Reflections on the GDS Workshop: Covid-19, ventilation norms & measuring CO2

Late September 2021 we, within the context of SIG Principles by design, organized a workshop on Covid-19, ventilation norms, and measuring CO₂. Measuring CO₂ is considered a useful proxy for Covid-19 infection risk because infected people exhale aerosols containing the virus with their CO_2. The idea for the workshop came from our concerns over the Utrecht University’s Covid-19 response (see our DUB article). The workshop offered a means to engage with the topic from a media studies perspective; investigating the role and possibilities of data in an institution’s ventilation narrative. By building CO₂ monitors with Arduino’s (a microcontroller board) and then having a device to create counter data we sought to open up questions on the role of institutions and the spread of (mis)information as well as the ability of creative making to build trust and provide expertise. In this blog we offer some initial reflections on these topics by first exploring how distrust in government guidelines and the University’s uncritical implementation of these led to the organization of the workshop and then discussing the intervention of the workshop itself on these matters.

Welcome to ground-zero empiricism

In April 2020, reflecting on the Covid-19 pandemic, historian of science Lorraine Daston observed how, “in moments of radical novelty and the radical uncertainty novelty emits, like a squid obscuring itself in ink, we are temporarily thrown back into a state of ground-zero empiricism.” It is a process where basic facts still need to be determined. The pandemic created a fertile ground for the circulation of competing ‘facts’ emerging from various institutions, experts and members of the public.
 

According to Bruno Latour facts, “stood or fell not on the strength of their inherent veracity but on the strength of the institutions and practices that produced them and made them intelligible” (as paraphrased in New York Times). The idea that knowledge is a social construction has since been hijacked and contributed to a so-called post-truth society characterized by anti-scientific thought, misinformation, conspiracy theories and the death of expertise. It raises questions about institutions and trust. As Latour points out, truth requires trust.

Facts remain robust only when they are supported by a common culture, by institutions that can be trusted, by a more or less decent public like, by more or less reliable media.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines trust as, “Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something; confidence or faith in a person or thing, or in an attribute of a person or thing.” To respond and navigate the pandemic we are thirsty for knowledge. But, as is discussed below, we inhabit a highly networked society in which building and maintaining trust between institutions, experts and the public, and knowing who to trust, is highly complex. Throw into the mix how the Covid-19 launched millions of self-proclaimed virologists and experts.

Trust and institutions: Now everyone can be a virologist

All sorts of media - broadcast television, newspapers, institutional websites and social media - have played a crucial role in the dissemination of information about the virus. Writing about trust in scientific expertise within the Covid-19 pandemic in the Netherlands, José van Dijck and Donya Alinejad note the transformation from traditional information flows between institutions to a “networked model of science communication” wherein social media are used to both distribute and combat misinformation.

We have seen how social platforms amplify misinformation spread by politicians and celebrities. Pop singer Nicki Minaj, for instance, linked swollen testicles to vaccination in a tweet to her 22 million followers. Twitter, however, did not remove Minaj’s tweet because she wasn’t in violation of the rules (the platform claimed, hadn’t advanced a claim of fact). Both the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Dr. Anthony Fauci and Trinidad and Tobago’s health minister went to debunk her claim, but the damage had already been done (the ‘fact’ was out there) and in the meanwhile Minaj had used up time and resources from these experts and their institutions. Interesting, it was later found that Minaj's cousin had caught an STD during an indiscretion and he had tried to cover this up by appealing to vaccine skepticism (the narrative plays into confirmation bias and appeals to personal beliefs and emotion rather than objective facts).

Research by Reuters Institute on Covid-19 misinformation found that, “top-down misinformation from politicians, celebrities, and other prominent public figures made up just 20% of the claims in our sample but accounted for 69% of total social media engagement.” The World Health Organization (W.H.O.) has even dubbed it the 2019-nCoV ‘infodemic’ acknowledging the also the challenge people have to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance. In response the W.H.O. now employs myth busters to track and respond to online myths and rumors. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport hired Ashis Brahma, a doctor from the Municipal Health Service, to make a one-minute mission inspired action movie in which concerns about the side effects of the vaccine are addressed.

Zooming-in on the Netherlands, research conducted by Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Free University Amsterdam, and the Haagse Hogeschool on the societal impact of Covid-19 for the period April 2020 - March 2021, found that trust in government, the National institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) and the Municipal Health Service (GGD) has declined and dissatisfaction with government policies had increased. Meanwhile, research by the Dutch Media Authority (CvdM) found that Covid-19 had contributed to an increase in news consumption and trust. This is important because journalism functions as a fourth estate that wields substantial social influence. Another research report noted that trust in Dutch traditional and online news media is high, trust in messages on social media is low.

Ventilation guidelines: the quest for facts

The pandemic makes an interesting case to explore trust, institutions and experts because of its global impact and this networked model of science communication. Both national and international experts (including guidelines formulated by the W.H.O), but also misinformation can contribute to distrust in local political decision making. For the workshop we focused on a very specific measure in the covid strategy, namely ventilation. This because the spread of Covid-19 was long a contested fact, there was a lot of variation in ventilation guidelines and these guidelines provoked explicit disagreements between both institutions and experts.

In a guest essay for the New York Times in May 2021, sociologist and writer Zeynep Tufecki reflects on why it took so long to accept the basic facts about Covid-19 like the question of how Covid-19 spreads. There was considerable discussion, also within the scientific community, whether the virus was airborne and there was a delayed acceptance of that fact. Had this fact been acknowledged earlier, Tufecki provides, the obsession with cleaning surfaces - what she calls hygiene theater - would have made room for thinking about improving ventilation (opening windows, moving things outdoors). It also explains why masks weren’t initially recommended by W.H.O. and CDC who believed heavier, short-range droplets were involved making distancing a sufficient measure.

