the national and European levels differently between 1991 and 1995, and if so, why? I would argue that they indeed did. Interestingly, these differences had always been the results of different perceptions regarding input or throughput, not output. After 1991, this started to change. Input and throughput were now perceived negatively at the European and national levels and output distinguished both levels after this period.

³⁸⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Nederlandse vissers vals beconcurrerd', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-15 (14-04-1995), 1.

³⁸⁹ Visserijnieuws, "'Verstandig omgaan met sterke jaarklasse tong'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-39 (01-10-1993), 5.

³⁹⁰ Visserijnieuws, "'Verstandig omgaan'", 5.

5. Turning Tides: Reforming the CFP (1996-2002)

In 2002, the CFP was reformed substantially, and this was partly the result of the policy's failure. It had failed in 'conservation, economic, and political terms'³⁹¹ according to the European Commission. The former two were not new, as these shortcomings were already recognised in 1992. The policy had not protected fish (conservation) nor fishers (economic). In light of the previous chapters, conclusions that the CFP had politically failed can hardly come as surprising. The Commission now acknowledged that 'the stakeholders do not feel sufficiently involved in the management of the policy and many believe that there is no level-playing field in terms of compliance and enforcement.'³⁹²

In addition the circumstances were conducive to reform. On the one hand, the political setting had changed. The original 1983 compromise was now far-removed. New actors (Austria, Sweden and Finland) were involved, which opened up room for new perspectives and new political coalitions. On the other hand, civil society started to push for reforms. Public attention to resource management had increased tremendously and many fish stocks were in a bad state, with North Sea cod facing extinction.³⁹³

National Level

At the national level, the situation was different. National policy was a huge success in political terms. Support for the Biesheuvel system was widespread. The 1993 white paper 'Balanced Fisheries' (*Vissen naar evenwicht*)³⁹⁴ had set the policy framework for the following 10 years. Fishers roughly knew what to expect and nothing substantially changed at the national level.

Input

Under the social democratic and liberal 'Purple coalitions' (1994-2002), corporatism was reduced substantially. The 'primacy of politics'³⁹⁵ was brought back and statutory corporations and other corporatist institutions came under attack. Their advisory roles were dismantled and interest groups started to interact with the Government directly. For fishers' associations, this was both a blessing and a curse a blessing as associations could now bypass the Fish Product Board, an institution they deemed dysfunctional. Furthermore, their own professionalisation had given them the ability to adequately advance their interests without the Fish Product Board. Nevertheless, direct interactions with the Government were a curse as well. Relations between the Government and fishers had always been

³⁹¹ European Commission, *Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy* (2001) 4.

³⁹² Commission, *Green Paper*, 4.

³⁹³ Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 294.

³⁹⁴ Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, *Vissen naar Evenwicht* (Den Haag 1993).

³⁹⁵ T. Koopmans, 'Het primaat van de politiek', *Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis* 4 (1998) 1, 97.

perceived as durable as they were either based on personal trust (1970s and early 1980s) or on formal procedures (late 1980s and early 1990s). Both had now disappeared, which made relations with the Government fragile. Associations were aware of this. Hoefnagel et al. interviewed representatives from both cutter associations on their relationships with the Government. Interviewees stated that there was no 'durable trust'³⁹⁶ and that the DF had become a 'carousel'.³⁹⁷

Relations with the Dutch Parliament changed as well. Their knowledge of and sympathy towards fisheries had disappeared. Both associations still had frequent meetings with members of the House, but they were not automatically responsive to fishers' concerns. Fishers had to sell their story, at which they were not effective according to the Federation.³⁹⁸ Moreover, the House's knowledge of fisheries was low and even the House's Standing Committee on Fisheries 'knew very little of European policy.'³⁹⁹ It was difficult for the fishing industry to propel experts into the parliamentary arena. According to Nooitgedagt the Dutch electoral system of proportional representation weakened fishers' position, as they were concentrated in certain regions.⁴⁰⁰ A constituency-based electoral system would have been more beneficial.

Despite both changes, there still were enough opportunities for input. Until 1998, input at the national level was not an issue. The Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries, Jozias van Aartsen, was popular among fishers, and he quickly gained a reputation as a tough negotiator in Brussels. Van Aartsen was not prepared to give up easily when Dutch interests were at stake.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, he was not afraid to let economic considerations triumph over ecological ones.⁴⁰² Fishers wanted Van Aartsen to retain his position after 1998, but Van Aartsen refused to do so.⁴⁰³ He argued that a minister should leave his office after four years, an idea typical of the time.⁴⁰⁴ Moreover, it provides a good example of perceptions of fishers' representatives that it was difficult to build durable trust.

State Secretary Geke Faber succeeded Van Aartsen in 1998 and she was everything Van Aartsen was not. Faber was strongly pro-environment, and she was perceived as a soft negotiator in Brussels.⁴⁰⁵ Consequently, Faber was far from popular among fishers. Under her leadership, the DG Fish took a strong pro-environment course. However,

³⁹⁶ Hoefnagel, Visser and De Vos, *Drijfveren*, 41.

³⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, 41.

³⁹⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 930, Note on the Fish Product Board's lobby (26-08-1999), 1.

³⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, 4.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, 2.

⁴⁰¹ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Sector zal Apotheker op daden beoordelen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1998-32 (07-08-1998), 1.

⁴⁰² *Visserijnieuws*, 'Van Aartsen wil bij vaststelling quota bedrijfsbelangen meewegen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-47 (24-11-1995), 1.

⁴⁰³ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Sector', 1.

⁴⁰⁴ NRC Handelsblad, 'Van Aartsen wil niet terug naar Landbouw', *NRC Handelsblad*, 03-07-1998, 11.

⁴⁰⁵ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Actie onafwendbaar na nee Faber', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-9 (02-03-2001), 1.

even then, the problem was not that she did not want to consult fishers' associations. Daalder, by then again chairman of the Federation, also acknowledged this.⁴⁰⁶ Rather, the problem was her responsiveness, which will be discussed in the section on throughput. Langstraat also gave circumstantial evidence that the problem was responsiveness, saying, 'One should not always be negative. We have achieved some things, for example for inland fisheries. However, she [Faber] is quite green. It takes a lot of time to convince her of something else.'⁴⁰⁷

Perceptions regarding the quality of representation changed little in this period. The biggest issues in the previous period were time constraints, fragmentation in the internal organisation and fragmentation in the cutter sector's organisation at large. After 1996, both associations maintained professionalisation and coordination as the way to remedy the problems. Nevertheless, the state of affairs within the Association confirms that both issues remained after 1996.⁴⁰⁸ Obtaining insight into the Federation was difficult. At most, I could find a statement by Daalder, who returned as the Federation's chairman in 1997. He appreciated that the job was not so time-consuming as it was before, as 'POs and quota management groups have taken a lot of work out of our hands.'⁴⁰⁹

Gathering an insight into the regional level was not possible for this period either. Zevibel's archives only cover the period up until 1994. Thus, it was not possible to assess how the association functioned in this period. However, one could also question *whether* Zevibel still functioned. It was standing on its last legs as there were only 22 cutter fishers left in 1998.⁴¹⁰ Zevibel had become irrelevant as POs and Biesheuvel groups had taken away Zevibel's role in drafting fish plans and quota management.

Unsurprisingly, organisation in the wide sense was perceived as deeply problematic and the issue became very pressing after 1996. First, TACs for several fish stocks reached all-time lows between 1996 and 2002. Unity was necessary more than ever as economic tides were turning. Second, environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) increasingly gained ground as stakeholders. To maximise their influence, fishers had to unite as well. The chairmen of both the Federation and Association acknowledged the problems, but they were sceptical of the possibilities of a merger. Again, they opted for coordination, which fishers were critical of.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Idee over gesloten gebieden is een "oorlogsverklaring"', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-28 (14-07-2000), 3.

⁴⁰⁷ H. van den Berge, 'Majesteit, het is maatjestijd', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 11-01-2002, 19.

⁴⁰⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond wuift twee Goereese bestuurders uit', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-4 (26-01-1996), 5; Visserijnieuws, 'Bestuurders Vissersbond nemen beleid onder de loep', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-40 (03-10-1997), 2; Visserijnieuws, 'Zuid-Nederland sluit aan bij Kop van Goeree', *Visserijnieuws*, 1998-10 (06-03-1998), 1; NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 930, Note on the Fish Product Board's lobby (26-08-1999), 1.

⁴⁰⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Daalder opnieuw voorzitter Federatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-7 (14-02-1997), 1.

⁴¹⁰ G. Th. A. Janssen, 'Van Zevibel rest alleen de naam', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 26-03-1998, 9.

⁴¹¹ Alfons Boom, 'Eén Visserijorganisatie...', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-3 (19-03-1996), 2; Cor van der Knaap, 'Centralisatie, Angst', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-7 (14-02-1997), 3.

In the words of Nooitgedagt, the two organisations had to ‘plot a course together, as their division was harming fisheries.’⁴¹² Daalder uttered similar sentiments early 1997.⁴¹³ Both associations coordinated their actions in the Fish Product Board’s Supply Committee, but this was ineffective. First, the Supply Committee was legally obliged to represent the *whole* of the Dutch fishing industry, not just the cutter sector. As a result, representatives from other sectors, such as big sea fisheries, were present as well, which hampered decision-making. Moreover, the Supply Committee had to consult the Government through the Board of the Fish Product Board.⁴¹⁴ The Board could decide whether they deemed it necessary to consult with the Dutch government on the association’s ideas and opinions.

Both led to tensions within the Supply Committee and it consequently grew dysfunctional. From May 1997 to May 1998 the Committee stopped meeting.⁴¹⁵ Eventually, the issue was resolved and the cutter associations were allowed to consult autonomously with the Government on issues specific to the cutter sector.⁴¹⁶ By mid-2001, these issue re-emerged and the Federation’s and Association’s constituencies grew frustrated with the situation.⁴¹⁷ Early in 2001, younger fishers demanded unity. For them, the rifts between Association and Federation belonged to the past.⁴¹⁸ Daalder gave in to their demands as he acknowledged the need for ‘extensive integration between the Federation and Association.’⁴¹⁹ In late 2001, both associations hired a consultancy firm to study the best organisational setup for the cutter sector. Nevertheless, a merger between two was out of the question for Daalder.⁴²⁰

Concluding, perceptions on the organisational setup of associations were not positive. Fishers and their representatives once again stated that their organisational setup in the wide sense hampered their effectiveness. Perceptions regarding the narrow organisation were slightly more positive as associations were satisfied that POs and quota management groups had taken over several administrative duties because this gave them time to focus on policy and influencing policy. At the same time, as became clear by the example of the Association, influencing national policy-making was far from easy. The internal fragmentation of the Association made it difficult to come up with policy proposals for the long term.

⁴¹² Visserijnieuws, ‘Nooitgedagt pleit voor breed gedragen koers’, *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-17 (26-04-1996), 3.

⁴¹³ Visserijnieuws, ‘Daalder: meer optrekken met Vissersbond’, *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-11 (14-03-1997), 5.

⁴¹⁴ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 849, Note on strengthening the Supply Committee’s role (22-01-2002), 1.

⁴¹⁵ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 849, Note on the role of the Supply Committee (17-04-1998), 2.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 4.

⁴¹⁷ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 856, Minutes of the Supply Committee’s meeting (31-01-2001), 3.

⁴¹⁸ Visserijnieuws, ‘Het roer in de kottector moet om’, *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-18 (04-05-2001), 1.

⁴¹⁹ Visserijnieuws, ‘Het roer’, 1.

⁴²⁰ Visserijnieuws, ‘Kan organisatie kottervloot beter?’, *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-43 (25-10-2001), 5.

