Knowing when to trust others is an important social skill, but recent findings suggest that humans struggle with this dilemma - trusting strangers more than they should. Although trust decisions often do not meet the standards of rationality, they appear to be boundedly rational. I present a model of heuristic trust, according to which people focus on their own potential outcomes (what may be gained or lost from trusting), but neglect the probabilities of those outcomes occurring. I examine how trustors form expectations of reciprocity, and how those expectations relate to optimal trust decisions: some previous research suggests that people underestimate the probability of reciprocity and, relative to their subjective expectations, trust strangers too much. In contrast, the heuristic model allows for fine-grained predictions of when people trust too much and when they trust too little. The accuracy of trust depends on the selection and use of available cues; errors occur when trustors neglect valid, but difficult to process, cues and overemphasize salient cues lacking validity.
17 April 2019 from 15:30 to 17:00
Cooperative Relations Seminar: lecture by Tony Evans, Tilburg University
Start date and time17 April 2019 15:30
End date and time17 April 2019 17:00