Since Covid-19 can spread through aerosols, good ventilation is considered an important measure in mitigating transmission risk. In the Netherlands, acceptance of aerosol transmission took particularly long. It was only after pressure, amongst others, from opposition parties and an open letter by 20 scientists that demissionary prime minister Mark Rutte introduced ventilation as a Covid-19 measure in July 2021. The RIVM (National Institute for Public Health and Environment) has formulated a ventilation policy, based on existing legal requirements from the Dutch Building Decree (Bouwbesluit 2012).

Defaulting to the decree was highly problematic. In traditional and social media experts weighed in referring to the decree an absolute minimum, stating it was never about preventing infections like Covid-19 (e.g. TU Delft), but simply to guarantee that people won't get sick in a building under ‘normal’ conditions. Distrust in the capacity and motives of the demissionary cabinet was further fueled when they announced intentions to relax ventilation norms in the hospitality industry fivefold in July 2021. Many experts and the industry itself were quoted in the media commenting on how these plans were incomprehensible in light of the pandemic.

Essentially, the demissionary government is managing the crisis on the basis of sectoral lobby and public opinion, instead of consistent policy, democratic processes, and scientific expertise. Not in the least due to political leadership from a conservative liberal party committed to keeping the economy running, captured in their strategy of self-termed “intelligent” lockdowns. Their strategy largely excuses them from taking responsibility for public health, as they persistently point to the personal responsibility of citizens themselves to behave.

From legal to moral safety

Despite the disputed decision on the part of the Dutch government to open up higher education without sufficient measures to ensure safety, Utrecht University assured faculty and students that ventilation was up to standards. Perhaps this is true in light of their obligation to ‘legal’ work safety, but when it comes to their moral obligation towards students and staff questions can certainly be raised as to why they haven’t explored if additional measures to RIVM guidelines are needed. Why have they not aligned themselves more explicitly with expert advice?

Returning to Latour, the University made little effort to provide further explanation of why the standards were sufficient and evidence that these conditions had been met. They, in other words, failed to maintain trust. Perhaps this is also because the situation is more poignant than imagined, namely that ventilation standards in most ‘corporate Netherlands’ are far removed from what we need to be safe in a pandemic. Yes, legally they might comply, but that isn’t really enough and one could suggest they have a moral obligation too. The University of Twente proved the exception. Although they still have hurdles to overcome in implementing their higher ventilation standards, they build trust through their transparency; publicly acknowledging the shortcomings of the government guidelines and communicating the steps they take towards their goals.

Many staff members working within higher education felt unsafe to return to in person teaching because of concerns over ventilation, as found in a survey by the General Union of Education (AoB). They had a gut feeling that the rooms were not properly ventilated, but such anecdotal evidence is itself not enough to be heard, held accountable and potentially change policy. It requires data-based evidence. The AoB actually recommended their use of CO₂ monitors. This is also where the workshop came in. It provided an opportunity for the participants to collect and generate their own knowledge about ventilation in classrooms (although with no intention of pursuing large-scale, systematic data collection, so not a citizen sensing project). Numbers and measurement are the kind of language a bureaucratic institution hears louder than words. There are dangers in going along with such rhetoric, since it affirms it as a valid way to address the concerns. However, collecting counter data to quantify the issue can enable subjects to argue back at the institution using its own logic.

Sensing data: asking relevant questions about knowledge production

The above tool critique already raised issues about the reliability and validity of citizen sensing projects. As Professor of Environmental Engineering for Buildings Cath Noakes has provided, measuring CO₂ is a good proxy measure for infection risk, but the values also depend on a whole host of variables such as the age of the occupants, their activity, metabolic rate, the space itself and the accuracy of the meter used. In the end, as Noakes remarks, we don’t actually know what a safe number is, but these monitors can be a useful tool to navigate spaces through comparison.

To measure CO₂ it is recommended to use nondispersive infrared (NDIR) sensors, since they follow the industry standard method of measurement, however they are also more expensive. We made the price conscious decision to use SGP30 Multi-Pixel Gas sensors instead. These sensors don't actually measure CO₂, instead they measure eCO2 or equivalent calculated carbon-dioxide. This is calculated on the basis of H2 concentration and not a ‘true’ CO₂ sensor for laboratory use. In effect then with the monitors we built we measured a proxy of a proxy. Such methodological issues do not deny that such projects can create valuable opportunities for learning and generating awareness. They help to open the black box of knowledge production and empower the participants to raise relevant questions about ventilation norms.

Towards accountability and care

So where do the quibbles around ventilation between institutions, experts and laymen in the Netherlands leave us? The short answer, with many questions. It made clear that the real lies in how trust is garnished/established and through what epistemological frames. The discussion about ventilation made apparent that the acceptance of new knowledge and the establishment of facts about the virus within scientific communities is technical, contested and slow. The quest for reliable knowledge has been time consuming and requires the ability to question and assess knowledge claims. An introduction in data collection and building sensors could help nurture the 'right' sort of criticism. An informed public might not only be able to talk back through data, provide a better understanding of data practices, and therefore the production of knowledge, but might actually produce publics that can ask the right questions, and give them a grasp to deal with growing complexity of public life. In that manner, such workshops might bring forth technologies of trust.

 
In the end the self-measuring of CO₂ concentration has been a playful and a practice of bottom-up knowledge production against narratives of those in power. It also enabled the exploration of the fragility of knowledge production and its insistence on care. It exposed the desire for more accountable practices from our institutions, requiring also better communication about their objectives, process and decision-making. Having said that, better communication might not be what is at stake. As media historian and philosopher John Durham Peters has rightfully pointed out, “Sending clear messages might not make for better relations; we might like each other less the more we understood about one another” (1999: 30).