Board members were manoeuvred into a difficult position after 1996 when TACs for many fish stocks reached all-time lows. Moreover, environmental interests had taken a strong place on the political agenda. The associations' constituencies wanted them to take a tough stance on both topics. When they did so, their constituency lauded them.⁴²¹ When they did not do so, the organisations were criticised.⁴²² This made it difficult for both associations to represent their constituency, as they sometimes had to make concessions. As Nooitgedagt stressed he had to go for what was best for most, 'which meant that you might be dissatisfied individually.'⁴²³ Both Nooitgedagt and Daalder agreed it was difficult to translate fishers' input into output.⁴²⁴ In May 2005, Nooitgedagt fittingly summarised how difficult it was to represent fishers, saying, 'It is easier to teach a cow how to pray, than to teach a fisher how to listen'⁴²⁵

Reconstructing perceptions about information was difficult for this period. Very few statements could be found. In 2001, fishers blockaded the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam and several fishers stated that communication with their association was excellent during the blockades.⁴²⁶ However, this one incident does not give an accurate representation of day-to-day supply of information. The best indications of perceptions of information comes from Hoefnagel et al. Early in 2003, they interviewed 19 fishers, 12 from the Federation and 7 from the Association. Hoefnagel et al. concluded that many of them were very positive on the informational supply by their associations.⁴²⁷ Based on this observation, I would argue that member perceptions regarding information had changed to the positive. The perceptions of board members on information could not be reconstructed, however.

Concluding, satisfaction with opportunities for input returned after 1996. However, this did not lead to overall satisfaction with input. Fishers and board members were critical of their quality of representation. The organisation of associations in the wide sense was perceived as deeply problematic. Perceptions regarding grassroots representation were similar to earlier periods. Again, representatives stressed how difficult it was to represent fishers, while fishers complained about the ability of board members to represent them, especially when they did not take a tough stance vis-à-vis the Government. Lastly,

⁴²¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Bescherming bodemleven "urgent"', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-31 (04-08-2000), 1

⁴²² Visserijnieuws, 'Broos visserijakkoord met perspectief', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-10 (09-03-2001), 1; Visserijnieuws, 'Ijmuiden zenuwcentrum vissersblokkade', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-10 (09-03-2001), 8-9; Arie Grinwis, 'Wie is tevreden?', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-10 (09-03-2001), 4.

⁴²³ Visserijnieuws, 'Goeree gaat op rendement in plaats van kilo's vissen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-4 (26-01-1996), 5.

⁴²⁴ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 856, Minutes of a meeting on the evaluation of the fisheries symposium of 3 November 2001 (04-12-2001), 1.

⁴²⁵ Leeuwarder Courant, 'De visserman heeft goud in handen', *Leeuwarder Courant*, 07-05-2005.

⁴²⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Broos visserijakkoord', 1.

⁴²⁷ Hoefnagel, Visser and De Vos, *Drijfveren*, 36.

perceptions on information were quite positive, although it should be noted that these perceptions could only be reconstructed for fishers and not for board members.

Throughput

Nature had taken a strong place on the political agenda. After 1996, this position was solidified. Responsiveness became the issue of this period and transparency and accountability were relatively minor issues in comparison. Fishers perceived the validity of their voices as standing at an all-time low, but until 1998, responsiveness was perceived as acceptable. The Minister of Agriculture, Nature, and Fisheries, Van Aartsen, was quite popular among fishers, although he certainly was not one of them.⁴²⁸ Nevertheless, fishers were far from enthusiastic regarding responsiveness. 'The interests of fishers were made subordinate to everything', as a board member from Vlissingen stated in 1996.⁴²⁹ Fishers could not believe that 'their' ministry was renamed from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to that of Agriculture, Nature, and Fisheries. As a chairman of local association from Goedereede stated, 'It is hard to believe that the interests of fisheries are safeguarded at the same ministry as where those who kick against us are housed.'⁴³⁰

Perceptions dramatically changed after 1998. Van Aartsen's successor, State Secretary Faber, followed a pro-environment course. Daalder concluded that 'the balance between economy and ecology had shifted too much towards ecology.'⁴³¹ Fishers felt that their voices were no longer valid in decision-making. The low point was reached mid-2000. In a confidential note to Faber, DF Fish and DF Nature discussed closing off parts of the North Sea to beam trawl fishing. The note explicitly mentioned that doing so could result in 'political support from nature and environmental groups.'⁴³² The Association and Federation obtained access to the confidential document. They felt betrayed by 'their' own Directorate.⁴³³ For the Federation, Roel Bol, head of DF Fish, had lost all his credibility. Bol had never spoken on the topic in meetings with the Federation.⁴³⁴ For Daalder, it became apparent that opportunities for input were worthless as fishers were kept out of 'the real debate'.⁴³⁵ The Federation refused to convene with Bol anymore and it requested the Minister of Agriculture, Nature and, Fisheries to replace him, which the Minister refused to do.⁴³⁶

⁴²⁸ H. van den Berge and J. Visscher, "'De visser moet wel een beetje zeerover blijven'", *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 19-04-1997, 11.

⁴²⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Lange-termijnvisie gaat voor het denken in dollartekens', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-14 (05-04-1996), 5.

⁴³⁰ Visserijnieuws, "'Coördinatie op ministerie LNV laat te wensen over'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-9 (28-02-1997), 5.

⁴³¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Economische visserij staat voorop', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-12 (24-03-2000), 3.

⁴³² Visserijnieuws, 'LNV denkt serieus na over gesloten delen Noordzee', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-27 (07-07-2000), 1.

⁴³³ Chiel Evers, 'Vissers schrikken van geheime nota', *Leeuwarder Courant*, 01-07-2000.

⁴³⁴ Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie: vervang leiding Directie Visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-28 (14-07-2000), 1.

⁴³⁵ Visserijnieuws, 'Bescherming bodemleven "urgent"', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-31 (04-08-2000), 1.

⁴³⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie: vervang leiding Directie Visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-28 (14-07-2000), 1; Visserijnieuws, 'Brinkhorst ergert zich aan Federatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-30 (28-07-2000), 3.

Daalder was upset with what he described as 'a lack of transparency'⁴³⁷ and 'back-door politics'.⁴³⁸ Nevertheless, I am reluctant to draw any larger conclusions regarding transparency, as this was the only time when transparency was mentioned. Accountability was not a major issue either. It was briefly around 2001 when the EU took measures to protect North Sea cod stocks. Initially fishers charged that the Government refused to compensate them for these measures. When the Government eventually did so, however, the debate quickly shifted to the role of their own associations. Many fishers were critical that their representatives had accepted the deal.⁴³⁹

Output

Under the Biesheuvel system, perceptions regarding output had changed drastically. Fishers became very positive on the national output and their positivity would remain during this period.⁴⁴⁰ At the same time, their positivity was threatened by national measures to protect marine ecology. However, most of the fishers under study were not active within coastal waters, and thus had little to do with Dutch policy. As a result, their critiques were aimed at throughput instead of output. Complaints on distributive justice disappeared as well, but this was not the result of changes in policy. Rather, the number of roundfish fishers had decreased enormously after 1996. Thus, those that complained disappeared.⁴⁴¹

To summarise, fishers' perceptions regarding the national level of policy-making changed little between 1996 and 2002. Again, the quality of representation was perceived as insufficient and fishers were satisfied with their opportunities for input. Responsiveness was perceived as abysmal and accountability and transparency were relatively minor issues. Output was perceived as good, just as in the previous period. The Biesheuvel system had brought massive changes in perceptions of performance. Distributive issue was not an issue anymore, but policy had not change, rather, those that had criticised output in the previous periods had disappeared.

European Level

The CFP was reformed substantially in 2002 after the European Commission concluded that policy had failed in 'conservation, economic, and political terms'.⁴⁴² The former two issues had already been identified in 1992 in that the CFP had failed in protecting fish (conservation) and fishers (economic). The Commission also deemed the CFP a political

⁴³⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Vervang leiding', 1.

⁴³⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie: vervang leiding Directie Visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-28 (14-07-2000), 1.

⁴³⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Broos visserijakkoord met perspectief', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-10 (09-03-2001), 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Meer draagvlak als vissers zelf regels maken en bewaren', *Visserijnieuws*, 1998-18 (01-05-1998), 1.

⁴⁴¹ Johan Schilder, 'Zorgen van een kabeljauwvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-8 (23-02-2001), 2.

⁴⁴² Commission, *Green Paper*, 4.

failure, saying, 'Stakeholders do not feel sufficiently involved in the management of the policy and many believe that there is no level-playing field in terms of compliance and enforcement.'⁴⁴³ The European Commission sought to pull in stakeholders in reforming the CFP and these attempts will be discussed in the paragraphs on input and throughput. The section on output will also briefly discuss the reform of the CFP. Nevertheless, this thesis studies perceptions up until 2002. Thus, perceptions on the reformed CFP will not be discussed. Rather, the focus will be on the process of reform.

Input

This period was the first period in which Dutch fishers were satisfied with their opportunities for input at the European level. Fishers had the feeling that they could reach the European Commission and that they could now provide input through the Fisheries Council and through the Commission itself. Moreover, there are multiple indications that associations extensively involved themselves for the first time in European affairs. They had learned how to operate at the European level, but there still were more than enough problems in their quality of representation.

Regarding the opportunities for input, Nooitgedagt was clear in 1996 that these were sufficient, stating, 'We are represented in a sufficient number of Brussels' institutions.'⁴⁴⁴ Interestingly, according to Nooitgedagt, a problem for Dutch representatives was that their country was too close to Brussels and that they went to Brussels by car and simply left after meetings had taken place. Representatives from other countries travelled home by plane a day after the meeting, and they could thus use the evening for lobbying.⁴⁴⁵ Geert Meun, the Federation's secretary agreed with Nooitgedagt. The problem was not that the organisations were not consulted at the European level, but the problem was that they were so at a very late stage. By then, the problems had already been defined, which made it difficult for the associations to contribute anything substantial.⁴⁴⁶

However, not all perceptions regarding opportunities for input were positive. In 1999, environmental NGOs were included in the ACF and the committee was restructured to end the dispersion of national viewpoints. From then on, the ACF favoured the inclusion of pan-European umbrella organisations.⁴⁴⁷ As a result, Dutch fishers lost their direct representatives. Which Langstraat was far from happy with. However, no statements from the associations under study could be found.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴³ Commission, *Green Paper*, 4.

⁴⁴⁴ Visserijnieuws, 'Ligt Holland te dicht bij Brussel?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-17 (26-04-1996), 3.

⁴⁴⁵ Visserijnieuws, 'Ligt Holland', 3.

⁴⁴⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Lobbybureau voorspelt kansen Nederlandse boomkorvisserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-21 (23-05-1997), 4.

⁴⁴⁷ Lado, *The Common Fisheries Policy*, 251.

⁴⁴⁸ Visserijnieuws, "'Visserij moet zich niet teveel op de borst kloppen'", *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-16 (21-04-2000), 1.

Around 1999, the first debates on the CFP's reform started. These mostly were debates within the boards of associations. Nooitgedagt stressed that involving fishers in policy was far from easy, saying:

It is clear that conducting policy without support from fishers is barely possible. However, which fisheries nation has been able to gather support from all fishers, let alone from fishers from more than one Member State. Most policy proposals have been implemented forcefully.⁴⁴⁹

Proper public consultation started March 2001. The European Commission published the 'Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy'.⁴⁵⁰ All who were interested were invited to contribute to the debate by sending in their comments, views and ideas, which two groups of Dutch fishers did.⁴⁵¹ Daalder praised the European Commission for 'reaching out its hand towards the sector'⁴⁵² and in a Supply Committee meeting in May 2001, both Daalder and Nooitgedagt praised the Commission's approach.⁴⁵³ However, Nooitgedagt also refrained from premature optimism when he emphasised that the Commission's responsiveness to fishers was still unclear.⁴⁵⁴

This is not to say that perceptions on input in general were all positive. To the contrary, opportunities had to be seized as well, which required adequate representation. As previously discussed, the quality of representation at the national level was not perceived positively by all. The informational supply appeared to have been perceived as adequate, but grassroots representation and organisation were not.

The quality of representation at the European level had always been problematic as national problems were compounded by language barriers, member disinterest on EC/EU affairs, and a lack of knowledge on the EC/EU by board members. In the previous period, the latter had already started to change. Associations began to involve themselves in European affairs, and their knowledge consequently increased. Whether language barriers still played a role after 1996 is difficult to assess as no statements could be found. Although in the interview with Langstraat, he stated that language barriers reduced the willingness of many to involve themselves in EU affairs.⁴⁵⁵

After 1996, both Associations continued to involve themselves at the European level. The Association started to 'think European'⁴⁵⁶ by publishing policy papers on the future

⁴⁴⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Regionalisering Europese visserijbeleid goede insteek', *Visserijnieuws*, 1999-42 (22-10-1999), 3.

⁴⁵⁰ European Commission, *Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy* (2001).

⁴⁵¹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039, Draft of the comments by the Working Group Young Fishers (Southern Netherlands) on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 8; NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039, Texel North Sea fishers comments on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 3.

⁴⁵² Visserijnieuws, 'Vissers, denk mee over eigen toekomst!', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-15 (13-04-2001), 1.

⁴⁵³ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 855, Draft of minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (10-05-2001), 4.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, 4.

⁴⁵⁵ Interview with D.J. Langstraat on 27-6-2018.

⁴⁵⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Visserbond denkt Europees', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-16 (19-04-1996), 4.

of the CFP and the Federation began to study the scientific data underlying European policy, which they claimed was unreliable.⁴⁵⁷ There are also indications that associations had understood how to 'play' the European game. For example, in 1997, the EU's Directorate-General for Competition viewed several market regulations by Dutch POs to be protectionist, but the DG Fish had given these powers to POs. Nooitgedagt wanted both DG's to convene with each other, but, he proposed to do by influencing them informally, instead of formally, as he feared that such an approach would agonise DG Competition.⁴⁵⁸ A year later, in 1998, Nooitgedagt again proposed lobbying. By May, Dutch fishers had almost exceeded the national cod quota and Daalder wanted the Government to open up the national quota reserve, a part of the quota which was reserved for emergencies. Nooitgedagt, however, wanted to lobby for a TAC enlargement for North Sea cod.⁴⁵⁹

Associations also began to keep an eye on the Fish Product Board's European activities. In 1996, the Fish Product Board hired a consultant to study its European lobbying and the consultant concluded that the Board's activities were insufficient. He recommended the Board to appoint an employee for public relations.⁴⁶⁰ By early 1997, the Fish Product Board concluded that its activities still were insufficient.⁴⁶¹ In mid-1999, the issue was raised again. Nooitgedagt was not overly dissatisfied with the Product Board's lobbying, but the Federation was more critical.⁴⁶² Langstraat, the Board's chairman, was of the opinion that a professional lobbyist was too expensive and that politicians and board members of associations should lobby in Brussels.⁴⁶³ Nevertheless, the fishing industry kept pushing for a better lobby. In 2001, the Fish Product Board declared to 'intensify its European activities'.⁴⁶⁴ From 2002 onwards, Langstraat would step down as the Fish Product Board's chairman, and he would take care of European affairs. To intensify European activities on the short term, Cornelis Visser, a professional lobbyist, was appointed late February 2001. The Association stated that it would keep 'a close eye'⁴⁶⁵ on him.

However, this is where the cutter sector's organisation came into play. As one fisher already stressed in 1997, fishers would only be strong negotiators in the 2002 CFP reform, if there was unity.⁴⁶⁶ 'Without an internal consensus, lobbying in Brussels is impossible',

⁴⁵⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie: onderzoek naar basis van visserijbeleid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-31 (02-08-1996), 3; Visserijnieuws, 'Visserbond denkt Europees', 4.

⁴⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 875, Minutes of a Cutter Committee meeting (04-12-1997), 1.

⁴⁵⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Kabeljauw-uitputting loopt uit de hand', *Visserijnieuws*, 1998-22/23 (29-05-1998), 1.

⁴⁶⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'PV: meer lobbyen in EU', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-25 (21-06-1996), 5.

⁴⁶¹ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 805, Note on Fish Product Board's PA and PR (20-03-1997), 1.

⁴⁶² NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 930, Note on the Fish Product Board's lobby (26-08-1999), 1.

⁴⁶³ Visserijnieuws, "'Visserij moet zich niet teveel op de borst kloppen'", *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-16 (21-04-2000), 1.

⁴⁶⁴ Visserijnieuws, 'Botsende beelden van de visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-2 (12-01-2001), 4.

⁴⁶⁵ Visserijnieuws, 'C. Visser lobbyist voor PV in Brussel', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-8 (23-02-2001), 5.

⁴⁶⁶ Cor van der Knaap, 'Centralisatie, Angst', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-7 (14-02-1997), 3.

as Rinus van Schendelen, an expert on lobbying, said at a conference of the Fish Product Board.⁴⁶⁷ Langstraat himself also stressed that sentiment in the interview.⁴⁶⁸

Associations had always been plagued by member disinterest on EC/EU affairs. As a result, representatives found it difficult to adequately speak on behalf of their constituency. From 1998 onwards, when the first debates on the CFP's reforms started, associations sought to involve their members, which was far from easy. It was no coincidence that Nooitgedagt asked questions in 1999 about whether a fisheries nation had been able to gather support from all fishers.⁴⁶⁹ When the European Commission released its green paper in March 2001, Daalder called on all fishers to read it. 'We can no longer simply blame Brussels' civil servants and their lack of knowledge [...] We should take up the gauntlet and we should respond in a professional manner to the Commission's call.'⁴⁷⁰ Two months later Nooitgedagt made similar statements. He hoped that fishers would come up with realistic ideas regarding the green paper.⁴⁷¹

Nooitgedagt and Daalder went to the ports to talk with fishers, but collecting input was far from easy. Many fishers found the green paper difficult to read.⁴⁷² Daalder, replied to them that they should read the paper nonetheless 'as it was on their own future.'⁴⁷³ It would have been better if the Federation would have come up with a survey on the green paper, so that fishers had some guidelines what to comment on.⁴⁷⁴ Another fisher was sceptical of Daalder's undertaking, asking 'What are you going to do with 400 opinions?'⁴⁷⁵

Two groups of fishers responded to the calls of their representatives and the European Commission and both sent in their views. Hardly coincidental, the first group to do so were fishers from Texel. Their local association *DETV Texel* was chaired by Ben Daalder, who had strongly encouraged fishers to speak up for themselves. They took their task seriously and they convened around ten times on the green paper.⁴⁷⁶ They were mostly occupied with European-level output, while another group of fishers was not. The 'Working Group Young Fishers (Southern Netherlands)' (*Werkgroep Jonge Vissers Zuid NL*) identified several problems on the input side. According to these fishers, grassroots involvement

⁴⁶⁷ Visserijnieuws, "'Zonder interne consensus is lobbyen in Brussel onmogelijk'", *Visserijnieuws*, 2002-3 (18-01-2002), 5.

⁴⁶⁸ Interview with D.J. Langstraat on 27-6-2018.

⁴⁶⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Regionalisering Europese visserijbeleid goede insteek', *Visserijnieuws*, 1999-42 (22-10-1999), 3.

⁴⁷⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Vissers, denk mee over eigen toekomst!', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-15 (13-04-2001), 1.

⁴⁷¹ Visserijnieuws, "'Een crisis biedt ook nieuwe kansen'", *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-18 (04-05-2001), 5.

⁴⁷² NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 855, Draft of minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (27-06-2001), 4.

⁴⁷³ Visserijnieuws, "'Schrijf op wat je er van vindt'", *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-25 (22-06-2001), 3.

⁴⁷⁴ Visserijnieuws, "'Schrijf op'", 3.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibidem, 3.

⁴⁷⁶ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 855, Draft of minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (27-06-2001), 4; NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039, Texel North Sea fishers comments on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 3.

would not increase if only representatives were involved. The group argued that fishers did not feel represented by their associations.⁴⁷⁷ In summary, one could say that fishers were quite critical of their representatives. At the same time, representatives saw that it was quite difficult to pull the grassroots level in.

Throughput

European policy-making has always been strongly criticised for its throughput, and its responsiveness was especially perceived as abysmal. Fishers were not much more positive regarding accountability or transparency. Little would change in this period. Again, responsiveness was criticised. First, the starting point of policy was criticised as it was too strongly based on biological considerations. Second, fishers concluded that they were involved too late.⁴⁷⁸

For biological considerations, fishers were clear. Zevibel Chairman Jan de Voogd compared biologists to magicians who were able to enchant the European policy-makers with their advices.⁴⁷⁹ The Federation also questioned the numbers underlying TACs and quotas and in 1996 it hired a research agency to assess the data's reliability. The researchers concluded that biological predictions often were inaccurate, which was a reason for the Federation to question whether it was 'socioeconomically responsible'⁴⁸⁰ to make use of the scientific advice in establishing TACs. However, the European Commission was not very receptive of these complaints. It appeared to fishers that debating with the body on the topic was a waste of time, which meant that their input was never translated into output.⁴⁸¹

Accountability and transparency were minor issues between 1996 and 2002. Transparency was mentioned several times, mostly around the perceived lack of a level playing field across the EU. For example the Association stressed in 1996 that it wanted to study other Member States and their monitoring systems. It had the feeling that these Member States were too lenient on their own fishers, but no information on this was provided.⁴⁸² In 1999, both the Federation and the Association again stressed the need for transparent arrangements so that a level playing field could be guaranteed.⁴⁸³ A year later, Nooitgedagt repeated these sentiments.⁴⁸⁴ Accountability was not an issue. One of the few examples

⁴⁷⁷ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039, Draft of the comments by the Working Group Young Fishers (Southern Netherlands) on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 10.

⁴⁷⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Lobbybureau voorspelt kansen Nederlandse boomkorvisserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-21 (23-05-1997), 4.

⁴⁷⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Zevibel laat biologen vallen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-18 (03-05-1996), 3.

⁴⁸⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Voorspellingen over omvang van visbestanden vaak onnauwkeurig', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-10 (07-03-1997), 1.

⁴⁸¹ Visserijnieuws, "'Platvisvloot moet onnodig zwaar offer brengen'", *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-51/52 (22-12-2000), 3.

⁴⁸² Visserijnieuws, 'Visserbond denkt Europees', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-16 (19-04-1996), 4.

⁴⁸³ Visserijnieuws, 'Parameters voor het MOP vertroebeld', *Visserijnieuws*, 1999-20 (21-05-1999), 3.

⁴⁸⁴ Visserijnieuws, "'Platvisvloot'", 3.

was strongly linked to transparency. After 1996, TACs for many fish stocks were lowered every year. In 2000, Nooitgedagt stated his dissatisfaction with the situation and he argued it was time to make transparent what the socioeconomic effects of TAC decreases were. So that those responsible for these decreases could be held accountable.⁴⁸⁵

To summarise, perceptions of throughput changed little in comparison to the previous periods. Again, fishers harshly criticised European policy-making for its responsiveness, with accountability and transparency being minor issues as well. Whether these perceptions changed after the European Commission presented the CFP's reforms in 2002 is unclear as the Federation and Association were more occupied with reforms on output, than they were with evaluating throughput. Yet the Fish Product Board stated that it was disappointed in the Commissions' responsiveness to the Board's proposals.⁴⁸⁶

Output

Unsurprisingly, the European level was again mainly criticised for its output, and perceptions on performance were mostly negative, with three issues dominating, one of which was discussed in the previous chapter as well. First, there was the perceived lack of a level playing field, a complaint that was quite resilient across the decades. Second, the level of TACs for many fish stocks was a problem. Third, the relationship between Multi-annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs) and quotas was another issue. Perceptions on distributive justice were slightly less negative. Just as in the previous period, fishers were happy with the allocation of TACs. However, they were more negative on the allocation of subsidies for vessel construction and modernisation. Moreover, they criticised the EU's cod recovery measures around 2000.

The first issue with performance was the perceived absence of a level playing field. Nooitgedagt critically questioned the European Commission on this topic in 1996.⁴⁸⁷ Three years later, both the Federation and Association stressed the need for even implementation of the CFP across Member States.⁴⁸⁸ In 2000, Nooitgedagt again stressed that fishers were playing on the same pitch, but all according to different rules.⁴⁸⁹ Fishers were no more positive on this issue than their representatives were. Fishers deemed harmonisation of controls a *sine qua non* to secure support among fishers.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁵ Visserijnieuws, "'Platvisvloot moet onnodig zwaar offer brengen'", *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-51/52 (22-12-2000), 3.

⁴⁸⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Gemengde gevoelens bij hervorming GVB', *Visserijnieuws*, 2002-22 (31-05-2002), 4.

⁴⁸⁷ Visserijnieuws, 'EC wil geen beperkte TAC-fluctuaties en vrij vissen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-44 (01-11-1996), 1.

⁴⁸⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Parameters voor het MOP vertroebeld', *Visserijnieuws*, 1999-20 (21-05-1999), 3.

⁴⁸⁹ Visserijnieuws, 'Platvisvloot', 3.

⁴⁹⁰ NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039 Draft of the comments by the Working Group Young Fishers (Southern Netherlands) on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 3; NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039, Texel North Sea fishers comments on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 1.

A second issue revolved around TACs. Between 1991 and 1994, these were set at favourable levels for fishers. In 1995, TACs for plaice and sole were lowered. In 1996 they were lowered even further and they were lowered even further in 1996. For example, 1996s TAC for plaice was 40% of 1994's TAC.⁴⁹¹ These reductions were not in line with fishers' ideas on a policy's economic performance and social impact. Kramer, chairman of the Association, perceived these decreases as 'attempts to ruin the whole sector.'⁴⁹² For Kramer, it appeared as if European policy was only geared towards the annihilation of fisheries for plaice and sole.⁴⁹³ For fishers these reductions made no sense either. In fact, they were catching a lot of plaice.⁴⁹⁴ In 1997, the situation was aggravated even further, when sole and plaice TACs were reduced again. The Federation no longer deemed it responsible that fishers had to pay the price for fluctuations in TACs.⁴⁹⁵ *Nooitgedagt* stated so as well. The TAC system was not bad in itself, but the major fluctuations were.⁴⁹⁶

Total Allowable Catches for 1998, 1999 and, 2000 were relatively favourable for fishers, and thus, they were quite satisfied. The situation changed in 2001, when North Sea cod faced extinction and TACs for plaice and sole were lowered to prevent bycatching of cod.⁴⁹⁷ For Dutch fishers, it made no sense that catch limits were linked, and they harshly criticized the distributive justice of this measure as well.⁴⁹⁸

A third issue was that of the relationship between MAGPs and quotas, the former of which were programmes aimed at attaining a balance between catch capacity and quotas. In the first three MAGPs (1983-1997), capacity was measured in engine power and gross register tonnage. From 1997 onwards, with MAGP IV, fishing effort was also included, which was measured in days-at-sea, i.e., the number of days a ship was allowed to fish. The Dutch government had strongly pushed for the introduction of days-at-sea regulations at the European level, as these had brought massive improvements domestically. They played a considerable role in limiting effort and preventing quota exceedances, but they were means to an end.

Within the Biesheuvel co-management system, full quota uptakes were guaranteed. The Dutch government pushed for the introduction of the same principle across the Union. Member States should always have the possibility to uptake their quotas, even if they surpassed their days-at-sea in doing so. The European Commission held a different

⁴⁹¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Quota-uitputting gaat fout', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-10 (08-03-1996), 10.

⁴⁹² Klaas Kramer, 'Wat is men met ons van plan', *Visserijnieuws* 1996-2 (12-02-1996), 4.

⁴⁹³ Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie wil onderzoek naar overlevingskansen kottervloot', *Visserijnieuws* 1996-5 (02-02-1996), 1.

⁴⁹⁴ Visserijnieuws, 'Dilemma: hoe aantonen dat er echt meer schol is?', *Visserijnieuws* 1996-32 (09-08-1996), 1.

⁴⁹⁵ Visserijnieuws, "'Forse quota-reducties niet langer te rechtvaardigen'", *Visserijnieuws* 1997-18 (02-05-1997), 3.

⁴⁹⁶ Visserijnieuws, 'Van 't kastje naar de muur', *Visserijnieuws* 1997-10 (18-04-1997), 5.

⁴⁹⁷ Visserijnieuws, "'Platvisvloot moet onnodig zwaar offer brengen'", *Visserijnieuws* 2000-51/52 (22-12-2000), 3.

⁴⁹⁸ Visserijnieuws, 'Belangen wel te vuur en te zwaard verdedigd?', *Visserijnieuws* 2001-1 (05-01-2001), 4.

interpretation. Days-at-sea were a means in themselves. Just as quotas, they were not to be exceeded.⁴⁹⁹ From 1998 onwards, this became quite an issue as MAGP IV had severely restricted fishing time for Dutch fishers and was undercutting their individual quota uptakes. In particular, MAGP IV was threatening the beloved Biesheuvel co-management system according to *Nooitgedagt*.⁵⁰⁰ Both the Federation and Association repeatedly stressed that MAGP objectives were to be subordinate to quotas.⁵⁰¹

Perceptions on distributive justice were slightly less negative. First, just as in the previous period, fishers were satisfied with the allocation of TACs. In 1999, Daalder stressed that the allocation keys should not be adjusted.⁵⁰² In addition, the Texel fishers and the Working Party Young Fishers both voiced their satisfaction with the allocation.⁵⁰³ Thus, in principle, the allocation of TACs was perceived as fair, which did not mean that fishers were always satisfied. Several measures were taken at the European level to prevent the extinction of cod around 2001. TACs for plaice and sole were lowered and a fifth of the North Sea was closed off for demersal fisheries for ten weeks. Dutch fishers perceived these measures as unreasonable as they were now carrying the burdens of policy, while their share in European cod landings was only 10%.⁵⁰⁴ The Association's secretary, Gerrit Hiemstra, did not rule out the possibility that the decisions were made to deliberately damage Dutch fisheries, saying, 'The Netherlands has the smallest fleet in the EU, but also the most profitable one. We do not make friends due to that. As we have experienced several times in the past.'⁵⁰⁵

Second, fishers also criticised the lack of a level playing field on the grounds of distributive justice. Fishers from other countries, especially Spain, received large subsidies for vessel modernisation and construction, whereas the Dutch fleet was only decommissioned. Both the Federation and Associations were critical of this development and they asked questions in 1996 when two civil servants from the EU's DG Fish visited the Netherlands.⁵⁰⁶ For Texel's fishers, these differences were incomprehensible as well.⁵⁰⁷ The Federation called the lack of an even playing field the 'ultimate failure of the Common

⁴⁹⁹ NL-HaNA, *Productschap Vis*, 2.25.82, inv. nr 850, Note on MAGP IV (25-03-1999), 1.

⁵⁰⁰ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Meer draagvlak als vissers zelf regels maken en bewaren', *Visserijnieuws* 1998-18 (01-05-1998), 1.

⁵⁰¹ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Parameters voor het MOP vertoebeld', *Visserijnieuws* 1999-20 (21-05-1999), 3; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Belangen wel te vuur en te zwaard verdedigd?', *Visserijnieuws* 2001-1 (05-01-2001), 4; *Visserijnieuws*, 'Gemengde gevoelens bij hervorming GVB', *Visserijnieuws* 2002-22 (31-05-2002), 4.

⁵⁰² *Visserijnieuws*, 'Regionalisering Europese visserijbeleid goede insteek', *Visserijnieuws* 1999-42 (22-10-1999), 3.

⁵⁰³ NL-HaNA, *Productschap Vis*, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039, Draft of the comments by the Working Group Young Fishers (Southern Netherlands) on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 3; NL-HaNA, *Productschap Vis*, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039, Texel North Sea fishers comments on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 2.

⁵⁰⁴ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Bewijzen dat platvisquota te laag zijn', *Visserijnieuws* 2001-1 (05-01-2001), 3.

⁵⁰⁵ *Telegraaf*, 'Nederland verbijsterd over EU-besluit', *Telegraaf*, 25-01-2001.

⁵⁰⁶ *Visserijnieuws*, 'Bedrijfsleven hamert op noodzakelijke stabiliteit', *Visserijnieuws* 1996-8 (23-02-1996), 5.

⁵⁰⁷ NL-HaNA, *Productschap Vis*, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 1039, Texel North Sea fishers comments on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), 3.

Fisheries Policy.⁵⁰⁸ To summarise, fishers were deeply critical of the CFP's output and its distributive justice, and its performance especially did not make sense to them.

Conclusion

For the first time since 1977, fishers' perceptions vis-à-vis the European level of policy-making changed. The European level had always been criticised for its input, throughput, and output. From 1996 onwards, perceptions on input started to change firmly. Associations and fishers now explicitly stated their satisfaction with their opportunities for input, which was mainly done in the context of the CFP's 2002 reforms. Nevertheless, their quality of representation remained an issue. Organisational fragmentation and problems in grassroots level representation gave rise to negative perceptions regarding the quality of representation. Perceptions on throughput and output changed little, and the European policy-making's responsiveness was again criticised. The Commission and Fisheries Council simply did not want to listen to Dutch fishers, or so the fishers believed. Both were unresponsive to fishers' views and ideas. At times, the decision-making was perceived as unaccountable and non-transparent, but these were minor issues.

Far more problematic was output. Dutch fishers harshly criticised the absence of a level playing field. Fishers from all Member States were playing on the same pitch, but under different rules. This led to a critique of the performance. Fishers kept on stressing that the CFP was harming them, as other Member States were far more lenient in their quota management and monitoring. These differences did not correspond to fishers' perceptions on how policy's economic performance should be. A second issue with performance revolved around both economic and social impacts. From 1996 to 2002, TACs for plaice and sole fluctuated heavily. For fishers, these fluctuations were incomprehensible and they felt subjected to the vagaries of politicians. Official decisions had huge impacts on their socioeconomic situations, and fishers were often critical of these decisions. Thus, they were critical of performance.

Fishers were critical of distributive justice as well. The allocation of TACs was perceived as fair and balanced, but the allocation of EU subsidies was not. The Mediterranean countries were given large sums of money for vessel modernisation and reconstruction, whereas the Dutch fleet was decommissioned. Again this was an issue regarding an uneven playing field. Lastly, fishers were critical of the distributive justice of the European cod recovery measures. They felt that they had to carry the burdens of these measures, even though they had not been responsible for cod overfishing in the first place.

⁵⁰⁸ Visserijnieuws, "'Geen schijnbeweging'", *Visserijnieuws* 2002-22 (31-05-2002), 4.

Did fishers perceive the national and European policy-making level differently between 1996-2002, and if so, why? Again, I would say they did, and as was the case between 1991 and 1995 as well, this was mainly regarding differences in output. Perceptions on input at the national level were not much different from those at the European level. In addition, differences in throughput were small as well. The point was just that national output made more sense to fishers. The system of co-management had brought massive improvements, whereas the European level output was regarded as negative.

Conclusion

'Fishers feel expelled from the North Sea', Dutch daily *Trouw* wrote June 2018.⁵⁰⁹ Brussels policy is woeful and the upcoming landing obligation and the looming EU ban of electric pulse fishing are unacceptable for Dutch fishers. The pressure group Unity Makes Strength (*Eendracht Maakt Kracht*) organised a protest in Amsterdam in early June 2018. The group's name was hardly coincidental as unity still was non-existent. To date, the rift between the Association and Federation has not been healed. Battles are merely fought under different names. VisNed, a co-op of seven Dutch POs, succeeded the Federation in 2010. Yet new names do not heal old rifts. In 2014, VisNed and the Association attempted to merge.⁵¹⁰ Again, the attempt failed. Many could not let go of their old grudges. 'Too often we are looking back instead of ahead'⁵¹¹, Jaap Hennekeij, Visned's chairman, explained. Hennekeij's successor, Mark Goedhart, stepped down after six months. VisNed was unmanageable. The seven POs could not even agree on a budget. Goedhart could not handle the divisions and mutual distrust, stating, 'Whatever topic you pick, they will all have different opinions. [...] I believe in unity, only unity makes strength.'⁵¹²

In light of the above, the question of what has changed since 2002 appears rhetorical. In 2018, unity among fishers is absent, and 'Brussels' still is the 'bad guy'. Why is the latter the case? *Why did Dutch fishers perceive the national and European policy-making level differently?* These attitudes were partly intrinsic to 'Europe'. As this thesis has shown, fishers did not feel accustomed to the world of Brussels. It took a long time before they could make sense of its institutions and procedures. For another part, 'Europe' was a symptom as well. It stood for a new reality in which 'nature' gained ground and the Europeanisation of fisheries policy coincided with this trend. The European policy-making process was more responsive to 'nature' than the Dutch national policy process was. In the 1990s, this would change as 'nature' gained a prominent place on the domestic political agenda. However, these variations in input and throughput were redressed by effective output through the Biesheuvel co-management system.

This thesis highlights the importance of historical and comparative studies on the EC/EU's legitimacy. These studies open up new perspectives, challenge prevailing ideas,

⁵⁰⁹ Emiel Hakkenes, 'Nederlandse vissers voelen zich van de Noordzee verdreven – en dan pikken ze niet langer', *Trouw*, 02-06-2018, <<https://www.trouw.nl/groen/nederlandse-vissers-voelen-zich-van-de-noordzee-verdreven-en-dat-pikken-ze-niet-langer~a36aa99e/>>, last accessed, 27-09-2018.

⁵¹⁰ Visserijnieuws, 'Eén in belangenbehartiging', *Visserijnieuws*, 12-07-2014, <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/een-in-belangenbehartiging>>, last accessed 12-09-2018.

⁵¹¹ Visserijnieuws, 'Grote teleurstelling in kottewereld', *Visserijnieuws*, 06-10-2014, <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/grote-teleurstelling-in-kottewereld>>, last accessed 12-09-2018.

⁵¹² Visserijnieuws, 'Mismoedig van verdeeldheid kottector', *Visserijnieuws*, 10-04-2015, <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/mismoedig-van-verdeeldheid-kottector>>, last accessed 12-09-2018.

and counter dominant narratives. A comparison between the two policy-making levels shows that a perceived lack of legitimacy at the European level is not fully intrinsic to its decision-making process. To the contrary, fishers' perceptions towards both levels have been strongly influenced by the rise of 'nature'. The national level, however, managed to make up for this through effective output. Furthermore, fishers' involvement in the CFP prior to 2002 is often neglected.⁵¹³ However, a historical approach shows that fishers have been involved in policy-making and that these involvements have shaped their perceptions. Fishers have had agency and they were not powerless victims of state intervention. The CFP's first 25 years cannot be lumped together under the label of 'no stakeholder involvement'.

In addition, this thesis also calls into question whether stakeholder involvement is a cure-all to problems of legitimacy. The pre-2002 CFP problems have been misdiagnosed as *just* a lack of stakeholder involvement and issues on representation remained under the radar. As already discussed, it is questionable whether fishers representation has improved since 2002. Goedhart's remarks on the variety of opinions among fishers does not lead us to this conclusion. The quality of representation is an essential part of input, and input problems are not fixed by focusing on opportunities for input alone. A deeper reflection is needed on who a stakeholder's representative claims to represent and who he really represents.

Even then, improving input is no panacea. Better input does not automatically result in improved output. Throughput is an important mitigating factor. This is where my thesis makes a third contribution to the literature. Fishers felt that their voices were not valid ones in the policy-making process and creating more opportunities for input will not take these issues away. The problem is not hearing; it is listening. Of course, it did not help that fishers perceived their opportunities for input as lacklustre. The legal vacuum of 1977-1983 did not contribute to positive perceptions of decision-making either, just as the allocation of TACs for the first 15 years did not do so. Moreover, fishers' perceptions that European decision-making was opaque, discredited policy as well. Yet these issues were subordinate to the larger issue at stake. Fishers perceived European policy-making as existing for fish and not for fishers.

Nevertheless, the debate on the EC/EU's legitimacy is far from settled. This thesis opens up two venues for future research. One venue remains firmly within the focus of

⁵¹³ Marc-Philippe Cooper, 'The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union – A Lesson in How Not to Make Policy', *Politics* 19 (1999) 22, pp. 61-70; European Commission, *Green Paper: Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy* (2009); Tim Gray and Jenny Hatchard, 'The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy's system of governance-rhetoric or reality?', *Marine Policy* 27 (2004), pp. 545-554.

this thesis: citizens' perceptions towards the EC/EU. There still is ample room for research on fishers' perceptions. These studies could expand on this thesis in width or in depth. They could do so in width by contextualising Dutch fishers' perceptions with perceptions of fishers from other Member States. Have these fishers had the same perceptions, and if so, why? Was it because they were better in influencing the European policy-making process? Or was it because the European level presented a better venue for influence as their own government was not receptive to their interests?

Future studies could contribute in depth by focusing on fishers' interest representation at the European level (e.g. concentrating on perceptions of European umbrella associations). How have these associations reflected on the policy-process and their own role therein? Future studies could also focus on perceptions of other actors in fisheries policy-making. For example, fishers perceived the European decision-making process and outcomes as geared towards environmental interests. While environmental NGO's have been quite critical of the CFP's output.⁵¹⁴ This puzzle needs to be explained.

A second venue for further research shifts its attention to policy-making, an aspect only briefly mentioned in this thesis. How have Dutch fishers operated at the European level? Which strategies have they pursued to present themselves? How have they responded to shifts in European decision-making? How have they responded to the rise of new coalitions and power groups? Preferably, this perspective would be combined with a study of perceptions. This could reveal how fishers' modus operandi has shaped their perceptions towards European policy-making.

⁵¹⁴ Eloise Todd and Ella Ritchie, 'Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations and the Common Fisheries Policy', *Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems* 10 (2000), pp. 141-149, 141; The Green 9, *Introducing the Green 9 group of environmental NGOs active at EU level* (2005) 5, <http://www.org.infofgm.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/green9_brochure_english_2005.pdf>, last accessed 27-09-2018.

Bibliography

Abbreviations:

Rijksarchief in Zeeland (RAZ)

Nationaal Archief (NL-HaNA)

Sources

Archival

- 1977 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (21-05-1977), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96.
- 1978 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (18-04-1978), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96.
- 1979 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Board (23-02-1979), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 96.
- 1990 annual address by the chairman of the Fish Product Board (18-01-1990), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 707.
- Chairman's Address at Zevibel's 1980 General Meeting (19-04-1980), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2.
- Chairman's Address at Zevibel's 1984 General Meeting (14-04-1984), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2.
- Chairman's Address at Zevibel's 1988 General Meeting (23-04-1988), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2.
- Comments by the Federation on the White Paper 'Balanced Fisheries' (17-07-1992), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 25.
- Draft of minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (10-05-2001), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 855.
- Draft of minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (27-06-2001), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 855.
- Draft of the minutes of a Cutter Committee meeting (14-06-1993), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 413, NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 413.
- Draft of the comments by the Working Group Young Fishers (Southern Netherlands) on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039.
- Explanatory note on the MAGP chapter of the report 'Ondernemend vissen, toekomstperspectief van de kottector' (1999), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 850.
- Fish Board report: Between Power and Powerlessness (1987), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 213.
- Internal note to all employees of the Directorate of Fisheries (10-06-1987), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 50.
- Letter from D.J. Langstraat to the Executive Board of the Fish Board (15-02-1985), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 25.
- Letter from D.J. Langstraat to the Federation of Fishers' Associations (09-01-1990), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 707.
- Letter from J. M. Walhout to the boards of associations affiliated to Zevibel's Cutter Board (03-05-1978), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 43.
- Letter from the Dutch Fishermen's Association to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (24-12-1979), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40.
- Letter from the Federation to the Fish Board (17-03-1988), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 46.
- Letter from the Federation to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (09-02-1984), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 477.
- Letter from the Supply Committee to RIVO-DLO on the development of an objective mesh gauge (27-09-1993), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 413.
- Letter from Zevibel's Executive Board to Zevibel's cutter fishers (November 1977), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 43.
- Letter from the Federation to the Fish Product Board (06-11-1989), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 707.
- Letter from the Fish Product Board to the European Commission (01-11-1977), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 250.

Letter on the inspection on mesh sizes for fishing nets from the Dutch Coreper to the European Commission (09-01-1996), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 899.

Minutes of a Cutter Committee meeting (22-08-1995), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 897.

Minutes of a Cutter Committee meeting (04-12-1997), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 875.

Minutes of a meeting between representatives from the fishing industry and State Secretary Ploeg (04-02-1985), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 44.

Minutes of a meeting between the DG Fish and the fishing industry (22-12-1980), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 23.

Minutes of a meeting between the Minister and the fishing industry (29-01-1982), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 24.

Minutes of a meeting between the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Fish Product Board (13-12-1989), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 345.

Minutes of a meeting between the State Secretary and representatives from the Dutch fishing industry (15-10-1984), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 25.

Minutes of a meeting of the Fish Board's Board (18-12-1985), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 26.

Minutes of a meeting of the Fish Board's Board (24-06-1986), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 27.

Minutes of a meeting on the evaluation of the fisheries symposium of 3 November 2001 (04-12-2001), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 856.

Minutes of a meeting with State Secretary Ploeg (04-02-1985), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 44.

Minutes of the 1984 General Meeting of Zevibel's Cutter sector (23-06-1984), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the 1986 General Meeting of Zevibel (19-04-1986), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2.

Minutes of the 1986 General Meeting of Zevibel (19-04-1986), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2.

Minutes of the 1991 General Meeting of Zevibel's Cutter sector (08-06-1991), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the 1992 General Meeting of Zevibel's Cutter sector (06-06-1992), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the 48th Board meeting of the Trust for Development and Decommissioning in Fisheries (13-02-1984), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 479.

Minutes of the 58th Board meeting by the Trust for Development and Decommissioning in Fisheries (01-07-1987), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 479.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (30-03-1979), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (14-09-1979), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (30-05-1980), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (01-11-1980), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (19-12-1981), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (28-05-1983), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (10-12-1983), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (15-12-1984), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (22-03-1986), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (29-09-1990), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter Board's meeting (23-03-1991), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Cutter sector's meeting (10-10-1992), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 71.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (11-10-1978), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 39.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (13-11-1979), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 39.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (22-07-1980), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (25-03-1981), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (23-06-1981), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (15-09-1981), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 40.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (21-04-1982), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 41.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (06-10-1982), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 41.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (07-12-1983), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 345.

Minutes of the Fish Board's Executive Board meeting (27-01-1989), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 46.

Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (11-10-1978), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 21

Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (11-11-1980), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 23.

Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (14-10-1981), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 24.

Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (14-10-1981), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 24.

Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (14-10-1986), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 27.

Minutes of the meeting of the Fish Board's Public Board (29-01-1987), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 27.

Minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (24-05-1994), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 413.

Minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (02-02-1995), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 897.

Minutes of the Supply Committee's meeting (31-01-2001), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 856.

Minutes of Zevibel's Board's meeting (21-10-1978), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 4.

Minutes of Zevibel's Board's meeting (11-10-1985), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 4.

Minutes of Zevibel's Board's meeting (04-12-1992), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 4.

Minutes of the Zevibel 1992 General Meeting (25-04-1992), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 2.

Note by the Directorate of Fisheries on self-regulation (15-02-1991), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij , 2.11.81, inv. nr. 25.

Note on consultation between the cutter sector and the government (22-08-1995), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 897.

Note on Fish Product Board's PA and PR (20-03-1997), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 805.

Note on fisheries white paper (23-10-1989), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij , 2.11.81, inv. nr. 228.

Note on MAGP IV (25-03-1999), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 850.

Note on strengthening the Supply Committee's role (22-01-2002), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 849.

Note on the Federation of Fisher's Associations' policy proposals (12-10-1989), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 230.

Note on the Fish Product Board's lobby (26-08-1999), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 930.

Note on the organisation of the Directorate of Fisheries (13-12-1991), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij , 2.11.81, inv. nr. 5.

Note on the role of the Supply Committee (17-04-1998), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 849.

Petition by the Dutch fishing industry presented to the European Commission (29-09-1981), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 23.

Policy note 'A margin of freedom' by the Federation of Fishers' Associations (05-10-1989), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij , 2.11.81, inv. nr. 369.

Policy note by the Federation of Fishers' Associations on mixed fisheries (04-02-1992), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij , 2.11.81, inv. nr. 230.

Policy Note by the Fish Product Board (1990), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 27.

Report by Geert Meun of conference on mesh size measurement (03-02-1997), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 874.

Report on capacity management of the cutter fleet (November 1979), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserijen, 2.11.58, inv. nr. 591.

- Report on the context in which the Directorate of Fisheries has to operate (04-02-1992), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 5.
- Report on the final evaluation of the Biesheuvel system (1996), NL-HaNA, LNV / Directie Visserij, 2.11.81, inv. nr. 323.
- Summary of a meeting between the Directorate of Fisheries and the fishing industry (03-09-1980), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 23.
- Summary of the meeting between representatives of the fishing industry and the Directorate General for Fisheries (03-09-1980), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 23.
- Summary of the meeting between the fishing industry and the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (10-05-1982), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr. 40.
- Summary on the meeting between the Minister and the fishing industry (10-05-1982), NL-HaNA, Visserijen 1980-1989, 2.11.99, inv. nr. 24.
- Texel North Sea fishers comments on the Commission's Green Paper (2001), NL-HaNA, Productschap Vis, 2.25.82, inv. nr 1039.
- Zevibel News Magazine (1979), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 120.
- Zevibel's 1993 annual report (1993), RAZ, Zevibel, inv. nr. 1.

Newspapers

- Berg, L. van de, 'Historisch Recht; Waar is dat gebleven?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-51/52 (18-12-1987), 7.
- Berge, H. van den and J. Visscher, "'De visser moet wel een beetje zeerover blijven'", *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 19-04-1997, 11.
- Berge, H. van den, 'Majesteit, het is maatjestijd', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 11-01-2002, 19.
- Boer, J. O., 'Brief van een teleurgestelde visserman', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-14 (10-04-1987), 5.
- Boersen, K., 'Wordt ons mooie land geregeerd door blinden?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 4.
- Boom, A., 'Eén Visserijorganisatie...!', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-3 (19-03-1996), 2.
- Daalder, B., 'Daalder's nieuwjaarswensen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-1, 5.
- Daalder, B., '1983, een onstuimig jaar', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-51/52 (23-12-1983), 8. Daalder, B., 'Wekelijkste beslomeringen van een visserij-bestuurder', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985) 3.
- Daalder, B., 'Vissers mogen zich ook in '88 niet tegen elkaar laten uitspelen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-51/52 (18-12-1987), 12.
- Dam, P. van, 'Ingezonden brieven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-50 (12-12-1986), 5.
- Dommerholt, G. J., 'Brief aan minister', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 6.
- Dommerholt, G. J., 'Grote vissen eten de kleine', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-29 (17-07-1987), 5.
- Emiel Hakkenes, 'Nederlandse vissers voelen zich van de Noordzee verdreven – en dan pikken ze niet langer', *Trouw*, 02-06-2018, <<https://www.trouw.nl/groen/nederlandse-vissers-voelen-zich-van-de-noordzee-verdreven-en-dat-pikken-ze-niet-langer~a36aa99e/>>, last accessed, 27-09-2018.
- Evers, C., 'Vissers schrikken van geheime nota', *Leeuwarder Courant*, 01-07-2000.
- Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Nieuws van de Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-2, 7.
- Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-16, 7.
- Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-18, 5.
- Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-19, 15.
- Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Voor alle duidelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-22, 10.
- Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-27, 13.
- Federatie van Visserijverenigingen, 'Federatie verzette veel werk voor vissers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-40, 11.
- Grinwis, A., 'Wie is tevreden?', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-10 (09-03-2001), 4.
- Hall, M., 'Leaving EU will open "sea of opportunity" for Britain's fishing industry, says Michael Gove', *Express*, 23-07-2017, <<https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/820699/Michael-Gove-leaving-EU-Brexit-opportunity-Britain-fishing-industry>>, last accessed 07-06-2018.

- Hazenoot, M., 'Mededelingen van de kustvissers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-19 (10 mei 1985), 9.
- Hoek, D., 'Dagboek van een gullenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-8 (22-02-1985), 2.
- Hoek, D., 'Dagboek van een gullenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-25 (21-06-1985), 4.
- Hoek, D., 'Dagboek van een gullenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-35 (30-08-1985), 4.
- Hoekstra, K., 'De actie van de vissers', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-5, 15.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Hoe staat het met de Noordzee-tong?', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-11, 11.
- Hoekstra, K., 'De Noordzee is niet leeggevestigd', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-14, 7.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Kerst 1978, het feest van de verwachting', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-51/52, 8.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Wat met de visserij in het jaar 1980 en daarna?', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-51/52, 69.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Sombere wolken pakken zich samen boven kleine visserman', *Visserijwereld*, 1981-5 (30-01-1981), 11.
- Hoekstra, K., 'De omgekeerde wereld', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-8, 7.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Ik zou wel eens willen weten', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-13, 9.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Waar gaan wij in 1984 naar toe?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-51/52 (23-12-1983), 6.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Het jaar 1985 – wat zal dat ons brengen??', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-51/52 (21-12-1984), 17.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Vissersbond overpeinzingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-43 (25-10-1985), 4.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Overcapaciteit gevaar voor visplannen 1986', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-1/2 (10-01-1986), 5.
- Hoekstra, K., 'Wie het weet mag het zeggen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-1 (09-01-1987), 4.
- Janssen, G. Th. A., 'Van Zevibel rest alleen de naam', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 26-03-1998, 9.
- Jonk, D., 'Kabeljauwvloot haalt buikriem stevig aan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-27/28 (12-07-1985), 5.
- Jonk, D., 'Gedachten van een garnalenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-51/52 (20-12-1985), 11.
- Jonk, D., 'Gedachten van een garnalenvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-19 (09-05-1986), 5.
- Klijn, A., 'Ingezonden brieven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-24 (16-08-1985), 7.
- Knaap, C. van der, 'Centralisatie, Angst', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-7 (14-02-1997), 3.
- Kramer, K., 'Met de beste wensen van...!', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-1 (09-01-1987), 5.
- Kramer, K., '“Streven naar opereren binnen de regelgeving”', *Visserijnieuws*, 1990-1 (05-01-1990), 7.
- Kramer, K., 'Tijd voor het oppakken van eigen verantwoordelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-1 (11-01-1991), 10.
- Kramer, K., 'Doel en middel', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-27 (09-07-1993), 2.
- Kramer, K., 'Wat is men met ons van plan', *Visserijnieuws* 1996-2 (12-02-1996), 4.
- Leeuwarder Courant, 'De visserman heeft goud in handen', *Leeuwarder Courant*, 07-05-2005.
- Marijs, B., 'Lezers schrijven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-12 (25-03-1988), 4.
- Nooitgedagt, J., 'Eerste stap naar verstandig zelfbestuur', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-51/52 (23-12-1988), 15.
- Nouwen, L. and Klaas Hoekstra, 'Bijstelling overheidsbeleid in kottersector dringend gewenst', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-18, 3.
- NRC Handelsblad, 'Van Aartsen wil niet terug naar Landbouw', *NRC Handelsblad*, 03-07-1998, 11.
- Oortwijn, H., '“Onderlaag”', *Visserijnieuws*, 1990-39 (28-09-1990), 6.
- Pasterkamp, B., 'Het spel van de kat en muis', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-25 (25-06-1993), 6.
- Poelkamp, J., 'Vragen van één vogelvrijverklaarde!', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-49 (09-12-1988), 4.
- Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, 'Blokade boze vissers', *Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant*, 04-12-1984, 5.
- Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, 'Vissers zullen vaker naar rechter moeten stappen.', *Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant* (28 april 1986), 7.
- Rederij C. Drijver, 'Ingezonden brieven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-17 (25-04-1986), 5.
- Reformatorisch Dagblad, 'Politie breekt blokkade sluiscomplex IJmuiden', *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 29-10-1987, 1.
- Rijneveld, R. and W. Smit, 'De Kiel gelegd voor de grote Kottersfederatie', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-22, 3-6.
- Schilder, J., 'Zorgen van een kabeljauwvisser', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-8 (23-02-2001), 2.
- Schipper, P. de, '“Geprobeerd vissers bij elkaar te houden”', *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-17 (28-04-1989), 5.
- Schot, B.W., 'Groenen lachen zich blauw', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-42 (18-10-1991), 5.

- Siereveld, J., 'Toppunt van egoïsme', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-25, 7.
- Smid, G., 'Lezers schrijven', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-45 (11-11-1988), 6.
- Telegraaf, 'Overlevingsstrijd zorgt voor ruzie in de visserijwereld', *Telegraaf*, 09-12-1987.
- Telegraaf, 'Nederland verbijsterd over EU-besluit', *Telegraaf*, 25-01-2001.
- Trouw, 'Kamer stemt in met "laatste kans" voor de kottervissers', *Trouw*, 25-06-1992, 1.
- Tuinsma, D., 'Aan de leden van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-32, 15.
- Tuinsma, D., 'Ned. Vissersbond gaat eigen weg', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-6, 10.
- Visser, A. J. de, 'De vangstsorteerder in ontwikkeling', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-20, 7.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond Urk vergaderde', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-6, 15.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Nederlandse Vissersbond Kernpunten jaarvergadering', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-18, 8.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Wij zijn er niet voor de vissen, maar voor de vissers'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-18, 11.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-19, 15.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Voor alle duidelijkheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-22, 10.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Verslechterde economie zet investeringen op de tocht', *Visserijnieuws*, 1982-39, 9.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Reorganisatie PBO moet vlotter', *Visserijnieuws*, 1983-39 (30-09-1983), 7.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Hoekstra en Tienstra: jaargenoten', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-13 (30-3-1984), 12.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Direkteur Visserijen: voorstander van open overleg', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-16 (20-04-1984), 13.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Welk systeem we ook kiezen – ik wil op voorhand een grotere verantwoordelijkheid leggen bij bedrijfsleven'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-20 (18-05-1984), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Zevibel-voorzitter J. van den Bos op Visserijdagen Breskens; Vissers worden veel op de vingers gekeken', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-32/33 (17-08-1984), 13.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Voor alles chaos voorkomen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-45 (09-11-1984), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Kabeljauwvissers: wij gaan door', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-46 (16-11-1984), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Van der Meer: verhoging sommige quota zit er in', *Visserijnieuws*, 1984-51/52 (21-12-1984), 17.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Licenties en visplannen houden Nederlandse vissers in hun greep', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-1 (11-01-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Kustvissers geven grote boomkorvissers nog zes weken bedenktijd', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-10 (08-03-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Wekelijkse perikelen van een bestuurder', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-16 (19-04-1986), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'De Visserijwereld staat op instorten', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-16 (19-04-1985), 7.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Razziabeleid overheid wekt woede vissers op', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-18 (03-05-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Kater in plaats van kadootje uit Brussel', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-24 (14-06-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Visserijbedrijfsleen komt voor 1 november met beleidsplan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-25 (21-06-1985), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Kabeljauwvloot haalt buikriem stevig aan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-27/28 (12-07-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Ploeg maakt zich hard voor 2000 PK-plafond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-39 (13-09-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Rondvisgroep wil eerst vergaderen over visplan', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-40 (04-10-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie hekelt heksenjacht van Nederlandse controle-instanties', *Visserijnieuws*, 1985-45 (8-11-1985), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Grote en kleine vissers moeilijk te bundelen in één organisatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-18 (02-05-1986), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Visserijbeleid 1987 met hulp vissers eind dit jaar rond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-19 (09-05-1986), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Rolt de kop van de staatssecretaris voor de visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-25 (20-06-1986), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Gele kaart EG voor Nederlandse controle', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-27/28 (11-07-1986), 3.

- Visserijnieuws, 'Warrig EG-beleid betekent miljoenenstrop tongvissers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-40 (03-10-1986), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Visserijoverleg gefrustreerd'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-19 (08-05-1987), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Visstop voor gebied meer effect dan vangstverbod'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-21/22 (22-05-1987), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Forumdiscussie onderstreept noodzaak tot eenheid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-27/28 (10-07-1987), 6.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Visserbond wil eigen minister', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-40 (09-10-1987), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Braks er door, nu visserij nog', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-51/52 (18-12-1987), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Verantwoordelijkheid van overheid reikt verder'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-2 (15-01-1988), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Ben Daalder en "het overweekse denken"', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-11 (18-03-1988), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Eenheid, nu of nooit!', *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-22 (03-06-1988), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Jammer, maar verstandig'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1988-45 (11-11-1988), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Klaas Kramer kraakt harde noten in maidenspeech', *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-8 (24-02-1989), 6.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Contact achterban moet beter'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-19 (12-05-1989), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Kop erbij en niet inslapen'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-16 (21-04-1989), 1/
- Visserijnieuws, 'Nederlandse scholvissers afhankelijk van ruil met Britten en Noren', *Visserijnieuws*, 1989-43 (27 oktober 1989), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Maaswijdteproblemen voorlopig niet opgelost', *Visserijnieuws*, 1990-23 (08-06-1990), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond bekritiseert "groot nieuws" op havens', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-10 (08-03-1991), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Vragenuurtje op jaarvergadering Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-16 (19-04-1991), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Individuele zeedagenregeling is niet het ei van Columbus', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-17 (26-04-1991), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond en Federatie over ontheffing zeedagen verdeeld', *Visserijnieuws*, 1991-44 (01-11-1991), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Directie Visserijen betreurt schrijven van de Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-4 (24-01-1992), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Bos bepleit uniform boetesysteem in EG', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-8 (21-02-1992), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Texel pleit voor één landelijke organisatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-13 (27-03-1992), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Boomkorvloot krijgt volgend jaar gemiddeld 100 zeedagen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-18 (01-05-1992), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Rondvisvissers ontevreden over belangenbehartiging', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-19 (08-05-1992), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Bedrijfsleven en Biesheuvel niet op één lijn', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-21 (22-05-1992), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Grote plus groepsvorming is maken van eigen beleid'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-40 (02-10-1992), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Ons Belang" belangrijke pijler van Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1992-41 (09-10-1992), 7.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Nooitgedagt: Harde werker dreigt "underdog" te worden', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-6 (12-02-1993), 7.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Uitbreiding personeel bij Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-36 (10-11-1993), 6.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Misschien nog een kruimeltje op ons stoepje, maar we zijn op de goede weg'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-31 (02-04-1993), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, "'Verstandig omgaan met sterke jaarklasse tong'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1993-39 (01-10-1993), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Positieve reacties op vangstquota', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-1 (07-01-1994), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Kleemans volgt Draaisma op als de nieuwe directeur Visserijen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-7 (18-02-1994), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Doorgaan op de weg die we samen zijn ingeslagen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-9 (04-03-1994), 4.

Visserijnieuws, 'Dick Langstraat al meer dan 25 jaar in de ban van visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-12 (25-03-1994), 4.

Visserijnieuws, 'Problemen van zestig jaar geleden spelen nog steeds', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-17 (29-04-1994), 9.

Visserijnieuws, 'Van Aartsen oriënteert zich in Den Oever op visserijsector', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-37 (16-09-1994), 6.

Visserijnieuws, 'Nederlandse Vissersbond gaat kantoor uitbreiden', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-39 (30-09-1994), 4.

Visserijnieuws, 'Marathonvergadering bestuur Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1994-41 (14-10-1994), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Hoop gevestigd op ministers bij vaststelling schol-TAC', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-9 (03-03-1995), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'Uitbreiding personeel bij Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-9 (03-03-1995), 3.

Visserijnieuws, 'Nederlandse vissers vals beconcurrereerd', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-15 (14-04-1995), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'Stappen voor komst objectief meetinstrument maaswijdte', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-20 (19-05-1995), 4.

Visserijnieuws, "'Help de visserij verzuipt nog steeds'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-22 (02-06-1995), 2.

Visserijnieuws, 'Groepsexperiment verlengd', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-26 (01-07-1995), 3.

Visserijnieuws, 'Van Aartsen wil bij vaststelling quota bedrijfsbelangen meewegen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-47 (24-11-1995), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'TAC- en quotasysteem doffe ellende', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-48 (01-12-1995), 3.

Visserijnieuws, 'NVB wil rechercherapport over illegale visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1995-51 (22-12-1995), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'Goeree gaat op rendement in plaats van kilo's vissen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-4 (26-01-1996), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond wuift twee Goereese bestuurders uit', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-4 (26-01-1996), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie wil onderzoek naar overlevingskansen kottervloot', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-5 (02-02-1996), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'Bedrijfsleven hamert op noodzakelijke stabiliteit', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-8 (23-02-1996), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Quota-uitputting gaat fout', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-10 (08-03-1996), 10.

Visserijnieuws, 'Lange-termijnvisie gaat voor het denken in dollartekens', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-14 (05-04-1996), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Vissersbond denkt Europees', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-16 (19-04-1996), 4.

Visserijnieuws, 'Laatste pleidooi Van der Beek voor één landelijke vereniging', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-16 (19-04-1996), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Nooitgedagt pleit voor breed gedragen koers', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-17 (26-04-1996), 3.

Visserijnieuws, 'Ligt Holland te dicht bij Brussel?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-17 (26-04-1996), 3.

Visserijnieuws, 'Zevibel laat biologen vallen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-18 (03-05-1996), 3.

Visserijnieuws, 'PV: meer lobbyen in EU', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-25 (21-06-1996), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie: onderzoek naar basis van visserijbeleid', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-31 (02-08-1996), 3.

Visserijnieuws, 'Dilemma: hoe aantonen dat er echt meer schol is?', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-32 (09-08-1996), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'EC wil geen beperkte TAC-fluctuaties en vrij vissen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1996-44 (01-11-1996), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'Daalder opnieuw voorzitter Federatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-7 (14-02-1997), 1.

Visserijnieuws, "'Coördinatie op ministerie LNV laat te wensen over'", *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-9 (28-02-1997), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Voorspellingen over omvang van visbestanden vaak onnauwkeurig', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-10 (07-03-1997), 1.

Visserijnieuws, 'Van 't kastje naar de muur', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-10 (18-04-1997), 5.

Visserijnieuws, 'Daalder: meer optrekken met Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-11 (14-03-1997), 5.

- Visserijnieuws, "Forse quota-reducties niet langer te rechtvaardigen", *Visserijnieuws* 1997-18 (02-05-1997), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Lobbybureau voorspelt kansen Nederlandse boomkorvisserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-21 (23-05-1997), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Bestuurders Vissersbond nemen beleid onder de loep', *Visserijnieuws*, 1997-40 (03-10-1997), 2.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Zuid-Nederland sluit aan bij Kop van Goeree', *Visserijnieuws*, 1998-10 (06-03-1998), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Kabeljauw-uitputting loopt uit de hand', *Visserijnieuws*, 1998-22/23 (29-05-1998), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Sector zal Apotheker op daden beoordelen', *Visserijnieuws*, 1998-32 (07-08-1998), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Parameters voor het MOP vertroebeld', *Visserijnieuws*, 1999-20 (21-05-1999), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Regionalisering Europese visserijbeleid goede insteek', *Visserijnieuws*, 1999-42 (22-10-1999), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Economische visserij staat voorop', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-12 (24-03-2000), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, "Visserij moet zich niet teveel op de borst kloppen", *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-16 (21-04-2000), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'LNV denkt serieus na over gesloten delen Noordzee', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-27 (07-07-2000), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Federatie: vervang leiding Directie Visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-28 (14-07-2000), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Idee over gesloten gebieden is een "oorlogsverklaring"', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-28 (14-07-2000), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Brinkhorst ergert zich aan Federatie', *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-30 (28-07-2000), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, "Platvisvloot moet onnodig zwaar offer brengen", *Visserijnieuws*, 2000-51/52 (22-12-2000), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Bewijzen dat platvisquota te laag zijn', *Visserijnieuws* 2001-1 (05-01-2001), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Belangen wel te vuur en te zwaard verdedigd?', *Visserijnieuws* 2001-1 (05-01-2001), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Botsende beelden van de visserij', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-2 (12-01-2001), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'C. Visser lobbyist voor PV in Brussel', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-8 (23-02-2001), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, "Faber heeft er geen snars aan gedaan", *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-9 (02-03-2001), 10.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Actie onafwendbaar na nee Faber', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-9 (02-03-2001), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Broos visserijakkoord met perspectief', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-10 (09-03-2001), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Ijmuiden zenuwcentrum vissersblokkade', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-10 (09-03-2001), 8-9.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Vissers, denk mee over eigen toekomst!', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-15 (13-04-2001), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "Een crisis biedt ook nieuwe kansen", *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-18 (04-05-2001), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Het roer in de kottersector moet om', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-18 (04-05-2001), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, "Schrijf op wat je er van vindt", *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-25 (22-06-2001), 3.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Bescherming bodemleven "urgent"', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-31 (04-08-2000), 1.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Kan organisatie kottervloot beter?', *Visserijnieuws*, 2001-43 (25-10-2001), 5/
- Visserijnieuws, "Zonder interne consensus is lobbyen in Brussel onmogelijk", *Visserijnieuws*, 2002-3 (18-01-2002), 5.
- Visserijnieuws, "Geen schijnbeweging", *Visserijnieuws* 2002-22 (31-05-2002), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Gemengde gevoelens bij hervorming GVB', *Visserijnieuws* 2002-22 (31-05-2002), 4.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Stop de Verdeeldheid!' *Visserijnieuws*, 12-2-2010 <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/stop-de-verdeeldheidben-daalder-neemt-afschied>>, last accessed 24-7-2018.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Eén in belangenbehartiging', *Visserijnieuws*, 12-07-2014, <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/een-in-belangenbehartiging>>, last accessed 12-09-2018.
- Visserijnieuws, 'Grote teleurstelling in kotterswereld', *Visserijnieuws*, 06-10-2014, <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/grote-teleurstelling-in-kotterswereld>>, last accessed 12-09-2018.

- Visserijnieuws, 'Mismoedig van verdeeldheid kottersector', *Visserijnieuws*, 10-04-2015, <<https://www.visserijnieuws.nl/nieuws/mismoedig-van-verdeeldheid-kottersector>>, last accessed 12-09-2018.
- Visserijwereld, 'Het EEG-Vissersbeleid', *Visserijwereld*, 1977-12, 13.
- Visserijwereld, 'Verontruste vissers richten petitie tot minister', *Visserijwereld*, 1978-4, 3.
- Visserijwereld, 'Jaarrede van de Voorzitter van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-21, 37.
- Visserijwereld, 'Heeft de visserij nog perspectief?', *Visserijwereld*, 1979-21, 51.
- Visserijwereld, 'Jaarverslag 1979 van "Zevibel"', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-14, 10.
- Visserijwereld, 'Jaarvergadering Federatie in teken van olieproblemen', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-21, 7.
- Visserijwereld, 'Minister ir. G.J.M. Braks sprak op drukbezochte jaarvergadering van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-25, 3-8.
- Visserijwereld, 'Jaarverslag 1979 van de Nederlandse Vissersbond', *Visserijwereld*, 1980-26, 5.
- Visserijwereld, "'Niet bang om beslissingen te moeten nemen, die tegen zijn groepsbelang ingaan"', *Visserijwereld*, 1981-11, 19.
- Visserijwereld, 'Federatie luidt noodklok', *Visserijwereld*, 1981-39, 5.
- Visserijwereld, 'Federatie van Visserijverenigingen hield tweede openbare vergadering', *Visserijwereld*, 1981-40, 8.
- Vissersbond, 'Mededelingen Ned. Vissersbond', *Visserijnieuws*, 1987-5 (30-01-1987), 3.
- Vries, J. G. de, 'De botte bijl', *Visserijnieuws*, 1986-16 (18-04-1986), 5.
- Vroegindewij, G.A., 'Minister Braks spreekt nog altijd de klare taal van boeren en vissers', *Reformatisch Dagblad*, 19-07-1988, 7.
- Werf, H. van der, 'Vissers houden protestmars in Amsterdam', *Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant*, 11-04-18, <<https://www.pzc.nl/zeeuws-nieuws/vissers-houden-protestmars-in-amsterdam~a172206e/>>, last accessed 26-7-2018.

Miscellaneous

- The Green 9, *Introducing the Green 9 group of environmental NGOs active at EU level* (2005) 5, <http://www.org.info.gm.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/green9_brochure_english_2005.pdf>, last accessed 27-09-2018.
- European Commission, *Report 1991 From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Common Fisheries Policy*, SEC-2288 (1991).
- European Commission, *Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy* (2001).
- European Commission, *Green Paper: Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy* (2009).
- Finch, R., *Stolen Seas; How the UK suffers under the Common Fisheries Policy*, (2015) <http://www.efddgroup.eu/images/publications/Stolen_Seas.pdf>, last accessed 07-06-2018.
- Fishing for Leave, 'Objectives', *Fishing for Leave*, <<http://ffl.org.uk/objectives/>>, last accessed 07-06-2018.
- Interview with D.J. Langstraat on 27-6-2018.
- Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, *Vissen naar Evenwicht* (Den Haag 1993).
- Subcommissie Visquoteringsregelingen, *Visquoteringsregelingen: Rapport van de Subcommissie Visquoteringsregelingen*, Tweede Kamer Vergaderjaar 1986-1987, 19955, nr. 2, 66.
- University of Aberdeen, 'Survey finds 92 per cent of UK fishermen will vote to leave the EU', *University of Aberdeen*, <<https://www.abdn.ac.uk/news/9282/>>, last accessed 07-06-2018.

Literature

- Aukema et al., S., 'De financiering van landbouw, tuinbouw en visserij', in: A.L.G.M. Bauwens et al. (Eds.) *Landbouw tussen vrijheid en gebondenheid* (Den Haag 1981) pp. 54-67.
- Bartelings et al., H. *Visserij in Trends* (Den Haag 2007).
- Beers, M. and Liesbeth van de Grift, 'Europa als politiek arena', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 130 (2017) 3, pp. 1-3.
- Bekkers, V. and Arthur Edwards, 'Legitimacy and Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Governance Practices', in: Bekkers et al., (Eds.), *Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices* (Aldershot 2007) pp. 35-61.
- Boelmans Kranenburg, H. A. H., 'Organisatie van de visserij tot 1955', in: H.A.H. Boelmans Kranenburg et al. (Eds.), *Het Visserijschap – Speerpunt voor de visserij* (Haarlem 1980) pp. 9-16.

- Bovens, M. and Anchrit Wille, *Diploma Democracy; The Rise of Political Meritocracy* (Oxford 2017).
- Buuren, A. van, and Erik-Hans Klijn, 'Kapitein in de storm? Een institutionele analyse van de rol van het Productschap Vis in een veranderend zeevisserijnetwerk', *Bestuurswetenschappen* 59 (2004) 3, pp. 281-304.
- Churchill, R., and Daniel Owen, *The EC Common Fisheries Policy* (Oxford 2010).
- Cooper, M. 'The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union – A Lesson in How Not to Make Policy', *Politics* 19 (1999) 22, pp. 61-70.
- Dulk, D.A. den, 'Vijfentwintig jaar belangenbehartiging in de visserij', in: H.A.H. Boelmans Kranenburg et al. (Eds.), *Het Visserijschap – Speerpunt voor de visserij* (Haarlem 1980) pp. 17-23.
- Engelkamp, S. and Doris Fuchs, 'Performing 'Green Europe'? A narrative analysis of European fisheries policy', *Sustainable Governance Discussion Paper* 1 (2016).
- Ginkel, R. van, *Braving Troubled Waters; Sea Change in a Dutch Fishing Community* (Amsterdam 2009).
- Gray, T. and Jenny Hatchard, 'The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy's system of governance-rhetoric or reality?', *Marine Policy* 27 (2004), pp. 545-554.
- Haas, E.B., *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (London 1958).
- Hart, J. de, *Landelijk Verenigd* (Den Haag 2005).
- Hegland, J. T., 'The Common Fisheries Policy and Competing Perspectives on Integration', *Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University Publication Series* 6 (2009)
- Heijer, W. M. den, *Ou je roer recht; de kottervisserij vanaf 1960* (Alkmaar 1999).
- Hiemstra, G., *De Nederlandse Vissersbond 1934-1994; "60 jaar zee- en kustvisserij"* (Emmeloord 1994).
- Hix, S., *What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It* (Cambridge 2008).
- Hoefnagel, E., Leontine Visser and Birgit de Vos, *Drijfveren van vissers en duurzaam visserijbeheer; Een verkenning* (Den Haag 2004).
- Holden, M., *The Common Fisheries Policy* (Oxford 1994).
- Hoof, L. van, 'Co-management: an alternative to enforcement', *ICES Journal of Marine Science* 67 (2010) 1, pp. 395-401.
- Hooghe, L. and Gary Marks, *Multi-level Governance and European Integration* (Oxford 2001).
- Kaiser, W., 'Transnational Western Europe since 1945: Integration as Political Society Formation', in: Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie (Eds.), *Transnational European Union; Towards a common political space* (Abingdon 2005) pp. 17-36.
- Kaiser, W. and Jan-Henrik Meyer, 'Beyond Governments and Supranational Institutions: Societal Actors in European Integration', In: idem (Eds.), *Societal Actors in European Integration, Polity-Building and Policy-Making 1958-1992* (Basingstoke 2013) pp. 1-14.
- Koopmans, T., 'Het primaat van de politiek', *Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis* 4 (1998) 1, pp. 97.
- Lado, E. P., *The Common Fisheries Policy; The Quest for Sustainability* (Oxford 2016).
- Langstraat, D.J., 'De visserij in Europees vaarwater', *Economisch Statistische Berichten* 63 (1978) 3168, pp. 840-847.
- LEI, *De Nederlandse zeevisserij op de drempel van een nieuw tijdvak* (n.p., 1975).
- LEI, *Visserij in cijfers 1981* (n.p., 1982) 11.
- LEI, *Sharing Responsibilities in Fisheries Management* (Den Haag 2005).
- Leigh, M., *European Integration and the Common Fisheries Policy* (London 1983).
- Marks, G., Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34 (1996) 3, pp. 341-378.
- Markus, T., *European Fisheries Law; From Promotion to Management* (Groningen 2004)
- Moravcsik, A., *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (New York 1998).
- Moravcsik, A., 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2002) 4, pp. 603-624.
- Nielsen, J., 'Participation in fishery management policy making; National and EC regulation of Danish fishermen', *Marine Policy* 18 (1994) 1, pp. 29-40.
- Poelzer, G., *Extracting Legitimacy: Input, Throughput, and Output Legitimacy in the Mining Industry* (Lulea 2018).
- Posthumus, R. and Adriaan Rijnsdorp, *Schol in de Noordzee; een biografie van de platvis en de Nederlandse visserij* (Amsterdam 2016).

- Poulsen, B., *Dutch Herring: An Environmental History, c. 1600-1800* (Amsterdam 2008).
- Rissa, T. and Mareike Kleine, 'Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU's Treaty Revision Methods', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45 (2007) 1, pp. 69-80.
- Scharpf, F., *Games Real Actors Play* (Boulder 1997).
- Scharpf, F., *Governing in Europe* (Oxford 1999).
- Scharpf, F., *Regieren in Europa: Effektiv und demokratisch?* (Frankfurt/Main 1999).
- Schmidt, V. A., 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 'Throughput'', *Political Studies* 61 (2013), pp. 2-22.
- Schmidt, V. A., 'The Eurozone's Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can the EU Rebuild Public Trust and Support for European Economic Integration?', *Discussion Paper 15* (2015) Online: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp015_en.pdf>, 11, last accessed 25-09-2018.
- Smit, W., 'Dutch demersal North Sea fisheries: initial allocation of flatfish ITQs', in: Ross Shotton (Ed.), *Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries* (Rome 2001) pp. 15-23.
- Stichting Nederland Maritiem Land, *Nederlandse Visserijsector; Economische Betekenis en Structuur* (Delft 1999).
- Symes, D., 'The European Community's Common Fisheries Policy', *Ocean and Coastal Management* 35 (1997) 2-3, pp. 137-155.
- Thomas, C. S. 'Introduction: The Study of Interest Groups', in: idem (Ed.), *Research Guide to U.S. and International Interest Groups* (London 2004) pp. 1-20.
- Tienstra et al. Th.J., 'Vijfentwintig jaar overheidsbeleid ten aanzien van de visserij', in: H.A.H. Boelmans Kranenburg et al. (Eds.), *Het Visserijschap – Speerpunt voor de visserij* (Haarlem 1980) pp. 24-33.
- Todd, E. and Ella Ritchie, 'Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations and the Common Fisheries Policy', *Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems* 10 (2000), pp. 141-149.
- Vervaele, J., Dick Ruimschotel and Rob Widdershoven, *Rechtshandhaving bij visquotering. Een evaluatieve studie naar rechtshandhaving van nationale en Europese regelgeving* (Utrecht 1990).
- Vliet, M. van, and Wim Dubbink, 'Het Tragedy of the Commons model en het Nederlandse visserijbeheer', *Beleid and Maatschappij* 25 (1998) 1, pp. 27-39.
- Wise, M., *The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community* (London 1984).
- World Conservation Monitoring Centre, *Global Biodiversity; Status of the Earth's living resources* (Dordrecht 1992).
- Zürn, M., 'Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and other International Institutions', *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2000) 2, pp. 183-221